Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The dispute arose when one attorney, after obtaining a $5 million default judgment against another attorney in California, sought to collect on that judgment by levying two Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) belonging to the judgment debtor. The debtor argued that because he had moved to Florida, Florida’s statutory exemptions should apply, shielding his IRAs from collection. He also claimed the IRAs were funded from a surrendered life insurance policy held in a private retirement plan, asserting exemptions under California law for both the policy and the retirement plan.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the claim of exemption. Initially, the court tentatively applied Florida law but later decided the law of the forum state—California—should govern exemption claims. Ultimately, the court found the debtor failed to prove that the IRAs qualified for any exemption under California law, including the private retirement plan exemption or that the funds were necessary for his support. The court denied the claim of exemption, permitting the creditor to levy the IRAs.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It held that California law applies to collection actions in California courts regardless of the judgment debtor’s domicile. It further concluded that a surrendered life insurance policy is not necessarily exempt from collection and, once surrendered, is treated as matured, requiring proof that the proceeds are necessary for support. The court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s factual findings, applied a de novo review to legal questions, and affirmed the order denying the exemption. Thus, the IRAs were subject to collection, and the trial court’s order was affirmed. View "Bagby v. Davis" on Justia Law

In December 2023, a man was arrested after setting a fire in a rural area near the Ortega Mountains in Riverside County, California. Witnesses saw him near the scene, and firefighters and investigators concluded the fire was intentionally and maliciously set. At the time, there was a prolonged state of emergency in California, initially declared in 2015 due to widespread tree mortality from bark beetle infestations, which increased wildfire risks in certain regions.A jury in the Superior Court of Riverside County convicted the defendant of felony arson of forest land and found true a sentencing enhancement for committing arson “during and within an area” proclaimed by the Governor to be in a state of emergency. The court imposed a lengthy prison sentence, including additional time for prior convictions and the state of emergency enhancement.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The appellate court found that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to decide the legal scope of the Governor’s state of emergency proclamation. The appellate court conducted an independent legal review and determined that the 2015 proclamation did not declare a statewide emergency but limited the emergency to specific high-risk zones to be identified by state agencies. The prosecution failed to provide evidence that the fire occurred within such a designated area, making the evidence insufficient to support the enhancement.The appellate court reversed the true finding on the state of emergency enhancement, ordered a full resentencing, and affirmed the underlying arson conviction. The court also directed that, upon the defendant’s request, the trial court hold a hearing on his ability to pay fines and costs, consistent with the standards set in People v. Kopp. View "People v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

The plaintiff purchased a vehicle in 2017 and later alleged it was defective, suing the manufacturer in 2021. The parties eventually settled, with the plaintiff surrendering the vehicle and dismissing the suit, and the manufacturer agreeing to pay $100,000. The settlement specified the plaintiff would be deemed the prevailing party for purposes of attorney fees, and the manufacturer would pay the amount determined by the trial court upon noticed motion. After the settlement was reported to the Superior Court of San Diego County, the court ordered dismissal within 45 days. When no dismissal was filed, the clerk issued notice that the case would be deemed dismissed without prejudice on August 15, 2023, unless a party showed good cause otherwise. No such cause was shown, and the plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for attorney fees.The motion for attorney fees was opposed by the manufacturer, arguing it was untimely under California Rules of Court, as it was not served within 180 days of the dismissal date. The plaintiff countered that the 180-day deadline did not apply, claiming the case had not been formally dismissed and no judgment had been entered. The Superior Court of San Diego County disagreed, finding the case had been dismissed on August 15, 2023, per the clerk’s notice and court rules, and denied the motion as untimely. The plaintiff appealed the denial, and a signed minute order dismissing the complaint was later entered, but the court maintained that the earlier date controlled.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the matter de novo. It held that a voluntary dismissal, even if not appealable, starts the clock for filing a motion for attorney fees when it concludes the litigation. The court found the case was dismissed on August 15, 2023, and the plaintiff failed to timely serve the fee motion. The order denying attorney fees was affirmed. View "Hatlevig v. General Motors LLC" on Justia Law

After an adult son sent text messages threatening a mass shooting at a local high school and referenced access to thousands of rounds of ammunition, the city police investigated the home he shared with his father. The father owned multiple firearms and large quantities of ammunition. Evidence showed the son had a history of mental health crises, including involuntary holds, and was subject to a lifetime ban from possessing firearms. Despite this prohibition, the son had access to firearms through his father, participated in shooting competitions, and had knowledge of how to access gun safes in the home. The father failed to turn in all firearms and ammunition as required by a temporary restraining order, and some safes were not adequately secured.The Superior Court of Orange County held an evidentiary hearing, where both the father and a police investigator testified. The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the father’s failure to adequately secure his firearms and ammunition, combined with his son’s mental health history and credible threat of mass violence, posed a significant danger to others. The court concluded the father’s conduct enabled his son’s access to firearms and found no adequate, less restrictive alternatives to a Gun Violence Restraining Order (GVRO). A three-year GVRO was issued against the father.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings and that the GVRO statute was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. The court concluded the trial court reasonably interpreted statutory causation and properly considered alternatives. The father’s Second Amendment and hearsay objections were deemed forfeited for not being raised below. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order granting the GVRO. View "Anaheim Police Dept. v. Crockett" on Justia Law

Edward and Linda Diaz purchased a motorhome from a California dealer, receiving warranties from the manufacturer that included a clause requiring any legal disputes related to the warranties to be litigated exclusively in Indiana, where the motorhome was manufactured. The warranties also contained a choice-of-law provision favoring Indiana law and a waiver of jury trial. After experiencing issues with the vehicle that were not remedied under warranty, the Diazes sued the manufacturer, dealer, and lender in California under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, alleging failure to repair defects and refusal to replace or refund the vehicle.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the defendants’ motion to stay the California action, enforcing the forum selection clause. The manufacturer had offered to stipulate that it would not oppose application of California’s Song-Beverly Act or a jury trial if the Diazes pursued their claims in Indiana. The court ordered the manufacturer to sign such a stipulation, holding that the Diazes could seek to lift the stay if Indiana courts declined to apply California law.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, concluded that the forum selection clause was unenforceable. The court held that the warranty’s terms, including the forum selection and choice-of-law provisions, violated California public policy by purporting to waive unwaivable statutory rights under the Song-Beverly Act. The court determined that the manufacturer’s post hoc offer to stipulate to California law did not cure the unconscionability present at contract formation and that severance of the unlawful terms would not further the interests of justice. As a result, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order staying the California action and directed entry of a new order denying the stay. View "Diaz v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc." on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who pleaded no contest in 2009 to second degree murder, shooting at an occupied vehicle, and participating in a criminal street gang, following an amended indictment stemming from a 2006 shooting. The plea was supported by a stipulation that police reports and grand jury testimony provided a factual basis for the charges. The defendant was sentenced to a total of 25 years to life. After a direct appeal resulted in a minor modification to presentence custody credits, the conviction stood.Years later, the defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The Kern County Superior Court initially denied the petition at the prima facie stage, but the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Upon remand, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing. The People introduced, and the court admitted, transcripts from the grand jury proceedings, police reports, witness statements, and related law enforcement documents, over the defendant’s objections. The trial court denied the resentencing petition, finding the defendant was a major participant in the murder who acted with reckless indifference to human life, relying on the challenged evidence.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, found that the trial court erred in admitting the grand jury transcript and police reports at the evidentiary hearing, as these did not fall within the exceptions for admissible evidence under section 1172.6(d)(3). The appellate court held that neither the stipulation to the factual basis for the plea nor any other exception permitted their admission. The court vacated the denial of the resentencing petition and remanded for a new evidentiary hearing, explicitly directing that only admissible evidence consistent with section 1172.6 may be considered. The holding does not bar the prosecution from presenting admissible evidence on remand. View "P. v. Dixon" on Justia Law

After an undercover police operation responding to an online advertisement for fentanyl, law enforcement negotiated a drug purchase with the defendant using text messages and a Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) phone number. The defendant was identified and apprehended with nearly 1,000 fentanyl pills in his possession, and his cell phone was linked to the communications coordinating the sale. At the time, the defendant was already on probation for a similar drug offense. He ultimately entered a plea of no contest to felony possession of fentanyl for sale, admitting to an enhancement for a large quantity of contraband.The Alameda County Superior Court, following the plea agreement, placed the defendant on two years of formal probation with electronic monitoring. Over defense objection, the court imposed a “five-way” search condition, allowing warrantless searches of his person, property, vehicle, residence, and all electronic devices under his control, including the obligation to provide passwords. The search clause was justified by the court based on the defendant’s use of electronic devices to facilitate drug sales and obscure his identity. The defendant timely appealed, arguing that the electronics search condition was unconstitutionally overbroad and unreasonable.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the probation condition’s constitutionality and reasonableness de novo. The court found the electronics search clause was neither overbroad nor unreasonable, given the direct involvement of electronic devices in the offense and the defendant’s criminal history. The court also rejected proposals from both the Attorney General and the defense to modify or narrow the condition, concluding that the clause was sufficiently tailored to the facts of the case and necessary for rehabilitation and public safety. The judgment was affirmed, and the search condition was upheld without modification. View "P. v. Flores" on Justia Law

In 2000, a 16-year-old girl and her boyfriend developed a fascination with murder, exchanging letters expressing admiration for notorious killers and a desire to commit murder themselves. In the early morning hours of July 21, 2000, she let her boyfriend into her family’s home, and waited in the bathroom while he fatally stabbed her uncle, three cousins, and seriously wounded her aunt. Her fingerprints were found on weapons and duct tape at the scene. During the investigation, she admitted to planning a staged robbery to bring her family together, but maintained she did not intend for anyone to be killed.A jury in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County convicted her of four counts of first degree murder under both direct aiding and abetting and felony murder theories. She was sentenced to four consecutive terms of 25 years to life. On direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal reversed her attempted murder conviction and special circumstance findings but affirmed her murder convictions. Subsequent appeals and resentencing focused on mitigating factors such as her age and psychological condition, but her convictions and sentences were largely upheld.In 2020, she petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, which allows certain defendants convicted under the felony murder rule or natural and probable consequences doctrine to seek resentencing. After an evidentiary hearing, the Superior Court found her ineligible for resentencing, concluding that she was a direct aider and abettor with intent to kill, and a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed, holding that resentencing relief is not available to a direct aider and abettor who acts with intent to kill, and found no error or ineffective assistance regarding the consideration of her youth. View "P. v. Diaz" on Justia Law

An employee working as a prep cook at a restaurant was injured during a physical altercation with a co-worker. The altercation arose out of a workplace argument that escalated, resulting in the co-worker striking the employee and causing significant injury. The injured employee filed a workers’ compensation claim, while the employer and its insurer denied liability, asserting the “initial physical aggressor” defense under California Labor Code section 3600(a)(7), arguing that the employee was the initial physical aggressor and thus barred from recovery.The matter was tried before a Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge (WCJ), who heard testimony from all involved and found that the employee was the initial physical aggressor, based largely on the credibility of eyewitnesses. The WCJ denied the employee’s claim for compensation. The employee timely filed a petition for reconsideration with the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB). Although the petition was filed and transmitted within the statutory 60-day period, the WCAB did not review it until after the deadline. The WCAB ultimately granted reconsideration, rescinded the WCJ’s denial, and found that the “initial physical aggressor” defense had not been proven, thus allowing the employee’s claim.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the WCAB’s order. The court held that under former section 5909 of the Labor Code, the WCAB lost jurisdiction to act on the petition for reconsideration after the 60-day statutory period elapsed, unless grounds for equitable tolling were present. The court concluded that equitable tolling was not warranted here because there was no evidence of reasonable diligence or special circumstances justifying such relief. Therefore, the court reversed the WCAB’s order and decision after reconsideration. View "Zenith Insurance Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

A murder occurred in 2014 when the victim, Justin Triplett, was shot multiple times at his apartment. Jason Johnomar Zapata became a suspect after evidence connected him to the murder weapon and ammunition. Nearly a year later, while in custody on unrelated charges, Zapata was subjected to what is known as a Perkins operation: he was placed in a holding cell with two undercover agents posing as inmates. During the operation, a law enforcement officer conducted a fake lineup and falsely told Zapata that a witness had identified him as the killer. When asked if he wanted to discuss the murder, Zapata invoked his right to counsel. Nevertheless, the deputy returned Zapata to the cell, announced to the undercover agents that Zapata would be charged with murder, and the agents subsequently questioned Zapata, eliciting an incriminating confession.At trial in the Superior Court of Riverside County, Zapata moved to suppress his statements, arguing that his Miranda rights were violated because he had invoked his right to counsel before the confession and had not waived it. The trial court denied the motion, admitted the confession into evidence, and Zapata was convicted by a jury of second degree murder. The jury did not reach a verdict on the personal firearm enhancement, but Zapata later admitted a lesser firearm use enhancement.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that when a suspect invokes the right to counsel and a known law enforcement officer actively “stimulates” a Perkins operation in a manner that amounts to custodial interrogation, any resulting incriminating statements are inadmissible under Miranda and Edwards. The court found the admission of Zapata's statements prejudicial and reversed the judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "P. v. Zapata" on Justia Law