Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, a couple and their two minor children, brought suit against their neighbor after a long history of escalating neighborhood disputes. The neighbor’s husband exhibited a pattern of threatening and violent behavior, including verbal threats, physical assault, gun-related incidents, and other menacing acts. The central incident occurred when the husband violently attacked one plaintiff with a baseball bat, after which he barricaded himself and ultimately died by suicide with a firearm. Plaintiffs alleged that the neighbor was negligent in failing to control her husband, failing to warn others, and providing false assurances about the absence of firearms and the husband’s dangerousness.The Contra Costa County Superior Court, treating the defendant’s demurrer as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, granted it and dismissed the action as to the neighbor. The court found that the complaint failed to establish that she had a special relationship with her husband or the plaintiffs that would give rise to a duty to protect the plaintiffs from his conduct. It also ruled there was no viable claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and denied leave to amend, finding no reasonable possibility of amendment. Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial was denied.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, held that the trial court correctly found no duty for the neighbor to protect plaintiffs from her husband under negligence principles, as the plaintiffs failed to allege facts showing her ability to control him or a special relationship that would give rise to such a duty. The court also determined that, although the existing complaint did not adequately allege negligent misrepresentation due to insufficient allegations of reasonable reliance, plaintiffs should have been granted leave to amend their complaint to attempt to state such a claim. The judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sproul v. Vallee" on Justia Law

A nonprofit religious organization operates several Zen Buddhist temples in California, providing residential training programs where participants, known as Work Practice Apprentices (WPAs), live and work at the temples. Participants perform various tasks, including cleaning, cooking, and guest services, as part of their Zen training. Upon completing the WPA program, individuals may become staff members, continuing similar duties while residing at the temple. The plaintiff participated as a WPA and later as a staff member, performing duties such as guest services, food preparation, and facility maintenance. She received modest monthly stipends and room and board, but ultimately challenged the compensation as inadequate under California wage-and-hour laws.After her affiliation with the organization ended, the plaintiff filed a wage claim with the Labor Commissioner, seeking unpaid regular and overtime wages, meal period premium wages, and liquidated damages. The Labor Commissioner ruled in her favor against the organization and two individual leaders, holding the individuals personally liable as employers under Labor Code section 558.1, and awarded her $149,177.15. The defendants appealed to the Superior Court of San Francisco, posting an undertaking only on behalf of the organization, not the individual defendants. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the appeals by the individuals for lack of undertakings and granted summary judgment for all defendants, finding the ministerial exception under the First Amendment barred the wage-and-hour claims.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reversed. It held that the ministerial exception does not bar wage-and-hour claims by ministers unless such claims would require judicial inquiry into ecclesiastical matters or religious doctrine. Because there was no evidence that adjudicating the plaintiff’s wage claims would entangle the court in religious concerns, the exception did not apply. The court also held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the individual defendants’ appeals due to their failure to post the required undertakings. View "Lorenzo v. San Francisco Zen Center" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was convicted of felony driving under the influence causing injury, with a prior DUI conviction, after causing a crash that injured another person. As part of her plea agreement, the defendant was ordered to serve jail time, complete probation and an alcohol program, and pay over $78,000 in restitution to the victim. After successfully completing her probation, she petitioned the trial court to expunge her conviction under Penal Code section 1203.4 and to reduce her felony conviction to a misdemeanor under section 17. At the time of her petition, she had paid only a small portion of the restitution, explaining that job and license loss hampered her ability to pay, and that relief would help her restore her employment and ability to pay.The Superior Court of Napa County denied both requests, emphasizing the limited amount of restitution paid as a principal reason for denial, along with the defendant’s prior DUI and delays in completing her alcohol program. The trial court suggested that a more substantial restitution payment might warrant a different result in the future. The People argued that unpaid restitution could be considered among other factors in denying relief.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the statutory language and legislative history of sections 1203.4 and 17. The court held that under both statutes, an unfulfilled order of restitution or restitution fine cannot be relied upon as any basis for denying expungement or reduction of a conviction, not even as a partial factor. Because the trial court based its denial on unpaid restitution, the appellate court found this to be legal error. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case for reconsideration without reliance on the unpaid restitution. View "P. v. Murphy" on Justia Law

In March 2015, Henry J. Lugo III signed a voluntary declaration of paternity (VDOP) identifying himself as the biological father of a child, and this declaration was filed with the Department of Child Support Services. In 2023, the County of Los Angeles initiated a child support action against Lugo based on the VDOP. Lugo denied being the child’s father and subsequently, after the trial court entered an order and a judgment requiring him to pay child support, he filed a request to set aside the VDOP on the ground of fraud, alleging he had been misled about the child's paternity and supported this with DNA evidence indicating he was not the biological father.Previously, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Lugo’s request to set aside the VDOP as untimely, reasoning that under the current version of Family Code section 7576, such a challenge must be brought within two years of the VDOP’s filing. Lugo argued that, according to Judicial Council form FL-281, which interprets the statute, the applicable time frame for VDOPs filed before January 1, 2020, is within six months after an initial court order for custody, visitation, or child support is made based on the VDOP. The trial court rejected this argument, finding the request untimely since Lugo filed it more than nine years after the VDOP was executed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that for VDOPs filed before January 1, 2020, a request to set aside may be timely filed under the time frame permitted by former Family Code section 7575, subdivision (c)(1). Specifically, the request is timely if brought within a reasonable time, not exceeding six months, after an initial court order for custody, visitation, or child support based on the VDOP. Because Lugo filed his request within this period, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the matter for consideration of the request’s merits. View "County of Los Angeles v. Lugo" on Justia Law

Two plaintiffs, identified as Jane Roe and John Doe, brought a defamation lawsuit against Jenna Smith and her mother, alleging that Jenna had falsely accused John of sexual assault and Jane of being a non-consensual partner while all were students at a Los Angeles County high school. These accusations, made both to other students and school officials, led to an investigation by the school, which ultimately found John not responsible for the alleged misconduct. The plaintiffs claimed significant reputational and emotional harm from the spread of these accusations and sought damages, injunctive relief, and an order preventing future defamatory statements.After the complaint was filed under pseudonyms, the First Amendment Coalition moved to unseal the plaintiffs’ names. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, however, deemed the motion premature and directed the plaintiffs to file a formal motion to maintain anonymity. Both plaintiffs and defendants filed such motions without supporting evidence. The court granted both motions, allowing all parties to proceed pseudonymously. The Coalition then appealed the order granting anonymity to the plaintiffs, while no party appealed the order regarding defendants.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the matter and applied independent judgment on the constitutional issue. It held that, absent statutory authorization, litigating under pseudonyms should only occur in rare circumstances and requires an evidentiary showing of an overriding interest that outweighs the public’s right of access to court records. The court found that the plaintiffs’ generalized fears of reputational harm and potential future impact on employment were insufficient and unsupported by evidence. It reversed the Superior Court’s order granting plaintiffs anonymity, emphasizing that defamation plaintiffs are generally not entitled to proceed pseudonymously without robust factual support. View "Roe v. Smith" on Justia Law

An incarcerated individual at Corcoran State Prison hired an attorney to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus, both in state and potentially federal court, for a total fee of $35,000. The attorney did not file the petition as agreed, leading the client to sue for breach of contract. Throughout the proceedings, the plaintiff notified the Superior Court of Orange County multiple times that he was incarcerated, requested remote appearances, and actively participated by filing necessary court documents, including a case management statement and fee waiver application. Despite these efforts, the plaintiff failed to appear for the scheduled trial, and the attorney attended and testified that the plaintiff was incarcerated.After the plaintiff's failure to appear at trial, the Superior Court of Orange County dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, stating it was unaware of the plaintiff’s incarceration until the day of trial. The plaintiff appealed this dismissal, arguing that the court should have recognized his incarceration and taken additional steps before terminating the case.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the dismissal. The appellate court found that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the lawsuit without first issuing an order to show cause or ensuring that the plaintiff had meaningful access to the court. The court emphasized that incarcerated, indigent litigants must be afforded meaningful access to civil courts, and that dismissal is a drastic remedy reserved for rare circumstances. The appellate court reversed the judgment of dismissal and remanded the case, instructing the trial court to provide the plaintiff with meaningful access to the court and to communicate with prison officials as necessary. The plaintiff may recover costs on appeal, subject to further determination by the trial court. View "Park v. Guisti" on Justia Law

OneTaste, Inc., a company founded in 2004 that promoted “orgasmic meditation,” sued Netflix for defamation in 2023. The lawsuit was based on a Netflix documentary that featured allegations from former employee Ayries Blanck, who claimed she was sexually assaulted and abused in connection with her employment and participation in OneTaste’s activities. The documentary included statements from Blanck’s sister and other former associates, as well as references to earlier media investigations and reports about alleged exploitative and abusive practices at OneTaste. OneTaste asserted that Netflix published false statements with actual malice, despite being provided with information it claimed disproved the allegations.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed Netflix’s special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16). Netflix argued its conduct was protected activity and that OneTaste could not demonstrate a probability of prevailing, especially on the element of actual malice. After considering the pleadings and both parties’ evidence, the trial court concluded that OneTaste failed to present sufficient evidence that Netflix published the challenged statements with actual malice. The court also found OneTaste’s additional evidence did not establish that Netflix was aware of probable falsity or recklessly disregarded the truth. As a result, the court granted Netflix’s motion to strike the complaint.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that OneTaste did not meet its burden to show a probability of prevailing on the defamation claim because it failed to produce evidence of actual malice by Netflix. The court also rejected OneTaste’s constitutional and public policy challenges to the anti-SLAPP statute and denied its requests for judicial notice of materials not considered by the trial court. View "Onetaste Incorporated v. Netflix, Inc." on Justia Law

Lauren Brown worked for a restaurant operated by Dave & Buster’s in Westchester, California, from November 2016 to April 2018. In June 2019, she filed a representative action under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), alleging various Labor Code violations, including failure to provide meal and rest periods, vacation pay, and accurate wage statements. Brown’s lawsuit was one of several PAGA actions filed against the same employer between June 2018 and June 2019. The employer had previously settled with another PAGA plaintiff, Andrade, whose amended complaint included claims similar to Brown’s, including vacation pay violations.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially stayed Brown’s case, finding it substantially identical to an earlier action. After the Andrade action settled and the San Diego County Superior Court approved the settlement, Dave & Buster’s moved for judgment on the pleadings in Brown’s case, arguing that claim preclusion barred her claims and that she lacked standing to pursue violations occurring after the Andrade settlement. Brown opposed, arguing that Andrade had not properly exhausted administrative remedies for her amended claims because she filed her amended complaint only 35 days after submitting an amended notice to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency, rather than waiting the statutory 65 days.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the trial court’s order independently. The appellate court held that Andrade’s failure to strictly comply with the 65-day waiting period was a harmless defect, as she substantially fulfilled the purpose of the pre-filing notice requirement and the Agency had an opportunity to object to the settlement but did not. The court found that all elements of claim preclusion were satisfied and affirmed the trial court’s judgment, dismissing Brown’s complaint with prejudice. View "Brown v. Dave & Buster's of California" on Justia Law

A former employee filed a labor claim against her employer and the employer’s business, seeking unpaid overtime and other compensation. The Labor Commissioner awarded her over $74,000. The decision was served by mail, triggering a 15-day deadline for the employer to appeal to the superior court and to either post an undertaking or seek a waiver of that requirement. The employer retained a third-party filing service, which attempted to file the appeal and waiver motion electronically on the last permissible day. The filing was rejected by the court clerk, and the documents were filed in person the following day, one day late.The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco determined that the employer’s appeal and waiver motion were untimely. The court found that the statutory deadline for appealing a Labor Commissioner decision is mandatory and jurisdictional, and that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the late filings. The employer argued that the deadline should be equitably tolled due to the filing service’s error, but the trial court rejected this argument.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that the statutory deadline for appealing a Labor Commissioner decision and for seeking a waiver of the undertaking requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional, and cannot be extended for reasons such as mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. The only exception is for fraud, which was not alleged. The court also held that the tolling provision in Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6 does not apply to notices of appeal from Labor Commissioner decisions. The court affirmed the superior court’s order dismissing the appeal as untimely. View "Dobarro v. Kim" on Justia Law

An 18-year-old driver, Elijah Henry, collided with Melanie Gilliland’s vehicle after running a red light, causing her severe injuries. At the time of the accident, Henry was being followed by Officer Matthew Harvey of the City of Pleasanton Police Department. Officer Harvey had entered a parking lot to investigate possible vehicle break-ins and, upon seeing Henry’s car leave the lot, made a U-turn to follow it. Henry, who had smoked marijuana earlier, accelerated away, fearing police interaction but denying any belief that he was being pursued for arrest. Officer Harvey did not activate his lights or siren and testified that he did not initiate a pursuit under the City’s vehicular pursuit policy.Gilliland sued both Henry and the City for negligence. The City asserted immunity under California Vehicle Code section 17004.7, which protects public entities from liability for damages caused by fleeing suspects if the entity has a compliant vehicular pursuit policy and provides regular training. The Alameda County Superior Court initially denied the City’s motion for summary judgment, finding that neither an actual nor perceived pursuit occurred under the City’s policy definition. However, after a bench trial before a different judge, the court found the City immune, interpreting “pursued” in the statute according to its ordinary meaning rather than the policy’s definition, and concluded Henry believed he was being pursued.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and held that the definition of “pursuit” in the public entity’s vehicular pursuit policy governs both actual and perceived pursuits under section 17004.7. The court found the trial court erred by applying the ordinary meaning of “pursued” and reversed the judgment, remanding for further proceedings using the correct legal standard. The main holding is that statutory immunity under section 17004.7 depends on the policy’s definition of pursuit, not the word’s general meaning. View "Gilliland v. City of Pleasanton" on Justia Law