Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Tara Starr petitioned for dissolution of her marriage to Thomas Starr, with the principal dispute centering on the date of separation—Tara claimed 2012 and Thomas asserted 2020. Tara’s original petition alleged a separation date of March 20, 2009, but after retaining counsel, she amended her petition to allege June 2, 2020, as the separation date. Throughout subsequent proceedings, including case management statements, trial briefs, and settlement conference statements, Tara consistently maintained that the actual separation occurred in 2012, and Thomas continued to dispute her position, claiming September 2020.The Contra Costa County Superior Court presided over pretrial and trial proceedings. The matter was bifurcated to first determine the separation date. At the trial, the court, sua sponte, raised the issue that Tara was bound by her amended petition’s allegation of June 2, 2020, as the separation date and suggested there was no controversy. Despite both parties previously treating the date as contested and preparing for trial on that issue, the court held Tara to the June 2020 date, after Thomas ultimately accepted it, and entered an order accordingly. Tara’s subsequent motion to set aside the order was denied, with the court finding her pleading to be a deliberate litigation strategy and not a mistake.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that Tara’s amended petition did not constitute a binding judicial admission regarding the date of separation, as Thomas had consistently contested the allegation throughout the litigation, and both parties prepared for trial on the disputed issue. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the matter for further proceedings to determine the separation date, denying Tara’s request for reassignment to a different judge. Tara was awarded costs on appeal. View "In re Marriage of Starr" on Justia Law

A married couple initiated divorce proceedings, with the primary dispute centering on the date of their separation. The wife, Tara, initially claimed in her petition that the separation occurred in 2009, while the husband, Thomas, claimed it was in September 2020. Tara later amended her petition, with the assistance of counsel, to allege a separation date of June 2, 2020. Despite this, in subsequent filings and during trial preparation, Tara consistently asserted that the actual separation occurred in 2012 and provided evidence and argument to support this claim. Both parties, through multiple attorneys and case management statements, continued to treat the date of separation as a contested issue, preparing for trial on whether the separation occurred in 2012 or 2020.The Contra Costa County Superior Court addressed the issue during a bifurcated trial. On the day of trial, the court, on its own initiative, declared that Tara was bound by the June 2, 2020 separation date alleged in her amended petition, characterizing it as a binding judicial admission. The court reasoned that Tara’s failure to formally amend her petition again prevented her from arguing a different date. When Thomas ultimately accepted the June 2, 2020 date to avoid trial, the court adopted this date as the legal separation and denied Tara’s subsequent motion to set aside the order or to permit another amendment to her petition.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It held that under the circumstances, the trial court erred in treating the separation date in the amended petition as a judicial admission binding Tara. The appellate court explained that a judicial admission requires the adverse party not to contest the allegation, which did not occur here, as Thomas continued to dispute the separation date throughout the proceedings until the trial began. The order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings to determine the actual date of separation. The appellate court declined to order reassignment to a different trial judge. View "Marriage of Starr" on Justia Law

The defendant, who had previously been convicted of first degree burglary and attempted first degree burglary, was found by a jury to have committed these offenses while a person was present. In a separate proceeding, the trial court determined that he had three prior felony convictions qualifying under California’s Three Strikes law, three prior serious felony convictions, and a prior prison term enhancement. He was initially sentenced to 66 years to life, which was later reduced to 41 years to life. Following referral from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, the defendant sought resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, requesting the trial court exercise its discretion to dismiss certain prior convictions and enhancements based on changes to Penal Code section 1385 and arguments under People v. Superior Court (Romero).The Superior Court of Los Angeles County held a hearing at which the defendant requested dismissal of two prior strike convictions and one five-year prior serious felony enhancement, citing age and conduct in prison. The People opposed, arguing the Three Strikes sentence was appropriate. The trial court dismissed the one-year prior prison term enhancement and struck the three five-year prior serious felony conviction enhancements but declined to dismiss any prior strike convictions under the Three Strikes law. The defendant was resentenced to 25 years to life.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed whether the amended section 1385, subdivision (c), applied to the Three Strikes law and whether the rule of lenity could extend its application. The court held that section 1385, subdivision (c), as amended by Senate Bill No. 81, does not apply to the Three Strikes law, since the law constitutes an alternative sentencing scheme, not an enhancement. The court also found no statutory ambiguity warranting application of the rule of lenity. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "P. v. Grandberry" on Justia Law

A licensed sidewalk vendor who had operated outside Petco Park in San Diego since 2009 was cited multiple times in mid-2024 under newly enacted city ordinances regulating sidewalk vending. On two occasions, city officials also impounded his merchandise and, in one instance, his sales proceeds. The vendor, who holds a valid city vending permit, alleged that the new ordinances, particularly those related to impoundment and restrictions on vending during certain hours and events, conflicted with state law enacted in 2018 designed to protect the rights of sidewalk vendors. He sought a writ of mandate, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of these local provisions.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied the vendor’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court acknowledged the negative impact on the vendor’s livelihood but found there was a minimal probability of success on the merits, reasoning that the city’s restrictions were permissible under the state law’s allowance for regulations related to health, safety, or welfare. The court concluded that the balance of harms favored the city, given public interest considerations, and thus refused to enjoin enforcement of the challenged ordinances.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, examined both the factual record and the legal questions concerning the interplay between the municipal code and state law. The appellate court held that the city’s ordinances authorizing impoundment of vending equipment and restricting vending hours in nonresidential areas more stringently than for other businesses are in direct conflict with state law. The court found the trial court erred by not adequately considering these conflicts. The appellate court reversed the denial of the preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to apply the correct legal standards and further develop the record as needed. View "Mustaqeem v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

More than one hundred individuals who became tenants at three apartment complexes in Los Angeles applied to rent from the property owners by filling out standard applications and paying $41.50 screening fees. The landlords used these fees to obtain credit and background reports. The plaintiffs alleged that the landlords violated California’s Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA) by failing to disclose the scope of the investigations, the identity of the reporting agencies, the right to inspect information, and by not providing copies of the consumer reports. Three plaintiffs also asserted a claim under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) based on the same alleged violations.After consolidating the cases, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment for the defendants, reasoning that none of the plaintiffs had shown actual damages or concrete injury resulting from the alleged ICRAA violations, and thus lacked standing. The court also found that the plaintiffs’ UCL claims failed for similar reasons, as they did not lose money or property due to the alleged conduct.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Three, held that the plaintiffs have standing to pursue their ICRAA claims because the statute provides a $10,000 minimum recovery for violations without requiring proof of actual damages or concrete injury. The court found that the statutory remedy is punitive and serves to deter violations, granting standing based on the violation itself. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the UCL claims, concluding that plaintiffs did not suffer an “injury in fact” or lose money or property as required for UCL standing. The judgment was therefore reversed as to the ICRAA claims, affirmed as to the UCL claims, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Yeh v. Barrington Pacific" on Justia Law

The case centers on Taiwan Orran Reed, who was convicted by a jury in August 2020 of multiple offenses, including pimping, pandering, human trafficking, and rape involving two victims. The jury also found special circumstances under California’s one strike law, resulting in Reed’s sentence of 21 years four months in prison, plus 30 years to life. Reed, who is African American, later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Riverside County Superior Court, seeking relief under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020. He alleged that racially discriminatory language—specifically being referred to as a “gorilla pimp”—was used by the prosecutor and expert law enforcement witnesses during his trial.After Reed’s retained counsel withdrew due to personal reasons and lack of payment, the superior court appointed the Riverside County Public Defender to represent Reed at an evidentiary hearing on his habeas petition. The Public Defender objected to the appointment, arguing that under Government Code section 27706, subdivision (g), his office has discretionary authority to decline representation in postconviction habeas matters, unlike mandatory representation required in trial proceedings under subdivision (a). The trial court disagreed and compelled the Public Defender to accept the appointment, finding that the Public Defender had not demonstrated unavailability.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, granted the Public Defender’s petition for writ of mandate. The appellate court held that section 27706(g) governs public defenders’ representation of habeas petitioners, granting them discretion to decline such appointments without a showing of unavailability. The trial court’s order compelling the Public Defender to represent Reed was vacated, and the superior court was directed to appoint alternate counsel for Reed’s habeas petition. View "Harmon v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

An attorney filed a petition for a writ of mandate on behalf of a client, seeking to have the trial court refer a statement of disqualification to a different judge. The petition included only the trial court’s order striking the statement of disqualification and did not provide the statement itself or any supporting evidence for the serious accusations made against the trial judge, such as alleged retaliation, discrimination, collusion with opposing counsel, and forgery of court orders. The attorney asserted that these claims were based on his and his client’s “earnest belief,” but failed to present any evidence from the court record to support them.The Superior Court of Orange County had previously struck the statement of disqualification, and the attorney’s petition to the appellate court was denied due to lack of supporting evidence. Following this denial, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, issued an order to show cause as to why sanctions should not be imposed for filing a frivolous writ petition and for failing to support factual contentions with citations to the record. The attorney responded but continued to provide no substantive evidence, instead relying on personal beliefs and documents not included in the trial record.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, found that the petition was frivolous and that the attorney had unreasonably violated procedural rules by making unsupported assertions, particularly serious accusations against the trial judge. The main holding is that an attorney may not make factual assertions or accusations against a judge without evidentiary support and must adhere to procedural requirements for appellate filings. The court imposed monetary sanctions of $25,000 against the attorney and ordered that notice be given to the State Bar. View "N.D. v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

The case concerns two children whose parents were subject to dependency proceedings after allegations of domestic violence and failure to protect were brought by a county child welfare agency. The children were ultimately removed from their parents' custody and placed with extended family members. Over the course of the proceedings, the social services department conducted multiple inquiries with both parents and a number of extended family members about possible Native American heritage, as required under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related California law. Each person asked denied any such heritage.After the initial dependency petition, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the allegations, ordered reunification services, and later returned the children to their parents. Following further incidents of domestic violence, the children were again removed, and supplemental petitions were sustained. The agency continued its ICWA inquiry, interviewing additional family members but did not specifically question the paternal grandfather, though he was interviewed on other subjects. The Superior Court terminated parental rights after finding the children adoptable and determined there was no reason to know the children were Indian children under ICWA.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed whether the agency’s failure to inquire specifically of the paternal grandfather required reversal of the order terminating parental rights. The court held that, under the standard articulated in In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, a finding that the initial ICWA inquiry was adequate is supported by substantial evidence where the agency interviewed the parents and several extended family members, even if not every possible relative was asked. The court found the agency’s efforts sufficient and affirmed the order terminating parental rights. View "In re Bella L." on Justia Law

An investor brought a derivative action against the managers of a limited liability company, alleging unauthorized transactions conducted under their management. After a bench trial, the investor lost both at trial and on appeal. The investor’s claims were rejected, and the court awarded costs to the prevailing manager. Although both managers were originally involved in the case, only one remained relevant for the cost award proceedings at this stage.Following the trial and appellate losses, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County awarded costs to the prevailing manager under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 and California Rules of Court, rule 8.891, which together provide that a prevailing party is generally entitled to recover costs. The plaintiff had previously defeated the manager’s motion for a security bond under Corporations Code section 17709.02, a statute intended to deter frivolous derivative suits. The plaintiff argued that this earlier success on the bond motion should bar any subsequent award of costs, claiming that section 17709.02 overrides the ordinary cost rules.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed this argument. The appellate court held that Corporations Code section 17709.02 does not preclude an award of ordinary litigation costs to a prevailing defendant in a derivative action where the bond motion was denied. The court found no statutory language supporting the plaintiff’s position and noted that case law, including Brusso v. Running Springs Country Club, Inc., confirms that the bond statute is special-purpose and does not displace general cost-recovery rules. The appellate court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment, awarding costs to the prevailing defendant. The court also found that the plaintiff had forfeited several additional arguments by failing to support them with adequate briefing or legal authority. View "Barrios v. Chraghchian" on Justia Law

A father and mother, previously married and sharing a child, were involved in an ongoing custody arrangement. After initial divorce proceedings, the mother was permitted unmonitored visitation with the child. In late 2023 and early 2024, the father alleged that the mother’s behavior had become increasingly erratic, including stalking, repeated unwanted visits to his home, entering his residence and car without permission, incessant calls and texts, following him and the child in her car, and making threats related to his employment and family. The father stated these actions caused fear for both himself and their child, prompting him to seek a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) and restored monitored visitation for the mother. The mother denied the allegations, attributing her actions to concern for the child’s safety and referencing her mental health history.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County heard testimony from both parties and considered evidence including text messages, videos, and the mother’s admissions. The court acknowledged that the mother’s conduct was obsessive and alarming but found that the behavior stemmed from her mental health condition rather than malicious intent. The court concluded that the father had not established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the mother’s actions constituted abuse under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA), specifically focusing on whether her conduct was intentionally threatening or intimidating. The court denied the DVRO but ordered professionally monitored visitation.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, found that the trial court misapplied the standard for abuse under the DVPA by requiring proof of intent to threaten or intimidate, rather than considering the totality of the circumstances and the effect of the conduct. The appellate court held that the uncontradicted evidence established abuse as defined by the DVPA and reversed the trial court’s order, remanding with directions to enter the requested DVRO. View "R.R. v. C.R." on Justia Law