Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case concerns the suspension of a driver’s license by the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) after the driver, stopped for erratic driving and suspected of being under the influence of alcohol, refused a chemical test when properly advised of the consequences. At the administrative hearing regarding his suspension, the DMV’s hearing officer introduced evidence, asked clarifying questions, and ruled on objections, all while stating she was acting as a neutral factfinder rather than as an advocate for the DMV. The driver argued that the hearing officer’s dual roles violated his due process rights by making her both a prosecutor and adjudicator.After the DMV sustained the license suspension, the driver petitioned the Superior Court of Alameda County for a writ of mandate, claiming that the hearing officer functioned as both advocate and judge, creating an unconstitutional risk of bias. The trial court denied the petition, finding that the DMV’s current policy required hearing officers to act only as neutral decisionmakers and that no due process violation occurred.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the denial. The court clarified that due process requires an impartial adjudicator but does not prohibit the same person from developing the evidence and making a decision in an administrative setting, so long as there is no disqualifying interest or extraordinary evidence of bias. The court held that the DMV’s current structure does not violate due process, as hearing officers are presumed impartial and their actions in presenting evidence do not turn them into advocates. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. The court expressly declined to follow recent decisions adopting an “appearance of bias” standard and reinforced that only an actual, constitutionally intolerable risk of bias triggers a due process violation. View "Chi v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

This case arose from a contractual dispute involving a commercial lease. Michael Scheinker, who later passed away and was succeeded by Jennifer O’Leary, leased property to Green America Inc. Walter Jones III signed the lease on behalf of Green America and also signed a guarantee clause, making him personally responsible for obligations under the lease, including attorney fees. After disputes developed, Green America initiated litigation against Scheinker. Scheinker successfully compelled arbitration, where he asserted claims against Green America and Jones. The arbitrator issued an award in Scheinker’s favor, finding Jones liable as guarantor. Scheinker then sought to confirm the arbitration award in the Superior Court of Riverside County.The Superior Court confirmed the arbitration award against Green America but denied the petition as to Jones, citing lack of personal jurisdiction since Jones had not been joined as a party before the matter was sent to arbitration. The court also expressly declined to rule on Jones’s request to vacate the arbitration award. Afterward, Jones moved for attorney’s fees and costs, arguing he was the prevailing party under Civil Code section 1717. The Superior Court denied attorney’s fees, reasoning that no party prevailed on the contract because the merits of enforceability as to Jones had not been resolved. The court did not separately address Jones’s request for costs.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. It held that the Superior Court acted within its discretion in denying Jones’s motion for attorney’s fees, finding that Jones had obtained only an interim victory and the substantive contract issues remained unresolved. However, the appellate court found that Jones was entitled to reasonable court costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, as he was a defendant in whose favor a dismissal was entered. The order was affirmed as to attorney’s fees and remanded for the award of costs to Jones. View "O'Leary v. Jones" on Justia Law

Several former executives and employees of a storage company were terminated or allegedly constructively terminated and subsequently brought claims against the company and its principals for wrongful termination, retaliation, harassment, and related causes of action. The company, in turn, sued two of the former executives, alleging breach of contract and misuse of confidential information, including forwarding company emails to personal accounts. The emails at issue contained communications from the company’s legal counsel and were allegedly attorney-client privileged. After their terminations, the former employees provided these emails to their attorney for use in their lawsuits against the company.The Superior Court of Orange County considered the company’s motions to disqualify the law firm representing the former employees, based on the firm’s possession and use of the disputed emails. The court found the emails were privileged and that the company held the privilege. However, it denied the motions, reasoning that the employees had been intended recipients of the emails, that privileged content would not be used to the company’s disadvantage, and that the emails were central to both parties’ claims.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, held that the trial court abused its discretion. The appellate court determined that the proper analytical framework for attorney disqualification, as set forth in State Comp. Ins. Fund v. WPS, Inc., should apply not only to inadvertently disclosed privileged material but also to situations where an attorney receives material that was impermissibly taken from the privilege holder without authorization. The appellate court found the trial court erred in its legal analysis, failed to properly apply the relevant standard regarding future prejudice, and made unsupported findings. The court reversed the trial court’s orders and remanded for reconsideration of the disqualification motions under the correct legal standards. View "Guardian Storage Centers v. Simpson" on Justia Law

Two married tenured professors at California State University, Chico alleged that they were subjected to harassment and discrimination by their department chair, with one professor experiencing conduct targeted at her gender and Korean ancestry. Despite their reports to university administration, the university did not intervene. As a result, one professor suffered serious mental health consequences, leading their doctor to recommend that she not work in the same environment as the chair. The university’s lack of response allegedly forced both professors to resign and accept positions at another university. After their resignation, the university initiated an investigation into one professor for an alleged violation of student privacy laws and communicated these allegations to the new employer, which the professors claimed was intended to sabotage their new employment. There were also alleged delays in transferring their lab equipment.The professors filed suit in the Superior Court of Butte County, asserting, among other claims, retaliation and whistleblower retaliation under California law. The university filed a special motion to strike these two causes of action under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the claims were based in part on communications protected by the statute. The trial court denied the motion, finding the university’s actions involved an official proceeding but also concluding that the professors demonstrated a likelihood of prevailing on their claims.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the anti-SLAPP motion. The appellate court held that the university failed to carry its burden to show that all actions underlying the challenged causes of action were protected activity. The court clarified that the presence of some protected communications within the allegations does not mean the entire cause of action arises from protected activity. The judgment denying the anti-SLAPP motion was therefore affirmed. View "Pechkis v. Trustees of the Cal. State University" on Justia Law

A man lived with his girlfriend for several years, and her brother moved in with them from Mexico. After neighbors heard alarming noises from their apartment, family members, prompted by disturbing messages from the man, entered the residence and found the bodies of both the girlfriend and her brother, who had died from numerous stab wounds. The apartment was extremely cold due to a newly purchased air conditioning unit placed to slow decomposition. The man was later found in Mexico and extradited to Los Angeles.At trial in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the prosecution charged the man with two counts of murder. The defense sought to introduce a handwritten note found at the crime scene, in which the man claimed he killed the victims in a rage after discovering them having sex. The trial court excluded the note during the prosecution’s case under Evidence Code section 352, reasoning its probative value was outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice and that it could not be properly tested without the man’s testimony. As a result, the man testified in order to introduce the note, and was subsequently convicted by a jury of first degree murder for his girlfriend and second degree murder for her brother.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court erred in excluding the note during the prosecution’s case, as its probative value concerning provocation and the defendant’s state of mind was not substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice, and a limiting instruction could have adequately addressed concerns. The Court of Appeal found the error prejudicial, as it forced the man to testify and likely affected the verdicts. The court reversed the convictions and directed the trial court to vacate them and set the matter for a new trial. View "People v. Tzul" on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute between a city and a civil liberties organization regarding public access to police records under the California Public Records Act. The organization submitted a request for records related to police K-9 use-of-force incidents, specifically seeking documents involving incidents resulting in “death or great bodily injury.” The city produced some records but withheld or redacted others, asserting that only records involving “serious bodily injury” as narrowly defined should be disclosed. The central disagreement focused on the meaning of “great bodily injury” in the statutory context.After the city maintained its position, the organization challenged the city’s interpretation in the Superior Court of Fresno County. The court did not decide whether the documents were investigatory records but instead ruled on the meaning of “great bodily injury.” It concluded that the term should be understood as “a significant or substantial physical injury,” consistent with the definition in Penal Code section 12022.7, rather than the narrower definition of “serious bodily injury” found elsewhere. The court therefore ordered the city to produce records involving any deployment of a police canine that resulted in great bodily injury, as so defined.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the city’s petition for writ of mandate. The appellate court agreed with the superior court, holding that the term “great bodily injury” in Penal Code section 832.7 should be construed in accordance with section 12022.7, meaning “a significant or substantial physical injury.” The court found no ambiguity in the statutory language, rejected the city’s alternative arguments, and concluded that the legislative history supported this broader interpretation. The court denied the city’s petition, affirmed the order for disclosure, and awarded costs to the organization. View "City of Fresno v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A former employee brought a class action lawsuit against her former employer, alleging violations of California wage and hour laws and other employment-related statutes. After the complaint was filed, the employer entered into approximately 954 individual settlement agreements with other employees, providing cash payments in exchange for releases of claims. The plaintiff did not sign such an agreement but moved for class certification and later sought to invalidate the individual settlements on the grounds of fraud and coercion, arguing the employer misrepresented the litigation’s status and the scope of the settlements.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County partially granted the motion, ruling that the individual settlement agreements were voidable due to fraud or duress and ordered that a curative notice be sent to affected employees. The court’s notice advised that employees could rescind their agreements and join the class action, but did not require immediate repayment of settlement funds to the employer. The employer objected, arguing the notice should have informed employees that they might be required to return the settlement money if they rescinded and the employer ultimately prevailed in the litigation. The trial court declined to include this language, instead following certain federal cases that allowed offsetting the settlement amount against any recovery but did not require repayment before judgment.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case on a writ. The court held that under California Civil Code sections 1689, 1691, and 1693, employees who rescind their settlement agreements may be required to repay the consideration they received, but repayment can be delayed until final judgment unless the employer shows substantial prejudice from delay. The court also found the trial court retains equitable authority to adjust repayment at judgment under section 1692. The appellate court directed the trial court to reconsider the curative notice in accordance with these principles. Each side was ordered to bear their own costs on appeal. View "The Merchant of Tennis, Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Late at night, police officers responded to a 911 call reporting a man with a gun in an area known for gang activity. The caller provided a description and stated that the man put a gun in a white Kia parked nearby. An officer recognized someone matching the description—later identified as Perez—who entered a nearby apartment. Officers, without a warrant or exigent circumstances, approached the residence, saw Perez inside through the screen door, and ordered him to come out at gunpoint. Perez initially did not comply but eventually exited and was detained outside. A witness identified Perez as the suspect, and a subsequent search of the Kia and Perez’s person uncovered a firearm, drugs, and related evidence.Perez moved to suppress the evidence in the Superior Court of Orange County, arguing that his seizure inside the apartment violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers lacked probable cause and a warrant. The prosecution argued that the initial detention was justified by reasonable suspicion and that no warrant was necessary since officers did not physically enter the residence. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the detention was proper, and Perez ultimately pleaded guilty and was sentenced.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that Perez was seized while still inside the residence and that, under the Fourth Amendment, such a seizure requires both probable cause and a warrant or exigent circumstances. The court rejected the prosecution’s arguments that the officers’ conduct was permissible as a mere detention or as a warrantless arrest effected from outside the home. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to allow Perez to withdraw his plea and to grant suppression of the evidence and identification derived from the unlawful seizure. View "People v. Perez" on Justia Law

Defendants constructed an accessory dwelling unit on a property in Fair Oaks without obtaining the required building permit from the County of Sacramento. They initially applied for a permit, but their application was incomplete and they failed to make necessary corrections. Despite receiving multiple notices of violation and stop work orders from the County, defendants completed construction and leased the unit to a tenant without ever obtaining a final permit or a certificate of occupancy, nor did the County inspect the unit for code compliance.After defendants unsuccessfully appealed the first notice of violation to the County Building Board of Appeals and did not challenge subsequent notices, the County filed suit in the Superior Court of Sacramento County. The County alleged that defendants’ conduct violated state and local building codes and constituted a public nuisance per se under local ordinances. Following a court trial, the Superior Court ruled in favor of the County on both causes of action and issued a permanent injunction, finding that building without a permit was a public nuisance per se as declared by County ordinance.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court rejected defendants’ arguments that the County lacked standing, that its nuisance ordinances conflicted with state law, and that the trial court misapplied the law in finding a nuisance per se. The appellate court held that the County had the authority and standing to enforce its building and nuisance codes, that its ordinances did not conflict with state law, and that construction without a permit constitutes a nuisance per se as expressly declared by County ordinance. The judgment was affirmed, and costs on appeal were awarded to the County. View "County of Sacramento v. NKS Real Estate Holdings" on Justia Law

The defendant was involved in an incident in August 2022 in which, while intoxicated, he assaulted a woman with whom he had a long-term relationship, causing physical injuries that required medical attention. When deputies attempted to arrest him, he resisted and injured two officers. He was subsequently charged with several offenses, including resisting an executive officer and inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant, and admitted to aggravating factors based on his prior convictions. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he was sentenced to county jail on the misdemeanor count and received a four-year suspended prison sentence with four years of probation on the felony count, along with presentence custody credits.After being arrested for a new offense and failing to comply with the conditions of his release, his probation was revoked by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (Judge Emily Cole), and the previously suspended four-year prison sentence was imposed. The court recalculated his presentence custody credits, but an error was made in the calculation. While his appeal was pending, appellate counsel notified the trial court (Supervising Judge Michelle deCasas) of the miscalculation, requesting correction. The trial court acknowledged the mistake but concluded it lacked jurisdiction to correct it after the notice of appeal had been filed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that Penal Code section 1237.1 expressly confers jurisdiction on the trial court to correct errors in presentence custody credit calculations even after a notice of appeal is filed, provided the defendant requests the correction. The court found that the miscalculation was conceded by both parties and modified the judgment to award the correct amount of 400 days of presentence custody credit. The judgment was otherwise affirmed as modified. View "People v. Taft" on Justia Law