Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Three former deputies of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department were discharged for alleged misconduct and subsequently appealed their terminations to the Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission. While their appeals were pending, each entered into a settlement agreement with department chiefs that purported to reinstate them to employment. The County of Los Angeles refused to honor these settlements, asserting that they lacked proper approval. The deputies, along with their union, sought enforcement of the settlements through claims for mandamus, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and declaratory relief, arguing that the department had longstanding authority to settle such appeals without further county approval.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the county’s demurrers to these claims without leave to amend, finding the settlements void for lack of county counsel approval and insufficient authority for department chiefs to bind the county. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal previously reversed in part, directing the trial court to grant leave to amend so petitioners could specify the legal basis for the department’s alleged authority. Petitioners filed several amended complaints, but the trial court again sustained demurrers, ultimately dismissing the action when petitioners failed to allege adequate legal authority for the chiefs to settle commission appeals on the county’s behalf.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, treated petitioners’ arguably untimely appeal as a writ petition under the unusual procedural circumstances. On the merits, the court held that petitioners failed to demonstrate that the sheriff and his subordinates had authority to bind the county to settlements of civil service commission appeals without approval from the Board of Supervisors or authority conferred by law. The court denied the writ petition, upholding dismissal of all claims. View "Assn. for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

A restaurant group based in Orange County provided catering services to a client and his family during the Masters golf tournament in Georgia. The parties discussed a menu for seven days but did not sign a written contract or discuss the cost beforehand. The restaurant group ended up providing meals and services for five days, serving around 25 guests per meal. After the event, the group sent an invoice for nearly $75,000, which the client disputed and refused to pay, leading to an increase in the invoice amount. The client maintained that he had been overcharged and would have made other arrangements had he known the cost.The Superior Court of Orange County heard the breach of contract case. During discovery, the client denied a request for admission that he had contracted with the restaurant group for seven days of service. At trial, the jury found in favor of the restaurant group but awarded a lesser amount than invoiced. After the verdict, the restaurant group sought cost-of-proof attorney’s fees under California Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420 for the client’s denial of the request for admission, as well as court reporter costs. The trial court awarded only a small portion of the requested attorney’s fees, explaining that the restaurant group had not properly identified which fees related specifically to proving contract formation. The court also struck the entire amount claimed for court reporter costs, finding the group had not provided sufficient proof that the costs were recoverable.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed both the fee and costs orders. The court held that the restaurant group was entitled to some cost-of-proof fees because the client denied a request for admission that was later proved true, but the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding only a limited amount due to the group’s failure to segregate relevant fees. The court also upheld the denial of court reporter costs for lack of supporting documentation. View "Hanna Carroll Restaurant Group LLC v. Hagestad" on Justia Law

Maurice Voce, a self-taught investor, traded stock options with Morgan Stanley & Co., LLC for decades, amassing a substantial fortune. His children and nephew, as co-trustees of his trusts and personal representative of his estate, alleged that Morgan Stanley and advisor John Privitelli continued facilitating risky trading and collecting commissions even as Maurice’s cognitive health declined in his later years. They claimed this conduct constituted breach of fiduciary duty and financial elder abuse. The plaintiffs also asserted that Privitelli’s advice extended to tax and estate planning, resulting in costly insurance policies and tax penalties.Previously, the plaintiffs initiated arbitration with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which dismissed their claims without prejudice, permitting them to pursue litigation. They then filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The trial court found the claims timely under the discovery rule but imposed a damages cutoff based on a backward projection of the remaining statute of limitations period. The court also granted defendants’ motion for nonsuit, dismissing both causes of action. It ruled there was insufficient evidence of harm for elder abuse and concluded defendants’ fiduciary duty did not cover tax and estate planning advice, as they were not formally hired or paid for such services. Additionally, it determined plaintiffs failed to provide expert testimony on excessive trading for the breach of fiduciary duty claim.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court misapplied the statute of limitations by limiting damages to a narrow period, rather than considering the full course of wrongful conduct for timely claims. The appellate court found plaintiffs’ evidence sufficient to survive nonsuit on both the elder abuse claim and the breach of fiduciary duty claim, to the extent that the latter involved issues beyond excessive trading. However, it affirmed nonsuit regarding the excessive trading theory due to lack of expert evidence. The judgment was reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "DeVone v. Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC" on Justia Law

A car rental company leased a vehicle to an individual, who subsequently was involved in a collision with another driver. The injured party sued both the renter and the rental company, asserting two theories of liability against the company: vicarious liability under California Vehicle Code sections 17150 and 17151, and negligent entrustment, arguing the company should be liable for renting a vehicle without verifying the renter had automobile insurance.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment in favor of the rental company. The court found that the Graves Amendment, a federal statute, preempted California’s vicarious liability statute when applied to rental car companies, thereby shielding the company from liability based solely on ownership of the vehicle. The court also determined that there was no negligent entrustment because the renter had a valid driver’s license, matched the photo on the license, and showed no signs of incompetence or unfitness to drive. The court did not find a duty for the rental company to verify automobile insurance for the renter.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The appellate court held that the Graves Amendment preempts California Vehicle Code section 17150 when used to impose vicarious liability on rental car companies, as section 17150 is not a financial responsibility law covered by the Amendment’s savings clause. The court further held that rental car companies do not have a duty to check whether renters possess automobile insurance and rejected the negligent entrustment claim, as there was no evidence the renter was incompetent or unfit. The judgment in favor of the rental company was affirmed. View "O'Brien v. Midway Rent-A-Car, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2006, the defendant acted as a lookout during an attempted robbery in which his associate shot and killed an off-duty Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department deputy, Maria Cecilia Rosa. The defendant and his associate were charged with first degree murder and attempted robbery. The jury convicted the defendant on both counts, finding the felony-murder special circumstance allegation not true. The defendant was sentenced to 29 years to life, later reduced to 26 years to life after the sentence on attempted robbery was stayed.Years later, following legislative changes by Senate Bill No. 1437, which restricted the felony-murder rule and created a mechanism for retroactive relief under Penal Code section 1172.6, the defendant filed a petition seeking resentencing. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing, finding that Rosa was killed in the course of her duties as a peace officer, making the defendant ineligible for relief under section 189, subdivision (f). On two prior appeals, the California Court of Appeal reviewed aspects of the evidentiary process and remanded for further hearings to determine whether Rosa was acting in the course of her peace officer duties and whether her authority extended while off duty.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the appeal. The court interpreted Penal Code section 830.1, subdivision (c), concluding it applies only to deputies hired, trained, and used for the limited purpose of working exclusively or initially in custodial assignments with modified training. The court found substantial evidence that Rosa was a fully trained deputy under section 830.1, subdivision (a), not a modified deputy, and thus had off-duty peace officer authority. Therefore, Rosa was killed in the course of her peace officer duties, and the defendant is not eligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6. The court affirmed the denial of the petition. View "People v. Flint" on Justia Law

A married couple each sought domestic violence restraining orders against the other during their divorce proceedings. Ultimately, they reached a settlement in which the wife admitted to certain acts of domestic abuse, agreed to a one-year restraining order protecting the husband, and dismissed her own restraining order request with prejudice. The parties also resolved financial issues, including temporary spousal support and advances on community property, but did not mention attorney fees in their agreement or the resulting court orders. The findings and restraining orders filed by the trial court specified that attorney fees were not applicable, and the section for such fees was left blank.After more than a year had passed, the husband moved for attorney fees under Family Code section 6344, arguing he prevailed on his restraining order request and successfully defended against his wife's request. The Superior Court of San Mateo County granted his motion, awarding him $39,000 in attorney fees. The wife appealed, contending the motion for attorney fees was untimely under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1702, which requires such motions to be filed within the time limit for filing a notice of appeal—generally within 180 days of judgment.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, held that rule 3.1702 applies to requests for attorney fees under section 6344. Because the husband filed his motion for attorney fees fourteen months after the final order on the restraining orders, his request was untimely. The appellate court rejected arguments that the issue of fees had been reserved or that section 6344 created its own deadline. The court reversed the award of attorney fees and ordered that each party bear their own costs on appeal. View "In re Marriage of A.O. & Vologodskaya" on Justia Law

TC Telephone, a provider participating in California’s Universal LifeLine Telephone Service Program, offered measured-rate phone service to low-income customers by purchasing service from other carriers and reselling it. Under the program’s measured-rate plan, customers received 60 untimed local calls monthly, while TC Telephone incurred per-minute charges from its suppliers. The company sought and received reimbursement from the California Public Utilities Commission (the Commission) for these per-minute charges, believing this practice was permitted under the Commission’s rules, which allowed for recovery of “lost revenues” caused by providing untimed calls. Commission staff initially approved these claims for years.After a 2019 inquiry into rising reimbursement claims, Commission staff expressed uncertainty about whether per-minute reimbursement was correct but instructed TC Telephone to continue its submissions until further clarification. In March 2020, the Commission issued a resolution explicitly forbidding per-minute reimbursement, stating that only per-call reimbursement would be allowed on a prospective basis. Following this, the Commission investigated TC Telephone’s past claims, concluded that its prior per-minute reimbursements violated program rules, and ordered repayment of over $8 million plus interest. TC Telephone’s petition for rehearing was denied by the Commission.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that, prior to the 2020 resolution, the Commission’s rules were unconstitutionally vague and failed to provide TC Telephone with fair notice that per-minute reimbursement was prohibited. The court found that neither the program’s regulations nor staff communications made this prohibition clear, and even Commission staff lacked certainty. As a result, the court annulled the Commission’s decisions ordering repayment and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "TC Telephone v. Pub. Utilities Com." on Justia Law

A city was investigated by the Civil Rights Department (CRD) after a job applicant complained that his conditional job offer for a custodian position was rescinded due to his criminal history. The applicant had explained his prior convictions, and the city stated it considered this information but ultimately decided that a recent conviction for fighting in public was sufficiently relevant to deny him employment. The city asserted it followed all procedural requirements under California’s Fair Chance Act, which restricts when and how employers may consider criminal records in hiring.The CRD began a broader investigation into whether the city’s hiring practices complied with the Fair Chance Act for all applicants. During this investigation, the city refused to provide certain documents related to its individualized assessments of applicants’ criminal histories, claiming these documents were protected by attorney-client and work product privileges, as city attorneys were involved in preparing them. The CRD petitioned the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to compel production, arguing that by defending its hiring decisions as compliant with the law, the city had waived any privilege.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the CRD’s motion, finding the city had waived privilege by putting the adequacy of its compliance at issue. The city appealed. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s order. The appellate court held that by asserting its individualized assessments were legally adequate as a defense, the city put those documents directly at issue and therefore waived any claim to privilege regarding them. The court emphasized that an employer cannot shield the content of such assessments from scrutiny by involving counsel in their preparation when claiming compliance with the Fair Chance Act. View "Civil Rights Dept. v. City of Torrance" on Justia Law

In 1996, the defendant, shortly after turning 18, conspired with her boyfriend to kill her mother for financial gain, making detailed plans and facilitating access to their home. On January 16, 1996, her boyfriend entered the house and killed her mother by shooting, beating, and stabbing her. The defendant’s younger sister witnessed the attack and attempted to call for help but was impeded by the defendant. The victim died from her injuries. At trial in 1998, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder, with special circumstance findings for intentional murder for financial gain and murder committed while lying in wait. She was sentenced to life without parole for murder and 25 years to life for conspiracy, the latter stayed.In November 2024, the defendant petitioned the Superior Court of Los Angeles County for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.1, arguing that changes in sentencing laws since her conviction would allow for a lesser sentence. After a hearing, the court found it had discretion to recall the sentence, reduced the murder conviction to second degree, and resentenced her to 15 years to life; the conspiracy conviction was similarly reduced, with sentence stayed. The People appealed, asserting the trial court lacked authority to resentence because there was no change in "applicable sentencing laws" as required by section 1172.1(a).The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case and held that the trial court did not have statutory authority to resentence the defendant on its own motion. The court concluded that since there had been no change in sentencing laws applicable to the defendant’s offenses, the original sentences for first degree murder with special circumstances and conspiracy to commit murder remained mandatory. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s resentencing order and directed that the original judgment and sentence remain in effect. View "P. v. Bray" on Justia Law

A detective observed the defendant in a parking lot handing an item to another man, who then appeared to use narcotics. The detective detained the defendant and found drugs and paraphernalia during a search. The defendant was charged with felony drug offenses and remanded into custody. After arraignment, the court scheduled a preliminary hearing, which was continued several times at the defense’s request. Before the preliminary hearing, the defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, to be heard concurrently with the preliminary hearing.As the rescheduled preliminary hearing approached, the prosecution requested a continuance because the detective who witnessed the events was unavailable due to medical leave. The defense opposed any further delay, and the defendant declined to waive the statutory time limit for holding the preliminary hearing under California Penal Code section 859b. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the motion for a continuance, granted the motion to suppress, and dismissed the complaint, finding the prosecution could not proceed without the suppressed evidence. The prosecution then moved to reinstate the complaint under Penal Code section 871.5, arguing the suppression motion could be bifurcated from the preliminary hearing. The Superior Court denied this motion as well.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the order denying reinstatement. It held that a defendant who brings a motion to suppress evidence at the preliminary hearing has a statutory and substantial right to have the motion litigated within the statutory timeframe for the preliminary hearing. The prosecution cannot bifurcate the suppression motion or extend the preliminary hearing beyond the statutory time limit without the defendant’s waiver. The appellate court affirmed the Superior Court’s order denying reinstatement of the complaint. View "People v. Thompson" on Justia Law