Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellants in this case were Richtek Technology Corporation, a Taiwan corporation, and Richtek USA, Inc., its California subsidiary. Respondents were James Chang, H.P. Huang and J.C. Chen, Taiwan residents and former employees of Richtek Technology, and uPI Semiconductor Corporation, a California company they formed. Appellants sued Respondents for trade secret misappropriation. uPI, Chang and Huang filed a demurrer on the ground that Appellants’ claims were time-barred under Taiwan’s statute of limitations for trade secret misappropriation claims. Huang, Chang and Chen also filed a motion to dismiss based on a forum selection clause in their employment agreements mandating a Taiwanese forum for Richtek Technology’s trade secret claims. The trial court sustained the demurrer and granted Chen’s motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals (1) reversed the order sustaining the demurrer to the complaint, holding that the trial court erred by using previous complaints filed in Taiwan to conclude that Appellants had knowledge of the misappropriation at issue in this lawsuit and the identity of the parties liable for damages; and (2) affirmed the order granting Chen’s motion to dismiss, holding that the forum selection clause in the employment agreement between Chen and Richtek Technology was mandatory. View "Richtek USA v. uPI Semiconductor Corp." on Justia Law

A class action complaint alleged that Honeywell engaged in uncompetitive and illegal conduct to increase its market share of round thermostats and to use its dominant market position to overcharge customers. In 2013, the parties reached a settlement and asked the trial court to preliminarily approve it. The court initially declined to do so because it had concerns about the notice proposed to be sent to class members. Those concerns were subsequently addressed to the court’s satisfaction, and on February 4, 2014, the court preliminarily approved the settlement. The notice of settlement was subsequently published and distributed to class members. The long version was distributed and posted on a website, and the short version was published in various print publications. The trial court found that four objectors to the settlement failed to establish they had standing, but rejected one objection on timeliness grounds and rejected the other three on their merits. The court of appeal affirmed, except for the ruling on standing, finding that the court properly approved the distribution of residual settlement funds and awarded class counsel attorney fees that amounted to 37.5 percent of the settlement fund. View "Roos v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

This action under the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and the False Advertising Law (FAL) arose from Philip Morris USA, Inc.'s use of terms such as "Lights" and "Lowered Tar and Nicotine" in advertising Marlboro Lights, to indicate they were less harmful to one's health than Marlboro Reds and other full-flavored cigarettes. The trial court determined Marlboro Lights were as dangerous than any other cigarettes, Philip Morris knew that, and its advertising was likely to deceive consumers. The court, however, denied plaintiffs' prayer for restitution on the ground they received value from Marlboro Lights apart from the deceptive advertising, and the evidence they submitted in an effort to show the difference between what they paid for Marlboro Lights and the value they actually received was incompetent and inadmissible. On appeal, plaintiffs contended the court erred as a matter of law by determining the only measure of restitution in a UCL products action was the measure set forth in "In re Vioxx Class of Cases," 180 Cal.App.4th 116 (2009)). Plaintiffs asserted value was immaterial, and they were not required to show any loss attributable to the deceptive advertising, because as an alternative measure the court had discretion to order Philip Morris to make a full refund of consumer expenditures, or its profits thereon, exclusively for the purpose of deterrence. Plaintiffs also contended the court abused its discretion by denying injunctive relief on the ground of mootness. A federal court opinion affirmed in relevant part in "United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc." (566 F.3d 1095 (2009)), and federal legislation have already enjoined tobacco companies' use of the objectionable descriptors, plaintiffs asserted the matter was not moot because Philip Morris continued to market the cigarettes, called Marlboro Gold, in light-colored packs, which ostensibly signified they were less dangerous than Marlboro Reds or other cigarettes sold in dark-colored packs. Additionally, plaintiffs argued the court erred by denying them declaratory relief, awarding Philip Morris costs as the prevailing party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, and denying them sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420 for Philip Morris's failure to make admissions. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that all of plaintiffs' points were meritless and affirmed the judgment. View "In re Tobacco Cases II" on Justia Law

In 2011 and 2012, the government brought enforcement actions against more than 80 facilities alleged to be selling and distributing marijuana for medicinal purposes in violation of the Los Angeles Municipal Code for public nuisance, the Narcotics Abatement Law, Health & Safety Code section 11570, and the state unfair competition law, Business & Professions Code section 17200. The complaints sought permanent injunctions, abatement of the nuisances and civil penalties. The trial court denied the government’s omnibus motion for summary judgment, reasoning that claims for penalties made under each of the statutory plans are elements of the causes of action alleged. The court of appeal vacated, holding that the penalties being sought are among the remedies available rather than elements of the causes of action alleged in the several complaints. View "People v. Cahuenga's The Spot" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether federal law preempted the effort by a district attorney to recover civil penalties under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) based on an employer’s alleged violation of workplace safety standards. Petitioners Solus Industrial Innovations, Emerson Power Transmission Corp., and Emerson Electric Co. (collectively Solus) argued the trial court erred by overruling their demurrer to two causes of action filed against them by Respondent, the Orange County District Attorney, alleging a right to recover such penalties. Solus argued that federal workplace safety law (Fed/OSHA) preempted any state law workplace safety enforcement mechanism which has not been specifically incorporated into the state workplace safety plan approved by the U.S. Secretary of Labor. The district attorney argued that once a state workplace safety plan has been approved by the Secretary of Labor, the state retains significant discretion to determine how it will enforce the safety standards incorporated therein, and thus the state may empower prosecutors to enforce those standards through whatever legal mechanism is available when such a case is referred to them. The trial court agreed with the district attorney and overruled Solus’s demurrer. But the court also certified this issue as presenting a controlling issue of law suitable for early appellate review under Code of Civil Procedure section 166.1. Solus then filed a petition for writ of mandate asking the Court of Appeal to review the trial court’s ruling. After the Court summarily denied the petition, the California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal with directions to issue an order to show cause. In the course of its opinion, the Court of Appeal noted that the UCL was not even in effect when California’s plan was approved. The California Supreme Court then granted review, and transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal with directions to reconsider the matter in light of former Civil Code section 3370.1 repealed by stats. 1977, ch. 299, sec. 3, p. 1204. Having done so, the Court of Appeal again concluded that the district attorney’s reliance on the UCL to address workplace safety violations was preempted. View "Solus Industrial Innovations, LLC v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law