Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this case, the defendant was indicted along with several co-defendants for the murder of Kisasi Baltrip and related offenses following a grand jury proceeding in 2007. The charges included first-degree murder, conspiracy, discharge of a firearm, and gang participation, with various enhancements. The defendant later pleaded no contest to second-degree murder and other charges as part of a plea agreement, admitting to a firearm enhancement. The factual basis for the plea was stipulated to be found in police reports and grand jury testimony. He was sentenced to 15 years to life plus additional terms for the enhancements and related offenses, and the judgment was affirmed on appeal after a modification to custody credits.Subsequently, the defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, which provides relief to certain individuals convicted of murder under theories that have since been restricted by legislative reform. The Superior Court of Kern County initially denied the petition at the prima facie stage, but the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reversed and remanded for a further hearing. Upon remand, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and admitted the grand jury transcript, police reports, witness statements, and other law enforcement documents over defense objection, relying on these materials to deny the petition on the basis that the defendant was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, held that neither the grand jury transcript nor the law enforcement-generated documents were admissible at the section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing under the governing statutory exception for evidence “previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial.” The court vacated the denial of the petition and remanded for a new evidentiary hearing, permitting the prosecution the opportunity to present admissible evidence. The holding was not that the petition should be granted outright, but rather that a new hearing must be held applying proper evidentiary standards. View "P. v. Dixon" on Justia Law

The underlying dispute arose after a public university system in California revised its student vaccination policy, reducing the number of mandatory immunizations required for incoming students as of fall 2023. The faculty union, representing teaching and academic staff, believed this policy change could negatively affect the health and safety of faculty members, especially those who are immunocompromised. Upon learning of the change shortly after its adoption, the union formally demanded bargaining over the policy’s effects. The university responded that the policy did not pertain to employment terms but was willing to meet and discuss the union’s concerns. The union declined this offer and instead filed an unfair practice charge, alleging the university failed to bargain in good faith.An administrative law judge for the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) heard the case and found that, while the vaccination policy itself was not a mandatory subject of bargaining, its foreseeable effects on faculty health required effects bargaining. The judge concluded the university violated its statutory duty by implementing the policy without bargaining and ordered remedies including rescinding the policy and compensating affected employees. The university contested these findings, asserting it neither implemented the policy before the charge was filed nor refused to bargain, and that accommodations for affected faculty were already available under disability laws.On review, PERB largely upheld the administrative law judge’s findings, holding the university had a duty to bargain over the effects of the policy and had begun implementing it without sufficient notice and opportunity for bargaining. However, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, found that while substantial evidence supported PERB’s conclusion that the policy had reasonably foreseeable effects on faculty health and thus required effects bargaining, there was no substantial evidence the university had implemented the policy or definitively refused to bargain prior to the union’s charge. Therefore, the court affirmed PERB’s ruling on the duty to bargain effects, but vacated the finding of a statutory violation and the associated remedies, remanding the matter for the parties to engage in effects bargaining. View "Trustees of the Cal. State Univ. v. Public Emp. Relations Bd." on Justia Law

A man faced criminal charges stemming from two separate incidents: one in San Diego in August 2020, where he struck a taxi driver with a skateboard during what appeared to be a psychotic episode, and another in Newport Beach in March 2022, where he damaged property at a car dealership and stole a yacht, causing injury and property damage. After the first incident, he was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and granted pretrial mental health diversion, but this was revoked following the second incident. After the Newport Beach offense, he was diagnosed by another expert with bipolar disorder and related conditions, with evidence suggesting he had been misdiagnosed and improperly medicated prior to the second incident.The Superior Court of Orange County considered his motion for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, supported by expert reports stating his mental health conditions contributed to the offenses and that he would likely respond to treatment without posing an unreasonable risk to public safety if treated in the community. The prosecution opposed, arguing prior diversion had failed and that he posed a danger. The trial court denied the motion, finding him eligible but not suitable for diversion due to doubts about his responsiveness to treatment and concerns about danger to public safety, relying in part on his history of declining treatment and the circumstances of the offenses.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed whether the lower court had abused its discretion. The appellate court held that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard regarding responsiveness to treatment by disregarding the uncontradicted opinion of a qualified mental health expert. It also found the trial court’s determination that the defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger was not supported by substantial evidence. The appellate court granted a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying diversion and to reconsider the motion consistent with the proper legal standards. View "Siam v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Tara Starr petitioned for dissolution of her marriage to Thomas Starr, with the principal dispute centering on the date of separation—Tara claimed 2012 and Thomas asserted 2020. Tara’s original petition alleged a separation date of March 20, 2009, but after retaining counsel, she amended her petition to allege June 2, 2020, as the separation date. Throughout subsequent proceedings, including case management statements, trial briefs, and settlement conference statements, Tara consistently maintained that the actual separation occurred in 2012, and Thomas continued to dispute her position, claiming September 2020.The Contra Costa County Superior Court presided over pretrial and trial proceedings. The matter was bifurcated to first determine the separation date. At the trial, the court, sua sponte, raised the issue that Tara was bound by her amended petition’s allegation of June 2, 2020, as the separation date and suggested there was no controversy. Despite both parties previously treating the date as contested and preparing for trial on that issue, the court held Tara to the June 2020 date, after Thomas ultimately accepted it, and entered an order accordingly. Tara’s subsequent motion to set aside the order was denied, with the court finding her pleading to be a deliberate litigation strategy and not a mistake.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that Tara’s amended petition did not constitute a binding judicial admission regarding the date of separation, as Thomas had consistently contested the allegation throughout the litigation, and both parties prepared for trial on the disputed issue. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the matter for further proceedings to determine the separation date, denying Tara’s request for reassignment to a different judge. Tara was awarded costs on appeal. View "In re Marriage of Starr" on Justia Law

A married couple initiated divorce proceedings, with the primary dispute centering on the date of their separation. The wife, Tara, initially claimed in her petition that the separation occurred in 2009, while the husband, Thomas, claimed it was in September 2020. Tara later amended her petition, with the assistance of counsel, to allege a separation date of June 2, 2020. Despite this, in subsequent filings and during trial preparation, Tara consistently asserted that the actual separation occurred in 2012 and provided evidence and argument to support this claim. Both parties, through multiple attorneys and case management statements, continued to treat the date of separation as a contested issue, preparing for trial on whether the separation occurred in 2012 or 2020.The Contra Costa County Superior Court addressed the issue during a bifurcated trial. On the day of trial, the court, on its own initiative, declared that Tara was bound by the June 2, 2020 separation date alleged in her amended petition, characterizing it as a binding judicial admission. The court reasoned that Tara’s failure to formally amend her petition again prevented her from arguing a different date. When Thomas ultimately accepted the June 2, 2020 date to avoid trial, the court adopted this date as the legal separation and denied Tara’s subsequent motion to set aside the order or to permit another amendment to her petition.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It held that under the circumstances, the trial court erred in treating the separation date in the amended petition as a judicial admission binding Tara. The appellate court explained that a judicial admission requires the adverse party not to contest the allegation, which did not occur here, as Thomas continued to dispute the separation date throughout the proceedings until the trial began. The order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings to determine the actual date of separation. The appellate court declined to order reassignment to a different trial judge. View "Marriage of Starr" on Justia Law

The defendant, who had previously been convicted of first degree burglary and attempted first degree burglary, was found by a jury to have committed these offenses while a person was present. In a separate proceeding, the trial court determined that he had three prior felony convictions qualifying under California’s Three Strikes law, three prior serious felony convictions, and a prior prison term enhancement. He was initially sentenced to 66 years to life, which was later reduced to 41 years to life. Following referral from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, the defendant sought resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, requesting the trial court exercise its discretion to dismiss certain prior convictions and enhancements based on changes to Penal Code section 1385 and arguments under People v. Superior Court (Romero).The Superior Court of Los Angeles County held a hearing at which the defendant requested dismissal of two prior strike convictions and one five-year prior serious felony enhancement, citing age and conduct in prison. The People opposed, arguing the Three Strikes sentence was appropriate. The trial court dismissed the one-year prior prison term enhancement and struck the three five-year prior serious felony conviction enhancements but declined to dismiss any prior strike convictions under the Three Strikes law. The defendant was resentenced to 25 years to life.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed whether the amended section 1385, subdivision (c), applied to the Three Strikes law and whether the rule of lenity could extend its application. The court held that section 1385, subdivision (c), as amended by Senate Bill No. 81, does not apply to the Three Strikes law, since the law constitutes an alternative sentencing scheme, not an enhancement. The court also found no statutory ambiguity warranting application of the rule of lenity. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "P. v. Grandberry" on Justia Law

A licensed sidewalk vendor who had operated outside Petco Park in San Diego since 2009 was cited multiple times in mid-2024 under newly enacted city ordinances regulating sidewalk vending. On two occasions, city officials also impounded his merchandise and, in one instance, his sales proceeds. The vendor, who holds a valid city vending permit, alleged that the new ordinances, particularly those related to impoundment and restrictions on vending during certain hours and events, conflicted with state law enacted in 2018 designed to protect the rights of sidewalk vendors. He sought a writ of mandate, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of these local provisions.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied the vendor’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court acknowledged the negative impact on the vendor’s livelihood but found there was a minimal probability of success on the merits, reasoning that the city’s restrictions were permissible under the state law’s allowance for regulations related to health, safety, or welfare. The court concluded that the balance of harms favored the city, given public interest considerations, and thus refused to enjoin enforcement of the challenged ordinances.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, examined both the factual record and the legal questions concerning the interplay between the municipal code and state law. The appellate court held that the city’s ordinances authorizing impoundment of vending equipment and restricting vending hours in nonresidential areas more stringently than for other businesses are in direct conflict with state law. The court found the trial court erred by not adequately considering these conflicts. The appellate court reversed the denial of the preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to apply the correct legal standards and further develop the record as needed. View "Mustaqeem v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

More than one hundred individuals who became tenants at three apartment complexes in Los Angeles applied to rent from the property owners by filling out standard applications and paying $41.50 screening fees. The landlords used these fees to obtain credit and background reports. The plaintiffs alleged that the landlords violated California’s Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA) by failing to disclose the scope of the investigations, the identity of the reporting agencies, the right to inspect information, and by not providing copies of the consumer reports. Three plaintiffs also asserted a claim under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) based on the same alleged violations.After consolidating the cases, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment for the defendants, reasoning that none of the plaintiffs had shown actual damages or concrete injury resulting from the alleged ICRAA violations, and thus lacked standing. The court also found that the plaintiffs’ UCL claims failed for similar reasons, as they did not lose money or property due to the alleged conduct.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Three, held that the plaintiffs have standing to pursue their ICRAA claims because the statute provides a $10,000 minimum recovery for violations without requiring proof of actual damages or concrete injury. The court found that the statutory remedy is punitive and serves to deter violations, granting standing based on the violation itself. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the UCL claims, concluding that plaintiffs did not suffer an “injury in fact” or lose money or property as required for UCL standing. The judgment was therefore reversed as to the ICRAA claims, affirmed as to the UCL claims, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Yeh v. Barrington Pacific" on Justia Law

The case centers on Taiwan Orran Reed, who was convicted by a jury in August 2020 of multiple offenses, including pimping, pandering, human trafficking, and rape involving two victims. The jury also found special circumstances under California’s one strike law, resulting in Reed’s sentence of 21 years four months in prison, plus 30 years to life. Reed, who is African American, later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Riverside County Superior Court, seeking relief under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020. He alleged that racially discriminatory language—specifically being referred to as a “gorilla pimp”—was used by the prosecutor and expert law enforcement witnesses during his trial.After Reed’s retained counsel withdrew due to personal reasons and lack of payment, the superior court appointed the Riverside County Public Defender to represent Reed at an evidentiary hearing on his habeas petition. The Public Defender objected to the appointment, arguing that under Government Code section 27706, subdivision (g), his office has discretionary authority to decline representation in postconviction habeas matters, unlike mandatory representation required in trial proceedings under subdivision (a). The trial court disagreed and compelled the Public Defender to accept the appointment, finding that the Public Defender had not demonstrated unavailability.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, granted the Public Defender’s petition for writ of mandate. The appellate court held that section 27706(g) governs public defenders’ representation of habeas petitioners, granting them discretion to decline such appointments without a showing of unavailability. The trial court’s order compelling the Public Defender to represent Reed was vacated, and the superior court was directed to appoint alternate counsel for Reed’s habeas petition. View "Harmon v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

An attorney filed a petition for a writ of mandate on behalf of a client, seeking to have the trial court refer a statement of disqualification to a different judge. The petition included only the trial court’s order striking the statement of disqualification and did not provide the statement itself or any supporting evidence for the serious accusations made against the trial judge, such as alleged retaliation, discrimination, collusion with opposing counsel, and forgery of court orders. The attorney asserted that these claims were based on his and his client’s “earnest belief,” but failed to present any evidence from the court record to support them.The Superior Court of Orange County had previously struck the statement of disqualification, and the attorney’s petition to the appellate court was denied due to lack of supporting evidence. Following this denial, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, issued an order to show cause as to why sanctions should not be imposed for filing a frivolous writ petition and for failing to support factual contentions with citations to the record. The attorney responded but continued to provide no substantive evidence, instead relying on personal beliefs and documents not included in the trial record.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, found that the petition was frivolous and that the attorney had unreasonably violated procedural rules by making unsupported assertions, particularly serious accusations against the trial judge. The main holding is that an attorney may not make factual assertions or accusations against a judge without evidentiary support and must adhere to procedural requirements for appellate filings. The court imposed monetary sanctions of $25,000 against the attorney and ordered that notice be given to the State Bar. View "N.D. v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law