Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In March 2021, the district attorneys of Riverside, San Diego, Los Angeles, and Santa Clara counties filed a civil enforcement action against Credit One Bank, N.A. (Credit One) on behalf of the People of the State of California. The lawsuit alleged that Credit One engaged in debt collection practices that violated California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Unfair Competition Law. The People sought injunctive relief, civil penalties, restitution, and other equitable relief. Credit One responded with written discovery requests and later noticed the deposition of the People’s person most qualified (PMQ) to testify on 25 topics, including two document requests.The trial court denied the People’s motion to quash the deposition notice but instructed them to refile it as a motion for a protective order. The court granted the protective order in part, limiting the deposition topics and document requests but requiring the People to designate a PMQ. The People challenged this order, arguing that they should not be subject to deposition under the Code of Civil Procedure and that the deposition would be tantamount to deposing opposing counsel.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that the People, represented by government agencies, are subject to deposition under section 2025.010 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, the court agreed that deposing the People in this context is effectively deposing opposing counsel. Therefore, the court applied the standard from Carehouse Convalescent Hospital v. Superior Court, requiring Credit One to demonstrate “extremely” good cause for the deposition. The trial court had not applied this standard, so the appellate court granted the petition and ordered the trial court to reconsider the People’s motion for a protective order using the correct standard. View "People v. Superior Ct. (Credit One Bank)" on Justia Law

Mother appealed the juvenile court’s orders denying her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 and terminating her parental rights to her daughter, C.R., born in December 2020. The father was not a party to the appeal. Mother did not challenge the merits of the court’s rulings but argued that the order terminating her parental rights should be conditionally reversed due to deficiencies in the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services’ (DCFS) initial inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related California statutes.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Juvenile Court Referee Juan M. Valles, had previously reviewed the case. The court detained C.R. from her parents in January 2021, sustained a section 300 petition, declared C.R. a dependent, and removed her from her parents’ custody. Mother was granted reunification services, which were later terminated in September 2023. The court denied mother’s section 388 petition in September 2024 and terminated her parental rights. Mother filed separate notices of appeal, which were consolidated for purposes of briefing, argument, and decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply was supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that both the Department and the court had previously inquired about the family’s potential Indian ancestry during mother’s dependency case, and maternal grandmother had denied any Indian ancestry. The court concluded that the Department’s inquiry was adequate and that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding that ICWA did not apply. The court affirmed the juvenile court’s orders. View "In re C.R." on Justia Law

Kenya Taylor hired Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) employee Tyler Martin-Brand to babysit her six-year-old son, Dayvon, during the winter break in 2019. Tragically, Martin-Brand killed Dayvon. Taylor sued LAUSD, alleging negligent hiring and supervision of Martin-Brand. A jury found in favor of Taylor, awarding her $30 million in damages. LAUSD appealed the trial court's denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and the judgment itself.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied LAUSD's motions for JNOV and a new trial, asserting that LAUSD was immune from liability under Education Code section 44808. The jury had found LAUSD negligent in hiring and supervising Martin-Brand, attributing 90% of the fault to LAUSD and 10% to Taylor.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court concluded that LAUSD was immune from liability for Dayvon’s off-campus death under Education Code section 44808, which limits school district liability for student injuries occurring off school property unless the district has specifically undertaken responsibility for the student. The court found that Dayvon’s death did not occur during any school-sponsored activity or under LAUSD’s supervision. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's order and judgment, directing the trial court to enter judgment in favor of LAUSD. View "Taylor v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

The Oakland Education Association (OEA) represents certain employees of the Oakland Unified School District (District). Following a dispute over school closures approved by the District, OEA members conducted a one-day strike. OEA filed an unfair practice charge with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), claiming the District committed unfair practices under the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA). The District filed a competing charge, claiming OEA’s strike was an unfair practice under EERA.PERB issued separate complaints for the competing charges and bifurcated the hearings. In its first decision, PERB found the District violated EERA. In its second decision, PERB held that OEA’s strike was legal because it was provoked by the District’s unfair practices and OEA had negotiated in good faith. The District did not challenge the first decision but contested the second, arguing that OEA’s strike was illegal and violated constitutional rights.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that public school employees may engage in unfair practice strikes under EERA. It concluded that PERB did not clearly err in finding that such strikes are allowed and that OEA’s one-day strike did not violate the rights to education, due process, or equal protection. The court also found that neither EERA nor the due process clause prohibits pre-impasse unfair practice strikes conducted before PERB determines an unfair practice has occurred. However, the court noted that PERB erred by excluding evidence of educational harm but deemed this error harmless. The court affirmed PERB’s decision. View "Oakland Unified School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Board" on Justia Law

The case involves siblings E.G., I.G., and K.G., who were found to be within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court due to allegations of sexual abuse by their stepfather, Erick C. E.G., aged 11, reported the abuse after a school assembly on safety and boundaries. She disclosed that Erick C. had sexually abused her multiple times since she was six years old. E.G. provided detailed accounts of the abuse to her school counselor, police, and social workers. Despite initially denying the abuse to her mother, E.G. later recanted her allegations, claiming they were dreams influenced by movies her parents watched.The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a petition alleging the children came under the court's jurisdiction due to Erick C.'s sexual abuse of E.G. and the risk it posed to her siblings. The juvenile court ordered the children released to their mother, with Erick C. required to stay away from E.G. During the investigation, E.G. recanted her allegations, influenced by family members who did not believe her and pressured her to change her story.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court's findings, noting E.G.'s consistent and detailed reports of abuse to multiple individuals over time. The court determined that E.G.'s recantation lacked credibility due to family pressure and inconsistent reasons for recanting. The court upheld the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings and the decision to declare the children dependents of the court, removing them from Erick C. and releasing them to their mother. The appeal by Erick C. was affirmed, and the court terminated jurisdiction with an exit order granting joint physical and legal custody to the parents. View "In re E.G." on Justia Law

Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. (CAG) filed two lawsuits under Proposition 65 against Walmart Inc. and Wal-Mart.com USA, LLC (collectively, Walmart), alleging that Walmart failed to warn consumers about products containing chemicals known to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity. Michael Marcus, CAG’s Secretary and Chief Financial Officer, purchased the products online as a corporate agent for CAG. During the purchase process, Marcus agreed to Walmart’s Terms of Use, which included an arbitration clause.In the Alameda County Superior Court, Walmart filed petitions to compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement Marcus accepted. The trial court denied Walmart’s petitions, concluding that Walmart failed to prove the existence of an agreement to arbitrate Proposition 65 claims, as the arbitration agreement only addressed the rights of the individual consumer and did not preclude an action brought by the state.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that a plaintiff cannot be compelled to arbitrate a Proposition 65 claim against a seller of consumer products simply because an agent of the plaintiff previously agreed to arbitrate disputes with the seller when purchasing the products online. The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s agent was not acting on behalf of the state, the real party in interest, when purchasing the products, and thus could not bind the state to arbitration. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court’s orders denying Walmart’s petitions to compel arbitration, as no agreement to arbitrate the Proposition 65 claims was formed. View "Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. v. Walmart, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Steve Rogers filed a lawsuit against the City of Redlands, alleging that the rates for the City’s solid waste collection included a surcharge for a City program to repair roads, which he claimed violated Vehicle Code section 9400.8. The trial was bifurcated into two phases. In phase one, the trial court determined that section 9400.8 was violated. In phase two, the court ruled that refunds were limited to those who paid under protest pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 5472. Both the City and Rogers appealed these rulings.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County initially reviewed the case. In phase one, the court found that the surcharge for the City’s pavement accelerated repair implementation strategy (PARIS) program constituted a charge for the privilege of using the City’s streets, thus violating section 9400.8. In phase two, the court concluded that Health and Safety Code section 5472 limited refunds to those who paid under protest, denying Rogers the retrospective remedies he sought.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s rulings. It agreed that the surcharge for the PARIS program was indeed a charge for the privilege of using the City’s streets, prohibited by section 9400.8. The court also upheld the trial court’s application of Health and Safety Code section 5472, which limited refunds to those who paid under protest. The appellate court found no error in the trial court’s decisions and affirmed the judgment in its entirety. View "Rogers v. City of Redlands" on Justia Law

Daniel Bray pleaded no contest to possession of child pornography. The trial court sentenced him to two years of formal probation with several conditions, including restrictions on Internet use, dating or socializing with individuals who have custody of minors, and prohibitions on possessing or frequenting places with pornography. Bray challenged these conditions as unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.The Santa Clara County Superior Court imposed these conditions, and Bray objected to the conditions regarding Internet use, dating and socializing, and pornography. The trial court overruled his objections, finding the conditions reasonable and related to the offense. Bray then appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the Internet use restriction was overbroad, as it unduly burdened Bray's ability to perform daily tasks and maintain employment. The court also found the condition on dating and socializing overbroad, as it infringed on Bray's right to freedom of association without being closely tailored to the goal of protecting minors. Additionally, the court agreed with the Attorney General's concession that the conditions regarding pornography were unconstitutionally vague and needed modification.The Court of Appeal remanded the case to the trial court to strike or modify the conditions on Internet use, dating and socializing, and pornography to ensure they are narrowly tailored and specific. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Bray" on Justia Law

Armani Miller appealed the trial court's denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. In August 2020, Miller pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter with a firearm use enhancement and was sentenced to 16 years in state prison. In May 2023, he filed a petition for resentencing, arguing that he could not be convicted of murder based on changes to the felony-murder rule effective January 1, 2019, and subsequent cases recognizing youth as a factor in determining reckless indifference to human life.The Alameda County Superior Court denied Miller's petition, finding he failed to make a prima facie case for relief. The court reasoned that Miller's plea and conviction occurred after the felony-murder rule was amended, and he could not show he could not be convicted of murder due to changes effective January 1, 2019.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that Miller could not establish a prima facie case for relief because the amended information against him was filed after the felony-murder rule was amended by Senate Bill 1437. Therefore, the prosecution was precluded from proceeding under the old, invalid theory of felony murder. The court concluded that Miller was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(1), as the charging document did not allow the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder that imputed malice based solely on his participation in the crime. The order denying Miller's petition for resentencing was affirmed. View "People v. Miller" on Justia Law

The City of Oakland entered into agreements with Oakland Bulk and Oversized Terminal, LLC (OBOT) to develop a bulk cargo shipping terminal at the former Oakland Army Base, including a 66-year Ground Lease. Amid public backlash over potential coal transportation, the City moved to block coal, leading to extensive litigation. The City terminated OBOT’s Ground Lease, claiming OBOT failed to meet the Initial Milestone Date for construction. OBOT and its subtenant, Oakland Global Rail Enterprise (OGRE), sued the City for breach of the Ground Lease, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and sought declaratory relief, alleging the City’s actions made it impossible for OBOT to meet the milestone and triggered a force majeure provision.The Alameda County Superior Court, after a bifurcated bench trial, found the City liable for breaching the Ground Lease and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court issued a detailed statement of decision, highlighting the City’s failure to cooperate, its obstructionist actions, and its bad faith efforts to terminate the lease. The court awarded OBOT attorney fees and costs.The City appealed to the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, arguing that the trial court misinterpreted the force majeure provision, improperly applied the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, erroneously declined to apply claim preclusion, and improperly entered judgment for OGRE. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment and orders, concluding that the City’s arguments lacked merit. The court held that the City’s actions constituted force majeure events, excusing OBOT’s performance delays, and that the City breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by obstructing OBOT’s efforts to develop the terminal. The court also found that claim preclusion did not apply as the federal case involved different issues and contracts. View "Oakland Bulk and Oversized Terminal v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law