Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant, Noe Lezama, was initially charged with murder but later entered a plea to voluntary manslaughter in 2019. In 2022, he filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that the timing and factual basis of his plea should not preclude him from being eligible for resentencing. The trial court summarily denied his petition, concluding that legislative history confirmed that those who pled guilty to manslaughter after statutory amendments eliminated imputed malice theories of murder liability are not eligible for resentencing as a matter of law.Previously, the trial court had sentenced Lezama to a total of 13 years in prison for voluntary manslaughter and a gang enhancement. The prosecution had initially charged Lezama and another individual with murder and conspiracy to commit murder, alleging that they had killed a man with malice aforethought. However, in 2019, the prosecution and Lezama reached a plea agreement, and the original information was amended to add a count of voluntary manslaughter and modify a criminal street gang enhancement.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found that the statutory language and defendant’s record of conviction confirmed that Lezama was not eligible for resentencing. The court noted that Senate Bill 1437, which took effect in 2019, amended the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. However, the court concluded that this did not apply to Lezama, who pled guilty to manslaughter after such theories had been eliminated by Senate Bill 1437. View "P. v. Lezama" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Anthony Sam and Renee Kwan, who formed a limited liability company (LLC) and purchased a parking lot. Sam alleged that Kwan, without his knowledge, sold the lot for a significant profit, fabricated documents, and pocketed the money without giving him anything. Sam sued Kwan, her entities, the company providing title and escrow services for the sale, and the parking lot buyer. The trial court ruled against Sam, denying him any remedy.The trial court's decisions were largely unfavorable for Sam. It denied First American's motion for summary judgment but granted the Board's motion for summary judgment. The court also granted judgment on the pleadings to various defendants, including Fidelity, First American, Kwan, Vibrant, Asset, 600 LLC, and Holdings. The court sustained Fidelity's demurrer in part with leave to amend and in part without leave to amend. Sam appealed these decisions.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight affirmed some of the trial court's rulings but reversed others. The appellate court reversed the denial of Sam's leave to amend his claims on behalf of 2013 LLC and remanded to permit Sam to bring these claims on behalf of the member entities. The court also reversed the remainder of the grants of judgment on the pleadings, except as to the breach of contract claims based on the operating agreements of 600 LLC and Holdings against 600 LLC and Holdings. The court affirmed the ruling that the breach of contract claims based on the operating agreements of 600 LLC and Holdings against 600 LLC and Holdings cannot be amended to state viable claims. The court reversed the sustaining of Fidelity's demurrer as to the civil conspiracy cause of action. Finally, the court reversed the grant of the Board's summary judgment motion. View "Sam v. Kwan" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between neighbors in a six-unit condominium building. Robert Dubac, the plaintiff, and Sandra Itkoff and Jonathan Diamond, the defendants, were owners of units in the same building. The defendants made several statements about Dubac, accusing him of various wrongdoings, including discrimination, self-dealing, acting in bad faith, racism, and harassment of their daughter. These statements were made through emails and oral communications to other residents of the building, the homeowners association, and an insurance carrier.The case was initially heard in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Dubac sued Itkoff and Diamond for defamation, infliction of emotional distress, interference with economic advantage, and civil harassment. In response, the defendants filed a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute, arguing that their statements were made in connection with a public issue. The trial court denied most of the motion, ruling that the majority of the statements did not meet the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, which required a showing that the statements were connected to a public issue.The case was then brought before the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight. The defendants appealed the trial court's refusal to strike the majority of Dubac's suit. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the dispute did not involve a public issue or an issue of public interest. The court reasoned that the dispute was essentially a private feud between neighbors and did not contribute to public discussion of public issues. The court also noted that the audience for the defendants' statements was small and confined to the building's residents and associated parties, further indicating that the matter was not of public interest. View "Dubac v. Itkoff" on Justia Law

The case involves Lizbeth Balderas, a former employee of Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc., who filed a complaint for civil penalties under the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) on behalf of herself and 500 other current and former employees. Balderas alleged that Fresh Start violated labor laws by not providing required meal and rest breaks, providing inaccurate wage statements, making untimely wage payments, and failing to pay wages at termination. Balderas did not file an individual claim but proceeded solely under PAGA, representing all aggrieved employees.The trial court struck Balderas's complaint, ruling that she lacked standing to bring a representative PAGA action on behalf of other employees because she did not allege an individual claim in the action. The court relied on language from a United States Supreme Court decision that had incorrectly recited California law on PAGA standing.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Six reviewed the case. The court concluded that Balderas, as an alleged aggrieved employee who was subject to alleged Labor Code violations by Fresh Start, may bring a representative PAGA action on behalf of herself and other Fresh Start employees, even though she did not file an individual cause of action seeking individual relief for herself in this action. The court held that the trial court erred by relying on the United States Supreme Court decision, which was incorrect on PAGA standing requirements. The court reversed the order striking the pleading. View "Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2015, Joseph Semprini filed a lawsuit against his employer, Wedbush Securities, Inc., alleging 11 personal causes of action and seven class claims for alleged wage and hour violations. Semprini and Wedbush agreed that Semprini’s personal claims would be arbitrated, while the remaining claims would proceed in court. The class was certified in 2017, and the parties litigated Semprini’s class and Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) claims in court over the next several years. In 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana that an employer may enforce an employee’s agreement to arbitrate individual PAGA claims. Following this decision, Wedbush asked its workforce to sign arbitration agreements, and 24 class members, including the second named plaintiff, Bradley Swain, agreed to do so.The Superior Court of Orange County denied Wedbush’s motion to compel arbitration of the named plaintiffs’ individual PAGA claims and the claims of the 24 class members who signed arbitration agreements. The court found that Wedbush had waived its right to compel arbitration by entering into the 2015 stipulation.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that even if the Viking River decision or the 2022 arbitration agreements gave Wedbush a new right to move to compel certain claims to arbitration, Wedbush waited too long to make its motion, particularly in light of the looming trial date. The court found that Wedbush had waived its right to compel arbitration by waiting nine months after the Viking River decision and five to six months after select class members signed the new arbitration agreements to file its motion to compel arbitration. View "Semprini v. Wedbush Securities Inc." on Justia Law

Saide Lugo, a former employee of Pixior, LLC, filed a lawsuit against the company and some of its employees for malicious prosecution. Lugo alleged that Pixior falsely reported her to the police, leading to a criminal prosecution against her, which she ultimately defeated. The parties disagreed on the circumstances leading to the police report. Pixior claimed that Lugo, a disgruntled employee, deleted valuable computer files upon her resignation. Lugo, on the other hand, argued that Pixior fabricated charges against her to tarnish her reputation as she was about to assist Pixior's adversary in an impending dispute. Both parties agreed that Pixior reported Lugo to the police, leading to her arrest and subsequent charges, which were eventually dismissed after it was discovered that a Pixior employee had lied under oath.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially reviewed the case. Pixior filed a special motion to strike in response to Lugo's lawsuit, which the trial court denied. The court found that Pixior's motion satisfied the first step of anti-SLAPP analysis, determining that Lugo's lawsuit concerned protected activity. However, the court ruled against Pixior on the second step, which required Lugo to demonstrate a probability of success.The case was then reviewed by the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District. The appellate court disagreed with the lower court's decision on the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. The court found that Lugo failed to defeat Pixior's defense that the police conducted an independent investigation before the district attorney filed charges. The court ruled that this independent investigation was a superseding cause that insulated Pixior from liability. Therefore, the court reversed the lower court's decision, ruling in favor of Pixior and awarding costs to the appellants. View "Lugo v. Pixior, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Nicholas Beaudreaux, serving a 50-year-to-life sentence for the first-degree murder and attempted robbery of Wayne Drummond, twice petitioned unsuccessfully for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. In the resentencing proceedings on his second petition, the trial court ruled that the order denying relief on his first petition, an order affirmed in 2020, foreclosed relief. Beaudreaux appealed again, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Lewis and Senate Bill No. 775, which clarified the procedural law governing section 1172.6 resentencing proceedings.Previously, Beaudreaux and a co-defendant, Brandon Crowder, were charged with the same two counts: murdering Drummond and attempting to rob Drummond. However, only Beaudreaux was charged with personally and intentionally discharging a firearm, causing great bodily injury and death to Drummond. A jury trial followed, and Crowder changed his plea from not guilty to no contest to the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. The jury found Beaudreaux guilty of first-degree murder and attempted robbery of Drummond, and found the sentencing enhancement allegations against him to be true.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District, the court agreed with Beaudreaux that the trial court erred at the prima facie stage of these resentencing proceedings by once again failing to appoint counsel, and by relying on substantive facts summarized in this court’s 2011 opinion affirming his conviction. However, the court concluded that these errors were harmless. The dispositive question was whether, based on the record of conviction, Beaudreaux was convicted as Drummond’s actual killer. The court concluded that the record was sufficient to refute conclusively Beaudreaux’s attempt to allege entitlement to section 1172.6 relief. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "P. v. Beaudreaux" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Arno Kuigoua, a registered nurse who was employed by the California Department of Veterans Affairs (the Department) at the Knight Veterans Home. Kuigoua was terminated in October 2018 after the Department found him guilty of sexually harassing women and providing substandard care that harmed patients. Kuigoua appealed his termination to the State Personnel Board, but his appeal was rejected. He then filed an administrative charge of employment discrimination with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing and the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging discrimination based on sex and retaliation.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed Kuigoua's case after he sued the Department in state court on state statutory claims. His complaint included allegations of unlawful gender, sex, and/or sexual orientation discrimination and harassment, unlawful race, color, and/or national origin discrimination and/or harassment, failure to prevent unlawful discrimination and/or harassment based on gender, sex, sexual orientation, race, color, and/or national origin, and retaliation based on gender, sex, sexual orientation, race, color, and/or national origin.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight reviewed the case after Kuigoua appealed the judgment of the Superior Court. The court found that Kuigoua's claims in court were not like, and were not reasonably related to, those in his administrative complaint. The court also found that an administrative investigation would not have uncovered the conduct that was the focus of Kuigoua's operative complaint. As a result, the court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, ruling that Kuigoua failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. View "Kuigoua v. Dept. of Veteran Affairs" on Justia Law

In 2016, Shawn Vincent Gray was found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) for one count of stalking and two counts of making criminal threats. He also admitted to a prior strike allegation and six one-year prior prison commitment allegations. As part of his plea agreement, Gray acknowledged that an NGI verdict would mean that he would be committed to the Department of Mental Health for a maximum term of 19 years and four months. In 2023, Gray filed a petition to recall his maximum commitment time and strike the legally invalid enhancement, citing Senate Bill No. 483 (SB 483) and Penal Code section 1172.75. The Kern County Superior Court granted the petition, recalculating Gray's maximum commitment term to 13 years and four months.The People appealed the superior court's decision, arguing that the court erred by recalculating Gray's maximum term of commitment. They claimed that the legislative changes that eliminated most section 667.5(b) sentencing enhancements did not retroactively apply to Gray's 2016 maximum term of commitment and that because Gray continued to be a threat to public safety, any reduced commitment recalculation was erroneous.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District found that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to entertain and consider Gray's petition in the first instance and its subsequent orders were void. The court concluded that the People's appeal was statutorily authorized and that it had appellate jurisdiction. However, it also found that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to entertain and consider Gray's petition in the first instance and its subsequent orders were void. The court reversed and vacated the superior court's orders recalling the 2016 judgment and recalculating Gray's maximum term of commitment. The court ordered the superior court to instead enter a new and different order denying Gray's petition in its entirety. View "P. v. Gray" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Israel Marcial Uriostegui, who was convicted of first-degree residential burglary by a jury. Uriostegui appealed the judgment, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his objection under section 231.7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This section aims to prevent the improper removal of jurors based on their actual or perceived race, ethnicity, gender, or membership in another protected group. Uriostegui's objection was based on the prosecutor's peremptory challenge against a prospective juror, T.N., who appeared to be Hispanic.Previously, the trial court had asked T.N. for basic information during voir dire. T.N. disclosed her employment at Taco Bell, her current unemployment due to an injury, and her lack of prior jury service. She also revealed that two of her family members had been convicted of a crime, but she was not close to them. When the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge against T.N., Uriostegui's counsel objected, arguing that the basis for excusing T.N. was presumptively invalid under section 231.7. The prosecutor justified the challenge by citing T.N.'s "lack of life experience," her unemployment, and her demeanor. The trial court denied Uriostegui's objection, finding no substantial likelihood that T.N.'s perceived membership in a protected class was a factor in the peremptory challenge.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District, Uriostegui contended that the trial court erred in denying his objection under section 231.7. The court agreed with Uriostegui, stating that the prosecutor's reasons for excusing T.N. were presumptively invalid under section 231.7. The court found that the prosecutor's reasons and the trial court's findings did not overcome the presumption of invalidity. The court concluded that the trial court erred in denying Uriostegui's objection under section 231.7. As a result, the judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial. View "People v. Uriostegui" on Justia Law