Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A dispute arose between the California FAIR Plan Association (CFPA), a statutorily created insurer of last resort, and the state’s Insurance Commissioner. The Commissioner issued an order in 2021 directing CFPA to submit a plan to offer and sell a comprehensive “Homeowners’ Policy” that included, among other coverages, premises liability and incidental workers’ compensation. CFPA challenged this order, contending that the Basic Property Insurance Law only required it to provide first-party property insurance—coverage for direct loss to property—not liability coverage or similar third-party protections.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied CFPA’s petition for a writ of mandate. The court found ambiguity in the statutory definition of “basic property insurance,” specifically in the phrase allowing for “other insurance coverages as may be added.” Deeming the term ambiguous, the court deferred to the Department of Insurance’s interpretation that allowed the Commissioner to require CFPA to offer additional coverages, including liability insurance, so long as such coverages had a connection to the insured property. The court relied in part on the longstanding approval of liability coverage in certain businessowner policies since the early 1990s.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the lower court’s decision de novo. It concluded that, while the statutory language was ambiguous, extrinsic evidence such as legislative history and statutory context demonstrated that the Legislature intended for CFPA to be limited to providing first-party property insurance. The court found no sufficient basis to defer to the Department of Insurance’s later-adopted interpretation that expanded coverage to liability. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and directed the trial court to grant CFPA’s petition for writ of mandate, holding that the Commissioner lacked authority under the Basic Property Insurance Law to require CFPA to offer liability coverage. View "California FAIR Plan Assn. v. Lara" on Justia Law

In 1998, a jury convicted Travis Scott Frederickson of two counts of first-degree murder, found that he personally used a firearm, and found true a special circumstance of multiple murder. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Following changes in California law that gave courts discretion to strike certain firearm enhancements, Frederickson petitioned for resentencing. In 2024, Frederickson asked the Superior Court of Orange County to recall his sentence and resentence him under the amended law. The prosecution agreed that the court could resentence as to the firearm enhancement, but argued that the court could not take any action that would effectively strike or dismiss the special circumstance finding.The Superior Court, however, reduced Frederickson’s convictions from first-degree to second-degree murder and imposed sentences on those lesser charges, including firearm enhancements. The trial court explicitly stated it was not striking or dismissing the special circumstance findings, but rather vacating the first-degree murder convictions; since the special circumstance only attaches to first-degree murder, it no longer applied once those convictions were vacated. The court entered new judgments for second-degree murder and imposed sentences accordingly.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not violate Penal Code section 1385.1—which prohibits judges from striking or dismissing special circumstance findings—by vacating the first-degree murder convictions and resentencing on the lesser offenses under section 1172.1. The appellate court reasoned that when a conviction is validly vacated, the attached special circumstance falls away by operation of law, not by judicial action proscribed by section 1385.1. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Frederickson" on Justia Law

Villa Zinfandel, LLC purchased real property in Napa County from a party that acquired it at a foreclosure sale. Christopher Bearman was occupying the property at the time. Villa Zinfandel filed an unlawful detainer complaint against Bearman as a limited civil action, seeking possession and holdover damages, as required by law after purchasing foreclosed property. Meanwhile, a third party, Edward Sanchez, filed a separate unlimited civil action to set aside the trustee’s deed upon sale, alleging violations in the foreclosure process. Bearman moved to consolidate the two actions, arguing that the issues overlapped. The trial court ultimately consolidated both cases for all purposes.Following consolidation, the trial court granted summary adjudication against Sanchez on his claim to unwind the foreclosure, while Villa Zinfandel’s unlawful detainer claim proceeded to trial. At trial, Villa Zinfandel introduced recorded foreclosure documents and the trustee’s deed upon sale. Bearman objected to the admission of these documents, arguing lack of foundation and hearsay, and contended that Villa Zinfandel needed to prove the truth of the recorded statements, not just their existence. The trial court overruled these objections, took judicial notice of the documents’ existence (but not their truth), and found in favor of Villa Zinfandel, awarding damages exceeding the then-applicable $35,000 cap for limited civil actions.On appeal, Bearman argued to the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, that the trial court erred by admitting the recorded documents and by awarding damages above the jurisdictional limit. The appellate court held that the trial court properly took judicial notice of the existence and facial contents of the recorded foreclosure documents and correctly applied legal presumptions regarding the regularity of the trustee’s sale. The court also held that, after consolidation for all purposes with an unlimited civil action, the case was no longer subject to the damages cap for limited civil actions. The judgment in favor of Villa Zinfandel was affirmed. View "Villa Zinfandel v. Bearman" on Justia Law

A teacher employed by the Los Angeles Unified School District purchased a variable annuity with an optional Guaranteed Minimum Income Benefit (GMIB) rider from an insurance company in 2010. The GMIB rider, which provided a guaranteed minimum level of payments, was subject to an annual fee that was disclosed both to the purchaser and on a state-maintained website as required by the California Education Code at the time of purchase. In 2018, the insurer ceased offering the GMIB rider to new customers, but permitted existing holders, including the plaintiff, to maintain the rider and continue paying the associated fee. After January 2019, the fee for the GMIB rider was no longer listed on the state-administered website, although the underlying annuity product remained available to new purchasers.The plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, alleging that the insurer’s collection of the GMIB rider fee after it was no longer disclosed on the state website constituted an unlawful business practice under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The plaintiff did not claim to have relied on the website or to have been misled about the fee, but asserted that the insurer was statutorily barred from collecting undisclosed fees. The trial court sustained the insurer’s demurrer, finding that the plaintiff failed to allege reliance necessary for standing under the UCL, and dismissed the action with prejudice when the plaintiff declined to amend the complaint.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the dismissal, albeit on different grounds. The court held that the Education Code does not require continued disclosure of fees for optional product features, such as the GMIB rider, after those features are no longer offered to prospective purchasers. As a result, the insurer was not prohibited from collecting the fee from existing holders, and the plaintiff’s UCL claim failed as a matter of law. The court awarded the insurer its costs on appeal. View "Jacobson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The plaintiff stayed at a hotel in San Diego in 2017 and alleged that he suffered injuries due to a bed bug infestation in his room. He filed a lawsuit against the hotel operator and associated parties, asserting several causes of action, including negligence, battery, and breach of warranty of habitability. After the case was filed, the plaintiff dismissed two defendants without prejudice. However, he delayed serving the main defendants for nearly three years. Once served, the defendants initiated discovery, but the plaintiff repeatedly failed to provide responses, even after extensions were granted and orders were issued by the court compelling compliance.The Superior Court of San Diego County, after multiple unopposed motions by the defendants and ongoing failures by the plaintiff and his counsel to comply with discovery orders, granted terminating sanctions. This resulted in dismissal of the action with prejudice and imposition of monetary sanctions. The plaintiff’s attorney argued that he lost contact with his client and sought relief under section 473(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, claiming attorney fault. The Superior Court set aside one dismissal order but ultimately denied relief from the terminating sanctions, finding the plaintiff and his attorney failed to justify their conduct or show the neglect was excusable. The court reaffirmed its dismissal and monetary sanctions.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, held that the mandatory relief provision of section 473(b) applies to an unopposed order granting dismissal as a terminating sanction. However, the court concluded the plaintiff did not meet his burden to demonstrate entitlement to relief, as the record showed he did not explain his lack of communication with counsel and his attorney’s failure to act was deliberate rather than inadvertent. The appellate court also found no abuse of discretion in the imposition of terminating sanctions and affirmed the judgment. View "Rodriguez v. WNT, Inc." on Justia Law

An activist who sought to distribute leaflets at two adjoining privately owned shopping centers in California was denied permission by the centers' owners, who maintained a policy prohibiting expressive activity, including leafletting, on their property. The activist’s leaflets promoted his views on men’s reproductive rights and invited the public to attend related meetings. After his requests to leaflet were repeatedly denied, he brought suit, arguing that the centers' blanket ban on expressive activity violated the California Constitution’s liberty of speech provision. He also challenged a section of the centers’ code of conduct that required prior written permission for noncommercial expressive activity, asserting that it granted management unfettered discretion.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found that a blanket ban on leafletting was unconstitutional and that the balance of harms favored the plaintiff. However, the court denied the activist’s motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding he was unlikely to prevail on the merits. The court reasoned that his deposition testimony limited his challenge to leafletting near store entrances—areas not considered public fora under California precedent—and further found that his leaflets constituted unlicensed legal advice, which it deemed unprotected speech.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reversed. The appellate court held that the plaintiff had standing to bring a facial challenge to the centers' expressive activity ban, regardless of whether his own speech was constitutionally protected, and that his challenge was not limited to store entrances. The court determined that the centers' total ban on expressive activity in common areas was unconstitutional under Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center and subsequent California Supreme Court authority. It also found the centers’ permitting requirement invalid for lacking objective criteria. The appellate court directed the trial court to grant a preliminary injunction, allowing the centers to impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions but not to prohibit expressive activity entirely. View "Salazar v. Majestic Realty Co." on Justia Law

A former student alleged that the director of his school’s childcare program sexually abused him during the 2001-2002 school year, both on campus and at her residence. The childcare program was operated by West End YMCA on the school’s campus, and the director was employed by West End YMCA, not by the school district. The student, as plaintiff, brought suit against several parties, including the school district, asserting multiple causes of action related to negligence and abuse.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County reviewed the district’s motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication on four causes of action asserted against it. The court granted summary adjudication in favor of the district on two causes—negligent hiring/retention and failure to perform mandatory duties—but denied it as to the first (negligent supervision of students) and fourth (negligent supervision/failure to warn, with respect to Johnson) causes of action. The school district sought writ relief from the partial denial, specifically contesting the denial as to the fourth cause of action.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the petition for writ of mandate. The appellate court focused solely on the fourth cause of action, which alleged negligent supervision of the program director. Applying the standard from C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist., the Court of Appeal held that liability for negligent supervision requires actual or constructive knowledge by the district’s supervisory employees of the individual’s dangerous propensities. The record contained no evidence that any district employee had actual or constructive knowledge of the director’s inappropriate conduct. Accordingly, the appellate court granted the writ of mandate and directed the superior court to enter summary adjudication in favor of the district on the third, fourth, and seventh causes of action, awarding costs to the district. View "Rancho Cucamonga Central School Dist. v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with multiple counts, including murder and attempted murder, arising from an alleged retaliatory shooting involving the “Mongolian Boys Society” gang. He was originally arraigned on a felony complaint in February 2020 and entered a general time waiver for his preliminary hearing. In May 2021, the prosecution amended the complaint to change the nature of certain firearm enhancements; petitioner was arraigned on the amended complaint the same day and agreed to a limited time waiver for the preliminary hearing until August 16, 2021, plus ten court days. The preliminary hearing was ultimately delayed several times due to requests for continuances, discovery issues, and pandemic-related quarantine measures, despite petitioner’s repeated objections to further continuances.The Superior Court of Fresno County held the preliminary hearing in November 2021, outside the period covered by petitioner’s limited waiver on the amended complaint, and subsequently held petitioner to answer on all charges. After the information was filed and the prosecution indicated intent to seek the death penalty, petitioner moved to set aside the information, initially without raising the timeliness issue. Later, he supplemented his motion to argue that the delay violated his right to a speedy preliminary hearing under Penal Code section 859b. The superior court denied the motion. Petitioner then sought writ relief, which was initially denied by the California Court of Appeal, but the California Supreme Court directed the appellate court to reconsider whether petitioner’s speedy preliminary hearing rights were violated.Upon review, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, held that while general time waivers for preliminary hearings under section 859b are irrevocable, a new 60-day period commences upon arraignment on an amended complaint unless expressly waived. Because petitioner did not enter a general time waiver at the second arraignment, and the preliminary hearing was held beyond the statutory time limit, the court granted relief and ordered the information set aside and the complaint dismissed as to petitioner. View "Lee v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

An employee of an independent home inspection company was injured while inspecting a private residence, slipping and falling on outdoor steps made of wooden railroad ties. The inspector was hired by his employer to conduct a safety inspection at the home for the homeowner's insurance company. The homeowner did not direct his work, provide tools, or control how he performed the inspection. The inspector admitted the steps were visible and that he was not watching where he stepped, and he received workers’ compensation benefits for his injuries. He and his wife sued the homeowner for negligence, premises liability, and loss of consortium, alleging the steps were hazardous.The Superior Court of Ventura County granted summary judgment for the homeowner, relying on the Privette doctrine, which generally prevents employees of independent contractors from suing the person who hired the contractor for work-related injuries. The plaintiffs argued that the homeowner was not a “hirer” under Privette and that there was a factual dispute about whether the “concealed hazard” exception from Kinsman v. Unocal Corporation applied. They pointed to evidence that the steps were sometimes slippery and that the homeowner had mentioned this to her gardener years earlier.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the judgment. The court held that the Privette doctrine applied because the homeowner, by allowing the inspection and paying for insurance, was effectively a hirer. The court further found that the concealed hazard exception did not apply, as there was no evidence the condition was concealed or that the inspector could not have discovered it with reasonable care. The court affirmed summary judgment for the homeowner, and the derivative loss of consortium claim failed as well. View "Andrews v. Wagner" on Justia Law

A teacher employed by the Los Angeles Unified School District purchased a variable annuity from Metropolitan Life Insurance Company in 2010, selecting an optional rider that guaranteed a minimum income benefit for an annual fee. At the time of purchase, the fee for this rider was disclosed both directly to her and on a state-maintained website, as required by California Education Code provisions governing vendors of certain retirement investment products to public education employees. In 2018, Met Life stopped offering the optional rider to new customers but continued to charge the annual fee to those, like the plaintiff, who had previously selected it. After January 2019, information about the rider fee was no longer displayed on the state website. The plaintiff continued making investments subject to the rider and paying the associated fee.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the plaintiff’s claim under the unfair competition law (UCL), which alleged Met Life unlawfully charged the fee without required public disclosure, regardless of whether the plaintiff had relied on the website or was misled. The court sustained Met Life’s demurrer and dismissed the case with prejudice, reasoning that the plaintiff failed to allege reliance on the lack of disclosure.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the judgment but for a different reason. The appellate court held that the Education Code does not require vendors to continue disclosing fees for optional product features that are no longer offered to new customers, even if existing customers still pay those fees. Therefore, Met Life was not prohibited from charging the fee after discontinuing the rider for new enrollees, and the plaintiff’s UCL claim was properly dismissed. View "Jacobson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law