Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute between a taxpayers' association and a water district over the imposition of groundwater replenishment charges. The taxpayers' association alleged that the water district's charges violated constitutional provisions and unfairly benefited large agricultural businesses. The association sought a writ of mandate to stop the collection of these charges and to vacate the resolutions imposing them. They also claimed conversion, civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and violations of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) against the water district's board members, general manager, and consulting firms.The Superior Court of Riverside County denied the defendants' anti-SLAPP motion, which sought to strike several causes of action on the grounds that they arose from protected activities. The court found that the public interest exemption to the anti-SLAPP statute applied. Additionally, the court sustained the defendants' demurrer to the first amended petition and complaint, finding the claims time-barred under the validation statutes. The court also awarded over $180,000 in attorney's fees to the plaintiffs, deeming the anti-SLAPP motion frivolous.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that the public interest exemption did not apply because the relief sought could only be provided by the water district, not the individual defendants. The court found that the anti-SLAPP motion should have been granted for most causes of action, except for conversion and the writ of mandate against the general manager. Consequently, the fee award was reversed. The court also affirmed the demurrer ruling, as the claims against the individual defendants were not legally sufficient. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Powell" on Justia Law

Sergio Ramirez, a former police officer, was terminated by the City of Indio Police Department following an internal affairs investigation. Ramirez was initially placed on administrative leave after being charged with rape and sexual assault, though he was later acquitted of all criminal charges. Despite the acquittal, the internal investigation concluded that Ramirez had violated several departmental policies, leading to his termination. Ramirez appealed the decision through the administrative appeal process outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the City and the Indio Police Officers’ Association.The arbitrator, after a full evidentiary hearing, recommended Ramirez's reinstatement with full back pay and benefits. However, the City Manager upheld the termination, citing Ramirez's poor judgment, dishonesty, and conduct unbecoming of an officer. Ramirez then petitioned the Superior Court of Riverside County for a writ of mandate, arguing that the City Manager should have deferred to the arbitrator's findings on the weight and credibility of the evidence. The Superior Court denied the petition, affirming the City Manager's decision.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that the MOU clearly vested the City Manager with the final authority to make disciplinary decisions, including the power to reject the arbitrator's advisory findings. The court found that the City Manager had conducted a thorough review of the arbitrator's recommendations and the evidence before making the final decision. The court also concluded that the administrative appeal process provided Ramirez with due process, as it included notice, an opportunity to respond, and a meaningful hearing. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed, upholding Ramirez's termination. View "Ramirez v. City of Indio" on Justia Law

The plaintiff entered into a lease agreement with the defendant for a new vehicle, which later exhibited multiple defects. Despite several repair attempts, the issues persisted. The plaintiff then filed a lawsuit against the defendant, alleging violations of California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, seeking various forms of relief including replacement or restitution, damages, and attorney fees.The case proceeded to trial in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, where the jury found the defendant liable and awarded the plaintiff damages. However, the jury did not find the defendant’s violation to be willful, thus no civil penalties were awarded. Subsequently, both parties filed motions regarding costs and attorney fees. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendant, limiting the plaintiff to pre-offer costs and attorney fees, and awarding the defendant post-offer costs based on a prior settlement offer under California Code of Civil Procedure section 998.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court addressed two main issues: whether a section 998 offer consisting of two simultaneous offers is valid, and whether an offer that promises to pay for statutory categories of damages with disputes resolved by a third party is sufficiently certain. The court concluded that simultaneous offers are generally invalid under section 998 due to the uncertainty they create for the trial court in determining whether the judgment is more favorable than the offer. However, since only one of the defendant’s two offers was invalid, the remaining valid offer was operative. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the plaintiff was limited to pre-offer costs and attorney fees, and the defendant was entitled to post-offer costs. View "Gorobets v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2016, the plaintiff purchased a shopping center from the defendants, which included a dry cleaning business. Before the sale, the defendants provided a 2013 visual inspection report but did not disclose a more detailed soil vapor survey report, which the plaintiff later discovered. After the purchase, the plaintiff incurred significant costs for cleaning up hazardous substances found in the soil. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had withheld critical information about the property's condition.The plaintiff filed a lawsuit in 2018, alleging fraud and violations of the Civil Code. During discovery, the defendants served requests for admission, which the plaintiff failed to respond to on time. The defendants moved to have the requests deemed admitted. The plaintiff later served a response with objections, but the trial court deemed the responses non-compliant and granted the defendants' motion, imposing sanctions. The plaintiff's subsequent motion to withdraw the deemed admissions was denied for failing to show mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the presence of waived objections in the plaintiff's proposed response did not necessarily prevent substantial compliance with the statutory requirements. The court found that the trial court had erred in its interpretation of the statute and that the plaintiff's responses were substantially compliant. The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, including vacating the order deeming the requests admitted, reconsidering sanctions, and allowing additional discovery. The plaintiff was awarded costs for the appeal. View "Katayama v. Continental Investment Group" on Justia Law

Frank Moseley was charged with murder after he killed his fiancé, who had told him she might be pregnant with another man's child. Moseley, a combat veteran diagnosed with PTSD, testified that his condition contributed to the crime. The jury found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter (heat of passion) and a weapon enhancement.The Superior Court of Orange County sentenced Moseley to 11 years in state prison, striking the additional punishment for the weapon use. The court acknowledged Moseley’s PTSD as a mitigating factor but did not explicitly consider the relevant service-related statutes (Penal Code §§ 1170.9 and 1170.91) when denying probation. Moseley’s counsel mentioned these statutes at the sentencing hearing but stated they were not "directly applicable." The probation department’s report and the sentencing briefs from both parties also failed to cite these statutes.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court did not expressly consider Moseley’s service-related PTSD as required by §§ 1170.9 and 1170.91. These statutes mandate that a trial court must consider a defendant’s service-related PTSD as a factor in mitigation when deciding on probation and sentencing. The appellate court determined that the record was ambiguous regarding whether the trial court was aware of its statutory obligations under these sections.The appellate court reversed Moseley’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, directing the trial court to comply with its statutory obligations under §§ 1170.9 and 1170.91. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Moseley" on Justia Law

In this case, the decedents, Robert and Elise Sandiford, and Deon Detes Abrams, Sr., died after their vehicles collided on State Route 99 (SR 99) and struck a tree on land owned by Union Pacific Railroad Company (Union Pacific). The relatives of the decedents sued Union Pacific, alleging negligence for failing to remove the tree or take measures to protect the public from the dangerous condition it posed. Union Pacific moved for summary judgment, arguing it owed no duty to remove the tree. The trial court denied the motion, finding no judicial exception to the ordinary duty of care under Civil Code section 1714.The trial court's denial of summary judgment was based on the application of factors from Rowland v. Christian, which did not support creating an exception to the ordinary duty of care. Union Pacific then filed a petition for a writ of mandate with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, seeking to overturn the trial court's decision.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that Union Pacific did not have a duty to remove the tree or take other measures to protect the driving public from the alleged dangerous condition posed by the tree. The court considered the foreseeability of harm, the certainty of injury, and the closeness of the connection between Union Pacific’s conduct and the injury. It also weighed public policy factors, including moral blame, the policy of preventing future harm, the burden on the defendant, and the availability of insurance. The court concluded that public policy clearly supported creating a judicial exception to the ordinary duty of care, thus granting Union Pacific's petition for a writ of mandate and directing the trial court to grant Union Pacific's motion for summary judgment. View "Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Reabold California LLC applied to convert a former oil well into a Class II injection well in the Brentwood Oil Field, Contra Costa County. The well, drilled in 1963, had been used to pump oil and water from an aquifer. Reabold proposed minor modifications to the well to inject produced water back into the aquifer, which had been exempted from the Safe Drinking Water Act. The project aimed to eliminate the need for trucking the produced water to a disposal site. The California Department of Conservation’s Division of Geologic Energy Management (CalGEM) approved the project, invoking a Class 1 categorical exemption under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) for minor alterations involving negligible or no expansion of use.The Contra Costa County Superior Court ruled in favor of Sunflower Alliance, which challenged CalGEM’s use of the categorical exemption. The court agreed with Sunflower that converting the well to an injection well constituted a significant change in use, thus not fitting within the Class 1 exemption. Consequently, the court issued a writ of mandate directing CalGEM to set aside its notice of exemption and project approval.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and reversed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court held that the well conversion project fell within the Class 1 exemption because the physical modifications were minor and the change in use posed negligible environmental risks. The court emphasized that the project involved injecting water into the same aquifer from which it was originally pumped, and regulatory conditions ensured the injected water would be confined within the aquifer. The court directed the lower court to deny Sunflower’s petition for writ of mandate and to order CalGEM to reinstate its project approval and notice of exemption. View "Sunflower Alliance v. Dept. of Conservation" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the adequacy of an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) prepared for a project proposing significant changes to the California State Capitol. The Department of General Services (DGS) and the Joint Committee on Rules of the California State Senate and Assembly (Joint Rules Committee) prepared both an EIR and a revised EIR under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The project includes demolishing the existing Capitol Annex, constructing a new attached Annex, building an underground visitor center, and constructing a new underground parking garage.The Superior Court of Sacramento County initially rejected challenges to the EIR brought by Save Our Capitol! and Save the Capitol, Save the Trees. On appeal, the Court of Appeal found certain aspects of the EIR flawed and remanded the case. After DGS revised the EIR and reapproved the project without the visitor center, the trial court discharged the writ. Save the Capitol, Save the Trees appealed, arguing the trial court prematurely discharged the writ. The Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the trial court's decision. Save Our Capitol! then filed a new petition challenging the revised EIR, which the trial court also rejected.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that recent legislation, Senate Bill No. 174, exempts the Capitol Annex Project from CEQA’s requirements. The court found that Senate Bill 174, which took effect immediately, dictates that all work performed under the Annex Act is exempt from CEQA. Consequently, Save Our Capitol!'s claims that DGS violated CEQA were rejected. The court also addressed and dismissed Save Our Capitol!'s argument that Senate Bill 174 is unconstitutional under article IV, section 28 of the California Constitution, finding that the bill explicitly bars funds from being used inconsistent with this constitutional provision. View "Save Our Capitol! v. Dept. of General Services" on Justia Law

Kenneth and Janet Lathrop purchased a motorhome from a dealer in California, manufactured by Thor Motor Coach, Inc. They later sued the dealer and Thor under the Song-Beverly Consumers Warranty Act and the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), alleging defects in the motorhome and failure to perform necessary repairs. Thor moved to stay the action based on a forum selection clause in its warranty, which designated Indiana as the exclusive forum for disputes and included a jury trial waiver and an Indiana choice-of-law clause. Thor acknowledged these provisions were unenforceable under California law and offered to stipulate that California substantive rights would apply in an Indiana court.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Thor’s motion to stay, finding the forum selection clause mandatory and not unreasonable. The court placed the burden on the Lathrops to show that enforcing the clause was unreasonable. The Lathrops appealed, arguing that the trial court applied the wrong standard and that Thor did not meet its burden to show that litigating in Indiana would not diminish their unwaivable rights under California law.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred by placing the burden on the Lathrops instead of Thor. The appellate court held that Thor did not meet its burden to show that litigating in Indiana would not substantially diminish the Lathrops’ rights under the Song-Beverly Act and the CLRA. The court also found that enforcing the forum selection clause based on Thor’s proposed stipulation would violate California public policy and that the stipulation was insufficient to protect the Lathrops’ unwaivable statutory rights. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s order granting the motion to stay and directed the trial court to deny the motion. View "Lathrop v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc." on Justia Law

A former employee, Liu, sued her employer, Miniso, alleging various employment-related claims, including sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and wage and hour violations. Liu claimed that she faced severe and pervasive harassment and discrimination based on her sexual orientation and gender identity, and that she was misclassified as an exempt employee, leading to unpaid wages and denied breaks. Liu also alleged that she was retaliated against for refusing to participate in illegal practices and for whistleblowing, which led to her constructive termination.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Miniso's motion to compel arbitration of Liu's claims. Miniso argued that Liu's allegations of sexual harassment were insufficient to state a claim and that the arbitration agreement should be enforced for the non-sexual harassment claims. The trial court found that Liu had adequately stated a claim for sexual harassment and, based on the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA), ruled that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable for all of Liu's claims.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that under the EFAA, if a plaintiff's case includes at least one claim of sexual harassment, the entire case is exempt from arbitration at the plaintiff's election. The court emphasized that the EFAA's language invalidates arbitration agreements with respect to the entire case, not just the sexual harassment claims. This interpretation avoids the inefficiency of having separate proceedings for different claims and aligns with the legislative intent to protect plaintiffs from being compelled into arbitration for sexual harassment disputes. View "Liu v. Miniso Depot CA, Inc." on Justia Law