Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Robert Rinker and Cindi Rinker, formerly married and sharing custody of their son, W., have a history of contentious interactions related to custody and visitation. After their separation, Robert was granted primary physical custody with monitored, and later unmonitored, visitation for Cindi. Beginning in late 2023, Robert alleged that Cindi’s behavior had deteriorated, including stalking him and W., entering his home and car without permission, making persistent and unwanted contact, and threatening communications. He claimed these actions caused fear for his and his son’s safety, prompting him to seek a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) and a return to monitored visitation for Cindi.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Family Court, held a hearing on Robert’s DVRO request. Both parties testified, with Robert detailing incidents of obsessive and alarming behavior, and Cindi admitting much of the conduct but denying malicious intent, attributing her actions to concern for her son and her mental health issues. The court found evidence of obsessive behavior by Cindi but concluded that Robert had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that her conduct constituted abuse under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA), focusing on whether her actions were intentionally threatening. The court denied the DVRO but ordered professional monitoring of Cindi’s visitation due to the “alarming” nature of her behavior.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It found that the trial court had applied an incorrect legal standard by narrowly focusing on Cindi’s intent rather than considering the totality of her conduct and its impact, as required by the DVPA. The appellate court held that Robert had met his burden to show past acts of abuse, including stalking and disturbing the peace, regardless of Cindi’s intent. The court reversed the denial of the DVRO and remanded with instructions to enter the restraining order as requested. View "Rinker v. Rinker" on Justia Law

A longtime deputy sheriff was convicted by a federal jury of mail and wire fraud after she submitted an insurance claim for items stolen during a burglary at her home, some of which she falsely claimed as her own but actually belonged to her employer, the sheriff’s office. She also used her employer’s fax machine and cover sheet in communicating with the insurance company and misrepresented her supervisor’s identity. The criminal conduct arose after a romantic relationship with a former inmate ended badly, leading to the burglary, but the fraud conviction was based on her false insurance claim, not on the relationship or the burglary itself.Following her conviction, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) determined that her crimes constituted conduct “arising out of or in the performance of her official duties” under Government Code section 7522.72, part of the Public Employees Pension Reform Act, and partially forfeited her pension. The administrative law judge and the San Francisco Superior Court both upheld CalPERS’s decision, reasoning that her actions were sufficiently connected to her employment, particularly in her misuse of employer property and resources and in the context of her relationship with the former inmate.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division One, reversed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the statute requires a specific causal nexus between the criminal conduct and the employee’s official duties, not merely any job-related connection. The court found that the deputy’s fraudulent insurance claim, although it referenced employer property and resources, did not arise out of or in the performance of her official duties as required by the statute. Accordingly, the pension forfeiture determination was set aside. View "Myres v. Bd. of Admin. for CalPERS" on Justia Law

A former employee worked for a retail company and, during his employment, signed an arbitration agreement that included a waiver of class, collective, and Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) representative actions. This agreement stated that any dispute must be brought in arbitration on an individual basis and not as a representative action. The agreement also included a severability clause, specifying that if any part of the waiver was found invalid, a private attorney general claim would have to be litigated in court.After his employment ended, the employee filed a lawsuit against the company under PAGA, alleging wage-and-hour violations on behalf of himself, other employees, and the State of California. The claims and requested relief were pleaded in the aggregate, and the complaint did not separately seek penalties for violations suffered by the plaintiff alone.The employer moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana allowed for arbitration of the “individual” component of a PAGA claim even if representative claims could not be arbitrated. The Alameda County Superior Court denied the motion, reasoning that there is no such thing as an “individual PAGA claim” under California law.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that, based on the language of the arbitration agreement, the parties did not agree to arbitrate individual PAGA claims. The court reasoned that as of the time the agreement was drafted, there was no clear distinction in California law between “individual” and “non-individual” PAGA claims. Therefore, the court declined to compel arbitration of the PAGA claim and affirmed the lower court’s order. Costs on appeal were awarded to the employee. View "LaCour v. Marshalls of California" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over possession and damages related to a residential property in Malibu. In 2019, the plaintiff filed an unlawful detainer action against several defendants, including the defendant, seeking possession of the property and damages. The defendant responded with an answer denying several key allegations, including the plaintiff’s ownership of the property and the claimed fair rental value. The plaintiff later obtained leave to file a first amended complaint, which reclassified the action and asserted new causes of action but relied on the same underlying facts as the original complaint. The defendant did not file a new answer to this amended complaint.The Los Angeles County Superior Court entered a default against the defendant after he failed to answer the amended complaint and subsequently entered a default judgment awarding significant damages. The defendant moved multiple times to set aside the default judgment. The court eventually denied his postjudgment motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), which allows courts to set aside void judgments. The defendant timely appealed these orders.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed whether the original answer sufficed to controvert the first amended complaint’s allegations and precluded entry of default. The appellate court held that because the defendant’s original answer denied essential factual allegations that remained central to the amended complaint—including ownership and valuation—the default judgment was improper. The court found that a defendant’s original answer stands as a response to reasserted facts in an amended complaint, and default cannot be entered on allegations previously denied. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and the trial court’s order denying the motion to set aside default, remanding with instructions to vacate the default and default judgment. View "Ammari v. Ammari" on Justia Law

A former employee brought a single-count action under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) against his previous employer, alleging violations of various wage-and-hour provisions of the California Labor Code. The employee had previously signed an arbitration agreement that included waivers of class action, collective action, and representative PAGA claims, with a severability clause stating that any invalidation of the PAGA waiver would require such claims to be litigated in court, not arbitrated. The complaint sought civil penalties on behalf of the employee, other current and former employees, and the State of California, but did not separately seek penalties for violations suffered by the employee personally.The employer moved to compel arbitration, arguing that recent federal and state precedent required arbitration of the "individual component" of the PAGA claim, relying on Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana and subsequent California cases. The Superior Court of Alameda County denied the motion, reasoning that under California law there was no such thing as an "individual PAGA claim" and, therefore, the claim could not be compelled to arbitration.Reviewing the denial, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, considered the parties’ arguments regarding the interpretation of the arbitration agreement and relevant case law. The court held that, based on the language of the agreement and the intent of the parties at the time it was signed, there was no clear agreement to arbitrate individual PAGA claims if the PAGA waiver was invalidated. The court reasoned that, although recent decisions allow splitting PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims, the agreement in this case did not provide for such arbitration. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order denying the motion to compel arbitration. View "LaCour v. Marshalls of California" on Justia Law

The case concerns a child who was removed from his parents due to domestic violence, the father’s criminal history, and the mother’s untreated mental illness. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services placed the child with a caretaker and provided reunification services to the parents, but these efforts were unsuccessful. Parental rights were ultimately terminated, and adoption was set as the permanent plan. Throughout the proceedings, the Department investigated whether the child might have Native American heritage, as required under California law analogous to the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the Department’s efforts to determine the child's possible Native American ancestry. The parents had initially denied any such heritage, but at one point the father suggested there might be Native American ancestry. The Department interviewed or attempted to contact numerous relatives and family associates about possible Native American ancestry, but did not contact four specific known relatives. After reviewing the Department's inquiry, the juvenile court found there was no reason to know that ICWA applied in this case.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the adequacy of the Department’s inquiry under the deferential standard established by the California Supreme Court. The Court of Appeal held that the Department had adequately discharged its duty of reasonable inquiry by asking those persons it would normally contact whether the child might have Native American heritage, and was not required to contact every possible relative. The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court’s order, explicitly disagreeing with a contrary approach that would impose broader duties on the Department. View "In re K.G." on Justia Law

After moving out of their condominium due to mold, Brenda Lee Allen and her family stayed at the Ontario Airport Inn Hotel, owned by Anil Bhula Patel. After more than 30 days, Allen’s funds ran out, and she requested extra time to pay rent, which was refused by the hotel manager, Luis Mejia. On April 19, 2020, while Allen and her family were moving out, an altercation occurred involving Allen, Mejia, and Patel. Allen alleged that Patel forcibly entered her room, threw her belongings into the hallway, struck her, and pushed her against the wall, causing her to suffer posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other serious health issues.Allen filed suit against Patel and his company, seeking compensatory and punitive damages for battery, assault, and related claims. The Superior Court of San Bernardino County bifurcated the trial to separate liability and compensatory damages from punitive damages. The jury awarded Allen over $1 million in compensatory damages for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Before the punitive damages phase, two jurors were unavailable, leading the trial court to declare a mistrial on that issue. Patel subsequently moved for a new trial, arguing attorney misconduct and other trial irregularities.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court conducted an independent review and found substantial evidence of misconduct by Allen’s attorney, including knowingly misleading statements about medical causation, introduction of prejudicial and inflammatory evidence, improper closing arguments violating the golden rule and reptile theory, and attacks on defense counsel’s character. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order granting a new trial on liability and compensatory damages, finding no abuse of discretion and concluding that the issue of punitive damages was moot. View "Allen v. Patel" on Justia Law

The plaintiff performed maintenance and handyman work for a property owned by a corporation, with the arrangement that he would receive free rent in exchange for keeping the water system operational and doing various tasks. He worked for the corporation between 2009 and 2016, receiving instructions and approvals from the company’s officer who managed the property. After the arrangement ended, it was undisputed that the plaintiff had not been paid wages apart from free rent. He filed a wage claim with the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, seeking unpaid wages, liquidated damages, waiting time penalties, and other remedies.After a favorable administrative decision by the Labor Commissioner, finding the plaintiff to be an employee entitled to recover unpaid wages and imposing personal liability on the company officer, the defendants appealed to the Superior Court of Humboldt County. Following a bench trial, the court awarded the plaintiff some unpaid wages and penalties, but calculated the statute of limitations from a later date, declined to impose personal liability on the officer, denied liquidated damages and administrative penalties, and rejected claims under the Unfair Competition Law.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewing the case after remand from the California Supreme Court, held that the trial court erred in several respects. The appellate court found the statute of limitations should have been calculated from the date the initial wage claim form was filed, not a later complaint. It held that the officer could be held personally liable under Labor Code section 558.1, and that the trial court lacked discretion to deny individual liability when the statutory criteria were met. The court also concluded liquidated damages under section 1194.2 and administrative penalties under section 248.5 should have been awarded, and waiting time penalties should have incorporated the rental value provided as compensation. The judgment was reversed in these respects and remanded for recalculation, while affirmed in other areas. View "Iloff v. LaPaille" on Justia Law

Four juveniles were found jointly and severally liable for victim restitution in the amount of $15,850.54, after an incident involving Jane Doe and her family. Two of the minors, J.L. and O.V., appealed the restitution order, specifically challenging a portion related to childcare expenses incurred by Doe’s mother. Both minors accepted the legitimacy of some childcare costs but argued for reductions in the total awarded based on their interpretation of supporting evidence. Additionally, J.L. and O.V. sought apportionment of the total restitution among the four co-offenders, referencing a recent amendment to the Welfare and Institutions Code that eliminated joint and several liability in juvenile delinquency restitution matters, effective January 1, 2025.The Superior Court of Marin County initially heard the matter. The juvenile court found that the People had established the restitution amount by a preponderance of the evidence and ordered all four minors jointly and severally liable for the total sum. J.L. and O.V. subsequently appealed the restitution order to the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the evidentiary record and legal arguments. The appellate court held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $3,850 for childcare expenses, finding sufficient factual support for the amount claimed. Regarding apportionment, the appellate court concluded that the recent statutory amendment to eliminate joint and several liability for victim restitution applies prospectively and not retroactively. Thus, J.L. and O.V. were not entitled to have their restitution obligations apportioned under the new law. The judgment of the juvenile court was affirmed. View "In re J.L." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed by defendant and, as a condition of employment, electronically signed both an offer letter containing an arbitration provision and a separate nondisclosure agreement (NDIAA) on the same day. The offer letter required arbitration for most employment-related disputes, while the NDIAA included terms such as a waiver of bond for injunctive relief and a heightened burden of proof for public domain information. Plaintiff’s employment ended in March 2023, after which she sued defendant in Alameda County Superior Court for disability discrimination, retaliation, and related claims under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, as well as wrongful termination. None of her claims involved confidential information or sought injunctive relief.Defendant moved to compel arbitration, asserting the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governed and that plaintiff’s claims fell within the arbitration agreement’s scope. The trial court found the arbitration agreement and NDIAA should be read together under California Civil Code section 1642, determined that certain NDIAA provisions were unconscionable, and concluded that unconscionability permeated the arbitration agreement. The court declined to sever the NDIAA’s unconscionable provisions and denied the motion to compel arbitration.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, disagreed with the trial court’s refusal to sever. The appellate court held that the FAA does not preempt section 1642, and even assuming the NDIAA’s challenged provisions were unconscionable and properly considered alongside the arbitration agreement, those provisions were collateral to the arbitration agreement’s central purpose and did not affect the claims at issue. Applying Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc., the appellate court determined that the unconscionable terms should have been severed and the arbitration agreement enforced. Consequently, the order denying arbitration was reversed. View "Wise v. Tesla Motors, Inc." on Justia Law