Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Law enforcement authorities investigating a graduate student at a university for rape served a search warrant on a major electronic service provider seeking data linked to the student’s university email account. Along with the warrant, the authorities obtained a nondisclosure order (NDO) that prohibited the provider from disclosing the existence of the warrant or the investigation to the target, the university, or others for 90 days. The provider did not contest the restriction as it applied to the target, but sought to modify the NDO so it could inform a trusted contact at the university about the warrant, arguing that doing so would not compromise the investigation and was required under state law and the First Amendment.In the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the provider’s motion to modify the NDO was denied. The court based its decision on a sealed affidavit supporting the warrant and NDO, finding that several statutory criteria justifying nondisclosure were satisfied. The court also rejected the provider’s proposal to notify a university contact, expressing concern about its lack of jurisdiction over the university and the possibility of unauthorized disclosure. The NDO was later extended, but ultimately lifted after the student was arrested.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the provider’s petition for a writ of mandate. The court held that the trial court complied with the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act by making the required findings before issuing the NDO, and that the NDO satisfied strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. The court reasoned that the NDO served a compelling governmental interest in protecting an ongoing criminal investigation and was narrowly tailored, as allowing disclosure to a university contact posed unacceptable risks. The petition for writ of mandate was denied, and each party was ordered to bear its own costs on appeal. View "Microsoft Corp. v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

A member of the governing board of a public water district was the subject of internal investigations after allegations of misconduct by district staff, as well as allegations made by that board member against staff. Two lengthy confidential reports, prepared by outside counsel, documented the results of these investigations. The board member was permitted to review, but not remove, the reports from a secure location at the district’s offices. Contrary to these restrictions, the board member took the reports without permission, later making extensive annotations on them. Repeated requests for their return were unsuccessful, leading to her censure by the board.The Santa Clara County Superior Court, upon the district's application under California’s claim and delivery law, granted a writ of possession and a turnover order directing the board member to return the reports. The board member stayed enforcement by posting a counterbond as allowed by statute. While the turnover order was stayed, the district sought a preliminary injunction under the general injunction statutes, again seeking return of the reports. After a hearing, the Superior Court granted a mandatory preliminary injunction requiring turnover of the reports, permitting the board member to redact her handwritten notes.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the appeal from the order granting the preliminary injunction. The court held that the claim and delivery statutory scheme does not preclude a party from seeking injunctive relief for the recovery of personal property, even after a writ of possession has been issued and stayed by a counterbond. The appellate court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding a likelihood of the district’s success on its conversion claim and in concluding that the balance of harms favored the district. The order granting the preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. v. Eisenberg" on Justia Law

A completed driver reexamination request was submitted to the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) by a confidential reporter, prompting the DMV to initiate a review of Richard Louis Brown’s driving qualifications. Brown was notified that he must submit a medical evaluation. His physician, a new provider to Brown, recommended a driving test but did not advise against driving. Following a reexamination, Brown failed a driving test, and his license was suspended. A second hearing officer later reinstated his license, finding no medical basis for the initial suspension and stating that Brown should not have been required to take the tests.Brown filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Sacramento County, seeking disclosure of the reporter’s identity and criminal sanctions against the reporter for alleged false information. The DMV opposed, explaining the confidentiality policy for reporters is intended to promote road safety and prevent retaliatory actions. The trial court denied the petition, applying a public interest balancing test and finding that the interest in maintaining reporter confidentiality outweighed the interest in disclosure. Judgment was entered against Brown, who then appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, held that due process was not violated by the DMV’s nondisclosure of the reporter’s identity. The court found that the risk of erroneous deprivation was low because the suspension was based on Brown’s failed driving test, not the reporter’s complaint, and Brown received notice and two hearings. The court concluded that neither federal nor California constitutional due process required disclosure of the reporter’s identity under the circumstances and affirmed the superior court’s judgment denying Brown’s petition. View "Brown v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

Several subsidiaries of a major entertainment company providing video streaming services were notified by the City of Santa Barbara that they owed significant sums in unpaid video users’ taxes, penalties, and interest for the period from 2018 to 2020. The City’s demand was based on a 2008 ordinance, approved by local voters, which imposed a tax on those using “video services” in the city. The ordinance defined “video services” broadly, including services delivered by Internet Protocol. The companies argued that their streaming services did not fall under the ordinance because streaming platforms do not provide a “channel” as contemplated by the ordinance, instead relying on customers’ independently obtained Internet services.Following the City’s deficiency notice, the companies appealed administratively. An independent hearing officer upheld the City’s position, concluding that the ordinance applied to video streaming. The companies then sought judicial review in the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County by filing a petition for a writ of administrative mandate. The trial court denied their petition, determining that the ordinance was intended to apply to streaming, that its enforcement did not violate federal or state law, and that the City was not required to provide additional notice before enforcement.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the ordinance, as approved by the electorate, applies to providers of video streaming services and that the ordinary, non-technical meaning of “channel” should govern. The court further held that applying the tax to streaming services does not violate the Internet Tax Freedom Act, the First Amendment, or the California Constitution, nor did the City’s delayed enforcement require additional voter approval or special notice under state law. The judgment denying the companies’ petition was affirmed. View "Disney Platform Distribution, Inc. v. City of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

A passenger was seriously injured after the driver of a remotely rented vehicle, accessed via a membership-based car-sharing service, crashed while under the influence of alcohol. The driver, a university student and approved member of the rental service, reserved the vehicle through a mobile app late at night after consuming alcohol at a party. The process for renting and accessing the car involved no face-to-face interaction with company staff, and the company had no prior knowledge of the driver’s intoxication or any history of impaired driving. Following the crash, the driver was convicted of felony DUI causing injury.The injured passenger sued the car-sharing company and its affiliated vehicle owner in the Superior Court of Yolo County, alleging negligent entrustment for providing the car to an unfit driver, negligent maintenance for failing to include technology to detect driver impairment, and vicarious liability based on vehicle ownership. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The trial court ruled for the defendants, holding that the company owed no duty to inquire about a renter’s impairment at the time of a remote rental, had no duty to install alcohol-detection devices, and was shielded from vicarious liability by federal law (the Graves Amendment).On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that remote rental car companies are exempt from statutory requirements to inspect for signs of impairment at the time of rental, per Civil Code section 1939.37, and that courts should not impose additional investigatory duties absent legislative action. The court also held that the Graves Amendment preempts state law claims of vicarious liability based solely on vehicle ownership. Judgment for the defendants was therefore affirmed. View "Tavares v. Zipcar, Inc." on Justia Law

The case centers on a defendant who was convicted by a jury of multiple offenses resulting from his involvement in a shootout with police officers in San Diego. During jury selection, the prosecution exercised a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror (Juror 1), who was believed to be a Latina, based on the prosecutor’s belief that she was confused about the concept of intent. The defendant objected, arguing that the peremptory challenge was being used to exclude Hispanic or Latina jurors. The trial court adopted the prosecution’s rationale, found that Juror 1 was confused about intent, and overruled the objection.The Superior Court of San Diego County presided over the trial and issued the challenged judgment, sentencing the defendant to a lengthy prison term. The defendant appealed, asserting that the trial court’s finding about Juror 1’s confusion was unsupported by the record. On appeal, the prosecution argued that the trial court’s factual finding was supported by substantial evidence and that the defendant had forfeited certain arguments for not making more specific objections during trial.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. Applying de novo review as mandated by statute, the appellate court concluded that the record did not support the trial court’s finding that Juror 1 was confused about intent. The court further held that the prosecutor’s justification—juror confusion—was a presumptively invalid reason for a peremptory challenge under section 231.7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the trial court failed to properly confirm the asserted behavior occurred. Because there was no substantial evidence to support the prosecutor’s stated reason, the appellate court held that the judgment must be reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "People v. Aguilar" on Justia Law

A woman, Susan, was one of three beneficiaries of her father Warren’s trust. She believed the trust’s terms were unfair to her compared to her brothers, David and Michael, as her share was subject to restrictive terms and higher taxes. Warren allegedly wanted to amend the trust to make distributions equal among his children, and had consulted an attorney about this. Susan claimed that David and Michael undertook several actions in 2021 to prevent Warren from making this amendment, including interfering with his lawyer, making accusations against Susan, and isolating Warren.Previously, Susan filed a probate petition in Alameda County Superior Court, seeking to remove David as trustee and as Warren’s agent, and alleging elder isolation and similar misconduct by her brothers. The probate petition raised many of the same factual allegations later made in this civil case. After Warren’s death, Susan dismissed her probate petition without prejudice. She then filed a civil complaint, asserting claims for intentional interference with expected inheritance (IIEI) and elder financial abuse. The elder abuse claim was later dismissed, and the IIEI claim proceeded. David filed a demurrer, arguing Susan had an adequate remedy in probate, among other defenses.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case after the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed Susan’s complaint. The appellate court held that Susan’s IIEI claim could not proceed because she had an adequate remedy in probate. The court reasoned that the tort of IIEI is only available when probate does not provide a remedy, and Susan, as a beneficiary, had standing and the ability to seek relief in probate but chose to dismiss her petition. The judgment dismissing the complaint was affirmed. View "Halperin v. Halperin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a lawsuit against the operator of an assisted living facility, alleging negligence, breach of contract, and wrongful death after a facility employee moved the decedent, allegedly causing her health to deteriorate and leading to her death eight days later. The Superior Court of Sacramento County granted summary adjudication in favor of the defendant on the negligence and wrongful death claims but denied it as to the breach of contract claim. Plaintiffs then voluntarily dismissed the entire action without prejudice rather than proceed to trial on the remaining claim.After the voluntary dismissal, plaintiffs appealed, but the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, dismissed the appeal, holding that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice was not an appealable final judgment. Plaintiffs then moved in the trial court to set aside their voluntary dismissal; when this was denied, they again appealed, and the Court of Appeal again dismissed, reiterating that there was no appealable final judgment.Subsequently, the trial court entered a judgment of costs in favor of the defendant. Plaintiffs appealed from this costs judgment, arguing that it constituted a final judgment that permitted them to challenge all prior orders in the case, including the summary adjudication. The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, rejected this argument, holding that the costs judgment, entered after a nonappealable voluntary dismissal without prejudice, was not itself an appealable final judgment for the purposes of raising the underlying claims. The court explained that plaintiffs were not challenging the costs order itself, but were seeking review of prior nonappealable orders, which is not permitted. The appeal was therefore dismissed. View "Viani v. Fair Oaks Estates, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves an individual, B.K., who has schizophrenia and has been under a conservatorship pursuant to the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act since 2019. The conservatorship was initially established after B.K. was found to be gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder, and it has been renewed annually following court hearings. In several renewal proceedings, B.K. expressed her desire to contest the conservatorship, at times requesting either a court or jury trial. At the most recent renewal proceeding, B.K. initially requested a jury trial but later, after consulting with her attorney, chose to proceed with a court trial instead. B.K. confirmed this choice in open court.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County conducted the court trial, during which expert testimony and B.K.’s own statements supported a finding that she remained gravely disabled and unable to care for herself due to her mental illness. The court renewed the conservatorship for another year. B.K. appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to adequately advise her of her right to a jury trial or to ensure that her waiver of that right was knowing and intelligent.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. Applying de novo review to statutory claims and substantial evidence review to the trial court’s implied finding, the Court of Appeal concluded that B.K. was aware of her right to a jury trial and that, under the totality of the circumstances, her waiver—made through counsel and confirmed in court—was knowing and intelligent. The appellate court held that direct advisement or a personal waiver was not required under the LPS Act when counsel confers with the conservatee and there is no indication of lack of authority or client understanding. The court affirmed the ruling, finding no reversible error. View "Conservatorship of B.K." on Justia Law

An 11-year-old student, Therese, died by suicide at her father's home during her school’s winter break. Her parents brought claims against the school district, alleging negligent hiring, supervision, and training of staff, failure to protect Therese from bullying, and inadequate response to her expressions of suicidal ideation. They argued the district failed to fulfill its duty to supervise students and to inform them of Therese’s condition. The parents also pursued a survival claim for Therese’s pre-death suffering, alleging harm occurred on campus due to the district’s negligence.The Superior Court of Solano County denied the school district’s motion for summary judgment, finding triable issues of fact as to whether the district exercised reasonable care and whether Therese suffered injury on campus due to the district’s negligence. The court relied on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School District, determining that statutory immunity under Education Code section 44808 did not apply because there were factual questions about on-campus harm and failure to exercise reasonable care.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case on a petition for writ of mandate. The appellate court held that under section 44808, the district is immune from liability for harms resulting from Therese’s off-campus suicide, as she was not under the district’s supervision at the time. However, the court determined that this immunity does not extend to the survival claim, which concerns alleged on-campus harm while Therese was under the district’s supervision. The appellate court ordered the trial court to grant summary adjudication in favor of the district on the wrongful death and related claims but allowed the survival claim to proceed. View "Vallejo City Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law