Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The petitioner was charged with first-degree murder. During the investigation, the prosecution informed the defense that an investigating officer had a sustained finding of dishonesty, and the police department intended to release related records under Penal Code section 832.7(b)(1)(C). The defense requested these records under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) and filed a Pitchess motion seeking additional Brady material. The trial court, after an in-camera review, found no additional Brady material and ordered the release of the dishonesty records but issued a protective order limiting their dissemination.The trial court's protective order restricted the defense from sharing the records outside the defense team. The petitioner sought an extraordinary writ of mandate to vacate this protective order, arguing that the records were nonconfidential and subject to public inspection under section 832.7(b)(1)(C). The Court of Appeal initially denied the petition, but the Supreme Court directed the appellate court to reconsider.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and concluded that the records of the officer's sustained finding of dishonesty were nonconfidential and subject to public inspection under section 832.7(b)(1)(C). The court held that the trial court should not have issued a protective order for these records, as they were not confidential. Consequently, the appellate court granted the petition for writ of mandate and directed the trial court to vacate its protective order concerning the records of the officer's dishonesty. View "Banuelos v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Condominium owners Gregory and Kathleen Haidet filed a lawsuit against their homeowners association, Del Mar Woods Homeowners Association (the HOA), alleging that their upstairs neighbors' improperly installed floors constituted a nuisance. The HOA filed a demurrer to the Haidets' initial complaint, which the trial court sustained, dismissing one cause of action without leave to amend and two with leave to amend. The Haidets chose not to amend their claims against the HOA and instead filed an amended complaint naming only other defendants. Subsequently, the Haidets filed a motion to dismiss the HOA without prejudice, while the HOA filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice. The trial court granted the HOA's request for dismissal with prejudice and awarded the HOA attorney fees.The Haidets appealed, arguing that the trial court should have dismissed the HOA without prejudice because they filed a timely amended complaint and could have stated valid claims against the HOA. The trial court found these arguments unpersuasive, citing Code of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision (f)(2), and related authorities. The Haidets also challenged the trial court's determination that the HOA was the "prevailing party" for purposes of Civil Code section 5975 and its award of $48,229.08 in attorney fees. The trial court found no abuse of discretion in its determination.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court held that the trial court was permitted to dismiss the HOA with prejudice under section 581, subdivision (f)(2), as the Haidets failed to amend their claims against the HOA within the time allowed. The court also upheld the trial court's award of attorney fees to the HOA, concluding that the HOA was the prevailing party as it had achieved its litigation objectives by means of its successful demurrer and the Haidets' omission of the HOA from their amended complaint. View "Haidet v. Del Mar Woods Homeowners Assn." on Justia Law

Susan Diamond appealed an order denying her request to set aside a judgment in her marital dissolution proceeding. Susan argued that the judgment should be vacated due to duress and mental incapacity during the dissolution process. The Family Code does not define mental incapacity or duress, but the court found guidance in the Probate Code and Code of Civil Procedure, which address an individual's ability to make decisions regarding assets, medical options, and ongoing legal actions.In the lower court, Susan and Troy Diamond were married in 1992 and separated in 2008. Susan filed for dissolution in 2013. Susan's attorney withdrew due to her lack of communication, and she represented herself thereafter. Susan did not appear at the trial in May 2015, leading to an uncontested trial where the court awarded Troy custody of their daughter, child support, and a significant monetary judgment. Susan later sought to set aside the judgment, claiming she was unaware of the trial and was incapacitated due to health issues. Her initial request was denied based on the disentitlement doctrine and lack of evidence of mistake.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Susan did not meet her burden to show she was mentally incapacitated or under duress during the dissolution proceedings. The court found that Susan's actions during the relevant period, such as selling her home and handling financial transactions, indicated she understood the nature and consequences of her actions. The court also found no evidence that Troy used threats or pressure to induce Susan not to participate in the proceedings. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that Susan did not establish grounds for relief under Family Code section 2122. View "Marriage of Diamond" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lorenza Maksimow slipped and fell on an ice patch in a public parking lot in the City of South Lake Tahoe. She sued the City, alleging the ice patch constituted a dangerous condition of public property under Government Code sections 830 and 835. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that Maksimow could not establish the existence of a dangerous condition or that the City had actual or constructive notice of such a condition. The trial court granted the motion and entered judgment in favor of the City.The Superior Court of El Dorado County found that Maksimow failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the City’s actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition. The court sustained the City’s objections to certain evidence presented by Maksimow, including climatological data and expert testimony, and concluded that there was no evidence to support the claim that the City had notice of the ice patch.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Maksimow did not present sufficient evidence to establish that the City had actual or constructive notice of the ice patch. The court noted that while City employees may have been aware of snowfall and the presence of an abandoned vehicle in the parking lot, there was no evidence that they had actual knowledge of the specific ice patch that caused Maksimow’s fall. Additionally, the court found that the evidence did not support an inference that the ice patch existed for a sufficient period of time to impute constructive notice to the City. Consequently, the appellate court concluded that summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the City. View "Maksimow v. City of South Lake Tahoe" on Justia Law

In November 2021, Brendan Krepchin reported an armed robbery at his apartment. Upon investigation, the Mountain View Police Department found no evidence of a robbery but discovered a note suggesting potential violence, law enforcement equipment, and firearms. The police department sought and obtained an emergency gun violence restraining order (GVRO) from the Santa Clara County Superior Court, which was later extended to a three-year order after a hearing in January 2023.The trial court found clear and convincing evidence that Krepchin posed a significant danger of causing personal injury by possessing firearms. The court emphasized the note found in his apartment and his inability to explain it. Krepchin appealed, arguing that the GVRO violated his Second Amendment rights, was procedurally defective, and that the trial court erred in qualifying an officer as a threat assessment expert and admitting hearsay evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the GVRO did not violate the Second Amendment, referencing the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Rahimi, which upheld firearm restrictions for individuals posing a threat. The court also found no procedural defects in the GVRO's issuance and ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying the officer as an expert or in admitting hearsay evidence. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the trial court's findings, including the note and other evidence indicating Krepchin's potential for violence. View "Mountain View Police Dept. v. Krepchin" on Justia Law

Cristian Omar Martinez successfully moved to vacate his conviction and withdraw his plea under Penal Code section 1473.7. He then filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him, which the trial court denied. Martinez appealed, arguing that section 1473.7 does not allow the trial court to reinstate the original charges and that doing so violates the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Attorney General contended that the order denying Martinez’s motion to dismiss is not appealable and that the trial court did not err in denying the motion.The Santa Clara County Superior Court initially charged Martinez with felony counts of inflicting corporal injury and unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor, and a misdemeanor count of damaging a wireless communication device. Martinez pleaded no contest to all charges in exchange for a reduced sentence. After completing probation, he moved to reduce his felony charges and clear his record, which the trial court granted. Later, Martinez successfully moved to vacate his conviction under section 1473.7, but the trial court reinstated the original charges. Martinez’s subsequent motion to dismiss these charges was denied.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court agreed with the Attorney General that the order denying Martinez’s motion to dismiss was not appealable. However, the court exercised its discretion to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. On the merits, the court concluded that section 1473.7 does not mandate the dismissal of refiled charges and that the statute does not preclude the refiling of the original charges as felonies. The court also found that double jeopardy does not bar further proceedings on the underlying charges. Consequently, the petition for writ of mandate was denied, and the parties were instructed to proceed on the reinstated information. View "Martinez v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Jeannine Bedard, a Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officer, refused to comply with the City of Los Angeles’s COVID-19 vaccination mandate and did not sign a notice enforcing the mandate. Consequently, the Chief of Police sought to terminate her employment. The LAPD Board of Rights reviewed the proposed discipline, found Bedard guilty of failing to comply with conditions of employment, and upheld her discharge. The Board also found that the City violated Bedard’s due process rights by not providing sufficient time to respond to the charges and awarded her back pay, which the City did not pay.Bedard filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, arguing that the disciplinary action was procedurally and legally invalid and seeking reinstatement and back pay. The trial court found the termination justified but agreed that the City violated Bedard’s due process rights by giving her insufficient time to respond. The court awarded her back pay.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. Bedard argued that her termination was improper because it was based on her refusal to sign an allegedly illegal contract, was too harsh a penalty, and violated her due process rights under Skelly v. State Personnel Board. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that Bedard’s refusal to comply with the vaccination mandate justified her termination. The court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that Bedard’s termination was not solely based on her refusal to sign the notice but also on her refusal to comply with the vaccination requirement. The court also held that the appropriate remedy for the due process violation was back pay, not reinstatement. View "Bedard v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In March 2020, Eva Osborne sued Pleasanton Automotive Company, LOP Automotive Company LP, HAG Automotive Investments LP, and Bob Slap, alleging workplace misconduct including discrimination, retaliation, harassment, and wage violations. Osborne, who worked as Slap’s executive assistant, claimed Slap required her to perform personal tasks without proper compensation. In response, Slap filed a cross-complaint against Osborne in August 2022, alleging libel, slander, and other claims based on statements Osborne made in a letter to HAG’s HR director.The Alameda Superior Court granted Osborne’s special motion to strike Slap’s cross-complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that Osborne’s statements were protected activity made in anticipation of litigation and were privileged under Civil Code section 47. The court found that Slap could not show his claims had minimal merit because the statements were privileged and he failed to demonstrate malice.The California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that Osborne’s statements were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute and that the litigation privilege barred Slap’s claims. The court found that Osborne’s HR letter was sent in good faith contemplation of litigation, supported by her retention of counsel and subsequent legal actions. The court did not need to address Osborne’s alternative arguments regarding conditional privilege and malice, as the litigation privilege alone was sufficient to affirm the trial court’s ruling. View "Osborne v. Pleasanton Automotive Co., LP" on Justia Law

Lois and David divorced in 1992, with David ordered to pay child and spousal support. The child support obligation ended in 2001 when their daughter turned 18 and graduated high school, but wage garnishments continued until 2008. In 2021, David sought reimbursement for overpaid child support, claiming he overpaid $46,061.55. Lois opposed, arguing the delay was unreasonable and would cause her financial hardship.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied David's request, finding he did not act timely and his reasons for the delay were insufficient to overcome the prejudice to Lois. The court noted David had previously acted to terminate spousal support but did not do so for child support. The court also found Lois had unclean hands, as she likely knew she was receiving overpayments. However, the court granted David $3,000 in attorney fees as sanctions against Lois for failing to comply with court orders.On appeal, David argued that reimbursement of overpaid child support is mandatory under Family Code section 4007 and that laches should not apply. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court found that the defense of laches did not apply due to Lois's unclean hands but disagreed with David's interpretation of Family Code section 4007. The court noted that the original support order did not require Lois to notify David of the termination of the child support obligation, and it was David's responsibility to terminate the wage garnishment order. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying David's request for reimbursement due to the significant delay and resulting prejudice to Lois. View "In re Marriage of Saraye" on Justia Law

A transgender woman, who had legally changed her name and gender marker in 2018, sought to have the entire record of her name change and gender marker correction sealed in 2023. She argued that the public availability of these records had led to harassment and threats after her transgender status was disclosed on social media, revealing her personal information and former name. The trial court denied her request to seal the entire record but did seal her application to seal, its supporting documentation, and a physician’s letter attached to her initial petition.The Superior Court of Stanislaus County initially granted her petition for a name and gender change in 2018 without any objections. In 2023, she filed an application to seal the entire record, citing harassment and threats due to the public availability of her records. The trial court denied the request to seal the entire record, reasoning that there was no evidence the harassment was initiated by the court’s records and that sealing the records would not necessarily solve the problem. The court also noted the strong presumption that name changes be public to prevent fraud and ensure creditors and others can locate individuals who have changed their names.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and found that the trial court’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence. The appellate court concluded that the appellant’s privacy and safety interests in concealing her transgender identity outweighed the public’s right of access to the records. The court held that the entire record should be sealed to protect her privacy and safety, as there was no less restrictive means to achieve these interests. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case with instructions to seal all records revealing the appellant’s name change or gender marker correction. View "In re M.T." on Justia Law