Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two individuals applied for employment with a public school district in Los Angeles. One applicant had a prior misdemeanor conviction for battery, and the other for misdemeanor grand theft; both convictions had been expunged under California’s statutory procedure. Despite the expungements, the school district rejected both applicants, asserting that its duty to protect students required it to consider nearly any criminal conviction, regardless of expungement.Each applicant brought a separate lawsuit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The trial courts, after considering motions for summary judgment, ruled in favor of the applicants. The courts found that the district had violated California Labor Code section 432.7 (the “Nondisclosure Statute”) by inquiring into and utilizing the expunged misdemeanor convictions as a basis for denying employment. The district appealed, and the cases were consolidated before the reviewing court.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, undertook an independent review of the relevant statutes. The court determined that the basic prohibition of Labor Code section 432.7 barred the district from asking about or using expunged convictions, and that none of the statutory exceptions relied on by the district applied. Specifically, the court found that no law required the district to seek or act upon the types of expunged misdemeanor convictions at issue. The court rejected the district’s arguments that it was entitled to broader exceptions, explaining that the statutory text and legislative history supported a narrow reading of the exceptions. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgments in favor of the applicants, holding that the district’s actions violated the Nondisclosure Statute and awarding costs to the respondents. View "A.S. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

The case involved a personal injury claim filed by the plaintiff against the defendants in Los Angeles County Superior Court. The main issue was whether the action was "brought to trial" within the statutory period required by California law, which mandates dismissal if a civil case is not brought to trial within five years (plus a COVID-19 emergency extension). As the deadline approached, several panels of prospective jurors were assembled and sworn in by the trial court, and the court conducted hardship excusals. However, the parties did not begin their voir dire examination of the sworn juror panels before the deadline expired.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County dismissed the action with prejudice under Code of Civil Procedure section 583.360, concluding the matter was not "brought to trial" by the deadline. The trial court reasoned that jury selection had not sufficiently commenced because the parties had not yet started their voir dire examination of the juror panels. The plaintiff appealed this dismissal.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that, consistent with Stueve v. Nemer, a civil action is "brought to trial" when a panel of prospective jurors assembles in the courtroom for voir dire and is sworn in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 232, subdivision (a). The court determined that the action was timely "brought to trial" on the date the panels were sworn, regardless of whether the parties' examination of the jurors had begun. The court reversed the judgment of dismissal, finding it was error to dismiss the case since the statutory requirements were met when the jury panels were assembled and sworn before the deadline. The plaintiff was awarded costs on appeal. View "Wilson v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Owners of residential property in Indian Wells, California, challenged a city ordinance that placed a 29-night minimum stay requirement on short-term rentals (STRs), effectively banning them. In response to property owners in common interest developments (CIDs) who wanted to permit STRs, the city enacted an ordinance allowing CIDs to vote to opt out of the minimum stay requirement, provided certain conditions were met. The plaintiffs, who owned property in a CID, sought a permit to operate an STR after their CID certified an opt-out vote, but the city denied the permit. The plaintiffs argued the opt-out procedure conflicted with California Civil Code section 4740, part of the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act, which protects owners from prohibitions on rentals adopted after they acquire title. They also asserted the city had unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to private parties.The Superior Court of Riverside County found in favor of the plaintiffs, concluding that the city’s opt-out procedure was preempted by section 4740 and conflicted with statutory voting requirements for amending CID governing documents. The trial court ruled the city had a duty to issue an STR permit and awarded attorney fees to the plaintiffs. The city appealed, arguing that section 4740 was not implicated and the delegation was permissible.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. It held that the city’s opt-out provision was not preempted by section 4740, as a vote to opt out did not amend CID governing documents or prohibit rentals, and compliance with both laws was possible. The court further held that the delegation of authority to CID members was constitutional and did not violate due process. It also determined the city had not acted arbitrarily or capriciously in enacting the ordinance. The court reversed the judgment and the postjudgment award of attorney fees, ordering costs in favor of the city. View "Parsons v. City of Indian Wells" on Justia Law

In 2003, Samuel Anthony Cruz and several other members of the 7th Street gang were involved in two separate shooting incidents that resulted in the deaths of rival gang members. Cruz was charged with two counts of murder but entered a plea agreement in which he pleaded guilty to two counts of voluntary manslaughter, along with enhancements and gang participation. He was sentenced to a negotiated term of 21 years and eight months.Many years later, Cruz filed a petition under California Penal Code section 1172.6, seeking to vacate his manslaughter convictions and be resentenced on the grounds that legal standards for murder liability had changed. The Superior Court of Orange County issued an order to show cause and held an evidentiary hearing. At this hearing, the prosecution introduced transcripts from the 2007 trial of Cruz’s codefendant, Juan Becerra. Cruz objected to the use of these transcripts on due process grounds but did not challenge the factual findings or dispute this court’s prior opinions allowing such evidence. The trial court denied Cruz’s petition, finding he was an actual shooter in one killing and a direct aider and abettor in the other.Upon appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed whether the trial court’s consideration of a codefendant’s trial testimony violated Cruz’s right to due process. The court held that admission of this testimony did not violate procedural due process because Cruz had a full and fair opportunity to contest the evidence: he could have subpoenaed witnesses, testified on his own behalf, or introduced new evidence. The court affirmed the trial court’s order denying Cruz’s petition for vacatur and resentencing. View "P. v. Cruz" on Justia Law

A group of preservation organizations challenged a city’s decision to amend its Historic Resources Element by eliminating references to an inventory of historic properties compiled in 1981. This inventory, which had identified over 700 pre-1940 structures deemed to have retained architectural integrity, had previously been recognized by city resolution as listing significant historical examples. Over the years, the city argued the inventory became both outdated and inaccurate, including properties that no longer existed or had been altered, and omitting others. Instead of updating the inventory, the city chose to remove all references to it, expand incentives for its separate, voluntary historic property register, and clarify owner consent as a criterion for that register. The city supported these changes with a negative declaration, concluding there would be no significant adverse impact on historic properties.The Superior Court of Orange County reviewed a petition for writ of mandamus filed by the plaintiffs, who argued that an environmental impact report was required before amending the element. The trial court found that the inventory properties were presumptively protected under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) but concluded that the city had shown the inventory as a whole was ineffective due to its inaccuracies. The court therefore denied the petition.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, disagreed with the trial court’s analysis. It held that properties on a city-recognized inventory are presumptively historical resources under CEQA and that rebutting this presumption requires an individualized determination that each property lacks historical significance, rather than a blanket finding that the inventory is outdated or flawed. The court found that the city’s amendment, by eliminating CEQA protections for all inventory properties without such analysis, was invalid and likely to have a significant adverse environmental effect. The appellate court reversed and remanded, directing the trial court to set aside the city’s approvals pending appropriate CEQA review. View "Laguna Beach Historic Pres. Coalition v. City of Laguna Beach" on Justia Law

A bankruptcy liquidator acting on behalf of a group of not-for-profit hospitals alleged that a company providing healthcare data and repricing services conspired with major health insurers to fix and suppress reimbursement rates for out-of-network (OON) medical services. The complaint described an industry practice in which insurers send OON claims to the company, whose proprietary algorithm, based on claims data from hundreds of insurers, sets suggested reimbursement rates. The liquidator claimed that these rates were consistently and artificially low, that insurers nearly always adopted them, and that the company openly promoted its universal adoption among leading insurers. The alleged scheme was said to harm providers by suppressing both OON and in-network rates, and to constitute unlawful horizontal price fixing, price tampering, and unlawful exchange of competitively sensitive information.After the insurers were ordered to arbitration and dismissed from the action, the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco sustained the remaining defendant company’s demurrer without leave to amend. The court reasoned that OON reimbursements were not subject to the Cartwright Act’s prohibition on price fixing because they were not standalone products or services but merely reflected fulfillment of insurers’ contractual obligations to subscribers. The court also ruled that the unlawful exchange of information and unfair competition claims depended on the price-fixing theory and thus failed for the same reason.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reversed the judgment. It held that payments for OON medical services by insurers are “prices” within the meaning of the Cartwright Act and are not exempt from antitrust scrutiny merely because they arise from insurers’ obligations to their subscribers. The court found that both state and federal antitrust law permit claims for price fixing in this context and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "VHS Liquidating Trust v. MultiPlan Corp." on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was convicted of first degree murder and other crimes in 1996, with the jury finding special circumstances and imposing a death sentence. During jury selection at trial, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike several Black and Latino jurors. The defendant’s counsel objected to these strikes, raising claims of racial discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky and People v. Wheeler. The trial court found a prima facie case of discrimination for most challenges, required race-neutral justifications from the prosecutor, and ultimately denied the motions. On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s rulings.Years later, the defendant sought postconviction discovery under Penal Code section 1054.9, including the prosecution’s jury selection notes. The Superior Court for the County of Riverside denied production of these notes, citing prior case law that required a prima facie showing of a Batson/Wheeler violation for postconviction access to jury selection notes. Shortly after this ruling, Assembly Bill No. 1036 was enacted, amending section 1054.9 to expressly include jury selection notes as discoverable material and shifting the burden to the prosecution to show good cause for withholding or redacting these notes.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, held that the recent legislative amendments eliminate the requirement for a defendant to make a prima facie case of racial bias to obtain jury selection notes postconviction. Instead, a request for these notes now shifts the burden to the prosecution to demonstrate good cause for shielding or redacting the notes. The appellate court granted the petition for writ of mandate, directing the trial court to adjudicate the defendant’s request in accordance with the current law. View "Montes v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A mother with a history of mental health and substance abuse issues had two children previously removed from her care after an incident involving erratic behavior and child endangerment. At the time her newborn son was born, her dependency case regarding his older siblings was still pending. When the county child welfare agency became aware of the birth and the ongoing concerns, they initiated dependency proceedings for the newborn. Throughout this process, the mother was inconsistent with court-ordered services, missed drug tests, limited the information available to her therapists and evaluators, and failed to produce the newborn to authorities as ordered, instead absconding with him for several weeks.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County held a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing. At this hearing, the court terminated reunification services as to the older siblings due to the mother’s lack of progress and questionable credibility. Simultaneously, the court found that a statutory “bypass” provision applied to the newborn, allowing the court to deny reunification services because the mother had previously failed to reunify with the siblings and had not made a reasonable effort to address the problems that led to their removal. The court set a permanency planning hearing for the newborn and denied reunification services for both parents.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the mother’s petition for extraordinary writ relief. The appellate court upheld its prior precedent that, where termination of reunification services for one child and denial of services for a sibling occur at the same hearing, the statutory requirement that the parent “subsequently” make reasonable efforts is not an opportunity for further delay. The court found substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s findings and denied the mother’s writ petition, affirming the denial of reunification services under the bypass provision. View "F.L. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

After divorcing in 2022, Eric and Tiare experienced escalating harassment and abuse beginning in late 2023. Tiare repeatedly sent manipulative and threatening messages, made suicide threats, and harassed Eric’s new girlfriend. The harassment intensified, culminating in Tiare entering Eric’s property, physically attacking him, and being arrested for battery and unauthorized entry. Various protective orders were issued, including a temporary restraining order (TRO), an emergency protective order, and a criminal protective order. Despite these, Tiare violated the orders and continued contacting Eric.The Marin County Superior Court initially granted Tiare three continuances for the hearing on Eric’s petition for a domestic violence restraining order, citing reasons such as giving Tiare time to respond, her attorney’s absence, and her participation in residential treatment. At the fourth hearing, Tiare requested another continuance, arguing her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent due to pending criminal charges. The trial court denied this request, found that Eric had proven acts of abuse, and issued a three-year restraining order protecting both Eric and his girlfriend.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the trial court’s denial of the fourth continuance. The appellate court held that respondents in Domestic Violence Prevention Act proceedings who intend to assert their Fifth Amendment right are not automatically entitled to a continuance. The trial court must balance the respondent’s Fifth Amendment interests against other interests, including those of the petitioner, judicial efficiency, nonparties, and the legislative purpose of prompt resolution. The appellate court found the trial court had properly weighed these competing interests and did not abuse its discretion in denying the request. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Irvine v. Irvine" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with misdemeanor battery under California Penal Code section 242. After arraignment, he did not waive his statutory right to a speedy trial, resulting in a last day for trial of October 14, 2024. Due to a witness’s planned absence and a defense counsel’s scheduling conflict, the trial was set for November 7, 2024, but ultimately continued to November 21, 2024. The defendant objected to the delay beyond the statutory period, arguing the witness would be available within the required timeframe and that other courtrooms could accommodate a timely trial.The Solano County Superior Court, with Judge Nisperos presiding, denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss for violation of his speedy trial rights under section 1382. The court reasoned it was not empowered to overturn a prior continuance order by another judge, despite acknowledging that section 1382 and section 1050 motions are distinct and require separate determinations. A jury convicted the defendant, and he appealed. The appellate division of the superior court affirmed the conviction, finding no abuse of discretion and holding that good cause existed for the continuance due to the witness’s unavailability and defense counsel’s engagement in another trial.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court erred in denying the section 1382 motion on procedural grounds and that no good cause existed to continue the trial beyond the statutory period. The witness was available within the required timeframe, and the court’s unavailability did not constitute good cause. Prejudice was established because the misdemeanor charge could not be refiled. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment. View "P. v. Adam" on Justia Law