Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case involves a dispute between plaintiffs Michelle Beverage and Joseph Mejia, and defendant Apple, Inc. The plaintiffs filed a class action complaint alleging that Apple's restrictive contractual terms and coercive conduct towards software developers on its App Store constituted unlawful and unfair practices that violated the Cartwright Act and the Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The plaintiffs specifically focused on Apple's treatment of one developer, Epic Games, Inc., and its gaming application, Fortnite. The trial court sustained a demurrer brought by Apple without leave to amend, applying the Colgate doctrine and the holding of Chavez v. Whirlpool Corporation. The court determined that the plaintiffs did not and could not state causes of action under either legal regime as a matter of law.The trial court's decision was based on the application of the Colgate doctrine and the holding of Chavez v. Whirlpool Corporation. The court found that the plaintiffs did not and could not state causes of action under either the Cartwright Act or the UCL as a matter of law. The plaintiffs appealed only one aspect of the trial court's ruling, arguing that the court erred by relying on Chavez to sustain the demurrer to their UCL cause of action alleging unfair practices by Apple towards Epic Games.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court disagreed with the plaintiffs' argument that Chavez was inconsistent with the California Supreme Court’s decision in Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Company. The court found that the trial court correctly relied on Chavez to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend. The court held that the plaintiffs did not state a claim as a matter of law under the "unfair" prong of the UCL, considering the trial court's ruling that Apple's practices constituted permissible unilateral conduct. View "Beverage v. Apple, Inc." on Justia Law

The defendant, Takeya Lashay Koontzy, pleaded no contest to fleeing the scene of an injury accident and was placed on probation with the condition that she pay victim restitution in an amount to be determined. However, due to the victim's delay in providing documentation of her damages and failure to appear on multiple dates set for restitution hearings, the trial court did not determine the amount of restitution before the termination of Koontzy's probation. More than two years post-termination, the court ordered Koontzy to pay $86,306.12 in victim restitution. Koontzy argued that the trial court was without authority to modify the amount of restitution owed to the victim following the termination of probation.The trial court had suspended the imposition of sentence and placed Koontzy on formal probation for three years, including that she pay victim restitution in an amount to be determined. However, due to various delays, the amount was not determined until after the termination of Koontzy's probation. The prosecution sought a determination of restitution, and over Koontzy's objection, the trial court concluded it retained jurisdiction to modify the victim restitution order.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Five agreed with Koontzy's argument. The court held that the trial court erred in modifying the restitution order after the termination of Koontzy's probation. The court reasoned that the restitution order in this case was not issued pursuant to section 1202.4, because the victim's damages were not due to Koontzy's criminal conduct. Therefore, modification of the restitution order after termination of probation could not be based on the express retention of jurisdiction in section 1202.46. The court concluded that the restitution order was a condition imposed under section 1203.1, and it was subject to the limitations in section 1203.3 permitting modification of probation conditions only during the term of probation. Accordingly, the trial court was without authority to modify the restitution order following termination of probation. The trial court's restitution order was reversed. View "People v. Koontzy" on Justia Law

Dr. Ryan Kime, an emergency medicine physician, applied for privileges in the emergency department of two hospitals owned by Dignity Health, Inc. (Dignity) while he was under disciplinary proceedings by the Medical Board of California. The proceedings resulted in a public reprimand. Dignity stopped processing Kime’s application a few days after the reprimand took effect. Kime sued Dignity for injunctive relief and damages, alleging that Dignity violated his common law and statutory rights by denying his application without offering him a hearing. Dignity moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had a policy not to consider applicants with disciplinary histories for emergency department privileges, and that no hearing is required when privileges are denied due to such a policy. The trial court granted Dignity’s motion for summary judgment and denied Kime’s motion for summary adjudication.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision. The court found that Dignity's policy of not considering applicants with disciplinary histories for emergency department privileges was a quasi-legislative decision, which did not require a hearing under the common law right to fair procedure. The court also found that Dignity's decision to deny Kime's application did not require a hearing under the statutory right set forth in the Business and Professions Code, as the decision was not made by a peer review body and did not require the filing of a report under section 805 of the Code. The court concluded that Kime had no right to a hearing under either the common law or statutory law. View "Kime v. Dignity Health, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Dr. R. Michael Williams, a board-certified oncologist, who had privileges at Doctor’s Medical Center of Modesto (DMCM) since 2003. Williams alleged that around 2018, his professional relationship with DMCM and other respondents deteriorated. He claimed that respondents treated him with hostility and unprofessionalism, and began investigating him. Williams filed two lawsuits against respondents based on their treatment of him. The first lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed by Williams after respondents filed anti-SLAPP motions. The second lawsuit, which is the subject of this appeal, was dismissed by the trial court after granting respondents' anti-SLAPP motions. Williams appealed both the granting of the anti-SLAPP motions and the award of attorney fees to respondents.The Superior Court of Stanislaus County had granted two separate anti-SLAPP motions filed by the respondents and awarded them attorney fees. Williams appealed these decisions, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that his claims arose from protected activity and that he failed to establish a probability of prevailing on his claims. He also contended that the award of attorney fees must be reversed because he had established that the court erred in granting the anti-SLAPP motions.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District reversed both the granting of the anti-SLAPP motions and the award of attorney fees. The court found that the trial court had erroneously relied on issue preclusion to find that respondents had met their burden under the first SLAPP question. The court concluded that the respondents did not meet their burden of showing that any cause of action or claim in the FAC arose from SLAPP protected activity. Therefore, the SLAPP order must be reversed, and it was unnecessary for the court to address whether Williams met his burden under the second step. View "Williams v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto" on Justia Law

The case involves Christine Matlock Dougherty, who sued U.S. Behavioral Health Plan, California (USB) for claims related to her son's healthcare. Dougherty's son, Ryan, was enrolled in a UnitedHealthcare HMO health plan, which Dougherty had access to through her employer. Ryan admitted himself into a residential treatment facility for severe drug addiction, but USB denied coverage for his stay after three days, arguing that he could be treated at home. Ryan fatally overdosed shortly after his discharge from the facility. Dougherty then sued USB, claiming that its wrongful denial of coverage for Ryan's treatment caused his death. USB petitioned to compel arbitration of her claims, but the trial court denied the petition, stating that USB's arbitration agreement was not enforceable because it did not comply with the disclosure requirements imposed by Health & Safety Code section 1363.1.The trial court denied USB's petition to compel arbitration on the grounds that the arbitration agreement did not comply with the disclosure requirements of Health & Safety Code section 1363.1. The court found that there were two separate contracts, one between Dougherty and UnitedHealthcare, and another between Dougherty and USB. The court ruled that the arbitration agreement in the supplement, which governed Dougherty's claims against USB, did not comply with section 1363.1's disclosure requirements.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court concluded that USB forfeited its argument that the issue of whether the arbitration agreement was valid under the disclosure requirements of section 1363.1 was delegated to the arbitrator. However, the court agreed with USB that the trial court erroneously denied USB’s petition because USB complied with section 1363.1. The court found that the only "health care service plan" at issue that "includes terms that require binding arbitration" is Dougherty’s plan with UnitedHealthcare, which includes both the EOC and the supplement as components of the plan. Therefore, the court concluded that there was no section 1363.1 violation and reversed the trial court's order denying the petition to compel arbitration. View "Dougherty v. U.S. Behavioral Health Plan" on Justia Law

This case revolves around an employment dispute where Renee Vines sued his former employer, O’Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC, for violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), alleging causes of action for race- and age-based discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. A jury found in his favor on his causes of action for retaliation and failure to prevent retaliation, but against him on his other causes of action. Vines moved for statutory attorneys’ fees, which the trial court granted but awarded only a portion of the requested amount. Vines appealed, and the appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in its determination of the fees.The trial court had initially awarded Vines a reduced amount of attorneys’ fees, based on its determination that Vines's unsuccessful discrimination and harassment causes of action were not closely related to or factually intertwined with his successful retaliation causes of action. Vines appealed this decision, and the appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in its determination. On remand, the trial court awarded Vines a significantly larger amount in fees.O’Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC, appealed from the order denying its motion to vacate the renewal of judgment, challenging only the amount of interest on the award of attorneys’ fees. O’Reilly argued that, because the appellate court's decision in the prior appeal was a reversal, not a modification, of the trial court’s initial order, interest on the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded should run from the date of the second order, not the first. The appellate court agreed with O’Reilly, reversed the order denying O’Reilly’s motion to vacate the renewed judgment, and directed the trial court to grant the motion. View "Vines v. O'Reilly Auto Enterprises" on Justia Law

The case revolves around June LaMarr, an employee at the University of California Davis Medical Center, who was transferred to a different department following performance issues and conflicts with her supervisor. The transfer was initially temporary, but later became permanent, resulting in a decrease in LaMarr's pay. LaMarr sued the Regents of the University of California, alleging that her due process rights were violated as she was not provided a hearing under Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. before her demotion.The trial court found in favor of the Regents. It concluded that LaMarr was not deprived of due process when she was offered the option to either transfer to a non-supervisory position with reduced pay or return to her higher paying supervisory position and face possible termination proceedings. The court reasoned that the Regents never issued a notice of intent to dismiss and that LaMarr's feeling of duress did not trigger due process protections.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District, LaMarr appealed the trial court's decision, arguing that the finding lacked substantial evidence. She contended that she was not informed of the adverse consequences of accepting a transfer and that her acceptance of the transfer was not voluntary.The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. It found substantial evidence that the Regents did not violate LaMarr's due process rights because she was never notified of an intent to terminate and any demotion was voluntary. The court also noted that a difficult choice is not the same as an involuntary choice. It concluded that there was substantial evidence supporting the trial court's finding that the Regents did not deprive LaMarr of due process. View "LaMarr v. The Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

The defendant, Robert Wayne Cunningham, was convicted of provocative act murder and other offenses related to a 1995 shootout with the police. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, along with consecutive determinate sentences. The incident occurred when Cunningham and his accomplice, Soley, were under police surveillance due to suspicion of committing a series of armed robberies. The police followed them to a liquor store, where they committed a robbery. The police blocked their car, leading to a shootout initiated by Cunningham, which resulted in Soley's death and injuries to Cunningham and at least one police officer.Cunningham sought sentencing relief under Penal Code section 1172.6 but was unsuccessful. He appealed, arguing that provocative murder is based on the imputation of malice, which he claimed is now barred by the newly enacted Penal Code section 188, subdivision (a)(3). He also contended that the prosecutor's argument that he started the gun battle was equivalent to arguing the now discarded "natural and probable consequences" doctrine.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District disagreed with Cunningham's arguments. The court noted that provocative act murder has been a part of California law since the 1960s and that the legislature's failure to mention it in the new statute indicates it did not intend to discard this theory. The court also stated that the prosecutor's argument did not preclude the statute and that the jury's verdict was informed by the instructions given. The court cited a recent case, People v. Antonelli, where it held that the provocative murder doctrine survived recent legislative enactments. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment, denying Cunningham's sentencing relief. View "People v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

The case involves Angel Mondragon, an employee of Sunrun Inc., who was required to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of his employment. The agreement covered most disputes related to Mondragon’s employment but excluded claims brought under the Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (PAGA). After his employment ended, Mondragon filed a complaint asserting several causes of action under PAGA. Sunrun filed a motion to compel arbitration of Mondragon’s claims, which the trial court denied. Sunrun appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court erred in ruling on whether Mondragon’s claims were arbitrable.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County had previously denied Sunrun's motion to compel arbitration. The court ruled that it, not the arbitrator, should decide questions of arbitrability. The court also ruled that the arbitration agreement unambiguously excluded PAGA claims and did not differentiate between individual PAGA claims and PAGA claims brought on behalf of other employees.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Seven affirmed the decision of the lower court. The court concluded that Mondragon, an unsophisticated party, did not delegate arbitrability decisions to the arbitrator. The court also concluded that the language of the arbitration agreement did not require Mondragon to arbitrate his individual PAGA claims. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the lower court. View "Mondragon v. Sunrun Inc." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a bail bond forfeiture involving Florian Basica, who was charged with second-degree robbery. The North River Insurance Company (the surety) and Bad Boys Bail Bonds (the bail agent) posted a $60,000 bond for Basica's release. However, Basica failed to appear for his preliminary hearing, leading to the forfeiture of the bond. The bail agent sought an extension of the exoneration period, which was granted twice by the trial court. The appellants later filed a motion to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bail bond, arguing that the trial court did not declare the forfeiture in a timely manner.The trial court denied the appellants' motion and entered summary judgment against the surety. The appellants argued that the entry of summary judgment was premature and an act in excess of jurisdiction, citing dicta from People v. Granite State Insurance Co. They contended that the court's power to enter summary judgment begins on the day following the denial of the motion.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District disagreed with the appellants' argument. It found that the trial court had the authority to enter summary judgment when the bond is forfeited and the period specified in section 1305 has elapsed without the forfeiture being set aside. In this case, the bond had been forfeited, and the exoneration period had elapsed without the forfeiture being set aside by the time the trial court entered summary judgment. Therefore, the court acted within its jurisdiction in entering summary judgment. The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "P. v. Basica" on Justia Law