Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A worker employed by an independent subcontractor was injured while performing rebar reinforcement work on a pedestrian bridge construction project. The subcontractor had been hired by a construction company serving as the turnkey contractor for the project. The worker fell while climbing rebar, claiming muddy conditions contributed to his injury. Central to the dispute was whether the construction company could be held liable under California law for the worker’s injuries, given the company’s role in preparing the worksite and its ongoing involvement in certain site safety measures.In the Superior Court of San Mateo County, the construction company sought summary judgment, arguing it was not liable under the Privette doctrine, which generally holds that a hirer of an independent contractor is not liable for injuries to the contractor’s employees. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding that the doctrine applied and that the worker had not raised a triable issue of fact showing an exception to the doctrine. The worker argued that the construction company owed him a nondelegable duty under Cal-OSHA regulations and that the company had not actually delegated workplace safety responsibilities to the subcontractor. He also contended that the “retained control” exception to the Privette doctrine applied because the construction company exercised control over site safety in a manner that affirmatively contributed to his injury.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that the Privette doctrine’s presumption of delegation applied, including to duties imposed by Cal-OSHA regulations, and that there was no evidence the construction company affirmatively contributed to the worker’s injury or interfered with the subcontractor’s means and methods. The court concluded that neither the nondelegable duty argument nor the retained control exception applied, and it affirmed summary judgment in favor of the construction company. View "Cordero v. Ghilotti Construction Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The dispute arose after the County of Los Angeles decided to outsource security work previously performed by members of the Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers Association (PPOA). PPOA is the exclusive bargaining representative for certain county security officers under a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the County. When PPOA learned of the County’s plan to contract out these services to a private company, it requested to meet and confer over the decision. The County refused, arguing that PPOA had waived its right to bargain over such decisions through provisions in the MOU, particularly a management rights clause and language addressing the transfer of functions to other entities.PPOA filed an unfair practice charge with the Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission (ERCOM), alleging the County failed to meet and confer as required by statute. An ERCOM hearing officer found that while the County ordinarily would have a duty to bargain over outsourcing, the MOU’s language constituted a clear and unmistakable waiver of PPOA’s bargaining rights. ERCOM adopted this finding. PPOA then filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, seeking to compel the County to meet and confer. The superior court agreed with the County, ruling that the MOU’s reference to “reorganization” included outsourcing and thus waived PPOA’s right to bargain over the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case and reversed the superior court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the MOU did not clearly and unmistakably waive PPOA’s right to meet and confer over the County’s decision to transfer work to a private contractor. The court ordered the superior court to issue a writ of mandate requiring the County to meet and confer with PPOA regarding its outsourcing decision. View "L.A. County Professional Peace Officers Assn. v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

An attorney operating a sole proprietorship law firm was targeted by a check fraud scheme. A purported client sent the attorney a cashier’s check for nearly $100,000, which the attorney deposited into his Interest on Lawyers Trust Account (IOLTA) at a major bank. After being instructed by the client, the attorney contacted the bank to confirm the legitimacy of the check. A bank employee repeatedly assured the attorney that the check had “cleared” and was “good to go,” both over the phone and in person, despite the attorney’s expressed concerns about possible fraud. Relying on these assurances, the attorney completed a wire transfer of most of the check’s funds as directed by the client. The next day, the bank notified the attorney that the check was fraudulent, charged back the entire amount to his account, and refused to reimburse his loss.The attorney filed suit in the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligent misrepresentation, and negligent hiring, supervision, and retention. The bank and its employee demurred to the complaint. The trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend, and judgment was entered in favor of the bank and the employee.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the sufficiency of the complaint. The court held that the attorney sufficiently stated a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, finding that he adequately alleged the bank employee represented the check was genuine without a reasonable basis. However, the court affirmed dismissal of the breach of contract, implied covenant, and negligent hiring claims, concluding the complaint failed to state those causes of action and that amendment would not cure the defects. The judgment of dismissal was reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Y.P. v. Wells Fargo Co." on Justia Law

In 2016, the defendant was convicted of multiple felonies and misdemeanors for violent offenses against his wife and a neighbor. He received a sentence that included a lengthy state prison term for the felonies and a consecutive county jail term for the misdemeanors. After a direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reversed one felony conviction but affirmed the rest and remanded the case for further proceedings on the reversed count. On remand in 2019, the trial court resentenced the defendant, but a clerical error led to the inclusion of misdemeanor jail time in the calculation of the total state prison term.Following this, a records analyst from the Department of Corrections notified the trial court in 2024 about the error in the abstract of judgment. The Superior Court of Riverside County held a hearing to address the issue. During this hearing, defense counsel requested a full resentencing, a Romero motion to dismiss a strike, and reconsideration of the upper term on one count. The court denied these requests, determining that only a clerical correction was required. However, the court also modified the misdemeanor sentences, reducing their terms and making them concurrent, changes for which it lacked jurisdiction.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and held that the error in the 2019 sentence was clerical, not judicial, and thus did not entitle the defendant to a full resentencing. The appellate court affirmed the denial of resentencing and the Romero motion. However, it found that the trial court exceeded its authority by modifying the misdemeanor sentences and vacated that portion of the order. The case was remanded with instructions to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect the original 2019 sentence. View "People v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man who was convicted of killing his girlfriend and her brother. The defendant and the girlfriend had lived together for years, and the girlfriend’s brother moved into their apartment. After neighbors heard shrieking and family received disturbing text messages from the defendant, the bodies of the girlfriend and her brother were discovered in the apartment, wrapped in rugs and placed near an air conditioner that had been set up to slow decomposition. Both victims had been stabbed multiple times. The defendant was later found in Mexico and extradited.At trial in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the prosecution charged the defendant with two counts of murder. A central issue was whether the defendant acted with premeditation or in the heat of passion. The defense sought to introduce a handwritten note found at the crime scene in which the defendant admitted to the killings and stated he was filled with rage after allegedly discovering the victims having sex. The trial court excluded the note during the prosecution’s case, ruling its probative value was outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice, but allowed the note when the defendant testified to introduce it himself. The jury convicted him of first degree murder for the girlfriend and second degree murder for the brother.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that while there was sufficient evidence for the case to go to the jury, the trial court erred in excluding the note during the prosecution’s case, as the note was highly probative of the defendant’s state of mind and the theory of provocation. The appellate court found this error was prejudicial because it likely affected the verdict, especially regarding the degree of murder. The judgment was reversed, and the trial court was directed to vacate the convictions and set the matter for a new trial. View "People v. Tzul" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of forcible rape against two victims on separate occasions, one of whom was 16 years old, and unlawful sexual intercourse with another 16-year-old minor. The offenses involved aggravated circumstances, including kidnapping, physical violence, and prior conviction for a similar offense. The evidence included DNA matching and testimony regarding the assaults, which involved threats, use of force, and infliction of injuries on the victims.After trial in the Superior Court of San Diego County, the jury made several true findings on special circumstances, including aggravated kidnapping, prior convictions, and multiple victims, under California's One Strike law and the Habitual Sexual Offender law. The trial court sentenced the defendant to life without the possibility of parole for one rape count, 50 years to life for the other, and additional determinate terms for robbery and unlawful sexual intercourse. The court also imposed and stayed alternative sentences based on unused One Strike law circumstances and the Habitual Sexual Offender law.On appeal to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, the defendant challenged certain aspects of the sentencing, including alleged dual use of facts and the imposition of stayed terms under alternative sentencing schemes. The appellate court rejected the claim of impermissible dual use of facts in imposing the upper term for robbery. However, it held that imposing and staying sentences under both the One Strike law and the Habitual Sexual Offender law was unauthorized, given that these are alternative sentencing schemes, and only one may be used per qualifying count. Similarly, the court struck the additional stayed sentences based on unused One Strike circumstances, concluding the statute authorizes only one One Strike sentence per count. The judgment was affirmed as modified, with the unauthorized stayed sentences ordered stricken. View "P. v. Bradley" on Justia Law

A San Diego family suffered a significant mistake after the sudden death of their relative, Jose Gonzalez, Jr., in Texas. Due to a mix-up at the Tarrant County Medical Examiner’s Office, the body of Mr. Gonzalez was confused with another individual who died a day later. As a result, the family received the wrong body for burial, while Mr. Gonzalez’s remains were mistakenly cremated in Texas. The widow, Celina Gonzalez, contracted with a California mortuary to arrange for Mr. Gonzalez’s body to be transported and prepared for funeral services in California. However, due to the error, the family discovered the mistake only at the viewing and could not bury their loved one as intended.Following these events, two lawsuits were filed in the Superior Court of San Diego County: one by the extended family and one by Celina and her daughter Edna. The cases were consolidated. The operative complaint alleged breach of contract and negligence. At trial, the mortuary asserted the affirmative defense of impracticability of performance, which the trial judge submitted to the jury. The jury found for the mortuary on both negligence and breach of contract, concluding that performance was excused due to impracticability. The trial court also granted nonsuit to the mortuary, ruling that only Celina, as the contracting party, had standing to sue for breach of contract, and that the extended family were not intended third-party beneficiaries.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, held that the defense of impracticability of performance is equitable and must be decided by the judge, not a jury. The appellate court reversed the judgment on the breach of contract claim as to Celina, remanding for a bench trial on the impracticability defense and, if necessary, a trial on damages. The court affirmed the dismissal of the extended family’s contract claims, finding they lacked standing. View "Gonzalez v. Community Mortuary" on Justia Law

A public hospital district in California established and recorded covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) in 1991 for a common interest development known as the Tulare Medical Center. These CC&Rs included a prohibition on abortion clinics within the development. In 2001, certain property subject to these CC&Rs was transferred to individual owners, who later sought to lease it to a family planning organization that provides a range of services, including abortion. The property owners association, comprised of all parcel owners and authorized to enforce the CC&Rs, objected to the lease and sought to enjoin the operation of the clinic, arguing that any abortion services would violate the CC&Rs.The Superior Court of Tulare County reviewed the association’s request for a preliminary injunction. After considering the parties’ submissions and arguments, the court denied the injunction. The court found there was a credible threat that abortion services would be provided but concluded the association had not shown a likelihood of prevailing on the merits. Specifically, the trial court noted unresolved legal questions regarding whether restrictions on abortion clinics in CC&Rs violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act or California constitutional protections, and found the association failed to demonstrate that the balance of harms favored an injunction.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that the prohibition on abortion clinics, adopted by a public entity, constituted government action that interfered with the fundamental constitutional right to reproductive choice under the California Constitution. The court applied the compelling interest test, found no compelling interest justifying the restriction, and concluded the prohibition violated fundamental public policy. Additionally, the court held that the prohibition was void under Civil Code section 53 because it indirectly limited property use based on a characteristic protected by the Unruh Act. The order denying the preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "Tulare Medical Center Property v. Valdivia" on Justia Law

Two men approached a van in a Denny’s parking lot in Los Angeles in the early morning hours of December 19, 1981. One of the men, holding a gun, demanded valuables from the occupants, Toney Lewis and Carolyn Spence. After robbing them, the gunman shot Lewis, who died from the wound. At trial, there was conflicting eyewitness identification as to whether the defendant or his brother was the shooter. An accomplice, who testified in exchange for a plea deal, stated that the defendant was the gunman and shot Lewis. Other witnesses recounted statements by the defendant suggesting his brother was not the killer and that he was the one who shot Lewis.The defendant was convicted in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County of murder, robbery, and attempted robbery, with the jury finding true that a principal was armed with a firearm but not true that the defendant personally used a firearm or that the robbery special circumstance (which, as instructed, required the defendant to have personally killed the victim) applied. On direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction. Subsequently, the defendant petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 (formerly 1170.95), which provides relief for certain felony-murder convictions. The resentencing court initially denied relief, finding the defendant aided and abetted the murder. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, instructing reconsideration under the theories that the defendant was either the actual killer or a major participant acting with reckless indifference.In the most recent proceeding, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, held that the jury’s not-true findings on the firearm enhancement and special circumstance did not preclude the resentencing court from finding the defendant was the actual killer. The court found substantial evidence supported that finding and affirmed the denial of resentencing. View "People v. Player" on Justia Law

A driver was stopped by California Highway Patrol officers after being observed swerving and speeding at over 100 miles per hour. During the stop, officers noted signs of alcohol impairment and, after field sobriety tests, arrested the driver for driving under the influence. The driver refused to take a chemical test after being properly advised that refusal would result in a one-year suspension of his license. The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) subsequently suspended his license for refusal. At the requested administrative hearing, the DMV hearing officer introduced evidence, ruled on objections, and asked one clarifying question. The hearing officer, following the DMV’s updated policy, stated she was acting as a neutral fact-finder and not as an advocate for the DMV.The driver petitioned the Superior Court of Alameda County for a writ of mandate, arguing that the hearing officer’s combination of functions—introducing evidence and adjudicating—violated his due process rights by creating an appearance of bias. The superior court denied the petition, finding no due process violation.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case de novo. The appellate court held that the DMV’s current policy, which instructs hearing officers to act solely as neutral decision-makers and not as advocates, does not violate due process. The court reaffirmed that due process requires proof of an actual, unacceptable risk of bias, not merely the appearance of bias. The combination of evidence development and adjudication by a neutral officer is permissible unless there are extraordinary circumstances demonstrating a disqualifying interest. The judgment of the superior court was affirmed. The holding is that, under the DMV’s present structure and policy, there is no due process violation where a neutral hearing officer performs both evidentiary and adjudicative functions in administrative license suspension hearings. View "Chi v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law