Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A nonprofit organization brought an action under California’s Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act (Proposition 65), alleging that a business’s tortilla products exposed consumers to acrylamide, a known carcinogen, without providing the required warnings. Before filing suit, the nonprofit sent the business and the California Attorney General a 60-day notice of violation, as required by Proposition 65. The notice identified the parties, the chemical, the product, and the exposure route, and included a certificate of merit and a summary of Proposition 65 (Appendix A), though it provided contact information for the nonprofit’s retained counsel rather than an individual within the nonprofit, and attached an outdated version of Appendix A.The Superior Court of San Diego County heard the business’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The business argued that strict compliance with the notice requirements was necessary, and that the nonprofit’s notice was deficient because it did not provide contact information for a responsible individual within the entity and included an outdated summary of Proposition 65. The trial court agreed, finding both deficiencies were fatal and granted the business’s motion, dismissing the action.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the dismissal. The appellate court held that the relevant regulation (section 25903) should be interpreted as directory rather than mandatory, meaning substantial compliance—rather than strict compliance—with the notice requirements is sufficient. The court determined that providing counsel’s contact information and an earlier version of Appendix A did not defeat the essential purposes of the notice requirement and that the nonprofit’s notice substantially complied. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s dismissal and remanded the case with directions to deny the business’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. View "Environmental Health Advocates, Inc. v. Pancho Villa's, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2000, Tommie Lawson Lynex, an African American man, was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and received a firearm enhancement under California Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d), resulting in a sentence of 50 years to life. Twenty years later, California enacted the Racial Justice Act, allowing prisoners to seek habeas relief if their conviction or sentence was influenced by race, ethnicity, or national origin. Lynex filed a habeas petition under this Act, including statistical evidence showing racial disparities in the prosecution of murder charges with firearm enhancements in Los Angeles County.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially denied Lynex’s habeas petition and his request for appointment of counsel, finding the petition procedurally barred as successive and concluding that Lynex had not made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief under the Racial Justice Act. The court also determined that Lynex did not sufficiently allege facts indicating racial animus or bias in the police investigation or prosecution.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard by requiring a prima facie showing for appointment of counsel. Under the Racial Justice Act and section 1473, subdivision (e), a petitioner need only plead a plausible allegation of a violation to obtain counsel. The appellate court also found that the trial court erred by not recognizing its discretion to permit amendment of the petition and by improperly invoking procedural bars at the initial stage. The Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its denial and conduct further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re Lynex" on Justia Law

The case concerns a criminal defendant who, while living with his parents and sister, became involved in a heated conflict with his sister. During the altercation, he threatened her and, at one point, pointed a gun and later a taser at her, ultimately leading her to leave the house. The defendant was charged by the Riverside County District Attorney with multiple offenses, including assault with a semiautomatic firearm, making criminal threats, assault with a deadly weapon, and misdemeanor battery. The defendant filed a motion for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, supported by diagnoses from mental health professionals indicating longstanding mental disorders that contributed to his conduct.Prior to trial, the Superior Court of Riverside County held a hearing on the motion. The court found a connection between the defendant’s mental health diagnoses and his conduct but concluded that his actions were primarily motivated by his sister’s threats to out him to their parents, rather than by his mental disorder alone. The court denied the diversion motion, reasoning that the defendant did not fall within the “spirit” of the diversion statute because he had been compliant with mental health treatment at the time of the incident and had no prior criminal history.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case after the defendant petitioned for a writ of mandate. The appellate court held that the trial court abused its residual discretion by denying the motion on improper grounds, misapplying the legal standard for diversion. The appellate court directed the trial court to vacate its order and conduct a new hearing consistent with the correct legal standards, emphasizing that eligibility for diversion does not require a mental disorder to be the sole motivating factor in the offense. The petition was granted and remanded for further proceedings. View "Flareau v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

After the death of Sandra Robinson from a fentanyl overdose, her adult children brought suit against Muhammad Alghannam, M.D., and others, alleging professional negligence, lack of informed consent, wrongful death, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and elder abuse. Sandra had an implanted fentanyl infusion pump managed by Alghannam and underwent surgery at Rideout Health. Post-surgery, she continued to receive fentanyl through the pump and self-administer doses, with clinical staff observing changes in her mental status. Plaintiffs claimed Alghannam treated Sandra without proper hospital staff privileges, failed to turn off the pain pump as requested, and did not obtain valid consent.The Superior Court of Yuba County sustained Alghannam’s demurrer to the fifth amended complaint without leave to amend, finding the medical negligence claims time-barred under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 and the elder abuse allegations insufficient. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the medical negligence statute of limitations did not apply, that tolling should occur due to intentional concealment, and that the claims related back to the original complaint under section 474.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo. It held that section 340.5 applied because Alghannam’s alleged actions fit within the statutory definition of professional negligence. The plaintiffs failed to plead facts supporting intentional concealment or timely substitution under section 474. The court also determined the elder abuse claim was insufficient, as there was no well-pleaded allegation of a caretaking relationship or physical abuse with the requisite culpability. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding plaintiffs did not meet their burden to show a reasonable possibility of amendment. View "Nichols v. Alghannam" on Justia Law

A former employee of the County of San Diego pleaded guilty to a felony charge for violating a state conflict-of-interest law, which prohibits public employees from having a financial interest in contracts made in their official capacity. After the guilty plea, but before sentencing, the San Diego County Employees Retirement Association (SDCERA) notified him that a portion of his accrued pension benefits would be forfeited under Government Code section 7522.74, as he had been “convicted” of a job-related felony. At sentencing, the criminal court reduced the offense to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b)(3). The employee then requested reinstatement of his pension benefits, which SDCERA denied.The employee challenged SDCERA’s denial through administrative appeals, including to its chief executive officer and Board of Retirement, but both appeals were denied. He subsequently petitioned the Superior Court of San Diego County for a writ of administrative mandate to set aside SDCERA’s decision. The court denied the petition, finding that section 7522.74 precluded reinstatement of the forfeited pension benefits. The employee timely appealed the judgment.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that a public employee is “convicted” for purposes of Government Code section 7522.74 upon an adjudication of guilt—whether by plea or jury verdict—and not only upon entry of judgment. The reduction of the felony to a misdemeanor at sentencing under Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b)(3), did not retroactively affect the forfeiture. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the employee’s pension benefits remained forfeited, and SDCERA properly denied reinstatement. View "Bishop v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn." on Justia Law

The defendant is incarcerated for murder and has been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. She has spent most of her sentence in an inpatient psychiatric treatment program and has been largely unresponsive to medications administered under an involuntary medication order. After other treatments failed, the acting warden petitioned for authorization to administer electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), as her condition persisted and she lacked the capacity to provide informed consent. Both parties stipulated to her incapacity to consent to ECT, and she conceded on appeal that ECT is medically necessary.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County held an evidentiary hearing and granted the warden’s petition, authorizing ECT for six months, the maximum period allowed by statute. On appeal, the defendant did not challenge the medical necessity of ECT but argued that the statutory requirement for “no less onerous alternatives” to ECT should include procedural alternatives, specifically the possibility of obtaining informed consent from a surrogate decisionmaker under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5326.7.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. It held that the “no less onerous alternatives” language in Penal Code section 2679 refers to medical alternatives to ECT, not alternative procedural methods such as surrogate consent. The court found that the statutory scheme intentionally excludes ECT from expedited surrogate decision-making provisions, requiring judicial authorization instead. The court rejected the argument that the warden must seek surrogate consent before judicial authorization and affirmed the trial court’s order authorizing ECT. View "P. v. T.B." on Justia Law

The case centers on the estate of Charles Frazier, who, after becoming very ill in late 2019, was cared for by Michael and Kelly Pagano. During this period, Frazier executed a new trust with the Paganos’ assistance, granting them a substantial portion of his assets. Shortly before his death in January 2020, Frazier expressed regret over this change to his nephews, Jeff and Theodore Haun, and executed another trust to revert his estate plan. After Frazier’s passing, the Paganos filed a civil complaint alleging Haun and Jeff had exerted undue influence over Frazier for personal benefit. Haun, as trustee of the January 2020 trust, then initiated a probate petition claiming financial elder abuse by the Paganos.The Superior Court of San Diego County consolidated the competing probate petitions for trial. After eight days of trial, the court found the Paganos had exerted undue influence over Frazier in the creation of the December 2019 trust and committed financial elder abuse. Haun and Jeff, however, were not found to have unduly influenced Frazier regarding the January 2020 trust. The court granted Haun’s petition, denied Kelly’s petition, awarded Haun compensatory and statutory damages, and entitled him to attorney’s fees. The court determined all attorney’s fees incurred by Haun were inextricably intertwined with his defense and prosecution of the elder abuse claims, making apportionment impractical.On appeal, the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, addressed whether Haun could recover attorney’s fees under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5(a), a unilateral fee-shifting provision, given the intertwined nature of his prosecution and defense. The court held that the statute does not bar recovery of fees for defense work that overlaps with prosecution of a successful financial elder abuse claim by a prevailing plaintiff. The judgment was affirmed, and costs of appeal were awarded to Haun. View "Haun v. Pagano" on Justia Law

The dispute arose when one attorney, after obtaining a $5 million default judgment against another attorney in California, sought to collect on that judgment by levying two Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) belonging to the judgment debtor. The debtor argued that because he had moved to Florida, Florida’s statutory exemptions should apply, shielding his IRAs from collection. He also claimed the IRAs were funded from a surrendered life insurance policy held in a private retirement plan, asserting exemptions under California law for both the policy and the retirement plan.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the claim of exemption. Initially, the court tentatively applied Florida law but later decided the law of the forum state—California—should govern exemption claims. Ultimately, the court found the debtor failed to prove that the IRAs qualified for any exemption under California law, including the private retirement plan exemption or that the funds were necessary for his support. The court denied the claim of exemption, permitting the creditor to levy the IRAs.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It held that California law applies to collection actions in California courts regardless of the judgment debtor’s domicile. It further concluded that a surrendered life insurance policy is not necessarily exempt from collection and, once surrendered, is treated as matured, requiring proof that the proceeds are necessary for support. The court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s factual findings, applied a de novo review to legal questions, and affirmed the order denying the exemption. Thus, the IRAs were subject to collection, and the trial court’s order was affirmed. View "Bagby v. Davis" on Justia Law

In December 2023, a man was arrested after setting a fire in a rural area near the Ortega Mountains in Riverside County, California. Witnesses saw him near the scene, and firefighters and investigators concluded the fire was intentionally and maliciously set. At the time, there was a prolonged state of emergency in California, initially declared in 2015 due to widespread tree mortality from bark beetle infestations, which increased wildfire risks in certain regions.A jury in the Superior Court of Riverside County convicted the defendant of felony arson of forest land and found true a sentencing enhancement for committing arson “during and within an area” proclaimed by the Governor to be in a state of emergency. The court imposed a lengthy prison sentence, including additional time for prior convictions and the state of emergency enhancement.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The appellate court found that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to decide the legal scope of the Governor’s state of emergency proclamation. The appellate court conducted an independent legal review and determined that the 2015 proclamation did not declare a statewide emergency but limited the emergency to specific high-risk zones to be identified by state agencies. The prosecution failed to provide evidence that the fire occurred within such a designated area, making the evidence insufficient to support the enhancement.The appellate court reversed the true finding on the state of emergency enhancement, ordered a full resentencing, and affirmed the underlying arson conviction. The court also directed that, upon the defendant’s request, the trial court hold a hearing on his ability to pay fines and costs, consistent with the standards set in People v. Kopp. View "People v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

The plaintiff purchased a vehicle in 2017 and later alleged it was defective, suing the manufacturer in 2021. The parties eventually settled, with the plaintiff surrendering the vehicle and dismissing the suit, and the manufacturer agreeing to pay $100,000. The settlement specified the plaintiff would be deemed the prevailing party for purposes of attorney fees, and the manufacturer would pay the amount determined by the trial court upon noticed motion. After the settlement was reported to the Superior Court of San Diego County, the court ordered dismissal within 45 days. When no dismissal was filed, the clerk issued notice that the case would be deemed dismissed without prejudice on August 15, 2023, unless a party showed good cause otherwise. No such cause was shown, and the plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for attorney fees.The motion for attorney fees was opposed by the manufacturer, arguing it was untimely under California Rules of Court, as it was not served within 180 days of the dismissal date. The plaintiff countered that the 180-day deadline did not apply, claiming the case had not been formally dismissed and no judgment had been entered. The Superior Court of San Diego County disagreed, finding the case had been dismissed on August 15, 2023, per the clerk’s notice and court rules, and denied the motion as untimely. The plaintiff appealed the denial, and a signed minute order dismissing the complaint was later entered, but the court maintained that the earlier date controlled.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the matter de novo. It held that a voluntary dismissal, even if not appealable, starts the clock for filing a motion for attorney fees when it concludes the litigation. The court found the case was dismissed on August 15, 2023, and the plaintiff failed to timely serve the fee motion. The order denying attorney fees was affirmed. View "Hatlevig v. General Motors LLC" on Justia Law