Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Kamran Ghadimi, M.D., filed a collection action against his former patient, Eileen Talbott, for unpaid medical bills. The parties engaged in settlement negotiations, and Ghadimi's counsel indicated acceptance of a $9,500 settlement. However, Ghadimi later backed out of the agreement. Talbott filed a cross-complaint to enforce the settlement. Ghadimi missed the deadline to respond, and the trial court entered his default. Ghadimi moved to set aside the default under the mandatory relief provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), but the trial court denied the motion, finding the default was due to a calculated litigation strategy by Ghadimi’s lawyers.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Ghadimi's motion to set aside the default, concluding that the default was caused by a deliberate litigation strategy rather than neglect or mistake. The court also found that Ghadimi's counsel's declaration seeking an extension to respond to the cross-complaint was not credible and that the default was not due to any mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case and concluded that Ghadimi was entitled to relief under the mandatory provision of section 473, subdivision (b). The court held that the default was caused by the actions of Ghadimi’s lawyers, not by Ghadimi himself, and that the mandatory relief provision should be applied to relieve the innocent client of the consequences of the attorney’s fault. The court reversed the judgment and the postjudgment order granting Talbott’s motion for attorneys’ fees, directing the trial court to vacate the default judgment and enter a new order granting Ghadimi’s motion to set aside the default. View "Talbott v. Ghadimi" on Justia Law

Jon Woods, a workers' compensation attorney, was convicted of 37 felony counts of workers' compensation fraud. Woods had engaged in unlawful kickback and referral fee arrangements, referring copy and subpoena work to companies that provided financial benefits to him and his firm. This corruption affected the workers' compensation system, as the employer's insurance company had to cover the costs.The Superior Court of Orange County reviewed the case, where Woods was found guilty on all counts and received a four-year prison sentence. He was also ordered to pay $701,452 in restitution. Woods appealed, arguing that the Williamson rule precluded convictions on counts 5 through 37, and that the court erred in limiting his cross-examination of certain prosecution witnesses.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Woods that the Williamson rule applied, as his conduct fell under a more specific statute, Labor Code section 139.32, which criminalizes kickback schemes and is a misdemeanor. Therefore, the court reversed Woods's convictions on counts 5 through 37, the white-collar sentencing enhancement, and the restitution award based on these charges. However, the court found no error in the trial court's limitation of cross-examination of prosecution witnesses and affirmed the remainder of the judgment. View "People v. Woods" on Justia Law

In 2001, a jury convicted Kim H. Tang of first-degree murder and using a deadly weapon. The court found true that Tang had one prison prior, one serious felony prior, and one strike prior. Tang was sentenced to 50 years to life, plus a five-year serious felony enhancement and a one-year weapon enhancement. The court imposed and stayed a one-year enhancement for the prison prior. Tang appealed, and in 2002, the Court of Appeal modified the judgment to strike the prison prior enhancement.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Tang's motion for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, which was enacted to invalidate certain sentence enhancements. The court concluded that Tang was ineligible for resentencing because the prison prior enhancement had been stricken, not imposed.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that a stricken enhancement is not considered an imposed enhancement under section 1172.75, subdivision (a). Therefore, Tang was not eligible for resentencing under the statute. The court directed the trial court to issue an amended abstract of judgment reflecting that the enhancement was stricken. View "P. v. Tang" on Justia Law

The case involves five public utilities operating in California, including Pacific Bell Telephone Company and AT&T Mobility LLC, which challenged the property tax rates imposed by Merced County for the fiscal years 2017-2018 and 2018-2019. The utilities argued that the tax rates applied to their properties exceeded the permissible rates under Section 19 of Article XIII of the California Constitution, which they interpreted as requiring utility property to be taxed at the same rate as non-utility property.In the Superior Court of Merced County, the utilities sought partial refunds of the property taxes paid, claiming that the tax rates levied on them were higher than the average tax rates in the county. The County demurred, relying on the precedent set by the Sixth District in County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, which held that Section 19 does not mandate the same tax rate for utility property as for locally assessed property. The utilities conceded that Santa Clara was binding but sought to challenge its holding on appeal. The Superior Court dismissed the case, and the utilities filed a timely notice of appeal.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that Section 19 of Article XIII of the California Constitution does not require utility property to be taxed at the same rate as non-utility property. Instead, the court interpreted the relevant language as an enabling clause, allowing utility property to be subject to taxation, rather than a limiting clause mandating equal tax rates. The court found that the historical context, language, and structure of Section 19 supported this interpretation, and thus, Merced County's application of the tax rates did not violate the constitutional provision. View "Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Merced" on Justia Law

Over a five-year period, Robert Michael Tafoya stalked and harassed E.R. in various ways. He frequently appeared at her workplace, left flowers on her car, followed her while shopping, made numerous Facebook posts claiming to be involved with her and the father of her children, and fraudulently applied for custody and visitation orders. Despite restraining orders, his behavior continued unabated, including attempts to pick up her children from school.Following a jury trial in the Superior Court of Riverside County, Tafoya was convicted of stalking, perjury, attempted child abduction, and filing false documents. He was sentenced to 25 years and eight months in prison. Tafoya appealed the convictions, arguing that his Facebook posts were protected by the First Amendment, there was insufficient evidence for the attempted child abduction conviction, and the perjury and false document convictions lacked false statements. He also appealed the restitution order, claiming the court used the wrong standard and lacked proper verification.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that Tafoya’s Facebook posts were not protected activity as they were part of a pattern of conduct that constituted a credible threat. The court found substantial evidence supporting the attempted child abduction conviction, noting that the visitation order was obtained by fraud and thus void. The court affirmed the convictions for stalking, attempted child abduction, and filing false documents. However, the court reversed the perjury conviction related to the restraining order (count 10) due to the lack of a false statement under penalty of perjury and remanded for resentencing. The restitution order was upheld, as the need for relocation expenses was justified by the record. View "People v. Tafoya" on Justia Law

Annette Gaylene Batten, who was convicted of first-degree murder in 1996 and sentenced to life in prison, was released on parole in August 2017. In December 2023, she admitted to two parole violations: driving under the influence and failing to inform her parole agent of her arrest. Consequently, the trial court revoked her parole and remanded her to the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and the jurisdiction of the Board of Parole Hearings for future parole consideration.The trial court's decision was based on Penal Code section 3000.08, subdivision (h), which mandates remand to the CDCR for parolees who violate conditions of lifetime parole. Batten argued that a statute enacted in 2020, which limits parole to three years for those released after July 2020, should apply to her, and that the disparity in treatment violates equal protection principles. The trial court, however, followed the existing law applicable to her case.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that rational basis review, rather than strict scrutiny, applies to Batten's equal protection challenge. The court found that there is a rational basis for treating inmates released before July 2020 differently from those released after that date. The Legislature could have reasonably decided that changing the terms of parole retroactively would undermine the Board's parole determinations. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's decision to remand Batten to the CDCR. View "People v. Batten" on Justia Law

Misael Padron, a Cuban citizen granted asylum in the United States, appealed the denial of his motion to vacate his conviction for carjacking, which he had entered pursuant to a no-contest plea. Padron argued that he did not understand the immigration consequences of his plea, which included mandatory detention, denial of naturalization, and near-certain termination of asylum and deportation. He provided evidence of his mental health challenges related to persecution in Cuba and claimed his defense counsel did not adequately inform him of the immigration consequences.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Padron’s motion, partly because he did not provide a declaration from his defense counsel and had signed a plea form acknowledging potential deportation. The court also noted that there was no alternative, immigration-neutral plea available to Padron.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Padron demonstrated error affecting his ability to understand the immigration consequences of his plea. The court found that Padron’s defense counsel did not adequately advise him of the mandatory immigration consequences, and Padron’s mental health challenges further impaired his understanding. The court also determined that Padron established a reasonable probability he would have rejected the plea had he understood the consequences, given his strong ties to the United States and the severe impact on his asylum status.The Court of Appeal reversed the denial of Padron’s motion and remanded the case with instructions to vacate Padron’s conviction and permit him to withdraw his plea and enter a different plea. View "People v. Padron" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Christian L. Johnson sued his employer, the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), alleging discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. During the litigation, Caltrans attorney Paul Brown sent an email to Johnson’s supervisor, Nicolas Duncan, which Duncan then shared with Johnson. Johnson forwarded the email to his attorney, John Shepardson, who further disseminated it to several experts and individuals. Caltrans sought a protective order, claiming the email was covered by attorney-client privilege. The trial court granted the order and later disqualified Shepardson and three experts for non-compliance with the order.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County issued the protective order, finding the email privileged. Johnson and Shepardson were ordered to destroy all copies and cease further dissemination. Caltrans later filed a motion to enforce the order and subsequently a motion to disqualify Shepardson and the experts, arguing continued non-compliance and misuse of the privileged email. The trial court granted the disqualification, citing Shepardson’s breach of ethical duties and the potential prejudice to Caltrans.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the Brown email was protected by attorney-client privilege. The court found no merit in Johnson’s arguments that the privilege was waived or that the crime-fraud exception applied. The court also upheld the disqualification of Shepardson and the experts, concluding that Shepardson’s actions violated ethical obligations and posed a risk of unfair advantage and harm to the integrity of the judicial process. The court emphasized the importance of maintaining public trust in the administration of justice. View "Johnson v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

An imposter posing as investment advisor Daniel Corey Payne of Lifetime Financial, Inc. stole over $300,000 from Mark Frank Harding. Prior to this, Lifetime had received several inquiries about a potential imposter posing as Payne but did not post a warning or take significant action. Harding sued Lifetime and others for negligence, arguing that as registered investment advisors, they had a duty to post a warning about the imposter on their website and report the complaints to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). Harding claimed that had they done so, he would not have transferred funds to the imposter.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that they owed no duty to Harding. The court noted that Harding was not a client of the defendants and that there was no fiduciary relationship between them. The court also found that there was no statutory or case authority imposing a duty on the defendants to warn nonclients about an imposter.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that the defendants did not owe a duty to Harding to report the imposter on their website or to FINRA. The court found that FINRA Rule 4530 did not apply because the defendants were not the subject of any written customer complaint involving allegations of theft or misappropriation of funds. The court also found that FINRA Rule 2210 did not impose an affirmative duty to warn the general public about a third-party impersonator. The court concluded that the defendants did not owe a duty to Harding and affirmed the summary judgment. View "Harding v. Lifetime Financial, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a project to build a four-story hotel and extend a road in the City of Clearlake. The City approved the project after adopting a mitigated negative declaration (MND) under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The Koi Nation of Northern California, a Native American tribe, challenged the approval, alleging the City failed to comply with CEQA, particularly the provisions added by Assembly Bill No. 52, which requires consideration of tribal cultural resources and meaningful consultation with tribes.The trial court denied Koi Nation's petition for writ of mandate, concluding that the City had not violated CEQA’s consultation requirements because there was no written request from Koi Nation to invoke the right to consultation. The court also rejected Koi Nation’s claims regarding the City’s failure to investigate and mitigate the project’s impacts on tribal cultural resources.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that Koi Nation had indeed requested consultation in writing, as required by CEQA. The court determined that the City failed to conduct meaningful consultation, as it did not engage in a process of seeking, discussing, and considering the views of Koi Nation, nor did it seek agreement on mitigation measures. The court concluded that the City’s failure to comply with CEQA’s consultation requirements constituted a prejudicial abuse of discretion, as it omitted material necessary for informed decision-making and public participation.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and judgment, instructing the superior court to issue a writ of mandate setting aside the City’s MND and related project approvals. The court did not address Koi Nation’s other arguments, including the need for an environmental impact report (EIR). View "Koi Nation of Northern California v. City of Clearlake" on Justia Law