Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a dispute between two individuals who cohabited for nearly a decade before marrying. During their relationship, the parties agreed to pool their efforts and share any property acquired during this period, which included contributions to one party’s government pension. After the relationship ended, the non-employee party claimed entitlement to a share of the pension accrued during their pre-marital cohabitation, based on their agreement.After separation and the filing of a civil action for breach of contract, the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco consolidated the proceedings. The court found that the parties had an implied-in-fact contract—known as a Marvin agreement—to share equally in all property acquired during their relationship, including pension contributions. The trial court held that the non-employee party was entitled to an equal share of the pension benefits accrued during the period of cohabitation, even though the parties were not married at the time.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed only the question of whether Public Utilities Code section 12337 barred the non-employee party from receiving a share of the pension. The appellate court held that section 12337, which generally renders such pensions unassignable and exempt from execution, does not preclude enforcement of an ownership interest in the pension arising from a Marvin agreement. The court reasoned that the non-employee party’s claim was not as a creditor but as an owner by virtue of contract, and therefore section 12337’s restrictions did not apply. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order, concluding that the non-employee party was entitled to an equal share of the pension benefits accrued during the Marvin period. View "Seiwald v. Irias" on Justia Law

Santa Clara County’s Board of Supervisors responded to significant anticipated federal funding cuts, stemming from Congress’s enactment of H.R. 1, by declaring an emergency and calling for a special election to seek voter approval for Measure A—a five-year general sales tax increase. The Board determined that these federal cuts would have an immediate and severe impact on healthcare and social safety net services for county residents, and that waiting until the next general election would result in deep service reductions. The Board’s resolution outlined detailed findings about the emergency’s nature and magnitude, and the measure was placed before voters in a special election.Prior to the election, individual county residents challenged the legal sufficiency of the emergency declaration in the Superior Court of Santa Clara County. They argued that the “cases of emergency” exception in article XIII C, section 2 of the California Constitution was improperly applied, and that the measure’s ballot question and impartial analysis were not impartial or accurate as required by the Elections Code. After expedited proceedings, the trial court denied their petition regarding the emergency declaration but ordered agreed-upon modifications to some ballot language.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, held that the “cases of emergency” clause should be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning—referring to unforeseen circumstances requiring immediate action—and does not require a narrow or specially defined scope. The court found that the Board’s resolution and findings provided sufficient factual basis for the emergency declaration and that the trial court’s handling of judicial notice, even if imperfect, was not prejudicial. The court declined to address arguments about the specific ballot language or impartial analysis, finding those issues moot. The judgment denying the writ was affirmed. View "Holtz v. Moreles" on Justia Law

A private corporation operating oil and water injection wells in the Fruitvale Oil Field sought permission from the California Department of Conservation, Geologic Energy Management Division (CalGEM) to drill and use up to twelve new water injection wells. These wells would dispose of “produced water,” a byproduct of oil production, by pumping it into a deep aquifer. CalGEM concluded that the proposed project was not exempt from review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and denied the required Project Approval Letter (PAL). The operator argued that the project qualified for various CEQA exemptions, including a statutory exemption for ongoing pre-CEQA private projects, as well as categorical exemptions for existing facilities and minor alterations to land.The Superior Court of Kern County granted the operator’s petition for a writ of mandate, concluding that the ongoing project exemption applied and ordering CalGEM to find the project exempt from CEQA and issue the PAL. The court also found that class 1 and class 4 categorical exemptions did not apply. The operator’s request for attorneys’ fees was struck down, as the court found it was not eligible under the relevant statute.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that substantial evidence supported CalGEM’s determination that none of the claimed exemptions applied. The court found the regulatory provision relied on for the ongoing project exemption to be invalid and, even if valid, held that CalGEM’s current approval process involved a greater degree of responsibility and control than existed before 1973, so the exemption could not apply. It further concluded that the categorical exemptions for existing facilities and minor alterations to land were inapplicable because the project involved drilling new wells to significant depths. The appellate court reversed the judgment granting the writ and dismissed the cross-appeal as moot. View "San Joaquin Facilities Management, Inc. v. Dept. of Conservation" on Justia Law

The case involves a dissolution of marriage between two parties after a 16-year marriage. The wife filed for temporary spousal support, and the Superior Court of Los Angeles County ordered the husband to pay $45,000 per month. Later, the husband requested a modification of the temporary spousal support, arguing that he sold his business, retired, and his income had significantly decreased. His forensic accountant documented a substantial windfall from the sale of the business. The wife responded by seeking an increase in support, referencing the proceeds from the sale. At the hearing, the trial court found no sufficient change in circumstances to justify modification and denied both parties’ requests to alter the temporary support amount. Importantly, the court expressly reserved jurisdiction to retroactively modify the support award from the date the modification request was served until the trial commenced.After the court’s denial, the husband appealed the order. The wife moved to dismiss the appeal, contending that the order was not final or appealable due to the trial court’s express reservation of jurisdiction. The husband argued that the order should be considered appealable because, after his appeal was filed, the trial judge declined to modify the temporary support and entered judgment.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, determined that the order denying the modification of temporary spousal support was not final and therefore not appealable because the trial court had expressly reserved jurisdiction to retroactively modify the award. The court dismissed the appeal, holding that an order which leaves the parties’ rights subject to revision at trial is not final for appellate purposes. The court clarified that the husband could challenge the order in his pending appeal from the judgment, which rendered the order final. View "Sterndahl v. Sterndahl" on Justia Law

A contractor, TL Veterans Construction, Inc., was hired by the California Military Department (CMD) to renovate buildings at a military base, including asbestos abatement work. TL Veterans had previously obtained insurance policies from Scottsdale Insurance Company based on applications that materially misrepresented the size and nature of its projects, including falsely denying involvement with asbestos. During the renovation, TL Veterans caused a fire that destroyed one of the buildings. Both TL Veterans and CMD, as an additional insured, sought coverage under the insurance policies, but Scottsdale discovered the misrepresentations and rescinded the policies.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment for Scottsdale, declaring that the insurance policies had been properly rescinded and were void from inception. CMD had cross-claimed for promissory estoppel and declaratory relief, but after the court’s summary judgment ruling, dismissed its remaining claims. CMD appealed, arguing that Scottsdale had waived its rescission right by failing to investigate a prior claim that might have revealed the misrepresentations, and that CMD’s reliance on the policies should prevent rescission.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Scottsdale did not waive its right to rescind because the prior claim did not reveal the asbestos misrepresentation, which was an independent and material basis for rescission. The court also held that California Insurance Code section 650 permits an insurer to rescind a policy based on material misrepresentations at any time before a lawsuit to enforce the policy is filed, and this right is not lost even if a third party (here, CMD as an additional insured) relied economically on the policy. The judgment in favor of Scottsdale was affirmed. View "Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. California Military Dept." on Justia Law

A beneficiary of a family trust filed a petition under the California Probate Code against one of the co-trustees, alleging that the trustees had delayed administering the trust and were taking steps to sell two hotel properties in a way that was not in the best interests of the trust and its beneficiaries. The beneficiary sued the co-trustee both in her capacity as a trustee and in her individual capacity, also recording lis pendens against the properties. The co-trustees objected, arguing they were authorized to sell the hotels and that the beneficiary’s claims were baseless. After some litigation, the beneficiary withdrew the lis pendens and dismissed the petition without prejudice.Following dismissal, the co-trustee who had been sued individually filed a motion in the Superior Court of Orange County seeking attorney fees and costs she had personally incurred in defending against the petition, arguing that the court's equitable powers allowed such an award even without statutory or contractual authorization. The probate court denied the motion, holding that absent a statute or contract providing for attorney fees, it lacked the power to award them to a party sued in her individual capacity. The court found that while probate courts have equitable power to allocate and apportion statutory attorney fees in certain trust proceedings, there was no statutory or contractual basis for awarding fees here.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the probate court’s ruling. The appellate court held that California probate courts do not have general equitable authority to award attorney fees to a party sued individually unless such fees are authorized by statute or contract. The court clarified that its equitable powers in probate matters extend to protecting trust assets and allocating statutory fees, but not to awarding fees for a trustee’s personal defense unrelated to benefit for the trust. View "McKinley v. Harris" on Justia Law

A beneficiary of a family trust filed a petition under Probate Code section 850 against one of the trustees in both her individual and trustee capacities, alleging mismanagement related to the sale of trust assets, specifically two hotels. The petitioner claimed the trustees delayed trust administration and took steps to sell the hotels without proper regard for the beneficiaries’ interests, requesting transfer of his share and double damages for alleged bad faith. The trustee, in her individual capacity, was accused of seeking personal gain from the sale. After the petitioner withdrew recorded lis pendens and dismissed his petition without prejudice, the probate court entered judgment in favor of the respondents.Following the dismissal, the trustee filed two motions for attorney fees and costs in the Superior Court of Orange County: one as trustee (with her co-trustee spouse) and another in her individual capacity, seeking to recover fees from the petitioner’s trust share, citing the probate court’s equitable powers. The probate court denied both motions, concluding it could not award attorney fees absent explicit statutory or contractual authority. The court found some statutory bases for trustees to seek reimbursement from trust assets, but only by separate petition, not post-judgment motion. The trustee’s individual motion is the sole subject of this appeal.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed whether the probate court had inherent equitable authority to award attorney fees to a trustee sued in her individual capacity. The appellate court held that, under California law, absent statutory or contractual provision, probate courts do not possess general equitable power to award attorney fees to parties sued in their individual capacity, even where litigation was allegedly frivolous. The order denying attorney fees to the trustee in her individual capacity was affirmed. View "McKinley v. Harris" on Justia Law

A felony complaint was filed against Mihai Olaru, alleging multiple theft offenses. At Olaru’s arraignment, his attorney and the prosecution stipulated to setting bail at $50,000, with the added condition that upon posting bail, Olaru would be placed on GPS monitoring through the bail bond company. The court ordered bail in the agreed amount and specified that GPS monitoring must be installed. United States Fire Insurance Company (U.S. Fire), through its bail agent AJH Bail Inc., posted the $50,000 bond, but Olaru was released from custody without GPS monitoring. Olaru subsequently failed to appear in court, resulting in the forfeiture of the bail bond and the issuance of a bench warrant.The Superior Court of Orange County entered summary judgment against U.S. Fire for $50,000 after Olaru failed to return to custody. U.S. Fire moved to set aside the summary judgment, arguing that the Orange County Sheriff’s Department released Olaru without the required GPS monitoring, constituting a unilateral change to the bail contract. The trial court denied the motion, finding substantial evidence that the responsibility for GPS monitoring rested with the bail bond company, not the jail or Sheriff’s Department. The trial court also determined that all statutory requirements for bail bond forfeiture and summary judgment had been satisfied.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying U.S. Fire’s motion to set aside the summary judgment. The appellate court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s determination that AJH Bail was responsible for arranging Olaru’s GPS monitoring, and that no unilateral change to the terms of the bail bond occurred. The order denying the motion to set aside summary judgment was affirmed. View "People v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, who had several drug-related convictions dating back more than a decade, applied for an office assistant position at a university. After a conditional job offer, the university initiated a background check, during which the plaintiff briefly worked part-time. The background check revealed the plaintiff's criminal history. The university sent a notice advising that his convictions might disqualify him, granting five business days to submit evidence of rehabilitation or challenge the findings. The plaintiff responded with hostile emails but did not provide evidence of rehabilitation. The university ultimately denied him the position, citing his failure to respond substantively and his unprofessional communications.The plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, asserting claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), including discrimination under the Fair Chance Act (FCA), retaliation, and failure to prevent retaliation. The trial court granted summary adjudication for the university on the retaliation and failure to prevent retaliation claims, finding the plaintiff did not engage in protected activity and no causal nexus existed between his complaints and the adverse employment action. The court also found that while the university failed to provide the full five-day response period required by the FCA, the plaintiff had to prove this procedural error caused him harm. The issue of harm was tried before a jury, which found the university would have made the same decision even if the plaintiff had been given the full response period.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Court held that the plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case for retaliation or failure to prevent retaliation, and that the university properly followed FCA procedures except for the response period, but the procedural violation did not cause harm. The Court clarified that courts are not to second-guess the employer’s individualized assessment under the FCA and that actual harm must be shown for recovery. View "McInerney v. Regents of the Univ. of California" on Justia Law

The People of the State of California charged Giovanni Garcia with felony vehicle theft, alleging three prior strike convictions for robbery and a previous prison term. After the case was transferred to Department 100, which functions as a felony master calendar court, Garcia’s counsel requested an indicated sentence from Judge Verastegui before the case was assigned for trial. The judge reviewed the case and exercised discretion to strike Garcia’s prior strikes, offering an indicated sentence of 16 months. Garcia agreed to plead guilty to this sentence, but the People objected and moved to disqualify Judge Verastegui under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 based on alleged prejudice.Previously, Judge Verastegui rejected the People’s section 170.6 motion, reasoning that as a master calendar judge, she was not subject to a peremptory challenge, and that offering an indicated sentence did not involve contested issues of law or fact. The judge proceeded to accept Garcia’s plea despite the People’s renewed objection. The People sought writ review, and the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, granted a stay and issued a Palma notice to the Superior Court, suggesting the trial court vacate its orders and grant the section 170.6 challenge. The Superior Court declined to do so, prompting full briefing and oral argument in the appellate court.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, held that the trial court erred in rejecting the People’s section 170.6 motion. The appellate court ruled that disqualification was mandatory because the judge acted outside the ministerial role of a master calendar court, and the proceedings involved contested issues of law or fact. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its orders denying the section 170.6 motion and accepting Garcia’s plea, and to assign the case to a different judge. The appellate court’s stay of proceedings was vacated upon issuance of its opinion. View "People v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law