Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

TC Telephone participated as a provider in California’s LifeLine program, offering measured-rate telephone service to low-income customers. This service allowed subscribers 60 untimed local calls per month, for which TC Telephone incurred per-minute charges from other carriers. To recoup its costs, TC Telephone sought and received reimbursement from the California Public Utilities Commission (the Commission) based on the total minutes used, rather than per-call. Over several years, Commission staff approved these per-minute reimbursement claims and provided guidance that was ambiguous about the proper method for calculating reimbursements.The Commission began investigating TC Telephone’s reimbursement practices after concerns arose regarding claim amounts. In March 2020, the Commission issued a resolution clarifying that LifeLine providers should seek reimbursement on a per-call basis, not per-minute, and specified that this clarification applied prospectively. However, the Commission subsequently initiated proceedings to determine whether TC Telephone’s prior per-minute reimbursement claims violated program rules. In its initial decision, the Commission found that TC Telephone had improperly sought per-minute reimbursement and ordered it to repay over $8 million in funds received between January 2018 and March 2020, plus interest. TC Telephone’s petition for rehearing was denied.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the Commission’s decisions. The court held that prior to the Commission’s resolution, the reimbursement rules were unconstitutionally vague and failed to provide TC Telephone with fair notice that per-minute reimbursement was prohibited. Because even Commission staff did not know whether per-minute reimbursement was allowed, punishing TC Telephone for its claims violated due process. The court annulled the Commission’s decisions and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "TC Telephone v. Pub. Utilities Com." on Justia Law

The dispute centers on the division of a government pension earned by an employee during a lengthy period of cohabitation before marriage. The employee worked at the East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD), contributing to his pension from 1987 to 2018. He and his partner began living together in 1993, executed a domestic partnership affidavit for benefits, purchased a home jointly, and eventually married in 2003. After their relationship ended, the partner sought legal separation and also filed a civil action alleging breach of an oral agreement made during their cohabitation period, in which they agreed to pool their earnings and share equally any property acquired as a result.The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco consolidated the civil and divorce proceedings. It bifurcated the case, first trying the claims regarding the oral agreement. After trial, the court found that an implied-in-fact (Marvin) agreement existed during the cohabitation period, entitling each party to an equal share of property acquired, including pension contributions and accumulations. The employee moved to clarify that statutory protections made his pension “unassignable” and “exempt from execution,” but the court held that the partner was entitled to half of the pension benefits accrued during the Marvin period, and could receive payment upon distribution or via other assets after actuarial valuation.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed whether Public Utilities Code section 12337 barred the partner from sharing in pension benefits accrued during cohabitation. The court held that section 12337 does not prohibit the partner from receiving a share of pension contributions and accumulations, because her claim was based on ownership arising from the Marvin agreement, not as a creditor or assignee. The trial court’s order was affirmed. View "Seiwald v. Irias" on Justia Law

Linda Keagle and her late husband obtained two loans in 2007 and 2008, totaling $450,000, from MLA Capital, LLC and Encarnacion Alvarez and her late husband. Both loans were evidenced by promissory notes with definite maturity dates in 2012 and 2013. The Keagles failed to make payments before the maturity dates, and subsequently, from August 2018 to March 2020, MLA Capital and the Alvarezes received monthly checks from C&C Organization, a company with which Linda was affiliated.MLA Capital and Encarnacion Alvarez filed a lawsuit in 2022 alleging breach of the promissory notes and related common counts. Linda moved for summary judgment in the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, arguing the claims were untimely under four-year and two-year statutes of limitations. She contended the payments made by C&C Organization did not restart or toll the limitations period, as she neither authorized nor signed the checks. Plaintiffs opposed, asserting a six-year statute of limitations applied and that the checks constituted partial payments restarting the limitations period. The trial court granted summary judgment for Linda, finding no evidence Linda had agreed to bear responsibility for the loans after maturity or authorized the payments.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and held that a six-year statute of limitations under California Uniform Commercial Code section 3118 applies to the promissory note claims and related common counts, as it is more specific and recent than general contract limitations statutes. The court further determined there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether the payments from C&C Organization constituted partial loan repayments authorized by Linda, which could have restarted the limitations period under Code of Civil Procedure section 360. The judgment was reversed, and the trial court was instructed to deny summary judgment. View "MLA Capital, LLC v. Keagle" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a dental assistant employed by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), alleged she faced retaliation after raising workplace safety concerns and filing complaints with Cal-OSHA. Over several years, she experienced actions which included unwarranted criticism, suspension without pay, obstacles to job advancement, and ultimately formal terminations. She filed government claims describing these incidents, and was reinstated after her dismissal was overturned by the State Personnel Board (SPB), but alleged further retaliatory conduct and a constructive discharge upon her return.The Solano County Superior Court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the State of California, CDCR, and three individual defendants. The court found the plaintiff failed to satisfy the Government Claims Act’s claims presentation requirement for her retaliation claim under Labor Code section 1102.5 and did not exhaust administrative remedies for her Whistleblower Protection Act cause of action. All claims were dismissed without leave to amend. The plaintiff appealed, contesting only the rulings related to her retaliation and whistleblower claims.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the operative complaint sufficiently alleged compliance with the Government Claims Act for a constructive discharge theory under section 1102.5(b), allowing that claim to proceed against the State and CDCR. However, it found no facts showing exhaustion of administrative remedies for the Whistleblower Protection Act claim and denied leave to amend. The court also held, as a matter of first impression, that individual supervisors are not personally liable for retaliation under section 1102.5. The judgment was affirmed in favor of the individual defendants and partially reversed for the State and CDCR as to the section 1102.5 claim. View "Chaudhry v. State" on Justia Law

Two neighboring owners in a condominium complex disputed the ownership of a garage parking space labeled 38G-a. Plaintiff WCST Enterprises, LLC owns Unit 38, while Defendant Berit Ling owns Unit 39. Although Ling had used garage space 38G-a for many years, both parties’ grant deeds identified different garage spaces appurtenant to their units. WCST purchased Unit 38 with knowledge of the ongoing dispute and filed a lawsuit seeking to quiet title to garage space 38G-a, among other claims.The Superior Court of Orange County initially ruled in favor of Ling after a bench trial. This decision was reversed by the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, which remanded for a new trial. After a trial de novo, the Superior Court granted judgment quieting title in favor of WCST, finding the grant deeds showed WCST was the rightful owner of garage space 38G-a. WCST waived its remaining claims and the judgment named WCST as the prevailing party and provided that attorney fees could be determined by appropriate motion.After judgment, WCST moved for attorney fees under Civil Code section 5975 and a contractual provision in the complex’s CC&R’s. The Superior Court denied the motion, finding WCST was not entitled to fees under either source because its quiet title action did not seek to enforce any rights under the CC&R’s or other governing documents, but rather sought to enforce rights under its grant deed. WCST appealed the fee order.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the postjudgment order denying attorney fees. The court held that a statement naming a party as “prevailing party” in the judgment does not automatically entitle that party to fees. The trial court retains discretion to deny fees where the prevailing party has not established entitlement under statute or contract. View "WCST Enterprises, LLC v. Ling" on Justia Law

A fatal accident occurred in 2016 when a bicyclist, Jonathan Tansavatdi, collided with a turning truck at an intersection in the City of Rancho Palos Verdes. The bicycle lane on Hawthorne Boulevard ended before the intersection, forcing cyclists to share the roadway. Jonathan’s mother, Betty Tansavatdi, sued the City, alleging that the intersection constituted a dangerous condition of public property and that the City failed to adequately warn of this danger.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially granted summary judgment for the City based on the affirmative defense of design immunity under Government Code section 830.6. The trial court found the City had established all elements of design immunity regarding the absence of a bicycle lane. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the finding of design immunity but remanded the case for consideration of the failure to warn claim. The California Supreme Court, in Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 639, held that design immunity does not categorically preclude failure to warn claims and remanded the matter, leaving open whether design immunity applies if warnings were part of an approved design.Upon remand, the City renewed its motion for summary judgment, arguing that all warning signs and markings at the intersection were part of the 2009 approved design plans. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, held that when a public entity has provided some warning of a dangerous condition as part of an approved and reasonable design, complaints about the adequacy of that warning fall within the scope of design immunity. The court affirmed summary judgment for the City and upheld the award of expert fees, finding the City’s section 998 settlement offer valid. View "Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted after jury trials in 2011 and 2012 of attempted murder, evading an officer, unlawfully taking a vehicle, and shooting at an inhabited dwelling. Each count included enhancements for gang involvement and firearm use, and he was sentenced to a total of 46 years and eight months to life in prison. Following direct appeal, the judgment was modified to reflect life with the possibility of parole on two counts, with a minimum parole eligibility of 15 years, and otherwise affirmed.Years later, the defendant filed a petition for recall and resentencing under California Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), arguing that as a juvenile at the time of the offense and having served over 15 years, his lengthy sentence was effectively a life without parole (LWOP) term. He relied on appellate decisions holding that juvenile offenders sentenced to de facto LWOP terms should be eligible for relief under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), on equal protection grounds. The Los Angeles County Superior Court reviewed the petition, considered recent appellate decisions and parties’ arguments, and denied the petition.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. Applying de novo review, it held that the defendant’s sentence did not constitute the functional equivalent of LWOP, as he was eligible for youthful offender parole under section 3051 at age 41. The court determined that section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) only applies to explicit LWOP sentences for juveniles and does not violate equal protection by excluding those sentenced to lengthy indeterminate terms. It affirmed the trial court’s denial of the petition. View "People v. Cortez" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted after he broke into a high school barn at night and killed a goat and a pig owned by students participating in an agricultural program. Surveillance footage showed someone entering the barn, carrying an axe, and later leaving with a wheelbarrow containing the dead pig. The next day, the deceased goat was found in the barn and the pig’s carcass was discovered hanging from a tree near the defendant’s living area at a nearby homeless encampment. The students who owned the animals testified to their emotional attachments and the distress caused by the incident.The Superior Court of San Benito County found the defendant guilty of two counts of animal cruelty, vandalism, burglary, unlawful possession of ammunition, possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia, and two counts of misdemeanor child abuse for causing emotional harm to the student animal owners. The defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 11 years and six months in prison. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the statutory exception permitting the killing of animals used for food, that his counsel was ineffective for not requesting such an instruction, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for animal cruelty related to the pig and for child abuse.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, affirmed the judgment. The court held that the Penal Code section allowing the “right to kill all animals used for food” does not apply to killing another person’s animal without the owner’s consent. The defendant’s conduct fell outside the statutory exception, and the evidence was sufficient to support all convictions. The court also found no instructional error or ineffective assistance of counsel. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "People v. Madruga" on Justia Law

Following significant property damage due to a rainstorm in January 2023, several local government entities in Merced County, including the City of Merced and a school district, filed suit against the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW). They alleged that the CDFW’s restrictions on cleaning and maintaining waterways contributed to flooding that caused the damage. Subsequent to this initial complaint, other parties—including homeowners, businesses, and insurers—filed related actions against CDFW, the City, and the County. These cases were ultimately consolidated in Merced County Superior Court.After consolidation, CDFW became the sole nonresident defendant in the case. In late 2025, CDFW sought to transfer the venue out of Merced County, citing Code of Civil Procedure sections 394 and 397, which generally allow for venue changes to guard against local prejudice in actions involving local government plaintiffs and nonresident defendants. The plaintiffs opposed the motion, and the Superior Court of Merced County ruled that venue was proper in Merced County under Government Code section 955.3, which specifically governs actions brought by local agencies against the State of California. The court also found CDFW’s motion untimely.CDFW then petitioned the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, for a writ of mandate to overturn the trial court’s denial of the motion to transfer venue. The Court of Appeal denied the petition, holding that Government Code section 955.3 expressly provides that such actions may be tried in the county where the local government plaintiff is situated, notwithstanding any other provision of law. The court concluded that section 955.3 supersedes section 394 and that the Attorney General’s ability to seek a venue change under section 397 is limited to a pre-answer motion, which was not made here. The stay previously issued was lifted, and costs were awarded to the real parties in interest. View "Dept. of Fish & Wildlife v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

A.H., a minor and tribal citizen, was placed under the guardianship of his paternal grandmother following his parents’ inability to care for him. Over the years, multiple child welfare referrals were made due to Guardian’s failure to meet A.H.’s medical and educational needs. The Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) initiated dependency proceedings, and the Soboba Band of Luiseno Indians (the Tribe) intervened because of concerns about Guardian’s mental health and her ability to care for A.H. The juvenile court ordered Guardian to undergo a psychological evaluation for case planning purposes after findings of inadequate care and missed medical appointments for A.H.In the Superior Court of Riverside County, the Tribe repeatedly requested access to Guardian’s psychological evaluation, arguing it was necessary for monitoring A.H.’s welfare and developing an appropriate case plan. Guardian objected, asserting privacy rights and noting the evaluation had not been filed with the court. The juvenile court denied the Tribe’s request, stating the evaluation was for case planning only and not for sharing with the Tribe. The Tribe then appealed, relying on state and federal law, including Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 and the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. It held that the Tribe, as an intervening party and member of A.H.’s multidisciplinary personnel team, is presumptively authorized to access Guardian’s psychological evaluation under section 827, subdivisions (a)(1)(K) and (f). The court found that neither privacy laws nor the psychotherapist-patient privilege barred disclosure, given the evaluation was court-ordered and necessary for A.H.’s best interests. The court reversed the juvenile court’s denial and directed release of the evaluation to the Tribe. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law