Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around Arno Kuigoua, a registered nurse who was employed by the California Department of Veterans Affairs (the Department) at the Knight Veterans Home. Kuigoua was terminated in October 2018 after the Department found him guilty of sexually harassing women and providing substandard care that harmed patients. Kuigoua appealed his termination to the State Personnel Board, but his appeal was rejected. He then filed an administrative charge of employment discrimination with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing and the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging discrimination based on sex and retaliation.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed Kuigoua's case after he sued the Department in state court on state statutory claims. His complaint included allegations of unlawful gender, sex, and/or sexual orientation discrimination and harassment, unlawful race, color, and/or national origin discrimination and/or harassment, failure to prevent unlawful discrimination and/or harassment based on gender, sex, sexual orientation, race, color, and/or national origin, and retaliation based on gender, sex, sexual orientation, race, color, and/or national origin.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight reviewed the case after Kuigoua appealed the judgment of the Superior Court. The court found that Kuigoua's claims in court were not like, and were not reasonably related to, those in his administrative complaint. The court also found that an administrative investigation would not have uncovered the conduct that was the focus of Kuigoua's operative complaint. As a result, the court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, ruling that Kuigoua failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. View "Kuigoua v. Dept. of Veteran Affairs" on Justia Law

The case involves a request for calendar entries of the Governor's former senior advisor for energy, Alice Reynolds, under the California Public Records Act (PRA). The request was made by the Energy and Policy Institute (EPI) and sought entries reflecting meetings with 10 specified entities, including the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), electric utilities, and unions representing energy workers, during the year prior to Reynolds' appointment to the presidency of the CPUC. The Governor's office denied the request, citing the deliberative process privilege, which protects the decision-making process of government agencies from public scrutiny.The trial court ruled in favor of EPI, finding that the public interest in access to these calendar entries outweighed the deliberative process privilege. The Governor appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One.The appellate court upheld the trial court's decision, concluding that EPI's request was sufficiently specific, focused, and limited, and the public interest in disclosure was sufficiently compelling when measured against the minimal impact on government decision-making, to override the deliberative process privilege. The court found that the entities specified in EPI's request were entities with which the Governor's senior energy advisor would be expected to meet regardless of the Governor's particular policy priorities. Therefore, disclosure of records that those meetings took place, without any information as to the substance of those meetings, would reveal little if anything about the Governor's or his senior advisor's policy positions or thought processes. The court also concluded that the public has a substantial interest in knowing the extent to which the current CPUC president interacted with the CPUC and the entities the CPUC regulates when she was the Governor's senior advisor for energy. View "State v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between two local water management agencies, Mission Springs Water District (Mission Springs) and Desert Water Agency (Desert Water), over who should be the regional groundwater sustainability agency (GSA) responsible for managing groundwater in the Coachella Valley region of Riverside County, California. The dispute arose from the implementation of the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, which requires the creation of GSAs to manage groundwater basins. Desert Water claimed to be the exclusive GSA within its statutory boundaries, which encompass most of Mission Springs' boundaries. Mission Springs challenged this claim and also sought resolution of competing claims to GSA authority for an additional three-square-mile area outside of Desert Water’s statutory boundaries.The Superior Court of Riverside County ruled in favor of Desert Water and the California Department of Water Resources (the Department), denying Mission Springs' petition for a writ of mandamus. Mission Springs appealed the decision.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Desert Water did not violate any provisions of the Water Code by becoming a GSA. It also found that Desert Water did not form a new public corporation or public agency within Mission Springs’ jurisdiction by becoming a GSA, and therefore did not violate section 30065 of the Water Code. The court further held that the Department did not err in posting Desert Water’s notice of intent to become a GSA, as Desert Water had complied with all notice requirements. Finally, the court found that the Department was not responsible for resolving the overlapping claims to the three-square-mile area, as the Act requires the agencies to resolve this dispute themselves. View "Mission Springs Water Dist. v. Desert Water Agency" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between the City of Santa Cruz (City) and the County of Santa Cruz (County) over the interpretation of the City's claim presentation ordinance. The County sued the City for damages exceeding $1.2 million, alleging that the City's failure to maintain and manage a certain area led to emergency repairs. The County argued that it was not required to present a claim to the City before filing the lawsuit, as per the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.). The City, however, demurred, arguing that the County failed to present a claim directly to the City as required by the City’s claim presentation ordinance (Santa Cruz Mun. Code, § 1.14.010).The trial court sustained in part and overruled in part the City’s demurrer, rejecting the City's argument that the County was required to present a claim before filing the lawsuit. The court reasoned that the City’s ordinance applies to claims that are “not governed by” section 905 (Santa Cruz Mun. Code, § 1.14.010), and the County’s claim against the City is governed by section 905, which provides an exception to the claims presentation requirement for the County’s claim against the City.The City appealed, arguing that its ordinance, which applies to claims “not governed by” section 905, must be interpreted as applying to claims “excepted” from section 905. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District agreed with the City's interpretation. The court concluded that the trial court erred in determining that the County was not required to comply with the claim presentation ordinance before filing its lawsuit against the City. The court directed the trial court to vacate its demurrer order, to enter a new order sustaining the demurrer, and to decide in the first instance whether the County should be granted leave to amend. View "City of Santa Cruz v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In this case, the People of the State of California filed a lawsuit against Holiday Liquor (owned by Abdul Jamal Sheriff and operated under Freetown Holdings Company) for public nuisance. The People claimed that the store had become a hub for illegal drug transactions, with customers and dealers using the store as a meeting point. The store was accused of tolerating loitering and drug dealing, lacking security, operating until 2 a.m., and selling alcohol in cheap single-serving containers.The trial court granted summary judgment for the People, ordering the store to hire guards, stop selling single-serving containers of alcohol, and take other measures to address the issue. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision.The court held that Holiday Liquor had indeed facilitated a public nuisance by failing to take reasonable measures to prevent the sale of illegal drugs on its property. The court ruled that the proprietor was aware of the illegal activities as he had been informed multiple times by the police. Despite this knowledge, he failed to implement recommended measures to mitigate the issue, such as hiring security guards, limiting operating hours, and ceasing the sale of single-serving alcohol containers. The ruling was based on the violation of sections 11570 et seq. of the Health and Safety Code (the drug house law), sections 3479 et seq. of the Civil Code (the public nuisance law), and sections 17200 et seq. of the Business and Professions Code (the unfair competition law). View "P. v. Freetown Holdings Co." on Justia Law

This appeal originates from a dispute between Alameda Health System (AHS) and Alameda County Employees’ Retirement Association (ACERA), concerning the method employed by ACERA to calculate the annual contributions that participating employers must make towards unfunded liabilities. This system was intended to ensure the ability to finance the pensions promised to employees. AHS is one of seven public entities that are part of ACERA's retirement system.Since 1948, ACERA has used the “Percentage of Payroll” method to calculate annual contributions for unfunded liabilities among its participating employers. This common approach pools actuarial risk to reduce volatility in contribution rates, simplify contribution calculations, and ensure timely funding for the retirement system. AHS raised concerns about this method in 2015, suggesting an alternative approach, the “Percentage of Liability” method, could result in AHS paying $12 million less in contributions each year.AHS requested that ACERA change its methodology and retrospectively reallocate contributions made of “approximately $65 million.” ACERA's Board unanimously voted to deny AHS's requests after consideration and consultation. AHS subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief challenging ACERA’s decisions. In 2022, the court granted ACERA's motion for summary judgment and AHS appealed. The appeals court affirmed the judgment, finding no abuse of discretion by ACERA or the lower court. View "Alameda Health System v. Alameda County Employees' Retirement Association" on Justia Law

In 2018, Steven Laurent Montgomery Jr. was sentenced to 18 years in prison, including two one-year enhancements for prior prison sentences, after pleading no contest to several violent felonies. Later, under Senate Bill No. 483, which invalidated most prison priors imposed before January 1, 2020, Montgomery became eligible for resentencing. Although the court struck the prison priors, it did not hold a resentencing hearing.This matter before the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three was to correct this oversight. The court agreed with the Attorney General's concession of error, reversed the trial court's order striking the prison priors, and remanded the case for a resentencing hearing under section 1172.75.The court also addressed a disagreement between the parties about the power of the prosecutor to withdraw from the plea bargain if the resentencing resulted in further sentence reductions. The court sided with Montgomery, concluding that the legislature intended to limit the prosecutor's ability to withdraw from the plea bargain due to sentence reductions at the resentencing hearing. The court's interpretation was based on the text and legislative history of Senate Bill No. 483, which indicated an intent to reduce or preserve sentences while limiting the prosecutor's ability to rescind plea agreements. View "People v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

The case centers around Laurie Smith, a former sheriff of Santa Clara County, who was investigated for bribery and other crimes related to the processing of concealed firearms licenses. Although she was not criminally charged, a civil grand jury presented an accusation charging her with misconduct in office. A month-long trial ensued, following which Smith retired and moved to dismiss the removal proceedings on the grounds of mootness. However, the trial court denied her motion, and Smith was found guilty on six counts, leading to a judgment of removal.Smith appealed, arguing that the removal proceedings were moot as she had already retired. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, disagreed. Despite her retirement, the judgment of removal had consequential implications: it barred Smith from jury service under section 203, subdivision (a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which excludes individuals convicted of malfeasance in office. In her removal trial, the jury found Smith guilty of perjury, a form of malfeasance in office.Smith contended that the literal language of these statutes should be disregarded because removal proceedings are not criminal cases. However, the court concluded that Smith's retirement did not render the removal proceedings moot because her conviction in those proceedings barred her from serving on a jury. The judgment of removal was thus affirmed. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

This case involves the Temple of 1001 Buddhas and others, who own a property in Fremont, California. They appealed against the City of Fremont's decision to uphold nuisance orders relating to their property based on alleged violations of the local building code. The plaintiffs argued that the appeals process used by the City of Fremont was preempted by section 1.8.8 of the California Building Code, which requires appeals to be heard by an independent agency or board, or the city's governing body. They also raised issues about the fairness of their administrative appeal hearing.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four concluded that the City of Fremont's appeals process did conflict with the state law in relation to enforcement determinations based on violations of Fremont’s Building Standards Code. However, it rejected the plaintiffs' claims about procedural unfairness and zoning violations.The court reversed part of the judgment and directed the trial court to issue appropriate mandamus relief. This included compelling Fremont to establish an appeals board or authorized agency to hear appeals, or provide for an appeal to its governing body as required by section 1.8.8 of the Building Code. Furthermore, Fremont was compelled to set aside the administrative hearing decision sustaining the nuisance determinations in NOA 3 that are premised on violations of the Fremont Building Standards Code and to provide for an appeal for those nuisance determinations. View "Temple of 1001 Buddhas v. City of Fremont" on Justia Law

Safety-Kleen of California, Inc. appealed against the denial of its petitions for a writ of mandate, which sought to compel the Department of Toxic Substances Control (the Department) to set aside final inspection violation scores concerning Safety-Kleen’s oil and hazardous waste treatment facility. The Department had classified certain violations at Safety-Kleen’s facility as Class I violations, which Safety-Kleen argued was an abuse of discretion under the Hazardous Waste Control Law (HWCL), as these violations did not pose a “significant threat to human health or safety or the environment.”The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District disagreed with Safety-Kleen, interpreting the HWCL to permit classification of a violation as Class I under independent statutory bases, including those that do not pose a significant threat to human health or safety or the environment. The court held that the Department did not abuse its discretion in determining Safety-Kleen’s final inspection violation scores. It also rejected Safety-Kleen’s argument that a Class II violation can only be reclassified as a Class I violation if the violation is chronic or the violator is recalcitrant. The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court. View "Safety-Kleen of Cal., Inc. v. Dept. of Toxic Substances Control" on Justia Law