Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After divorcing in 2022, Eric and Tiare experienced escalating harassment and abuse beginning in late 2023. Tiare repeatedly sent manipulative and threatening messages, made suicide threats, and harassed Eric’s new girlfriend. The harassment intensified, culminating in Tiare entering Eric’s property, physically attacking him, and being arrested for battery and unauthorized entry. Various protective orders were issued, including a temporary restraining order (TRO), an emergency protective order, and a criminal protective order. Despite these, Tiare violated the orders and continued contacting Eric.The Marin County Superior Court initially granted Tiare three continuances for the hearing on Eric’s petition for a domestic violence restraining order, citing reasons such as giving Tiare time to respond, her attorney’s absence, and her participation in residential treatment. At the fourth hearing, Tiare requested another continuance, arguing her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent due to pending criminal charges. The trial court denied this request, found that Eric had proven acts of abuse, and issued a three-year restraining order protecting both Eric and his girlfriend.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the trial court’s denial of the fourth continuance. The appellate court held that respondents in Domestic Violence Prevention Act proceedings who intend to assert their Fifth Amendment right are not automatically entitled to a continuance. The trial court must balance the respondent’s Fifth Amendment interests against other interests, including those of the petitioner, judicial efficiency, nonparties, and the legislative purpose of prompt resolution. The appellate court found the trial court had properly weighed these competing interests and did not abuse its discretion in denying the request. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Irvine v. Irvine" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with misdemeanor battery under California Penal Code section 242. After arraignment, he did not waive his statutory right to a speedy trial, resulting in a last day for trial of October 14, 2024. Due to a witness’s planned absence and a defense counsel’s scheduling conflict, the trial was set for November 7, 2024, but ultimately continued to November 21, 2024. The defendant objected to the delay beyond the statutory period, arguing the witness would be available within the required timeframe and that other courtrooms could accommodate a timely trial.The Solano County Superior Court, with Judge Nisperos presiding, denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss for violation of his speedy trial rights under section 1382. The court reasoned it was not empowered to overturn a prior continuance order by another judge, despite acknowledging that section 1382 and section 1050 motions are distinct and require separate determinations. A jury convicted the defendant, and he appealed. The appellate division of the superior court affirmed the conviction, finding no abuse of discretion and holding that good cause existed for the continuance due to the witness’s unavailability and defense counsel’s engagement in another trial.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court erred in denying the section 1382 motion on procedural grounds and that no good cause existed to continue the trial beyond the statutory period. The witness was available within the required timeframe, and the court’s unavailability did not constitute good cause. Prejudice was established because the misdemeanor charge could not be refiled. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment. View "P. v. Adam" on Justia Law

A criminal defendant was charged with battery resulting in serious bodily injury. After the defendant was released on a $110,000 bail bond posted by a surety, he failed to appear for a pretrial hearing. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County declared the bond forfeited and notified the surety. The surety sought a 180-day extension to locate the defendant, eventually finding him in Texas and requesting his extradition. The District Attorney initiated extradition and notified the surety that the costs of returning the defendant would be sought. Following the defendant’s return and first court appearance after extradition, the trial court exonerated the bond, conditioned upon payment of extradition costs, but did not specify the amount or a payment deadline at that time.After the defendant’s return, the District Attorney filed a motion to recover actual extradition costs, submitting supporting documentation. The surety opposed, arguing that the court’s conditional exoneration order was void for lack of notice of a payment deadline and for failing to specify a monetary amount, as required by Penal Code sections 1305.2 and 1306(b). The surety also contended the motion for costs was untimely. Additional filings followed, with the District Attorney maintaining entitlement to costs and the surety reiterating its objections. Ultimately, the trial court granted the District Attorney’s motion for extradition costs and denied the surety’s motion to vacate the forfeiture or exonerate the bond without payment of costs.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that a trial court may condition the exoneration of a bail bond on payment of extradition costs to be determined later, even if the order does not initially specify the amount or a payment deadline. The court further held that such a procedure is “just” under the relevant statutes, and affirmed the order awarding extradition costs. View "P. v. Bankers Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Several individuals filed a putative class action against two related corporate defendants, alleging that the defendants’ website terms and conditions violated a California statute known as section 1670.8, or the “Yelp Law.” The plaintiffs argued that certain provisions in the website’s terms—specifically, language related to trademark use and website access—prohibited or penalized negative statements about the defendants, their employees, or their goods and services. The plaintiffs claimed these provisions constituted unlawful non-disparagement clauses in consumer contracts.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case and sustained the defendants’ demurrer to the consolidated class action complaint, first with leave to amend and then, after an amended complaint was filed, without leave to amend. The court found that the challenged terms were limited to intellectual property protections and did not restrict consumer speech. It also determined that the statute did not create a private right of action for merely including a violative provision unless there was a threat to enforce that provision or penalize speech. The court concluded that neither the trademark nor the termination provisions in the defendants’ terms constituted actionable violations of section 1670.8 and entered judgment dismissing the case.Upon appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Five, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the website’s trademark language did not waive consumers’ rights to make critical statements about the defendants, and the website access termination clause was not a restriction on consumer speech. The court concluded that plaintiffs had not stated a cause of action under section 1670.8 and confirmed that the inclusion of these provisions, without a threat or attempt to enforce against protected speech, does not violate the statute. View "Scott v. Ulta Beauty, Inc." on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with organized retail theft and grand theft. He sought pretrial mental health diversion, providing documentation that he had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and substance use disorder. The prosecution requested that the defendant submit to an examination by a prosecution-retained mental health expert, arguing this was needed to assess the connection between the mental health diagnosis and the alleged criminal conduct.After a hearing, the Stanislaus County Superior Court denied the prosecution’s request for a compelled examination under Penal Code section 1054.3, subdivision (b), and subsequently denied their motion for reconsideration. Later, the court granted the defendant’s motion for pretrial mental health diversion. The prosecution then petitioned the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, seeking a writ of mandate and/or prohibition to overturn the superior court’s denial of their request for a compelled mental health examination.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed whether trial courts have authority under Penal Code section 1054.3, subdivision (b)(1), to order a defendant seeking pretrial mental health diversion under section 1001.36 to submit to an examination by a prosecution-retained mental health expert. The court held that such authority does not exist in the diversion context because a defendant moving for diversion does not place their mental state at issue through proposed testimony of a mental health expert at any phase of the criminal action. The court reasoned that diversion eligibility is determined at an informal hearing, not at trial, and does not involve the defendant’s criminal intent as an element of the offense. The petition for a writ of mandate and/or prohibition was therefore denied. View "People v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon, with several sentencing enhancements, following a 2012 shooting in an apartment parking lot. The evidence included witness testimony, forensic findings, and the defendant’s own statements, including admissions of gang affiliation and multiple inconsistent accounts of the incident. The victim was killed at close range, and there was no evidence supporting the defendant’s claims regarding the victim’s alleged prior threats or possession of a weapon. The defendant was originally sentenced to 50 years to life, plus a determinate term, which was later slightly reduced after the elimination of a prior prison term enhancement.After sentencing, the defendant pursued multiple petitions and motions under the California Racial Justice Act (CRJA), alleging racial bias by a juror, discriminatory language by a prosecutor, and statistical disparities in sentencing enhancements for Black defendants. These filings included habeas petitions in both the San Bernardino County Superior Court and the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District, as well as CRJA motions during resentencing proceedings. Each claim was rejected by the courts, with findings that the defendant had not established a prima facie case under the CRJA and that no evidentiary hearing was warranted.The California Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, conducted an independent review of the record and the defendant’s supplemental brief, as requested by appellate counsel pursuant to People v. Delgadillo. The court held that the defendant failed to meet the CRJA’s prima facie burden for any of his claims. The court affirmed the trial court’s orders denying the CRJA motions, and declined to further review the entire record for unraised issues. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law

A physician who practiced at Corona Regional Medical Center alleged that the hospital and three individual doctors conspired to defame him, destroy his professional reputation, and summarily suspended his admitting privileges under false pretenses. He claimed these actions were motivated by competitive and financial interests, and that the hospital and defendants orchestrated a campaign using fabricated internal reports to target him, resulting in financial and emotional harm. The physician entered into an agreement with the hospital to lift his suspension, subject to several conditions, and avoided having the suspension reported to the California Medical Board. His wife separately claimed loss of consortium due to the defendants’ actions.The Superior Court of Riverside County reviewed the case and granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court found that the physician had failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him through the hospital’s peer review process before suing for damages. The trial court also partially granted the defendants’ motion for attorney fees based on a provision in the hospital’s bylaws, but denied fees against the wife, and reduced the fee amounts for certain attorneys.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the judgment and the postjudgment order. The court held that the physician did not establish he was excused from exhausting his administrative remedies, as the agreement to lift his suspension was conditional and did not provide the maximum relief available through the peer review process. The court also upheld the attorney fee award to defendants under the bylaws, finding the fee provision valid and not preempted by statute, and concluded that the trial court correctly denied fees against the wife and for certain attorney billing records. View "Sujan v. UHS Corona" on Justia Law

A police officer observed the defendant commit a traffic violation and attempted to pull him over. The defendant eventually stopped his vehicle, but behaved confrontationally toward the officer and refused to comply with commands. When the officer opened the driver’s door and attempted to remove the defendant, the defendant swung at him while holding a handgun. A struggle ensued inside the vehicle, with the firearm pointed at the officer’s face and the trigger pulled, resulting in a “click” but no discharge. Investigation later revealed the gun was loaded with bullets facing backwards, rendering it incapable of firing. The defendant was apprehended and had a blood alcohol content of .21.After a first jury trial, the defendant was convicted of assault with a firearm, carrying a loaded and unregistered firearm, driving under the influence, and public intoxication. The jury could not reach a verdict on attempted murder and resisting arrest, resulting in a retrial limited to those charges. In the second trial, the defendant was convicted of attempted murder and resisting arrest by the Superior Court of San Luis Obispo County.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that voluntary intoxication could only be considered in deciding intent to kill and knowledge that the victim was a peace officer, but not in determining premeditation and deliberation. The appellate court held that the instructions, viewed as a whole, permitted consideration of intoxication in relation to premeditation and deliberation, and that any objection was forfeited due to lack of a request for modification. The court also rejected the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, finding no prejudice. The judgment was affirmed. View "People v. Ammons" on Justia Law

A bicyclist was involved in a collision with a semi-trailer operated by a truck driver and owned by the driver’s employer. She sued for personal injuries, including a traumatic brain injury, alleging motor vehicle negligence. During litigation, she made four settlement offers under California Code of Civil Procedure section 998—three offers for $1,000,000 and a final offer for $2,000,000, all of which expired without acceptance. After a six-week bench trial, the Los Angeles County Superior Court found both parties negligent, apportioning 85 percent of fault to the defendants and 15 percent to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was awarded $1,062,500 after reduction for comparative negligence.Following trial, the plaintiff sought nearly $1 million in costs, including prejudgment interest and expert witness fees, arguing entitlement under section 998 and Civil Code section 3291. The defendants moved to tax costs, claiming the plaintiff’s recovery did not exceed her final $2,000,000 offer. The Superior Court agreed, ruling that only the last unaccepted section 998 offer controls when determining eligibility for cost-shifting and prejudgment interest, and since the judgment plus allowable costs did not exceed the final offer, the plaintiff was not entitled to expert fees or interest. The court also reduced certain requested costs for lack of substantiation regarding their necessity or reasonableness.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the order. It held that under the “last offer rule,” a plaintiff’s entitlement to section 998 benefits and prejudgment interest must be measured against the final unaccepted offer. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial of expert witness fees and prejudgment interest, as well as its reductions of costs for insufficient documentation, finding no abuse of discretion. Respondents were awarded their costs on appeal. View "Meehan v. Aguirre" on Justia Law

The case concerns a code enforcement action initiated by the County of Marin against Tim Sakach, acting as trustee for a parcel of land. Following a hearing, an administrative law judge ordered Sakach to abate violations and pay associated costs and penalties. The administrative decision advised that judicial review could be sought by filing a notice of appeal in the Marin County Superior Court within twenty days. On the twentieth day after service, Sakach, representing himself, submitted his notice of appeal to the superior court. However, seven days later, the court clerk rejected this filing because it did not include a copy of the administrative decision. Sakach resubmitted the notice with the required attachment, but it was file-stamped after the deadline.The County of Marin responded by filing a demurrer, arguing that the appeal was untimely since the accepted notice was filed after the twenty-day period. Sakach opposed the demurrer, attaching documents related to his initial timely submission and the clerk’s rejection notice. The Marin County Superior Court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, finding the appeal untimely and declining to take judicial notice of Sakach’s documents, reasoning they were not court records under Evidence Code section 452(d). Judgment of dismissal was entered, and Sakach appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. Applying de novo review, it held that the superior court clerk erred in rejecting Sakach’s initial notice of appeal, as state law does not require an appellant to attach the administrative decision. The appellate court found the clerk’s rejection notice to be a court record subject to judicial notice and determined that Sakach’s original notice should be deemed filed on the date it was submitted. The judgment was reversed, with instructions to deem Sakach’s notice of appeal filed on January 9, 2024, and Sakach was awarded his costs on appeal. View "Sakach v. County of Marin" on Justia Law