Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two victims were robbed at gunpoint and had their personal items and vehicle stolen by two suspects, one of whom drove away in the victims’ car while the other fled in a different vehicle. Police responded shortly after, locating the victim’s vehicle and monitoring the suspect’s vehicle at an address associated with one of the suspects, Marcos Andres Andrade. During the investigation, officers obtained cell site location information (CSLI) from Andrade’s phone carrier without a warrant by submitting an emergency disclosure request. This data assisted in acquiring search and arrest warrants, leading to Andrade’s arrest and recovery of some stolen items.The Santa Clara County Superior Court reviewed Andrade’s motion to suppress evidence derived from the warrantless CSLI request. The trial court denied the motion, finding exigent circumstances justified the search because the suspects were outstanding, armed, and there was potential for destruction of evidence or public danger. Andrade subsequently entered a no contest plea to second degree robbery and admitted a prior strike, receiving a four-year sentence. He appealed, arguing the exigent circumstances exception did not apply.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, considered whether the warrantless acquisition of both historical and real-time CSLI was a Fourth Amendment search, and if exigent circumstances justified the search. The court held that law enforcement’s request for historical and real-time CSLI constituted a Fourth Amendment search, requiring a warrant unless a valid exception applied. The court found that no exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search in this case and directed suppression of the CSLI data. The judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings, with instructions for the trial court to permit Andrade to withdraw his plea and to determine whether other evidence should be suppressed as fruits of the illegally obtained CSLI. View "People v. Andrade" on Justia Law

The defendant entered the residence of his ex-girlfriend, violating a criminal protective order, and assaulted her, causing significant injuries that required surgery. After law enforcement arrived, the defendant resisted arrest and assaulted a correctional officer. He was charged with several felonies, including corporal injury to a cohabitant with a prior conviction, false imprisonment by violence, resisting an executive officer, and other misdemeanors. The charging document also alleged two prior strikes—first degree burglary and criminal threats—and two serious felony enhancements.After a preliminary hearing, the defendant filed a motion under People v. Superior Court (Romero) to dismiss one of the prior strikes. The People opposed this motion. Judge Catherine Swysen initially denied the Romero motion. Later, before Judge Barry LaBarbera, the defendant pleaded guilty to all charges and admitted both strikes, with the understanding that the renewed Romero motion would be considered at sentencing. At sentencing, Judge LaBarbera granted the motion and dismissed the burglary strike, citing the defendant’s age at the time of the offense, his background, mental illness, and rehabilitative efforts. The defendant was sentenced to 27 years and eight months in prison.The People appealed to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Six, arguing for the first time that the trial court erred in allowing a renewed Romero motion and abused its discretion in dismissing the strike. The appellate court held that the People forfeited their claim regarding the renewed Romero motion by failing to object at trial and declined to review the forfeited claim. The court further held that Judge LaBarbera did not abuse his discretion in granting the Romero motion. The judgment was affirmed. View "P. v. Perkins" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with inflicting corporal injury on his girlfriend, along with possessing drug paraphernalia and a controlled substance. The incident occurred when the defendant, under the influence and agitated, choked his girlfriend with a guitar amp cord while she was driving, endangering both her and their unborn child as well as others on the freeway. After being arrested, the defendant sought pretrial mental health diversion, submitting evidence of his participation in a residential treatment program and a forensic psychological evaluation diagnosing multiple mental health and substance use disorders.In the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the trial judge determined that the defendant met the eligibility criteria for mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, but found him unsuitable for diversion. The court concluded that the defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community, citing both the facts of the charged offense—specifically, the use of a weapon in a dangerous manner—and a pattern of domestic violence in the defendant’s past, including a prior conviction and an uncharged incident. The defendant pleaded no contest to the corporal injury charge pursuant to a negotiated plea, was placed on formal probation with a treatment requirement, and appealed the denial of diversion.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the trial court’s denial for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the defendant posed an unreasonable risk of committing a violent felony (a “super strike”) if treated outside custody. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying mental health diversion. View "People v. Henn" on Justia Law

A commercial law firm entered into a 66-month lease for office space in downtown Oakland, California, but quickly failed to make rent and other payments. After accumulating substantial arrears, the landlord initiated an unlawful detainer action. The parties settled, with the tenant agreeing to pay arrears and stipulating that if it defaulted again, the landlord could obtain a judgment for possession, unpaid rent, fees, and future rent. The tenant defaulted again, leading the landlord to seek and obtain judgment under the settlement’s terms.The Alameda County Superior Court held hearings on damages, including the landlord’s claim for future rent. The landlord presented expert testimony and evidence on market conditions, showing high vacancy rates and poor prospects for re-leasing the premises. The tenant did not present counter-evidence. The court found the tenant breached the settlement and awarded possession to the landlord, damages for unpaid rent and fees, and future rental damages for three years, reduced to present value, based on market evidence and the landlord's duty to mitigate.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. It held that substantial evidence supported the award of future rent, the stipulation for damages was not an unlawful penalty under California law, and the judgment did not result in a double recovery. The court applied the substantial evidence standard for factual findings and de novo review for legal issues. The judgment was affirmed, and the landlord was awarded costs on appeal. View "USPA City Center, LLC v. Law Offices of Jason W. Estavillo, P.C." on Justia Law

C.M., a 16-year-old, was the subject of a juvenile wardship petition alleging attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon, along with a personal infliction of great bodily injury. C.M. admitted to assault with a deadly weapon and the great bodily injury allegation, while the attempted murder charge was dismissed. After jurisdiction was transferred from Riverside County to Los Angeles County, the Los Angeles Superior Court found that C.M. had completed all terms of probation and ordered the record sealed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786.Prior to the current appeal, the Los Angeles Superior Court issued the sealing order over the People’s objection. The People argued that section 786, subdivision (d), prohibits sealing records for offenses listed in section 707, subdivision (b), and claimed that assault with a deadly weapon should be treated as equivalent to “assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury,” which is listed in section 707(b)(14). The Superior Court disagreed, and the People sought review by petitioning for a writ of mandate.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court concluded that assault with a deadly weapon is not expressly listed in section 707, subdivision (b), and that section 786 only prohibits sealing for offenses actually adjudicated as section 707(b) offenses. The court held that the statutory language does not permit courts to reclassify offenses for sealing purposes based on conduct, and that legislative history supports a streamlined process limited to adjudicated offenses listed in section 707(b). Therefore, the Court of Appeal denied the People’s petition for writ of mandate, affirming the juvenile court’s sealing order. View "P. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute between two individuals who cohabited for nearly a decade before marrying. During their relationship, the parties agreed to pool their efforts and share any property acquired during this period, which included contributions to one party’s government pension. After the relationship ended, the non-employee party claimed entitlement to a share of the pension accrued during their pre-marital cohabitation, based on their agreement.After separation and the filing of a civil action for breach of contract, the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco consolidated the proceedings. The court found that the parties had an implied-in-fact contract—known as a Marvin agreement—to share equally in all property acquired during their relationship, including pension contributions. The trial court held that the non-employee party was entitled to an equal share of the pension benefits accrued during the period of cohabitation, even though the parties were not married at the time.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed only the question of whether Public Utilities Code section 12337 barred the non-employee party from receiving a share of the pension. The appellate court held that section 12337, which generally renders such pensions unassignable and exempt from execution, does not preclude enforcement of an ownership interest in the pension arising from a Marvin agreement. The court reasoned that the non-employee party’s claim was not as a creditor but as an owner by virtue of contract, and therefore section 12337’s restrictions did not apply. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order, concluding that the non-employee party was entitled to an equal share of the pension benefits accrued during the Marvin period. View "Seiwald v. Irias" on Justia Law

Santa Clara County’s Board of Supervisors responded to significant anticipated federal funding cuts, stemming from Congress’s enactment of H.R. 1, by declaring an emergency and calling for a special election to seek voter approval for Measure A—a five-year general sales tax increase. The Board determined that these federal cuts would have an immediate and severe impact on healthcare and social safety net services for county residents, and that waiting until the next general election would result in deep service reductions. The Board’s resolution outlined detailed findings about the emergency’s nature and magnitude, and the measure was placed before voters in a special election.Prior to the election, individual county residents challenged the legal sufficiency of the emergency declaration in the Superior Court of Santa Clara County. They argued that the “cases of emergency” exception in article XIII C, section 2 of the California Constitution was improperly applied, and that the measure’s ballot question and impartial analysis were not impartial or accurate as required by the Elections Code. After expedited proceedings, the trial court denied their petition regarding the emergency declaration but ordered agreed-upon modifications to some ballot language.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, held that the “cases of emergency” clause should be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning—referring to unforeseen circumstances requiring immediate action—and does not require a narrow or specially defined scope. The court found that the Board’s resolution and findings provided sufficient factual basis for the emergency declaration and that the trial court’s handling of judicial notice, even if imperfect, was not prejudicial. The court declined to address arguments about the specific ballot language or impartial analysis, finding those issues moot. The judgment denying the writ was affirmed. View "Holtz v. Moreles" on Justia Law

A private corporation operating oil and water injection wells in the Fruitvale Oil Field sought permission from the California Department of Conservation, Geologic Energy Management Division (CalGEM) to drill and use up to twelve new water injection wells. These wells would dispose of “produced water,” a byproduct of oil production, by pumping it into a deep aquifer. CalGEM concluded that the proposed project was not exempt from review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and denied the required Project Approval Letter (PAL). The operator argued that the project qualified for various CEQA exemptions, including a statutory exemption for ongoing pre-CEQA private projects, as well as categorical exemptions for existing facilities and minor alterations to land.The Superior Court of Kern County granted the operator’s petition for a writ of mandate, concluding that the ongoing project exemption applied and ordering CalGEM to find the project exempt from CEQA and issue the PAL. The court also found that class 1 and class 4 categorical exemptions did not apply. The operator’s request for attorneys’ fees was struck down, as the court found it was not eligible under the relevant statute.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that substantial evidence supported CalGEM’s determination that none of the claimed exemptions applied. The court found the regulatory provision relied on for the ongoing project exemption to be invalid and, even if valid, held that CalGEM’s current approval process involved a greater degree of responsibility and control than existed before 1973, so the exemption could not apply. It further concluded that the categorical exemptions for existing facilities and minor alterations to land were inapplicable because the project involved drilling new wells to significant depths. The appellate court reversed the judgment granting the writ and dismissed the cross-appeal as moot. View "San Joaquin Facilities Management, Inc. v. Dept. of Conservation" on Justia Law

The case involves a dissolution of marriage between two parties after a 16-year marriage. The wife filed for temporary spousal support, and the Superior Court of Los Angeles County ordered the husband to pay $45,000 per month. Later, the husband requested a modification of the temporary spousal support, arguing that he sold his business, retired, and his income had significantly decreased. His forensic accountant documented a substantial windfall from the sale of the business. The wife responded by seeking an increase in support, referencing the proceeds from the sale. At the hearing, the trial court found no sufficient change in circumstances to justify modification and denied both parties’ requests to alter the temporary support amount. Importantly, the court expressly reserved jurisdiction to retroactively modify the support award from the date the modification request was served until the trial commenced.After the court’s denial, the husband appealed the order. The wife moved to dismiss the appeal, contending that the order was not final or appealable due to the trial court’s express reservation of jurisdiction. The husband argued that the order should be considered appealable because, after his appeal was filed, the trial judge declined to modify the temporary support and entered judgment.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, determined that the order denying the modification of temporary spousal support was not final and therefore not appealable because the trial court had expressly reserved jurisdiction to retroactively modify the award. The court dismissed the appeal, holding that an order which leaves the parties’ rights subject to revision at trial is not final for appellate purposes. The court clarified that the husband could challenge the order in his pending appeal from the judgment, which rendered the order final. View "Sterndahl v. Sterndahl" on Justia Law

A contractor, TL Veterans Construction, Inc., was hired by the California Military Department (CMD) to renovate buildings at a military base, including asbestos abatement work. TL Veterans had previously obtained insurance policies from Scottsdale Insurance Company based on applications that materially misrepresented the size and nature of its projects, including falsely denying involvement with asbestos. During the renovation, TL Veterans caused a fire that destroyed one of the buildings. Both TL Veterans and CMD, as an additional insured, sought coverage under the insurance policies, but Scottsdale discovered the misrepresentations and rescinded the policies.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment for Scottsdale, declaring that the insurance policies had been properly rescinded and were void from inception. CMD had cross-claimed for promissory estoppel and declaratory relief, but after the court’s summary judgment ruling, dismissed its remaining claims. CMD appealed, arguing that Scottsdale had waived its rescission right by failing to investigate a prior claim that might have revealed the misrepresentations, and that CMD’s reliance on the policies should prevent rescission.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Scottsdale did not waive its right to rescind because the prior claim did not reveal the asbestos misrepresentation, which was an independent and material basis for rescission. The court also held that California Insurance Code section 650 permits an insurer to rescind a policy based on material misrepresentations at any time before a lawsuit to enforce the policy is filed, and this right is not lost even if a third party (here, CMD as an additional insured) relied economically on the policy. The judgment in favor of Scottsdale was affirmed. View "Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. California Military Dept." on Justia Law