Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
People v. Lara
The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 25 years to life. During pretrial proceedings, his defense counsel raised doubts about his competency to stand trial, leading the trial court to suspend criminal proceedings and appoint a psychologist for evaluation. The psychologist observed the defendant's extremely low intelligence, confusion during police interviews and the competency evaluation, and scores below the cutoff on a test designed to assess incompetence due to intellectual disability. Despite these observations, the psychologist concluded that the defendant was competent to stand trial. The trial court found the defendant competent based on the psychologist's report, and criminal proceedings resumed.The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court mishandled the procedures for determining his competency. He contended that there was sufficient evidence of intellectual disability to trigger the trial court's duty to appoint the director of the regional center for the developmentally disabled, or the director’s designee, to examine him. The appellate court agreed, concluding that the trial court was presented with evidence raising sufficient doubt that the defendant was intellectually disabled and was thus obligated to appoint the regional center director or their designee for evaluation. The court's failure to do so was deemed prejudicial error.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that the trial court erred by not appointing the regional center director or their designee to evaluate the defendant for developmental disability. The appellate court found that the psychologist's report, which indicated the defendant's extremely low IQ and confusion, raised sufficient doubt about his intellectual disability. The court concluded that the trial court's failure to appoint the regional center director deprived the defendant of a fair competency trial. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the matter for a new trial. View "People v. Lara" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
Egelston v. State Personnel Board
Jonathan Egelston, a youth correctional officer, was dismissed from his position by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation after he allegedly assaulted and harassed his girlfriend, J.G., and subsequently lied about the incident. The State Personnel Board (SPB) upheld his dismissal following an evidentiary hearing. Egelston then petitioned for a writ of mandate to reverse the SPB's decision, but the trial court denied his petition.The family law court had previously dismissed J.G.'s request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Egelston without prejudice. Egelston argued that this dismissal should bar the findings of assault and dishonesty under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. However, the trial court found that the SPB's credibility determinations, which favored J.G.'s testimony over Egelston's, were entitled to great weight.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Egelston's contention regarding res judicata and collateral estoppel was forfeited because it was not raised in the lower court. Additionally, the court found that the claim lacked merit. The family law court's dismissal of the DVRO without prejudice did not constitute a final judgment on the merits, and thus had no preclusive effect. The causes of action in the DVRO proceeding and the SPB proceedings were different, and the parties were not in privity.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment, upholding Egelston's dismissal from his position. The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation was awarded its costs on appeal. View "Egelston v. State Personnel Board" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law
People v. Thompson
Perrie Thompson was sentenced to 50 years to life for a homicide he committed at age 17. Fifteen years later, he petitioned for relief under Penal Code section 1170(d), which allows juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole to seek resentencing. Thompson argued that his sentence was effectively life without parole and cited cases like People v. Contreras and People v. Heard to support his claim. He presented evidence of his rehabilitation efforts while incarcerated. The trial court denied his petition, stating that his sentence was not equivalent to life without parole since he would be eligible for parole within his life expectancy.Thompson appealed the decision. The Attorney General initially opposed the appeal but later conceded that a 50-years-to-life sentence is functionally equivalent to life without parole and that denying relief to such offenders violates equal protection. However, the court independently reviewed the merits of Thompson's arguments.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court's order. The court held that Thompson's 50-years-to-life sentence is not the functional equivalent of life without parole for equal protection purposes. The court reasoned that the legislative intent behind section 1170(d) was to address the most severe punishments, specifically life without parole, and that the Legislature could rationally distinguish between life without parole and lengthy term-of-years sentences. The court concluded that Thompson failed to demonstrate that the exclusion of his sentence from section 1170(d) relief was irrational or unconstitutional. View "People v. Thompson" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Rights, Criminal Law
People v. Brinson
In 2000, Johnny Lawrence Brinson was convicted of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, with firearm use and discharge, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced to 39 years to life in prison. In 2024, Brinson filed multiple requests for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.1, citing amendments to the Penal Code and Assembly Bill No. 600. The trial court declined to take any action on these requests.Previously, the trial court had affirmed Brinson's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. In 2024, Brinson filed his first request for recall and resentencing, which the court denied. He subsequently filed two more requests, both of which the court also declined to act upon, issuing orders stating no action would be taken pursuant to section 1172.1, subdivision (c). Brinson appealed the court's decision not to act on his requests.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court's decision not to take action on Brinson's request for recall and resentencing is not an appealable order. The court emphasized that under section 1172.1, subdivision (c), a defendant is not entitled to file a petition for resentencing, and the court is not required to respond to such a request. The appellate court agreed with existing case law that a trial court's decision not to act on a defendant-initiated request for recall and resentencing does not affect the defendant's substantial rights. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. View "People v. Brinson" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
People v. Valle
David Valle, an inmate at the California Men’s Colony, was found in possession of a 14-inch by 1-inch sharpened plastic fragment, metal fragments from a shower valve cover, and a folded metal sheet during a cell search. The plastic fragment was described as a weapon resembling a spear or knife. Valle admitted to having the items but claimed he could not remember why.Valle was convicted by a jury of possessing a sharp instrument in prison under Penal Code section 4502. The trial court sentenced him as a third-strike offender to 25 years to life in prison. Valle appealed, arguing that section 4502 is unconstitutionally vague because it does not define "sharp instrument."The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed Valle's constitutional challenge de novo and rejected it. The court held that section 4502 is not unconstitutionally vague, either facially or as applied to Valle. The court reasoned that the statute's purpose is to protect inmates and prison officials from assaults by armed prisoners and that it provides a clear standard of conduct. The court cited previous California decisions that consistently upheld the statute's constitutionality.The court concluded that a 14-inch by 1-inch sharpened piece of hard, non-flexible plastic is a sharp instrument prohibited by section 4502. Valle's possession of such items, concealed in his cell, demonstrated his understanding that they were prohibited. The judgment was affirmed. View "People v. Valle" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Mitchell v. Hutchinson
Anthony Mitchell was driving his Ferrari in Dana Point when he ran over large rocks that had rolled onto the road from an adjacent slope, causing damage to his car and unspecified personal injuries. Mitchell and his passenger, Scott Sieverts, sued multiple parties, including Gail B. Hutchinson, trustee of the Hutchinson Family Trust, for negligence and premises liability, alleging that the defendants failed to maintain their properties to prevent rocks from becoming hazards.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of Hutchinson, concluding that she met her initial burden of showing that the plaintiffs could not prove causation. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to create a triable issue of material fact regarding whether the rocks came from Hutchinson’s property or whether the defendants negligently maintained their slopes. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that Hutchinson met her initial burden under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (p)(2), by showing that the plaintiffs could not prove causation. The burden then shifted to the plaintiffs, who failed to show a triable issue of material fact. The court found that the plaintiffs' expert's opinion was speculative and lacked foundation, and there was no admissible evidence tying the rocks to Hutchinson’s property or proving negligence. Consequently, the summary judgment in favor of Hutchinson was affirmed. View "Mitchell v. Hutchinson" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Personal Injury, Real Estate & Property Law
Conservatorship of Anne S.
Marc B. Hankin appealed a probate court order that dismissed his petition for the appointment of a probate conservator for Anne S. and imposed $5,577 in sanctions against him. Hankin, who had only met Anne once and lived nearby, filed the petition along with attorney G. Scott Sobel, who had known Anne for many years. The petition alleged that Anne was being unduly influenced and possibly mistreated by her housemate. Anne, through her attorney, objected to the conservatorship. Sobel later withdrew from the petition, leaving Hankin to maintain it on his own. Anne and other parties involved reached a settlement agreement, which Hankin opposed, arguing Anne lacked the capacity to sign it.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Anne's motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that Hankin lacked standing to petition for conservatorship under Probate Code section 1820. The court also imposed sanctions on Hankin, finding his petition legally frivolous. Hankin appealed both decisions.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that Hankin did not qualify as an "interested person" or "friend" under section 1820. The court noted that Hankin's brief interaction with Anne did not establish a close or intimate relationship necessary to be considered a friend. Additionally, the court found that Hankin's arguments for standing were unsupported by existing law and did not present a good faith argument for extending the law. The court also upheld the sanctions, determining that Hankin's petition was legally frivolous and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding them. View "Conservatorship of Anne S." on Justia Law
Dessins v. City of Sacramento
In 2022, the City of Sacramento proposed a new storm drainage fee to fund repairs, maintenance, and improvements to its storm drainage system. The fee was calculated based on parcel size and land use, expected to generate approximately $20 million annually, with City-owned properties contributing about $496,000. The City conducted an election, mailing ballots to property owners, including itself, as it owned one percent of the properties. The fee was approved with 22,178 votes in favor and 20,229 against. Without the City's votes, the fee would not have passed.Dessins LLC, a property owner who voted against the fee, filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint against the City and the City Council, arguing that the City's votes should not have counted. The Superior Court of Sacramento County ruled in favor of the City, concluding that the City was entitled to vote in the election. Dessins then appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the City, as a property owner of properties subject to the fee, was entitled to vote under article XIII D, section 6, subdivision (c) of the California Constitution. The court found that the plain language of the provision allowed the City to vote and that the City's vote did not subvert the purposes of Proposition 218. The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, allowing the storm drainage fee to stand. View "Dessins v. City of Sacramento" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Napa
The case involves Pacific Bell Telephone Company and other utilities suing the County of Napa and the state Board of Equalization for a refund of property taxes and declaratory relief. The utilities argue that from 2018 to 2023, the tax rates used to compute the debt-service component of their property taxes were higher than those applied to other properties, violating the California Constitution's requirement that public utility property be taxed in the same manner as other property.In the lower court, the trial court sustained the respondents' demurrer to the utilities' complaint without leave to amend, based on the precedent set by the Sixth District Court of Appeal in County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, which held that the California Constitution does not mandate that public utility property be taxed at the same rate as other property. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the respondents.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing with the reasoning in Santa Clara and another case, Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Merced. The court concluded that the constitutional provision does not require the same or comparable debt-service tax rates for public utility and nonutility property. The court also rejected the utilities' claim that the tax rates violated the principle of taxation uniformity embodied in the California Constitution. The judgment in favor of the respondents was affirmed. View "Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Napa" on Justia Law
Gray v. Superior Ct.
Kevin Gray, a sexually violent predator (SVP), was found suitable for conditional release. The State Department of State Hospitals identified a proposed placement for Gray, but the Stanislaus County District Attorney opposed it due to its proximity to a home where a child engaged in a public charter school’s independent study program. The court ruled that the home constituted a “school” under section 6608.5, subdivision (f), making the location ineligible for Gray’s placement.The trial court initially determined Gray was suitable for conditional release and ordered a housing search. After an extensive search, a proposed site was identified. The People opposed the site, arguing it was too close to a home-based school. The court agreed, ruling the home was a “school” under the statute, and barred the placement.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that a home where a child engages in a public school independent study program does not constitute a “school” under section 6608.5, subdivision (f). The court distinguished this case from People v. Superior Court (Cheek), which involved a private home school. The court noted that independent study is a program, not a type of school, and the legislative intent behind the placement restriction was to protect children in traditional school settings. The court declined to consider alternative arguments regarding the proximity of children fitting Gray’s victim profile, as these were not addressed by the trial court.The court granted the petition for writ of mandate, directing the trial court to vacate its order barring Gray’s placement at the proposed site. View "Gray v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law