Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Gregory Wilson was convicted by a jury of multiple charges, including human trafficking of a minor by force or fear, human trafficking to commit another crime, kidnapping, and criminal threats. He was sentenced to an aggregate determinate term of 31 years and eight months, followed by an indeterminate term of 30 years to life. Wilson appealed, arguing that his defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the prosecutor's use of the term "gorilla pimp" during closing arguments, which he claimed violated the Racial Justice Act (RJA).The trial court had found Wilson guilty based on substantial evidence, including testimonies from victims B.W., K.W., and B.C., who described being forced into prostitution through violence and threats. The jury found Wilson not guilty of rape and forcible oral copulation but convicted him on other charges. The trial court sentenced him accordingly.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that defense counsel was not ineffective as a matter of law for failing to object to the prosecutor's use of the term "gorilla pimp." The court reasoned that the term is a recognized term of art in the sex trafficking subculture, describing a pimp who uses force and violence. The court also noted that the issue of ineffective counsel should be resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding, where defense counsel can explain their conduct.The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding substantial evidence supporting Wilson's convictions for human trafficking and kidnapping. The court also rejected Wilson's claims regarding sentencing, including the argument that the trial court abused its discretion and violated section 654's prohibition against multiple punishments. View "People v. Wilson" on Justia Law

In this case, Sacramento Television Stations Inc. (Sac TV) sought additional audio and video recordings from the City of Roseville (City) under the California Public Records Act (CPRA). The recordings pertained to an incident on April 6, 2023, where Roseville Police Department (Roseville PD) officers discharged firearms at a suspect, Eric J. Abril, resulting in injuries and a fatality. The City provided limited footage, arguing that further disclosure would interfere with an active investigation.The Superior Court of Placer County ruled that the City had shown by clear and convincing evidence that releasing more footage would substantially interfere with the ongoing investigation into Abril's criminal case. Consequently, the court denied Sac TV's petition for additional recordings. Sac TV then filed a petition for writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, seeking to overturn the superior court's decision.The California Court of Appeal reviewed the case and concluded that the superior court's finding of an "active investigation" was not supported by substantial evidence. The appellate court determined that the City had not provided sufficient detail to demonstrate how further disclosure would interfere with an active investigation. The court also found that the superior court correctly interpreted that more disclosure was required under subdivision (e) of section 7923.625 of the Government Code, but it had not determined the extent of additional disclosure needed.The Court of Appeal vacated the superior court's ruling and directed it to hold further proceedings, including an in camera review of the City's recordings, to determine the extent of additional disclosure required. The appellate court emphasized the importance of providing sufficient context to understand the events captured in the recordings, as mandated by the CPRA. View "Sacramento Television Stations Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Monroe Operations, LLC, doing business as Newport Healthcare, hired Karla Velarde as a care coordinator and required her to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment. Velarde was later terminated and filed a lawsuit alleging discrimination, retaliation, and violation of whistleblower protections. Newport Healthcare and its director of residential services, Amanda Seymour, filed a motion to compel arbitration, which the trial court denied. The court found that Velarde was pressured to sign the agreement, which she did not want to do, and that the agreement unlawfully prohibited her from seeking judicial review of an arbitration award.The Superior Court of Orange County ruled that the arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable because it was presented as an adhesive contract buried among 31 documents that Velarde had to sign quickly while an HR manager waited. Additionally, Newport Healthcare's HR manager made false representations about the nature and terms of the agreement, which contradicted the written terms, rendering the agreement substantively unconscionable. The court denied the motion to compel arbitration based on these findings.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found ample evidence of procedural unconscionability due to the pressure and misrepresentations made by Newport Healthcare. The court also found substantive unconscionability because the agreement did not conform to Velarde's reasonable expectations and placed her in a disadvantageous position. The appellate court concluded that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable and affirmed the order denying the motion to compel arbitration. View "Velarde v. Monroe Operations, LLC" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of threatening a police officer via social media while on mandatory supervision. As a condition of his postrelease community supervision, the trial court prohibited him from creating or using social media accounts and from accessing social media websites. The defendant challenged this condition as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.The Superior Court of Sacramento County initially sentenced the defendant to a split sentence for various offenses, including carrying a concealed weapon and perjury. While on mandatory supervision, the defendant was convicted of making a criminal threat using his Facebook account. The trial court executed the previously imposed sentence and added a consecutive sentence for the new conviction. On appeal, the Court of Appeal vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. The trial court then imposed a revised sentence, and the defendant was released on postrelease supervision with the challenged social media condition.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the social media prohibition was not unconstitutionally vague, as it clearly defined the prohibited conduct. The court also found that the condition was not overbroad, as it was closely related to the defendant's use of social media to commit the crime. The court concluded that the prohibition was a reasonable measure to protect the state's interest in the defendant's reformation and rehabilitation. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed. View "People v. Nixon" on Justia Law

Coyote Aviation Corporation (Coyote) entered into a 20-year lease with the City of Redlands (City) on April 4, 2000, for property at the Redlands Municipal Airport. The lease included two 15-year options to extend. An amended lease was signed on September 5, 2000, with the same termination date of April 4, 2020. Coyote believed the lease should terminate on September 5, 2020, but no written amendment was made. In June 2020, Coyote attempted to exercise the extension option, but the City rejected it, stating the lease had already terminated. The City issued a 30-day notice to quit, and Coyote filed a lawsuit for breach of contract and other claims.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County sustained the City’s demurrer to Coyote’s first amended complaint (FAC) and entered judgment against Coyote. The court found that Coyote failed to provide timely written notice to exercise the extension option as required by the lease. The court also rejected Coyote’s claims of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, declaratory relief, and promissory estoppel, finding no clear promise by the City to amend the lease termination date.The City filed an unlawful detainer action when Coyote did not vacate the property. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, ordering Coyote to vacate. The court found no triable issues of fact regarding the timeliness of Coyote’s notice to exercise the extension option and rejected Coyote’s arguments of estoppel and waiver.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the trial court’s decisions. The court held that the lease’s terms were clear and unambiguous, requiring written notice to exercise the extension option. The court also found that City officials did not have the authority to amend the lease orally or accept late notice. The court upheld the trial court’s rulings on the demurrer and summary judgment, denying Coyote’s claims and requests for leave to amend. View "Coyote Aviation Corp. v. City of Redlands" on Justia Law

R & J Sheet Metal, Inc. (R&J) appealed an order directing it to pay contribution to W.E. O’Neil Construction Co. of California (WEO), Continental Casualty Company (Continental), and Western Surety Company (Western) (collectively, the WEO defendants). R&J and the WEO defendants were co-debtors on a joint and several judgment in favor of Joseph Karscig, Inc., doing business as Architectural Systems, Inc. (ASI). R&J appealed the judgment, while the WEO defendants satisfied it and sought contribution from R&J. The trial court initially took the motion off calendar due to R&J’s pending appeal. After the appeal was resolved, the WEO defendants filed a second contribution motion, including postjudgment interest, which the trial court granted, ordering R&J to pay one-half of the judgment.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the WEO defendants' motion for contribution, deeming them a single entity for liability purposes and ordering R&J to pay one-half of the judgment. R&J argued the motion was untimely and that the trial court should not have allocated liability pro rata without taking evidence on the judgment debtors’ proportionate liability. R&J also contended that Western should not have been included as a single entity with WEO and Continental.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that the original contribution motion was valid despite being filed during the pendency of R&J’s appeal, as taking the motion off calendar did not affect the appeal’s status quo. The court also found that the second motion was a permissible update of the original motion to include postjudgment interest. The court rejected R&J’s argument that the trial court should have determined the judgment debtors’ proportionate liability through an evidentiary hearing, holding that pro rata contribution was proper in the absence of a judgment or underlying instrument allocating liability. The court also found that R&J had forfeited its argument regarding Western’s inclusion in a single entity with WEO and Continental by failing to raise it below. View "R & J Sheet Metal v. W.E. O'Neil Construction" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, 640 Octavia LLC and Edward Kountze, owned an apartment building in San Francisco and hired Walston Law Group to represent them in a federal unlawful detainer action against a tenant. During the trial, it was discovered that Walston's attorney had created a document with new house rules during the trial, which led to the federal judge excluding the document and giving a curative instruction to the jury. The jury found in favor of the tenant, and plaintiffs subsequently sued Walston for legal malpractice, alleging various breaches and negligence.The San Francisco Superior Court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice due to their failure to comply with discovery orders, and the case proceeded to trial on Walston's cross-complaint for unpaid attorney fees. The jury awarded Walston $78,905.43 in damages plus $29,826.25 in prejudgment interest. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial court's pretrial order excluding evidence of their malpractice allegations was erroneous and prejudicial.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of claim or issue preclusion to exclude evidence supporting plaintiffs' malpractice allegations. The appellate court held that the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint was interlocutory and not a final judgment, thus preclusion doctrines did not apply. The court found that the exclusion of evidence was prejudicial, as it prevented the jury from properly considering plaintiffs' defense that Walston's alleged malpractice excused them from paying the fees.The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, allowing plaintiffs to present evidence of Walston's alleged malpractice. View "640 Octavia LLC v. Walston" on Justia Law

In 1991, Jesus Izaguirre Nino pleaded guilty to the second-degree murder of Fernando Avalos and admitted to using a firearm during the crime. Nino later petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, which the superior court denied at the prima facie review stage, citing preliminary hearing testimony that indicated Nino was the actual killer. The Supreme Court's decision in People v. Patton, which allows preliminary hearing testimony to be considered at the prima facie review stage, was issued while Nino's appeal was pending. The preliminary hearing testimony showed Nino shot and killed Fernando alone.The superior court denied Nino's petition, concluding he was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 because he was the actual killer. Nino appealed, arguing that he could have been convicted of second-degree felony murder based on the now-invalid theory of imputed malice, as he intended only to scare Fernando, not kill him.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that an actual killer could still be eligible for relief under section 1172.6 if the conviction was based on the now-invalid theory of second-degree felony murder. The court found that the record did not conclusively establish that Nino could not have been convicted of second-degree felony murder based on imputed malice. Therefore, the court reversed the superior court's order denying Nino's petition for resentencing and remanded the case with directions for the superior court to issue an order to show cause and set an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d). View "People v. Nino" on Justia Law

In June 2018, Leslie Davies and volunteers from the Animal Protection and Rescue League, Inc. protested against a pet store in a Temecula shopping mall, alleging the store sourced dogs from puppy mills. They were asked by mall officials to move their protest due to a table reservation conflict. When Davies refused, Riverside Sheriff’s Deputy Rudy Leso threatened her with arrest if she did not comply. Davies requested a citation instead, but Leso insisted on arrest. Consequently, Davies and the volunteers left the area.The plaintiffs, Davies and the League, filed a lawsuit against the County of Riverside and Deputy Leso in August 2019. The Superior Court of Riverside County sustained demurrers without leave to amend for several causes of action, including negligence, Bane Act, and Ralph Act claims. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the remaining cause of action for declaratory relief.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s decisions, finding no error. It held that Davies’s negligence claim failed because she did not allege physical injury or a breach of duty. The Ralph Act claim was dismissed as the threat of arrest did not constitute violence. The Bane Act claim was also dismissed because the threat of arrest alone did not amount to coercion or intimidation. Lastly, the court upheld the summary judgment on the declaratory relief claim, noting there was no actual controversy since the County agreed that mall rules are not laws and cannot provide probable cause for arrest. The appellate court affirmed the judgment in favor of the County and Deputy Leso. View "Animal Protection and Rescue v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

Nathaniel Gabriel Porter was cited for a traffic infraction under California Vehicle Code section 23123.5(a) for holding and viewing a mapping application on his wireless phone while driving. Section 23123.5(a) prohibits drivers from holding and operating a handheld wireless telephone unless it is used in a voice-operated and hands-free manner. Porter contested the citation, arguing that viewing a mapping application did not constitute "operating" the phone as defined by the statute. The traffic commissioner found Porter guilty and imposed a $158 fine.Porter appealed to the appellate division of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, which reversed his conviction. The appellate division concluded that "operating" a wireless telephone required active use or manipulation, such as talking, listening, emailing, or browsing the internet, and that merely observing GPS directions did not meet this threshold. The court suggested that the Legislature might need to amend the statute to address evolving technology and distracted driving concerns.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case to ensure uniformity in legal interpretation. The court examined the statutory language, legislative history, and public policy considerations. It concluded that "operating" under section 23123.5(a) includes all uses of a handheld phone's functions while driving, including viewing a mapping application. The court determined that the Legislature intended to prohibit all handheld phone use while driving to mitigate distracted driving risks. Consequently, the appellate division's judgment was reversed, and Porter's traffic conviction was reinstated. View "P. v. Porter" on Justia Law