Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

San Francisco voters approved Proposition M in November 2022, which imposed an “Empty Homes Tax” on owners of residential units in buildings with more than two units if any unit was kept vacant for over 182 days in a tax year. The tax, designed to discourage prolonged vacancies and increase housing availability, applied on a tiered scale based on the unit’s size and length of vacancy, with certain exemptions. Plaintiffs, including individual property owners and housing associations, challenged the proposition, arguing it violated statutory and constitutional protections, particularly the Ellis Act, which guarantees the right of property owners not to offer their units for rent.The San Francisco City & County Superior Court reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs submitted evidence that the tax would force them to rent out units or pay substantial sums, affecting their personal use, privacy, and familial arrangements. The City argued plaintiffs lacked standing and that Proposition M was lawful. After briefing and a hearing, the trial court found plaintiffs had standing and granted their motion, holding Proposition M violated the Takings Clause, was preempted by the Ellis Act, and infringed on due process, equal protection, and privacy rights. The court entered judgment prohibiting the City from enforcing Proposition M.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case de novo. The court focused on the Ellis Act preemption claim, finding that Proposition M, by imposing a substantial tax on owners who choose not to rent out residential units, directly conflicted with the Ellis Act’s protection of an owner’s right not to offer their property for rent. The court held that Proposition M was preempted by the Ellis Act and affirmed the judgment, declining to reach the constitutional issues. The plaintiffs were awarded costs on appeal. View "Debbane v. City & County of S.F." on Justia Law

The case involves an incident in which Alberto Jorge Barraza confronted Nikko G., a man known for his long hair and pride in his Native American heritage. Nikko had expressed plans to sell his hair to a company making wigs. After Barraza and associates perceived Nikko had stolen from them, they discussed cutting off his hair as punishment. Barraza approached Nikko while he was asleep in a car, attempted to cut off his hair with a knife, and when Nikko resisted, stabbed him in the leg, resulting in Nikko’s death due to a severed artery.Following these events, a jury in the Superior Court of San Diego County convicted Barraza of first degree felony murder, with the underlying felony being robbery, as well as assault with a deadly weapon. The jury found several enhancements true, including personal use of a deadly weapon and infliction of great bodily injury. The trial court sentenced Barraza to 25 years to life for murder, plus a consecutive term for the weapon enhancement, while staying the sentence for the assault conviction and related enhancements.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed whether the evidence supported the felony murder conviction, specifically whether forcibly cutting attached hair constitutes robbery under Penal Code section 211. The court held that growing human hair, still attached to a person’s head, is part of the human body and not personal property as required for robbery. Therefore, forcibly cutting attached hair does not satisfy the legal definition of robbery, and the evidence did not establish robbery or attempted robbery. The court reversed Barraza’s conviction for first degree felony murder. View "People v. Barraza" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who committed a series of crimes at a rural single-family residence. Early one morning, the defendant confronted the victim in her backyard at gunpoint, restrained her, and moved her into the house. He tied her hands and feet, left her immobilized in the master bedroom for over an hour, and continued to search for valuables throughout the home. Later, he moved her to the living room and proceeded to search the house and garage. When the victim’s family arrived and intervened, the defendant fled in the victim’s vehicle, abandoning it and the stolen property a few miles away.A jury in the Superior Court of Lassen County convicted the defendant of multiple offenses, including kidnapping for robbery, first degree robbery, first degree burglary, grand theft of a firearm, false imprisonment, unlawful possession of a firearm, and unlawful taking of a vehicle. The court sentenced him to a lengthy prison term, including consecutive and concurrent sentences for the various convictions. The defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of evidence for the kidnapping for robbery and robbery convictions, and argued that certain convictions were lesser included offenses and should be vacated.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District reviewed the case. It held that the evidence was insufficient to support the kidnapping for robbery conviction because the victim’s movement was merely incidental to the robbery and did not meet the asportation requirement. However, the court affirmed the first degree robbery conviction, ruling that actual removal of stolen goods to a place of temporary safety is not required for robbery completion. The court vacated the grand theft of a firearm conviction as a lesser included offense of robbery and remanded the case for full resentencing, but allowed the false imprisonment conviction to stand. View "People v. Atencio" on Justia Law

The case concerns a minor, X.G., who was involved in a robbery in which several individuals participated, some armed with firearms. X.G. was identified as one of the perpetrators and ultimately pled no contest to grand theft, while other charges were dismissed. The victim suffered economic losses, including stolen cash and jewelry. Although other individuals were implicated, X.G. was the only person adjudicated in the juvenile proceedings.The Superior Court of San Francisco County, after terminating X.G.’s probation, held a restitution hearing and ordered X.G. to pay the full amount of restitution requested by the victim. The court reasoned that, because there were no other defendants before it, it could not apportion restitution. X.G. argued that recent amendments to Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 required apportionment based on share of responsibility or fault, especially since other adult co-offenders were named in the arrest warrant. The prosecution countered that X.G. was solely responsible because he was the only adjudicated offender.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that section 730.6 requires juvenile courts to consider whether compelling and extraordinary reasons justify deviating from an award of full restitution, including the involvement of other responsible individuals not adjudicated as co-offenders. The appellate court found that the juvenile court misunderstood its discretion to consider apportionment and therefore failed to exercise it. The main holding is that juvenile courts must evaluate whether the specific circumstances warrant less than full restitution, based on the minor’s responsibility and other relevant factors. The restitution order was reversed and the matter remanded for the juvenile court to exercise its discretion in accordance with this guidance. View "In re X.G." on Justia Law

A married couple established a family trust, which was later amended to include specific provisions and a no contest clause. Upon the husband's death, his father received a monetary distribution from the trust and also received proceeds from a life insurance policy. A dispute arose when the widow claimed entitlement to half the insurance proceeds, leading to litigation. Shortly before mediation in that lawsuit, the father filed a petition to invalidate the trust, alleging it was procured by fraud, duress, undue influence, and lack of capacity. After settlement of the insurance lawsuit, the father dismissed his trust invalidity petition.The widow then filed a petition in the Alameda County Superior Court, asserting that the father’s challenge to the trust constituted a contest under the no contest clause, requiring him to return the trust distribution. The probate court focused on whether the father's action was a “paper contest”—a concept drawn from older case law—which would not trigger the no contest clause. The court concluded the petition was abandoned without action and resembled a “paper contest,” so it did not enforce the no contest clause and denied the widow’s petition. The court also awarded costs to the father.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that under the current statutory scheme governing no contest clauses (Probate Code sections 21310 et seq.), the “paper contest” exception does not apply. The court reversed the probate court’s judgment and cost award, and remanded the case for the probate court to determine if the father's petition constitutes a contest under section 21310 and whether the trust’s no contest clause is enforceable under section 21311. The main holding is that the “paper contest” exception is not applicable under current California law, and enforcement depends on statutory definitions and requirements. View "Nelson v. Nelson" on Justia Law

A man committed two murders in Alameda County in 1976 when he was 17 years old, resulting in two concurrent life sentences. Nearly two decades later, while incarcerated in Kern County, he was convicted by a jury of possessing marijuana in prison. Under California’s Three Strikes Law at that time, the Kern County Superior Court imposed a consecutive sentence of 25 years to life for the drug offense, making his total sentence significantly longer. Although Proposition 36 later amended the Three Strikes Law to exclude non-serious, non-violent offenses from third-strike punishment, it did not benefit him due to his prior murder convictions.In July 2024, the defendant requested resentencing under newly expanded Penal Code section 1172.1, which allowed courts to recall sentences on their own motion if sentencing laws had changed. The Alameda County Superior Court, considering his age, rehabilitation, and lack of current dangerousness, recalled his sentences and resentenced him for voluntary manslaughter, imposing reduced consecutive sentences. For the Kern County offense, the court dismissed his strikes and imposed a four-year term to run concurrently, resulting in a total sentence less than the time he had already served and ordering his immediate release. The Alameda County District Attorney and Attorney General did not appeal this ruling. However, the Kern County District Attorney, who had not participated in the resentencing proceeding, filed a notice of appeal regarding the Kern County conviction.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. It held that the Kern County District Attorney lacked authority to exercise the People’s right to appeal the Alameda County Superior Court’s resentencing order. The court further concluded that the Kern County District Attorney could not seek writ relief to circumvent this lack of authority. As a result, the appeal was dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "P. v. Toussaint" on Justia Law

A woman brought her daughter’s dog to a veterinary hospital for grooming. While preparing to bathe the dog in the grooming room, the animal escaped through a propped-open door into the hallway. The woman chased the dog and subsequently fell headfirst in the hallway, rendering her unresponsive. Emergency responders transported her to the hospital, where she died three days later due to blunt force injuries to her head and neck. The facility had a 1.25-inch unmarked elevation change at the threshold between the grooming room and hallway, and, after the incident, a gate was installed to prevent animal escapes.Her husband and son filed a wrongful death action in San Mateo County Superior Court against both the hospital owner and the building owner, alleging negligence and premises liability. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiffs could not prove causation. Plaintiffs provided expert declarations: two biomechanical engineers opined that the threshold likely caused the trip and fall, and a veterinarian asserted that failing to secure the dog and leaving the door open violated safety protocols and contributed to the accident. The trial court excluded key portions of the experts’ opinions as speculative and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, ruling there was no admissible evidence of causation.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. It found the trial court erred by failing to properly analyze the expert testimony under the standards set forth in Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California, and by not construing the evidence and inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. The appellate court held that the expert declarations provided a sufficient basis for a jury to infer causation and raised a triable issue of fact. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Osaze v. Gee" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, who was the CEO of a private company with government contracts and a security clearance, was arrested in December 2021 for felony domestic violence. Although no charges were filed, police prepared an investigative report. In February 2022, the San Francisco Superior Court ordered the arrest and related records sealed under California Penal Code sections 851.91 and 851.92. Despite this, the police department released the incident report to a third party without restriction, and it was later sent anonymously to an independent journalist who published articles about the plaintiff’s arrest online, including the report. The plaintiff sought to have the posts removed and subsequently sued the journalist, the platform hosting the articles, and another entity associated with the journalist, alleging multiple causes of action including privacy violations and statutory breaches.The San Francisco County Superior Court reviewed anti-SLAPP motions filed by all defendants, which argued the suit arose from constitutionally protected activity and was barred by the First Amendment and the Communications Decency Act (CDA). The court found that the plaintiff’s claims were based on the defendants’ speech—specifically, online publication in a public forum about a matter of public interest, given the plaintiff’s role and the company's government work. It also determined that statutory protections for sealing did not override constitutional protections, and rejected the argument that defendants’ actions were illegal as a matter of law. The court granted the anti-SLAPP motions and awarded attorney fees to the defendants.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four affirmed the trial court’s orders. The main holding was that the First Amendment protects the lawfully obtained, truthful publication of information of public significance, even if the information was originally subject to statutory sealing, and that section 230(c)(1) of the CDA bars claims against interactive computer service providers for hosting such content. The attorney fee award was also affirmed. View "Blackman v. Substack" on Justia Law

TC Telephone participated as a provider in California’s LifeLine program, offering measured-rate telephone service to low-income customers. This service allowed subscribers 60 untimed local calls per month, for which TC Telephone incurred per-minute charges from other carriers. To recoup its costs, TC Telephone sought and received reimbursement from the California Public Utilities Commission (the Commission) based on the total minutes used, rather than per-call. Over several years, Commission staff approved these per-minute reimbursement claims and provided guidance that was ambiguous about the proper method for calculating reimbursements.The Commission began investigating TC Telephone’s reimbursement practices after concerns arose regarding claim amounts. In March 2020, the Commission issued a resolution clarifying that LifeLine providers should seek reimbursement on a per-call basis, not per-minute, and specified that this clarification applied prospectively. However, the Commission subsequently initiated proceedings to determine whether TC Telephone’s prior per-minute reimbursement claims violated program rules. In its initial decision, the Commission found that TC Telephone had improperly sought per-minute reimbursement and ordered it to repay over $8 million in funds received between January 2018 and March 2020, plus interest. TC Telephone’s petition for rehearing was denied.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the Commission’s decisions. The court held that prior to the Commission’s resolution, the reimbursement rules were unconstitutionally vague and failed to provide TC Telephone with fair notice that per-minute reimbursement was prohibited. Because even Commission staff did not know whether per-minute reimbursement was allowed, punishing TC Telephone for its claims violated due process. The court annulled the Commission’s decisions and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "TC Telephone v. Pub. Utilities Com." on Justia Law

The dispute centers on the division of a government pension earned by an employee during a lengthy period of cohabitation before marriage. The employee worked at the East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD), contributing to his pension from 1987 to 2018. He and his partner began living together in 1993, executed a domestic partnership affidavit for benefits, purchased a home jointly, and eventually married in 2003. After their relationship ended, the partner sought legal separation and also filed a civil action alleging breach of an oral agreement made during their cohabitation period, in which they agreed to pool their earnings and share equally any property acquired as a result.The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco consolidated the civil and divorce proceedings. It bifurcated the case, first trying the claims regarding the oral agreement. After trial, the court found that an implied-in-fact (Marvin) agreement existed during the cohabitation period, entitling each party to an equal share of property acquired, including pension contributions and accumulations. The employee moved to clarify that statutory protections made his pension “unassignable” and “exempt from execution,” but the court held that the partner was entitled to half of the pension benefits accrued during the Marvin period, and could receive payment upon distribution or via other assets after actuarial valuation.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed whether Public Utilities Code section 12337 barred the partner from sharing in pension benefits accrued during cohabitation. The court held that section 12337 does not prohibit the partner from receiving a share of pension contributions and accumulations, because her claim was based on ownership arising from the Marvin agreement, not as a creditor or assignee. The trial court’s order was affirmed. View "Seiwald v. Irias" on Justia Law