Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two individuals who use a rideshare company’s smartphone application alleged that the company engaged in a deceptive pricing scheme. They claimed the company publicly advertises that the price displayed to consumers before a ride is “the price [the consumer will] pay at the end of the ride.” However, plaintiffs asserted that this displayed price is only an estimate and that the company frequently charges more than the advertised price. Plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent the company from advertising prices lower than what consumers actually pay and requested restitution or disgorgement of any excess amounts paid.The Superior Court of California, City and County of San Francisco, reviewed the company’s motion to compel arbitration under its user agreement. That agreement required arbitration of individual claims and included a class action waiver, but also stated that if the waiver was unenforceable, claims subject to the waiver would proceed in court. Plaintiffs argued that the waiver violated California law (as interpreted in McGill v. Citibank, N.A.), since it barred them from seeking public injunctive relief. The trial court agreed, finding that the relief sought was public in nature and that the agreement did not require severance of plaintiffs’ requests for individual relief into arbitration.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that plaintiffs sought public injunctive relief because their requested injunction would benefit all potential users of the platform, not simply themselves or a discrete group. The court further held that the arbitration agreement was ambiguous regarding whether only the injunctive request should proceed in court or whether all relief should. Applying the contra proferentem rule, the court construed the ambiguity against the company and concluded the entire action must remain in court. The order denying arbitration was affirmed. View "Bogguess v. Uber Technologies" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted in 2011 of first degree murder, multiple sexual offenses, and related crimes stemming from incidents in July 2008. A jury found him guilty and determined that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death. Additional findings included three prior prison terms. He was originally sentenced to 78 years to life in prison. Following a change in the law eliminating one-year sentence enhancements for prior prison terms, the defendant petitioned for resentencing. The trial court resentenced him to 77 years to life, removing the prior prison term enhancements but retaining all other aspects of the sentence, including the gun enhancement.After the resentencing, the defendant argued that the trial court should have dismissed the gun enhancement under Penal Code section 1385(c), specifically referencing the Racial Justice Act (RJA). He contended that applying the enhancement would result in a discriminatory racial impact. In the Alameda County Superior Court, the trial judge found that dismissing the enhancement would endanger public safety and that none of the mitigating factors, including those based on racial bias, were established. The defendant’s evidence of racial bias was based on a statistical report and a claim of bias by the original sentencing judge, but the trial court found these claims insufficient under the RJA.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, held that the defendant failed to present evidence meeting the RJA’s requirements. Specifically, he did not show that he received a longer sentence than similarly situated individuals of other races in the same county, nor did he provide comparator cases or adequate statistical evidence. The appellate court affirmed that to trigger section 1385(c)(2)(A), a defendant must satisfy the RJA’s standard, which the defendant did not. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "People v. Savoy" on Justia Law

A consumer used an online platform to book short-term accommodations, paying through the platform’s payment processor. The payment processor, a subsidiary of the platform, collected, held, and later disbursed guest payments to hosts after the guest’s check-in. The platform’s terms specified that the payment processor acted as a collection agent for the host and retained any interest earned on guest funds held before disbursement. The platform did not claim to act as an escrow agent or company and explicitly disclaimed any broader agency relationship with users.The consumer sued in the Superior Court of San Francisco City and County, alleging that the defendants unlawfully operated as escrow agents without complying with California’s Escrow Law and engaged in unfair business practices, in violation of the state’s unfair competition law (UCL). The complaint also included claims under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act and for unjust enrichment. The trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrer to the operative complaint without leave to amend, finding that the plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that the defendants acted as escrow holders or conducted escrow transactions as defined by law. Judgment was entered for the defendants.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the trial court’s order de novo. The appellate court held that the plaintiff’s complaint did not allege facts showing that the defendants acted as escrow agents under California law, as there was no indication that any party expected or intended an escrow relationship, or that the transactions had the irrevocability and fiduciary duties characteristic of escrow arrangements. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the complaint failed to state a cause of action under the UCL for unlawful or unfair business practices, and that amendment would not cure the defects. View "Edson v. Airbnb Payments, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between a maternal grandparent and a mother regarding court-ordered visitation with the mother’s two children. The children were previously removed from the mother’s custody and placed with the grandparent during juvenile dependency proceedings, but the mother later regained custody. After the dependency court terminated jurisdiction and issued final custody and visitation orders, the grandparent petitioned under Family Code section 3104 for visitation with the grandchildren, alleging a close relationship with one child. The mother opposed this petition, arguing the grandparent lacked a substantial relationship with the children, and subsequently requested attorney’s fees and costs incurred in opposing the petition.The Superior Court of Riverside County issued an interim order allowing limited telephone contact between the grandparent and the children and set a date for a long-term visitation hearing. The court denied the mother’s request for attorney’s fees and costs, determining it lacked statutory authority to grant such fees in a grandparent visitation proceeding. Specifically, the court concluded that statutory fee-shifting provisions in the Family Code, including section 7605, did not apply to petitions brought under section 3104.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the denial of attorney’s fees. The appellate court held that a petition for grandparent visitation under section 3104 is not a proceeding under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) and therefore does not trigger the fee-shifting provision of Family Code section 7605. The court also found that previous juvenile court parentage and custody orders were not UPA judgments, and that dependency proceedings are fundamentally distinct from UPA actions. The order denying the request for attorney’s fees and costs was affirmed, with each party ordered to bear their own appellate costs. View "Timothy S. v. Sarah H." on Justia Law

A bail bond company, acting as surety for a criminal defendant, posted a $90,000 bond to secure the defendant’s release in a felony case. When the defendant failed to appear for arraignment, the court ordered the bail forfeited and notified the surety. The surety requested and was granted an extension of the period in which the defendant could be surrendered. After this period lapsed without surrender, the court entered a summary judgment for the full amount of the bond plus costs and interest against the surety in the same criminal case. The surety moved to set aside the summary judgment, arguing it should have been entered in a new civil case, not in the criminal proceeding.The Superior Court of Stanislaus County denied the surety’s motion, finding no statutory requirement to open a new civil case for entry of summary judgment on a forfeited bail bond. The surety appealed, contending that Penal Code section 1306 impliedly required summary judgment to be entered in a separate civil action, citing prior procedures and various appellate cases as support.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District reviewed the appeal independently, as only legal issues were in dispute. The court held that the relevant bail statutes—particularly Penal Code section 1306—do not expressly require summary judgment to be entered in a new civil case, nor do they prohibit entry in the criminal case. The court concluded that if the Legislature had intended such a requirement, it would have stated so. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that summary judgment on a forfeited bail bond may be entered in either the criminal case or a newly opened civil case, at the court’s discretion. View "People v. North River Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A man was charged with implied malice murder, felony child endangerment, and possession of fentanyl for sale after a 19-month-old child died from ingesting fentanyl and methamphetamine in a home shared by the man, the child’s parents, and another adult. The man sold fentanyl to the child’s parents, and all four adults used drugs in the house. The evidence showed that drugs and paraphernalia were accessible throughout the house and that the adults, including the child’s parents, were reckless in their use of drugs around the child. There was no evidence that the man personally left drugs within the child’s reach, but he sometimes smoked drugs in her presence. The child died of acute toxicity, with both fentanyl and methamphetamine present in her system.At the preliminary hearing in Santa Clara County Superior Court, the magistrate held the man to answer on the murder charge, reasoning that by providing fentanyl that ultimately ended up in the child’s system and not protecting her, he aided and abetted her death. The magistrate found no evidence that the man provided the methamphetamine or directly left drugs accessible to the child. The trial court denied the man’s motion to set aside the murder charge, finding sufficient evidence under the applicable probable cause standard.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the magistrate’s holding order. It concluded that, as a matter of law, the man’s actions in supplying drugs to the parents were too remote from the parents’ life-endangering conduct to support prosecution for implied malice murder. The court held that the evidence did not establish that the man proximately caused the child’s death or aided and abetted the specific life-endangering act. The court granted a writ prohibiting further prosecution of the murder charge but allowed prosecution on the remaining counts. View "Ortega v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A teenager, M.T., alleged that an elementary school teacher, who worked for a local school district, sexually abused him in the summer of 1997 at her home. M.T. was not a student at the teacher’s school, nor had he previously met her; he was introduced to her by a friend who had been her student. The abuse took place at the teacher’s residence, outside the school year, and not as part of any school-sponsored activity or event. The teacher had a history of abusing other boys and ultimately pled guilty to criminal charges related to her conduct.After learning of the abuse, M.T. filed a lawsuit against the school district in the Santa Cruz County Superior Court, asserting claims including negligence, negligent hiring and supervision, and breach of mandatory duty. The district moved for summary judgment, asserting that it owed no duty to M.T. and was immune from liability under Education Code section 44808, as the abuse occurred off school property and was unrelated to any school activity. The trial court granted summary judgment on both grounds, finding no special relationship existed between the district and M.T., and that statutory immunity applied.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the district did not owe a duty of care to M.T. because there was no special relationship: M.T. was not a student of the teacher or her school, and the abuse occurred off campus with no school-related activity involved. The court also held that the district was immune from liability under Education Code section 44808, as none of the statutory exceptions to immunity applied. The summary judgment for the district was affirmed. View "M.T. v. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Three former deputies of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department were discharged for alleged misconduct and subsequently appealed their terminations to the Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission. While their appeals were pending, each entered into a settlement agreement with department chiefs that purported to reinstate them to employment. The County of Los Angeles refused to honor these settlements, asserting that they lacked proper approval. The deputies, along with their union, sought enforcement of the settlements through claims for mandamus, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and declaratory relief, arguing that the department had longstanding authority to settle such appeals without further county approval.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the county’s demurrers to these claims without leave to amend, finding the settlements void for lack of county counsel approval and insufficient authority for department chiefs to bind the county. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal previously reversed in part, directing the trial court to grant leave to amend so petitioners could specify the legal basis for the department’s alleged authority. Petitioners filed several amended complaints, but the trial court again sustained demurrers, ultimately dismissing the action when petitioners failed to allege adequate legal authority for the chiefs to settle commission appeals on the county’s behalf.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, treated petitioners’ arguably untimely appeal as a writ petition under the unusual procedural circumstances. On the merits, the court held that petitioners failed to demonstrate that the sheriff and his subordinates had authority to bind the county to settlements of civil service commission appeals without approval from the Board of Supervisors or authority conferred by law. The court denied the writ petition, upholding dismissal of all claims. View "Assn. for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

A restaurant group based in Orange County provided catering services to a client and his family during the Masters golf tournament in Georgia. The parties discussed a menu for seven days but did not sign a written contract or discuss the cost beforehand. The restaurant group ended up providing meals and services for five days, serving around 25 guests per meal. After the event, the group sent an invoice for nearly $75,000, which the client disputed and refused to pay, leading to an increase in the invoice amount. The client maintained that he had been overcharged and would have made other arrangements had he known the cost.The Superior Court of Orange County heard the breach of contract case. During discovery, the client denied a request for admission that he had contracted with the restaurant group for seven days of service. At trial, the jury found in favor of the restaurant group but awarded a lesser amount than invoiced. After the verdict, the restaurant group sought cost-of-proof attorney’s fees under California Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420 for the client’s denial of the request for admission, as well as court reporter costs. The trial court awarded only a small portion of the requested attorney’s fees, explaining that the restaurant group had not properly identified which fees related specifically to proving contract formation. The court also struck the entire amount claimed for court reporter costs, finding the group had not provided sufficient proof that the costs were recoverable.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed both the fee and costs orders. The court held that the restaurant group was entitled to some cost-of-proof fees because the client denied a request for admission that was later proved true, but the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding only a limited amount due to the group’s failure to segregate relevant fees. The court also upheld the denial of court reporter costs for lack of supporting documentation. View "Hanna Carroll Restaurant Group LLC v. Hagestad" on Justia Law

Maurice Voce, a self-taught investor, traded stock options with Morgan Stanley & Co., LLC for decades, amassing a substantial fortune. His children and nephew, as co-trustees of his trusts and personal representative of his estate, alleged that Morgan Stanley and advisor John Privitelli continued facilitating risky trading and collecting commissions even as Maurice’s cognitive health declined in his later years. They claimed this conduct constituted breach of fiduciary duty and financial elder abuse. The plaintiffs also asserted that Privitelli’s advice extended to tax and estate planning, resulting in costly insurance policies and tax penalties.Previously, the plaintiffs initiated arbitration with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which dismissed their claims without prejudice, permitting them to pursue litigation. They then filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The trial court found the claims timely under the discovery rule but imposed a damages cutoff based on a backward projection of the remaining statute of limitations period. The court also granted defendants’ motion for nonsuit, dismissing both causes of action. It ruled there was insufficient evidence of harm for elder abuse and concluded defendants’ fiduciary duty did not cover tax and estate planning advice, as they were not formally hired or paid for such services. Additionally, it determined plaintiffs failed to provide expert testimony on excessive trading for the breach of fiduciary duty claim.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court misapplied the statute of limitations by limiting damages to a narrow period, rather than considering the full course of wrongful conduct for timely claims. The appellate court found plaintiffs’ evidence sufficient to survive nonsuit on both the elder abuse claim and the breach of fiduciary duty claim, to the extent that the latter involved issues beyond excessive trading. However, it affirmed nonsuit regarding the excessive trading theory due to lack of expert evidence. The judgment was reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "DeVone v. Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC" on Justia Law