Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two young children, ages four and two, were severely injured after falling from a second-floor bedroom window in an apartment building in Lodi, California, where they lived with their mother. The accident occurred shortly after the property owner replaced the apartment’s windows during a renovation that did not include installing fall prevention devices on the upper-floor windows. The children’s guardian ad litem sued the property owner and its manager, alleging negligence based on both general negligence and negligence per se, claiming that the absence of fall prevention devices violated the California Building Standards Code and proximately caused the injuries.The case was heard in the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda. Prior to trial, the defendants sought to defeat the negligence per se claim, arguing the building was exempt from current code requirements because it complied with the code at the time of its original construction in 1980. The trial court denied their motion, allowing both negligence theories to proceed to trial. After plaintiffs presented their case, the court granted a nonsuit for the entire complaint, ruling there was no duty owed under general negligence given lack of foreseeability, and that the window replacement qualified for a code exemption, negating negligence per se.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the matter de novo. The appellate court affirmed the nonsuit on the general negligence claim, finding the harm was not sufficiently foreseeable to impose a duty. However, it reversed the nonsuit as to negligence per se, holding that replacing the window did not qualify for the “original materials” exemption in the Building Code, and thus the defendants were required to comply with current safety standards. The case was remanded for retrial on the negligence per se claim. View "Jimenez v. Hayes Apartment Homes" on Justia Law

A California nonprofit organization focused on preventing deceptive environmental claims filed a lawsuit against a manufacturer of feminine hygiene products. The organization alleged that the manufacturer labeled and advertised certain products, including period underwear, pads, and panty liners, as “organic” or “made with organic cotton” in violation of the California Organic Food and Farming Act (COFFA). The complaint stated that these products contained less than the minimum required percentage of certified organic materials and included nonagricultural and nonorganically produced components not permitted under state or federal organic standards.The case was first heard in the Alameda County Superior Court. The manufacturer moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that COFFA applies only to agricultural products, cosmetics, and pet food—not to personal care products such as feminine hygiene items. The Superior Court agreed with the manufacturer and granted judgment on the pleadings, concluding that COFFA did not govern the products in question. The nonprofit timely appealed that decision.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case de novo. The appellate court held that COFFA applies broadly to all products sold as “organic” or containing “organic” materials in California, unless specifically exempted, and that the statute’s plain language encompasses feminine hygiene products. The court found no basis for an implied exception for personal care products and determined that the trial court erred in its interpretation. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment, clarifying that COFFA’s standards and labeling requirements apply to the manufacturer’s products at issue. View "Environmental Democracy Project v. Rael" on Justia Law

A city in California owned a downtown parking garage known as Garage 5, which was in poor condition and underutilized according to studies conducted in 2019 and 2022. The city had previously adopted a housing plan to identify public land suitable for housing development. In public meetings and study sessions throughout 2021 and 2022, city staff and consultants presented data showing declining demand for public parking and the high cost of necessary repairs to Garage 5. After further study and public comment, the city’s council passed a resolution in December 2022 declaring Garage 5 to be surplus land under the Surplus Land Act, provided that any future development retain at least 75 public parking spaces.The owner of nearby properties, Airport Business Center, filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief in Sonoma County Superior Court. The petitioner argued the city had violated the Surplus Land Act by declaring the garage surplus while there was still an ongoing need for public parking and contended that the city’s findings were not supported by the evidence. The Superior Court denied the petition, finding the city’s actions were not arbitrary or capricious, and that there was substantial evidentiary support for the resolution. A temporary stay was granted pending appeal, but the Court of Appeal denied a request for further stay.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that the Surplus Land Act’s requirement that property be “not necessary for the agency’s use” allows a city to designate property as surplus if it is not indispensable for agency operations, even if the property serves a public purpose like parking. The evidence supported the city’s determination, and the findings in the resolution satisfied statutory requirements. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, awarding costs to the city. View "Airport Business Center v. City of Santa Rosa" on Justia Law

The case concerns challenges to groundwater replenishment charges imposed by a water district in a desert region where groundwater is the main source of potable water. The water district operates three areas of benefit (AOBs) and levies replenishment charges on customers who pump significant groundwater. Domestic customers do not pay these charges directly, but their payments for drinking water are allocated to the replenishment funds through the district’s enterprise fund system. Plaintiffs, including a taxpayer association, alleged that the replenishment charges were unconstitutionally structured, resulting in higher rates for certain AOBs and unfair subsidies for others, benefitting large agricultural businesses.The litigation began with a combined petition and class action in the Superior Court of Riverside County, which was dismissed because the court found the validation statutes applied and the statute of limitations had expired. Subsequent reverse validation actions for later fiscal years were timely filed and consolidated. The Superior Court, in rulings by two judges, found the replenishment charges to be unconstitutional taxes because they did not satisfy the requirements of California Constitution Article XIII C, Section 1, subdivision (e)(2). Specifically, the court found that the district failed to show the allocation of replenishment costs bore a fair or reasonable relationship to the burdens or benefits received by each AOB, and thus the charges were not exempt from being classified as taxes. The court awarded substantial refunds to affected ratepayers and enjoined the district from imposing similar unconstitutional charges in the future.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed both the district’s appeal of the remedies and liability findings and the taxpayer association’s cross-appeal on procedural grounds. The appellate court affirmed in full, holding that the replenishment charges were unconstitutional, the remedies were proper, and that the validation statutes applied to these charges, thus barring untimely claims for earlier years. The appellate court also found no error in the trial court’s grant of refund and injunctive relief. View "Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Coachella Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law

A property owner in Los Angeles obtained a density bonus from the city in 2005, allowing him to build one additional housing unit beyond what zoning would otherwise permit, in exchange for agreeing to rent one of the units to low-income households for at least 30 years. This agreement was formalized and recorded against the property in 2006. The owner had previously taken out a mortgage, and the lender recorded its deed of trust against the property in 2005. After the owner defaulted, the lender foreclosed on the property in 2013. Several years later, new owners purchased the property, allegedly unaware of the recorded agreement requiring the low-income rental restriction.Following a notice from the City demanding compliance with the affordable housing agreement, the new owners filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, seeking quiet title and declaratory relief. They argued that the affordable housing agreement, recorded after the original deed of trust, was a junior encumbrance extinguished by the foreclosure. The City countered that the agreement was a condition of a building permit and survived foreclosure. The trial court sustained the City’s demurrer without leave to amend, finding that the agreement was a covenant running with the land and survived foreclosure.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the affordable housing agreement was equivalent to a “condition attached to a permit” under Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(E), and thus survived foreclosure. Permit conditions that have not been timely challenged run with the land and remain enforceable against successor owners, even those who acquire the property through foreclosure. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a valid claim and were not entitled to amend their complaint. View "Rodriguez v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Following the death of Daniel W. Bodmann, Sr., a dispute arose among his widow, Heather Holden-Bodmann, and his six biological and stepchildren, including Thomas E. Krouse, Jr. (Tom), over the administration of Bodmann Insurance—an estate asset—and the appointment of an executor for Dan’s estate. Dan’s holographic will named all seven children as executors and directed Andrea, one of the children, to maintain the insurance business. After Dan’s death, Andrea relied on Tom to help facilitate the transfer of the business’s clients, but conflict emerged between Tom and Heather regarding access to business records. The court found that Tom’s conduct toward Heather was aggressively disrespectful and contributed to a breakdown in cooperation, resulting in the decline of Bodmann Insurance.In the San Mateo County Superior Court, dueling petitions were filed for appointment as executor and special administrator. After an 11-day bench trial, Judge Buchwald found Tom’s behavior disqualified him from managing the business and denied his appointment as executor, citing his unwarranted aggression toward Heather and its detrimental impact on the estate asset. Interim orders limited Tom’s involvement in the business, allowed Andrea to run it, and later appointed Beth as special administrator and prospective executor after Dan, Jr. withdrew his request to serve.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding Tom’s conduct amounted to mismanagement of the estate under Probate Code sections 8402(a)(3) and 8502(a), thus disqualifying him as executor. The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s order, holding that substantial evidence supported the finding that Tom’s aggressive and disruptive treatment of Heather “mismanaged” Bodmann Insurance, justifying his disqualification as executor. The orders denying Tom’s petition and limiting his participation in the business were affirmed. View "In re Estate of Bodmann" on Justia Law

One evening, a group of friends gathered at an apartment, where alcohol and marijuana were consumed. Among them was A.S., who became highly intoxicated and passed out on a couch. Later, Ruben Paramo Gallardo, who was also present, was observed by another friend, D.L., on top of A.S., appearing to penetrate her while she was unconscious. D.L. intervened and called the police. A.S. later underwent a medical exam that documented various injuries and found Gallardo’s DNA on her body. At trial, Gallardo testified that the sexual contact was consensual and that A.S. was awake, but this was contradicted by other evidence.In the Superior Court of San Diego County, a jury found Gallardo guilty of two offenses: rape of an unconscious person under Penal Code section 261, subdivision (a)(4), and assault with intent to commit rape under section 220, subdivision (a)(1). The court sentenced him to four years for the assault count and stayed a concurrent three-year term for the rape count pursuant to section 654. Gallardo appealed, arguing that assault with intent to commit rape is a lesser included offense of rape of an unconscious person, and therefore his conviction for assault should be reversed.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. Applying the statutory elements test, the court determined that assault with intent to commit rape requires proof of intent to use force, which is not an element of rape of an unconscious person. Therefore, assault with intent to commit rape is not a lesser included offense of rape of an unconscious person. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that Gallardo could properly be convicted of both offenses. View "People v. Gallardo" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, an experienced bus rider, was injured when she fell while standing on a public bus operated by a transit district. She had stood up and moved toward the rear door in anticipation of her stop, holding a bag in one hand and a phone in the other. Security camera footage showed she was not holding onto a railing at the time the bus made a routine turn, lost her balance, and fell. The driver was not alleged to have made any unusual maneuver, nor did other passengers appear affected. The plaintiff claimed the driver operated the bus negligently and failed to warn her to hold on or sit down.After the incident, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of Kern County, asserting causes of action for motor vehicle negligence against both the driver and the transit district (the latter on a vicarious liability theory). The defendants moved for summary judgment, relying heavily on the bus’s video recording to argue that the bus’s movement was ordinary and that the plaintiff’s own actions were the proximate cause of her injury. The plaintiff argued that factual disputes remained, that the heightened duty of care for common carriers was not met, and that expert opinion and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur created triable issues for the jury. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, concluding there was no evidence of negligence by the driver and that the plaintiff’s own conduct was the sole proximate cause of her injury.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, holding that, while common carriers owe a heightened duty of care, that duty does not make them insurers of passenger safety for ordinary vehicle movements. The court further held that evidence, including the video, established the driver did not breach the applicable duty, and the plaintiff’s own negligence was the sole proximate cause of her injury. The court also ruled that neither comparative negligence nor res ipsa loquitur doctrines applied under these facts. Judgment for the defendants was affirmed. View "Agustin v. Golden Empire Transit Dist." on Justia Law

The defendant was originally convicted in 2011 of felony possession of child pornography, which required him to register as a sex offender. In 2015, he was convicted of failing to register a change of address, an offense classified as a felony because his registration requirement was based on his prior felony conviction. Years later, after his child pornography conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor and dismissed, he sought to have his 2015 failure to register conviction likewise reduced to a misdemeanor and dismissed, citing his rehabilitation, lack of subsequent offenses, and support from family and associates.The Santa Cruz County Superior Court had previously granted the defendant’s motion to reduce his 2011 conviction to a misdemeanor and dismissed that case. However, when the defendant petitioned to reduce and dismiss his 2015 felony registration offense, the court denied the motion, finding that the offense was a straight felony, not a wobbler, and that it was not appropriate to dismiss the case. The defendant appealed, arguing that the later reduction of his underlying offense should retroactively affect the status of his 2015 conviction, or that the court should have exercised discretion to reduce or dismiss it in the interest of justice.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s order. The court held that the 2015 failure to register conviction was a straight felony under Penal Code section 290.018(b), and not subject to reduction under Penal Code section 17(b), which only applies to wobblers. The reduction of the underlying 2011 offense did not retroactively convert the 2015 conviction to a misdemeanor. The court also found no substantive due process violation, as the legislative scheme had a rational basis. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in denying dismissal under Penal Code section 1203.4. View "People v. Woodward" on Justia Law

An agricultural company opposed a unionization effort initiated by the United Farm Workers of America, who sought certification as the exclusive bargaining representative for the company's employees under a new statutory procedure. The union filed a Majority Support Petition with the Agricultural Labor Relations Board, presenting evidence that a majority of employees supported union representation. The company responded by submitting objections and employee declarations alleging misconduct by the union during the signature collection process. The Board's regional director investigated and determined that the union had met the statutory criteria for certification, leading the Board to certify the union as the employees' representative.Following the certification, the company filed additional objections with the Agricultural Labor Relations Board, including constitutional challenges to the underlying statute. The Board dismissed most objections and set others for a hearing, but stated it could not rule on constitutional questions. While administrative proceedings were ongoing, the company filed a petition in the Superior Court of Kern County seeking to enjoin the Board from proceeding and to declare the statute unconstitutional. The Board and the union argued that the court lacked jurisdiction due to statutory limits on judicial review, but the superior court nonetheless issued a preliminary injunction halting the Board's proceedings. Appeals and writ petitions followed, consolidating the matter before the reviewing court.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, held that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to consider the challenge at this stage. The court reaffirmed that under California law, employers may not directly challenge union certification decisions in court except in extraordinary circumstances, which were not present here. The proper procedure is for employers to wait until an unfair labor practice proceeding or mandatory mediation is completed and a final order is issued before seeking judicial review. The court reversed the preliminary injunction and ordered dismissal of the company’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Wonderful Nurseries v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law