Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A criminal defendant was charged with multiple counts of theft. At arraignment, his attorney and the prosecution stipulated to setting bail at $50,000, with the requirement that, upon posting bail, the defendant would be placed on GPS monitoring through the bail bond company. The trial court adopted this agreement, specifying that GPS monitoring was required and at the defendant’s expense. United States Fire Insurance Company, through its agent, posted the bail bond, but it appears that GPS monitoring was not arranged. The defendant was released, later failed to appear in court, and the court forfeited the bond and issued a bench warrant.After forfeiture, the Superior Court of Orange County entered summary judgment against the surety for $50,000. United States Fire Insurance Company moved to set aside the judgment, arguing that the defendant’s release without GPS monitoring constituted a unilateral change to the bail contract, voiding the bond. The trial court denied the motion, finding that arranging GPS monitoring was the responsibility of the bail bond company, and not the sheriff’s department or jail, and that there was no change to the terms of the bond after its execution.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the denial of the motion to set aside summary judgment under the abuse of discretion standard. The appellate court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the bail bond company was responsible for ensuring GPS monitoring as a condition of release. The court distinguished this case from People v. Lexington National Ins. Corp., concluding there was no unilateral change to the bond terms. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and awarded costs on appeal to the respondent. View "People v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A licensed psychologist faced disciplinary action after being convicted in 2018 of insurance fraud related to a workers’ compensation claim. The Board of Psychology issued an accusation in 2019 based on the conviction and also alleged dishonesty in her 2007 license application for failing to disclose a 1984 conviction. Following a two-day evidentiary hearing in 2020, the Board found cause to discipline her solely for the insurance fraud conviction, dismissed the charge related to the 1984 conviction, and placed her on probation for five years with various conditions, holding the probation in abeyance during periods when she was not practicing in California.After moving out of state and returning, the psychologist petitioned the Board in 2023 for early termination of her probation. The Board held an evidentiary hearing in 2024, found she failed to provide clear and convincing evidence of rehabilitation—citing her lack of insight and responsibility for the insurance fraud conviction—and denied the petition. The Board noted her probation had been tolled due to her absence and non-practice. She then sought judicial review of both the 2021 probation decision and the 2024 denial of early termination in the Superior Court of Sacramento County.The Superior Court denied her petition, finding the challenge to the 2021 decision untimely and concluding the 2024 denial was supported by substantial evidence. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Court held that the trial court properly applied the substantial evidence test to review the Board’s denial of early termination, as this was analogous to review of an agency’s decision on reinstatement rather than discipline. The Court found the Board did not abuse its discretion and rejected arguments regarding procedural unfairness and relevance of the 1984 conviction. The judgment was affirmed. View "Bombardini v. Board of Psychology" on Justia Law

Three adjacent residential parcels in Los Gatos were subject to a lot line adjustment application in 2023, submitted by the owners’ architect. One parcel had an existing house, while two were unimproved and nonconforming with zoning requirements. The adjustment sought to resolve nonconformities, including minimum lot size and street frontage. As a condition, the Town required an offer of dedication for a cul-de-sac easement to provide new access and satisfy frontage requirements. The Town accepted this dedication, resulting in a mapped cul-de-sac extension.The Town’s development review commission approved the adjustment, and subsequent appeals by an adjacent homeowner, Alison Steer, were denied by the planning commission and Town Council. Steer argued the approval was discretionary, not ministerial, due to the Town’s acceptance of the dedication, which she claimed triggered the need for environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The Town filed a notice of exemption, stating the approval was ministerial and thus exempt from CEQA. Steer then filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Santa Clara County Superior Court, alleging CEQA violations. The trial court denied the petition, reasoning that the dedication was for zoning compliance and the Town lacked discretion to refuse it, making the approval ministerial.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that while lot line adjustments are typically ministerial, this approval included a discretionary element—the Town’s acceptance of the property dedication for the cul-de-sac. The court found that the Town had discretion to accept, modify, or reject the dedication, which made the project discretionary for CEQA purposes. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to grant the petition for writ of mandate, concluding the Town violated CEQA by relying on the ministerial exemption. View "Steer v. Town of Los Gatos" on Justia Law

The plaintiff was employed as a wealth advisor for a bank and alleged that a coworker, who was an investment strategist, sexually harassed and assaulted her during a business trip. The alleged harasser, though considered influential and holding a senior title, was not designated as a supervisor of the plaintiff and had no authority over her employment, such as hiring, firing, or evaluating performance. However, he did supervise support staff known as associates. After the incident, the plaintiff reported the alleged harassment and assault to the bank, her supervisor, and law enforcement. The bank conducted an internal investigation and concluded that her allegations regarding the sexual assault and harassment were unsubstantiated, but found that coworkers had used her phone without consent and violated other company policies.The plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County against the bank and several individuals, asserting a cause of action for sexual harassment under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The bank moved for summary judgment, arguing it could not be strictly liable because the alleged harasser was not the plaintiff’s supervisor and, alternatively, that it was not negligent because it had responded promptly and appropriately to her complaints. The trial court granted summary judgment for the bank, finding strict liability did not apply and that the bank was not liable under the negligence standard.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The main holding was that, under FEHA, strict liability does not apply to an employer for sexual harassment committed by a supervisor who does not supervise the plaintiff, even if the alleged harasser supervises other employees. The court affirmed the judgment, declining to extend strict liability in such circumstances and also determined the plaintiff forfeited her negligence and ratification arguments on appeal. View "Doe v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

A man was employed by a company and took parental leave in early 2023. Upon his return, he alleged that the company retaliated against him for taking leave, denied him a comparable position, interfered with his right to additional leave, and ultimately terminated him. He also claimed that a superior repeatedly questioned him about his remaining leave. In February 2024, he filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, asserting claims related to parental leave rights, whistleblower retaliation, wrongful termination, and unfair competition. Notably, he did not initially assert a claim for sex-based harassment, though he was aware of facts that could support such a claim.When the company moved to compel arbitration based on an employment agreement, the man opposed the motion, focusing solely on the validity of the arbitration agreement and not raising the possibility of a sexual harassment claim or the applicability of the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA). The Superior Court compelled arbitration. Subsequently, the man added a sexual harassment claim in arbitration and then filed a second lawsuit in Superior Court, seeking to invalidate the arbitration agreement under the EFAA and consolidate the two suits.The Superior Court consolidated the actions, invalidated the arbitration agreement based on the EFAA, and denied the company’s renewed effort to compel arbitration. The company appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, held that the plaintiff waived the protections of the EFAA by knowingly withholding his sexual harassment claim and the EFAA argument during the initial litigation and opposition to the motion to compel arbitration. The court reversed the Superior Court’s orders, directed that arbitration be compelled, and awarded appellate costs to the company. View "Chin v. DoorDash, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2006, the defendant acted as a lookout during an attempted robbery committed by his associate, who shot and killed an off-duty Los Angeles County Sheriff’s deputy. The defendant was charged with first degree murder and attempted robbery. At trial in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the jury was instructed on the felony-murder rule and convicted him on both counts. The court sentenced him to 29 years to life, later reduced to 26 years to life after the sentence for attempted robbery was stayed.Years later, following legislative changes to the felony-murder rule under Senate Bill No. 1437, the defendant petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, which allows relief for certain felony-murder convictions. However, the statute excludes defendants if the victim was a peace officer killed in the course of duty and the defendant knew or should have known the victim’s status. After a series of appeals, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, directed the trial court to hold evidentiary hearings to determine whether the slain deputy was acting as a peace officer within the meaning of the statute at the time of her death.After further hearings, the trial court found that the deputy was not a “modified” custodial deputy with limited authority but rather a fully trained deputy sheriff under section 830.1, subdivision (a), who retained peace officer authority, including while off duty. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed this finding, holding that section 830.1, subdivision (c) applies only to deputies hired, trained, and utilized exclusively or initially as modified custodial deputies, not to regular deputies assigned to custodial duties. Substantial evidence supported that the victim was a regular deputy with full peace officer authority. Therefore, the defendant was ineligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6, and the trial court’s order denying the petition was affirmed. View "People v. Flint" on Justia Law

A teacher was employed by a public school district for three consecutive years, beginning in August 2019. At the time of hiring, she was told her position was created due to increased enrollment and that she would initially be classified as a temporary employee, with the expectation of later becoming probationary and eventually permanent. Throughout her three years, she consistently received temporary contracts, with district administrators repeatedly explaining this was due to COVID-19-related uncertainties and that all similarly situated teachers were also classified as temporary. After her third year, the district informed her that her contract would not be renewed, citing budget constraints and low enrollment.She filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, seeking reinstatement as a permanent employee, claiming she had been misclassified as temporary. The district defended its actions by arguing she was temporarily filling a position made available by two other teachers who were job-sharing, which it contended qualified as "leave" under Education Code section 44920. The superior court credited testimony that the teacher was hired due to increased enrollment, not as a replacement for the job-sharing arrangement, but nonetheless concluded she could be classified as temporary because the total number of temporary teachers did not exceed the number of teachers on leave (including those in job-share). The court denied her petition, and also indicated that laches would bar her claim, though it deemed the issue moot based on its primary ruling.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reversed. It held that a voluntary job-sharing arrangement does not constitute a "leave of absence" under Education Code section 44920 and therefore does not justify classifying a replacement teacher as temporary. Since the teacher was not properly classified as temporary, she became probationary by default and, after two years, a permanent employee by operation of law. The court ordered her reinstatement with the appropriate seniority date and remanded for determination of lost compensation, also rejecting the district’s laches defense. View "Washington v. Alta Loma School Dist." on Justia Law

A dispute arose among siblings over the distribution of their late mother’s trust, which contained an equalization provision allowing the trustee to reduce a beneficiary’s share for unpaid loans or unequal gifts. Over several decades, family members engaged in informal financial dealings, including property rentals, sales, and loans. After the mother’s death, suspicions about the handling of trust assets and prior transactions led two siblings to file petitions for instructions, accounting, removal of trustees, and other relief against their brothers.The Superior Court of Orange County held a lengthy trial, finding the two petitioners credible and the respondents not credible. The court determined that certain quitclaim deeds conveyed full legal and beneficial interests to their mother. It denied quiet title and monetary damages claims by the respondents, ruled against elder abuse and breach of fiduciary duty claims due to expiration of the statute of limitations, removed the respondents as trustees, and appointed a temporary trustee. The court conducted an audit of past transactions, ordered various loans and proceeds from property rentals and sales to be treated as early distributions under the trust’s equalization provision, and awarded attorney fees to the petitioners from trust assets.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, found the trial court erred in its broad interpretation of the equalization provision. The appellate court clarified that only unpaid loans and gifts—not rental, sales, or other non-gift/non-loan proceeds—could be considered for equalization under the trust. Accordingly, it reversed the trial court’s orders regarding equalization of rental and sales proceeds and the attorney fee awards, but affirmed the judgment on other issues, including denial of quiet title to a disputed property. The appellate court ordered costs to be recovered by the appellants. View "Sandford v. Sandford" on Justia Law

Two individuals formed a limited liability company to purchase a jet, with one contributing funds that he had embezzled from a client. The company secured an aircraft insurance policy from an insurer, which later renewed the policy without investigating the source of funds used for the purchase. Eventually, the United States government seized the jet in connection with criminal charges against the member who committed the embezzlement. The other member had no knowledge of the crime.After the seizure, the company filed a claim with the insurer, seeking compensation under the policy for the loss. The insurer denied coverage and rescinded the policy, citing concealment of the material fact that embezzled funds were used to purchase the aircraft. The company sued for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Following trial in the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County, the trial court denied the insurer’s motion for judgment based on concealment, and the jury found in favor of the company, awarding substantial damages, including punitive damages.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. Applying a de novo standard, the court held that an applicant for insurance has an affirmative duty to disclose material facts, even if the insurer does not specifically inquire about them. The court determined that the use of embezzled funds was a material fact, and the manager’s knowledge of the embezzlement was imputed to the company. Therefore, the insurer was entitled to rescind the policy. The judgment in favor of the company was reversed, and the company’s cross-appeal was dismissed. View "Passport 420, LLC v. Starr Indemnity & Liability Co." on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant charged with multiple counts of vandalism, who was found mentally incompetent to stand trial by the Contra Costa County Superior Court. After initial release and supervision, he was committed to a conditional release program (CONREP) for outpatient treatment, despite CONREP recommending inpatient care due to his refusal to comply with program rules. Although the defendant later agreed to the terms, ongoing noncompliance—including substance use and missed appointments—led CONREP to request revocation of his outpatient status and transfer to inpatient hospitalization.Following a series of reports documenting continued noncompliance, CONREP formally petitioned to revoke the defendant’s outpatient status under Penal Code section 1608. At a hearing, defense counsel requested a full evidentiary hearing, citing precedent involving defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court, however, determined that those precedents were not directly applicable because they pertained to different statutory provisions and types of defendants. The court considered the revocation request based on written reports, argument by counsel, and did not allow live testimony or cross-examination, ultimately ordering the defendant’s transfer to inpatient care.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the petition for writ of mandate. While the defendant’s competency was restored and he was released from custody during the proceedings, the court addressed the due process issue as it was likely to recur and evade review. The court held that, for defendants found incompetent to stand trial, due process does not require a full evidentiary hearing upon demand when outpatient status is revoked under section 1608. The procedures used—including written reports, opportunity for counsel to present evidence and argument, and the court’s discretion to allow live testimony in appropriate cases—were sufficient. The petition was dismissed as moot. View "Jordan v. Superior Court" on Justia Law