Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves a father, H.A., who sought to vacate orders of the juvenile court that terminated his visitation rights and the mother’s reunification services, and set a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. The father argued that the inquiry into the minors’ potential Indian heritage in this dependency case was insufficient and failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The San Joaquin County Human Services Agency had filed a section 300 petition on behalf of the minors based on the parents’ substance abuse, domestic violence, and the mother’s untreated mental health issues. Both parents denied having any Native American ancestry.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District agreed with the father's contention. The court found that the inquiry of relatives and family members about the minors’ potential Indian heritage was necessary to meet the requirements of the ICWA. The court noted that the Agency had contact with the maternal and paternal grandmothers and the paternal great-aunt, but did not ask them, or any other relatives, about possible Native American ancestry.The court vacated the juvenile court’s finding that the minors are not Indian children within the meaning of the ICWA and remanded the case to the juvenile court for further proceedings to address compliance with the inquiry and notice provisions of the ICWA. The court also issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the respondent juvenile court to vacate the ICWA findings and conduct further proceedings to determine whether the ICWA inquiry and notice requirements have been met. The court emphasized the obligations of the parents’ and minors’ counsel, the juvenile court, and the Agency under the ICWA. View "H.A. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The case involves a minor, Randy C., who was stopped by police for driving a car with illegally tinted windows. During the stop, the officer smelled unburnt marijuana and observed a marijuana blunt on the passenger's lap. The officer conducted a search of the vehicle, finding a handgun in the glove compartment and an AR-15 firearm in the trunk. Randy C. was subsequently charged with multiple felony offenses, including possession of an assault weapon by a minor and possession of a concealed firearm and ammunition in a vehicle by a minor. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing there was no probable cause to search the vehicle.The juvenile court denied Randy C.'s motion to suppress the evidence. Following this ruling, Randy C. admitted to the felony offenses charged, and the remaining counts were dismissed pursuant to a negotiated plea deal. The juvenile court declared wardship and committed Randy C. to juvenile hall for 274 days with 55 days of credit for time served. Randy C. appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the search and seizure conducted by police were unlawful.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District affirmed the juvenile court's decision. The court held that the officer had probable cause to search the vehicle based on the smell of unburnt marijuana and the observation of a marijuana blunt in the passenger's lap, which was considered an open container of marijuana in violation of the law. The court rejected Randy C.'s argument that the marijuana blunt was not an "open container" within the meaning of the law, concluding that the paper wrapping enclosing the marijuana presented no barrier to accessing the marijuana, thereby facilitating its consumption. View "In re Randy C." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a lawsuit filed by Masimo Corporation against John Bauche, BoundlessRise, LLC (Boundless), and Skyward Investments, LLC (Skyward), represented by The Vanderpool Law Firm (Vanderpool). The lawsuit was based on Bauche's misappropriation of corporate funds while he was a Masimo employee. Bauche had fraudulently engaged Boundless, a company he solely owned, as an "outside vendor" for Masimo, and later transferred the money paid for fraudulent vendor services to Skyward, another company he solely owned. Masimo's attempts to obtain substantive discovery responses from the defendants were met with boilerplate objections, leading to a motion to compel responses and a request for discovery sanctions.The case was stayed twice, first due to Bauche's appeal from the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion, and then to allow a federal criminal case against him to be resolved. The referee supervising discovery recommended that the motion to compel be granted and Masimo be awarded $10,000 in discovery sanctions. The trial court agreed and entered an order to that effect, awarding sanctions against Vanderpool and the three defendants.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three, Vanderpool appealed the order, arguing that it had substituted out of the case as counsel before the motion to compel was filed and was therefore unsanctionable. The court rejected this argument, stating that it is not necessary to be counsel of record to be liable for monetary sanctions for discovery misuse. The court affirmed the order, concluding that Vanderpool and its clients were liable for discovery misuse. The court also criticized Vanderpool for its lack of civility in the proceedings. View "Masimo Corporation v. The Vanderpool Law Firm, Inc." on Justia Law

In April 2013, Brandi Stiles and Abel Gorgita purchased a 2011 Kia Optima, which was manufactured and distributed by Kia Motors America, Inc. At the time of purchase, some of Kia's original warranties were still in effect, including the basic and drivetrain warranties. The car developed serious defects covered by the warranties, including issues with the transmission, electrical system, brakes, engine, suspension, and steering. Despite multiple attempts, Kia was unable to repair the defects. Stiles and Gorgita alleged that Kia failed to replace the car or make restitution as required under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.Kia demurred to the first amended complaint, arguing that the remedies sought under the Song-Beverly Act apply only to new motor vehicles, and the car purchased by Stiles and Gorgita was not a "new motor vehicle" as defined in the Act. The trial court sustained Kia's demurrer, relying on a previous case, Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC, which held that a used motor vehicle with an unexpired warranty is not a "new motor vehicle" under the Song-Beverly Act.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Six reversed the trial court's decision. The court held that a previously owned motor vehicle purchased with the manufacturer’s new car warranty still in effect is a “new motor vehicle” as defined by the Song-Beverly Act. Therefore, the replace or refund remedy of the Act applies. The court rejected Kia's argument that the Act's definition of a "new motor vehicle" should be limited to vehicles that have never been previously sold to a consumer and come with full express warranties. The court also rejected Kia's argument that Stiles and Gorgita's interpretation of the Act conflicts with its implied warranty provisions. View "Stiles v. Kia Motors America, Inc." on Justia Law

The case revolves around an oil spill caused by Plains All American Pipeline, L.P. (Plains). The spill resulted in the unlawful discharge of over 142,000 gallons of crude oil into the ocean and onto a beach. The trial court considered restitution for four groups of claimants who alleged losses due to the spill. The People of the State of California appealed the denial of restitution for claimants in two of these groups.The trial court had previously ruled that oil industry claimants were not direct victims of Plains' crimes and accepted mediated settlements in lieu of restitution. It also denied restitution to fishers based on a pending class action lawsuit, declined to consider aggregate proof presented by fishers, and refused to consider Plains' criminal conduct.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Six held that restitution could not be denied based on mediated civil settlements or a class action lawsuit. However, it upheld the trial court's decision to deny restitution to fishers and oil industry workers, stating that they were not direct victims of the pipeline shutdown after the spill. The court remanded the case for consideration of restitution for four fisher claims, but in all other respects, it affirmed the trial court's decision and denied the writ petition. View "People v. Plains All American Pipeline, L.P." on Justia Law

The case involves Diana Lovejoy, who was convicted of conspiring with her co-defendant, Weldon McDavid, to murder her ex-husband, Greg Mulvihill. She was also found guilty of attempted murder after McDavid shot and wounded Mulvihill. Several years after her convictions were final, she sought to be resentenced pursuant to current Penal Code section 1172.6, claiming that both convictions may have been based on a theory of imputed malice. The trial court disagreed and denied her petition for relief without an evidentiary hearing.The Superior Court of San Diego County affirmed Lovejoy's convictions. The court concluded that Lovejoy’s conviction for conspiracy to commit murder was necessarily based on a jury finding that she personally harbored an intent to kill, making her ineligible for relief under the statute. Lovejoy appealed this decision.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court concluded that Lovejoy's conviction for conspiracy to commit murder was necessarily based on a jury finding that she personally harbored an intent to kill, making her ineligible for relief under the statute. The court also found that Lovejoy's conviction for attempted murder was not based on a now-impermissible theory, i.e., the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Therefore, the court affirmed the order denying Lovejoy’s petition for resentencing. View "People v. Lovejoy" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances and an enhancement for personally and intentionally discharging a firearm causing great bodily injury or death. The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that his trial counsel exhibited racial bias towards him in violation of the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (RJA) by advising him to use Ebonics and slang when he testified. He also contended that the trial court erred in imposing two sentence enhancements and a parole revocation restitution fine after sentencing him to life without the possibility of parole.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Five, found that the defendant's trial counsel did not exhibit racial bias. The court noted that the counsel's advice to the defendant to "speak how you speak" when testifying was a valid tactical decision aimed at ensuring the defendant appeared authentic and genuine before the jury. The court also found that the defendant had not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that his counsel's advice indicated racial animus or bias towards him. Therefore, the court concluded that there was no violation of the RJA.The court also found that the defendant's claim that his enhancements should have been stricken was forfeited for failure to request that the trial court strike the enhancements under section 1385. However, the court agreed with the defendant and the People that the trial court improperly imposed a parole revocation restitution fine. The court modified the judgment to strike the parole revocation restitution fine and affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "P. v. Coleman" on Justia Law

In 2019, Miguel Garcia pleaded no contest to second degree robbery and possession of a firearm by a felon, admitting he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm. His 12-year sentence included seven one-year prior prison term sentence enhancements. At a resentencing hearing, the superior court dismissed the prior prison term enhancements but resentenced Garcia to the same 12-year sentence by imposing the firearm enhancement that had been previously stricken, finding Garcia continued to pose a threat to public safety. Garcia appealed, challenging the superior court’s finding that imposition of a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County had initially sentenced Garcia to 12 years, including seven one-year enhancements for prior prison terms. However, due to changes in the law, these enhancements were later deemed invalid and Garcia was resentenced. At the resentencing hearing, the court dismissed the prior prison term enhancements but maintained the 12-year sentence by imposing a previously stricken firearm enhancement, citing Garcia's continued threat to public safety.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Seven reviewed the superior court’s finding that reducing Garcia’s sentence would endanger public safety for an abuse of discretion. The court considered the nature of the offense, Garcia’s multiple prior felony convictions of increasing seriousness, his failure to appear for sentencing, and his participation in a prison riot in which he beat another inmate. The court found that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in its decision. However, the court directed the superior court to correct a clerical error in the abstract of judgment to reflect that Garcia was sentenced to a concurrent term of two years on count 2 for possession of a firearm by a felon. The court affirmed the resentencing order. View "People v. Garcia" on Justia Law

The case involves Dr. Gopal Balakrishnan, a former tenured professor at the University of California, Santa Cruz (UCSC), who was dismissed and denied emeritus status for sexually abusing a fellow academic at an off-campus academic conference and a UCSC student whom he volunteered to walk home from an off-campus graduation party. Balakrishnan appealed the decision, arguing that the university lacked jurisdiction to discipline him because the victims were not university students, the university misinterpreted and misapplied its own regulations and policies, he did not receive notice of all charges, and the sanctions were excessive.In the lower courts, Balakrishnan filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandate to set aside the findings and decision of the Regents of the University of California to terminate his employment and deny him emeritus status. The trial court denied his petition, upholding the university's decision.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California, the court rejected Balakrishnan's contentions and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court found that the university had the authority to discipline Balakrishnan for his off-campus behavior based on its internal policies, rules, and regulations. The court also found that Balakrishnan had received notice of the charges and that the sanctions were not excessive given the severity of his conduct. View "Balakrishnan v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

The case involves Symons Emergency Specialties (Symons), a provider of ambulance services, and the City of Riverside. The City regulates ambulance services within its limits under the Riverside Municipal Code (RMC), which requires operators to obtain a valid franchise or permit. Symons filed a civil complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the City, arguing that the RMC section requiring a permit is invalid under the Emergency Medical Services System and Prehospital Emergency Medical Care Act (EMS Act). The dispute centered on whether the City had regulated nonemergency ambulance services as of June 1, 1980, which would allow it to continue doing so under the EMS Act's grandfathering provisions.The trial court found in favor of the City, concluding that Symons had failed to meet its burden of proof. Symons appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting certain testimonies, that the court's factual finding was not supported by substantial evidence, and that the RMC section violated federal anti-trust law.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found no error in the admission of testimonies, concluded that substantial evidence supported the trial court's findings, and rejected Symons's anti-trust argument. The court held that the City's regulation of ambulance services did not violate the EMS Act or federal anti-trust law. View "Symons Emergency Specialties v. City of Riverside" on Justia Law