Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Fleming filed a class action complaint, alleging Oliphant violated the California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Oliphant filed a petition to dismiss Fleming’s class action claims and compel binding arbitration of his individual claims under the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. 2). According to Oliphant’s records custodian, Fleming electronically applied for a credit card in December 2013. The electronic application included no reference to an arbitration agreement. Fleming received the card, used his card for purchases, made payments on his account, and received account statements, which did not include any reference to arbitration. There is no evidence of any signed agreement. Oliphant provided no evidence that it even sent such an agreement to Fleming. Oliphant proffered three Cardmember Agreements—or exemplars—that were in effect when Fleming opened his account, when he made his last payment to the account in March 2018, and when the account was charged off in May 2018, which included arbitration agreements. Fleming denied receiving any of the exemplars.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the petition to compel arbitration. Oliphant did not meet its burden in proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement with Fleming. Nothing in the record suggests that Fleming might have consented to an arbitration provision. View "Fleming v. Oliphant Financial, LLC" on Justia Law

Casandra Murrey, a single, 46-year-old female, worked for General Electric Company (GE) as a product sales specialist for ultrasound equipment. The complaint alleged GE hired Murrey in early 2018 and she was a “top performer.” In 2019, GE hired Joseph Gorczyca, III. In January 2020, he became Murrey’s direct supervisor, and he engaged in continuous sexual harassment in the workplace with Murrey and others. She alleged GE “never properly completed an immediate [n]or appropriate investigation or took any . . . corrective action. Instead, [GE] later informed [her] that Gorczyca was ‘no longer with the company.’” Thereafter, GE “commenced an illegal pattern of retaliatory behavior against Murrey because [she] engage[ed] in protective activity” that included “denying appropriate support for [her] sales position” and refusing to promote her. Eight months after Murrey filed the complaint, GE moved to compel arbitration. GE sent all new hires a “welcome e-mail” to the new hire’s personal e-mail address that contained a link to GE’s electronic onboarding system/portal. Each document was assigned a separate task and the new hire signed employment-related agreements using his or her electronic signature. Based on this process and GE’s other security measures, GE’s lead HR specialist Michelle Thayer concluded Murrey’s electronic signature on an Acknowledgment was made by Murrey that Murrey assented to an included arbitration in the onboarding materials. The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration, concluding:(1) GE met its burden of showing the arbitration agreement covered Murrey’s claims; (2) all of Murrey’s causes of action arose out of or were connected with her employment; and (3) Murrey met her burden showing procedural unconscionability because it was a contract of adhesion; but (5) Murrey failed to show a sufficient degree of substantive unconscionability to render the agreement unenforceable. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding the arbitration agreement in this case contained a high degree of procedural unconscionability. "When we consider the procedural and substantively unconscionable provisions together, they indicate a concerted effort to impose on an employee a forum with distinct advantages for the employer." The Court issued a writ of mandate on the trial court to vacate the order compelling arbitration, and to enter a new order denying the motion. View "Murrey v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff signed an arbitration contract with an employer called Intelex Enterprises, LLC. While working for Intelex, Plaintiff also worked for other firms (Other Firms). These Other Firms were legally separate from Intelex but functionally related to it. The Other Firms did not contract for arbitration with Plaintiff. After termination, Plaintiff sued the Other Firms but not Intelex: Intelex has never been a party to the case. The Other Firms moved to compel arbitration based on Plaintiff’s agreement with Intelex. The trial court denied the Other Firms’ motion to enforce a contract they had not signed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the Other Firms cannot equitably estop Defendant because they do not show she is trying to profit from some unfair action. They have no proof of agency. And they are not third-party beneficiaries of Intelex’s contract. The court explained that the Other Firms point to six places in the record they say show agency, but these materials do not measure up. The citation to Plaintiff’s complaint spotlights text that omits Intelex and cannot show agency. A different citation is to their attorney’s declaration recounting irrelevant procedural history. Other citations refer to Plaintiff’s admission that she worked for both Intelex and the Other Firms. This admission does not establish agency. View "Hernandez v. Meridian Management Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Sisyphian for (1) failure to pay minimum wage, (2) failure to pay overtime wages, (3) failure to pay wages for missed meal periods, (4) failure to pay wages for missed rest breaks, (5) waiting time penalties (6) failure to provide accurate wage statements and (7) unfair competition. In reliance on the arbitration clause in the Entertainment Agreement, the trial court granted Sisyphian’s motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims. The arbitrator concluded that Plaintiff’s complaint contained a viable prayer for attorney fees for the claims on which she prevailed. Plaintiff filed a petition to confirm the final arbitration award. Following the entry of judgment for Plaintiff in the amount of $105,109.75, Sisyphian appealed. Sisyphian argued that the trial court erred in confirming the final arbitration award because, in reconsidering its initial attorney fees order, the arbitrator exceeded his powers   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that because Plaintiff’s petition to confirm was procedurally proper because no party sought dismissal of Plaintiff’s petition, and because Sisyphian’s filings seeking to vacate or correct the arbitration award were not timely filed, the trial court, in this case, was obligated to confirm the final arbitration award. Further, because Sisyphian forfeited its right to seek to vacate or correct the final arbitration award before the trial court, the court may not consider its arguments to do so on appeal. View "Darby v. Sisyphian, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and appellant, a contractor, prevailed in an arbitration against its client, the Defendant and Respondent. After finding that Plaintiff was not duly licensed because its responsible managing employee (RME) did not meet the criteria required by law, the trial court granted Defendant's petition to vacate the arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded her powers.Plaintiff made two main arguments on appeal. It first contends the trial court misapplied the burden of proof regarding whether Plaintiff was a duly licensed contractor. The Second Appellate District rejected this argument, finding that the trial court correctly determined that Plaintiff had the burden of proof on this issue.Plaintiff also argued the trial court erroneously denied it an evidentiary hearing. In the trial court, however, Plaintiff did not seek an evidentiary hearing. It instead argued that such a hearing was not authorized by law. Therefore, the Second Appellate District held that Plaintiff forfeited the issue on appeal. View "Vascos Excavation Group LLC v. Gold" on Justia Law

Three plaintiffs began working for Wise on separate dates. Each purportedly signed an arbitration agreement, “governed by the Federal Arbitration Act and the California Arbitration Act. It bans class arbitration and waives the employees’ right to join class litigation, noting that the employee “may wish to consult with an attorney.” An acknowledgment indicates that the employee has read the agreement and understands that he can choose not to sign and still be employed by Wise, without retaliation. Wise fired the plaintiffs. They filed a joint complaint.Wise moved to compel each plaintiff to submit to individual arbitration. Wise submitted a declaration from its HR director, authenticating the documents, bearing the handwritten signature of each plaintiff. Each plaintiff alleged that, on his first day of work, he was handed a stack of documents and was not given any time to review them nor given a copy of the documents, adding “I do not recall ever reading or signing any" Binding Arbitration Agreement ... I do not know how my signature was placed on [either document].”The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The court of appeal reversed. The plaintiffs offered no admissible evidence creating a dispute as to the authenticity of their physical signatures and did not prove that the agreement was unconscionable. The FAA does not prescribe substantive rules of law for resolving disputes. It does not displace the substantive law of California. View "Iyere v. Wise Auto Group" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Desert Regional Medical Center, Inc. (DRMC) appealed trial court orders denying DRMC’s first amended petitions to compel nurses Leah Miller, Lynn Fontana, and Renita Romero (Respondents) to arbitrate their labor claims alleging rest and meal break violations by DRMC. DRMC contended the trial court erred by denying its petitions to compel arbitration and failing to stay Respondents’ individual claims until after completion of arbitration of a separate proceeding initiated by Respondents’ union (the California Nurses Association) on behalf of all nurses employed by DRMC in California. DRMC argued the trial court erred in denying DRMC’s petitions to compel arbitration based on a finding DRMC waived the right to arbitrate. DRMC argued the issue of waiver had to be determined by the arbitrator, not the trial court, and, even if the court has jurisdiction to decide waiver, there was insufficient evidence to support its finding of waiver. DRMC further contended Respondents were estopped from arguing waiver because Respondents’ Union was responsible for DRMC’s delay in petitioning to compel arbitration and agreed, in a separate proceeding, to arbitrate the Union’s group grievance. After review, the Court of Appeal rejected DRMC’s contentions and affirmed the order denying DRMC’s amended petitions to compel arbitration and request for a stay. View "Desert Regional Medical Center, Inc. v. Miller" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs first worked for Tesla through staffing agencies. When Tesla offered them employment, effective August 2, 2017, most of the plaintiffs electronically signed offer letters, including an arbitration provision, “any and all disputes, claims, or causes of action, in law or equity, arising from or relating to your employment, or the termination of your employment, will be resolved, to the fullest extent permitted by law by final, binding and confidential arbitration.” A complaint under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code 12900) alleged that the plaintiff and other Black workers “suffered severe and pervasive harassment.”The trial court partially granted Tesla's motion to compel arbitration, reasoning that the arbitration clauses required the plaintiffs to arbitrate disputes that arose on or after 8/2/17 while claims based on alleged wrongs before 8/2/17 are not within the scope of the agreements. The trial court denied the motion to the extent that the plaintiffs sought a public injunction. The court of appeal affirmed. The court properly declined to mandate arbitration of the request for a public injunction. Injunctions sought under FEHA may be considered “public injunctions.” The Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. 1), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in 2022 (Viking River) does not preempt the California rule prohibiting waiver of the right to seek such injunctions. View "Vaughn v. Tesla, Inc." on Justia Law

Doe alleges that she was sexually assaulted by a massage therapist during a massage at a San Rafael Massage Envy retail location. She filed suit against the Arizona-based franchisor that licenses the “Massage Envy” brand name (MEF), and the independently owned San Rafael franchise where the assault allegedly occurred. MEF moved to compel arbitration on the basis of a “Terms of Use Agreement” presented to Doe when she checked in for a massage she had booked at the franchise location. The trial court concluded that there was no agreement to arbitrate between Doe and MEF.The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting MEF’s argument that the “Terms of Use Agreement,” which was available to Doe via a hyperlink on the electronic tablet she was given at the franchise, was a valid and enforceable “clickwrap” agreement of the sort that courts routinely enforce. Doe did not have reasonable notice that she was entering into any agreement with MEF, much less notice of the terms of the agreement. The transaction was nothing like the typical transactions in which clickwrap agreements are used; Doe went to a physical location, where she was already a member, and was handed a tablet to check in for a massage. View "Doe v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLC" on Justia Law

Valley Hospital admitted Ann as a resident to recover from hip surgery. Weeks later, Valley discharged Ann to an assisted living facility, where she died five days later. This suit alleges that Ann, unable due to dementia to communicate her needs, lost 40 pounds and became severely dehydrated at Valley, resulting in acute renal failure and that Valley, billing Medicare until her eligibility expired, "dumped" her at a non-medical facility, "misrepresenting to the family and facility that [Ann] was stable and healthy enough” for the transfer.Valley submitted an arbitration agreement that John had signed on Ann’s behalf. The agreement stated that residents were not required to sign as a condition of admission. The court sent the suit to arbitration. The plaintiffs paid their portion of the arbitration filing fee. Valley did not timely pay the balance. More than 30 days after the deadline, citing Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98, the plaintiffs moved to vacate the stay of litigation and to withdraw from arbitration. Valley paid its fees that day. The court of appeal affirmed an order permitting the resumption of litigation. The statute provides that a business pursuing arbitration under a pre-dispute arbitration agreement is in material breach of that agreement—thereby waiving its right to arbitrate—if it fails to timely pay its share of arbitration fees; it does not require an arbitrator’s determination of default and it is not limited to only to mandatory pre-dispute agreements. View "Williams v. West Coast Hospitals, Inc." on Justia Law