Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Janet signed a Durable Power of Attorney and Nomination of Conservator (DPOA), appointing Randall as her attorney-in-fact. The DPOA advised that it “does not authorize anyone to make medical and other health care decisions,” authorized Randall to “demand, arbitrate, and pursue litigation on [Janet’s] behalf, authorized Randall to “do all things and enter into all transactions necessary to provide for the Principal’s personal care,” including the provision of institutional residential care. Janet later moved into a residential care facility, Atria; Randall signed a one-page “Agreement to Arbitrate.”While living at Atria, Janet allegedly fell and broke her hip. Janet, through Randall as her guardian ad litem, sued Atria under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (Welf. & Inst. Code 15600), asserting elder neglect and abuse, negligence, fraud, financial elder abuse, and unfair business practices, alleging that Atria failed to assist with her activities of daily living, failed to supervise her, and failed to check on her after knowing she felt dizzy and unwell. Atria sought to compel arbitration. Janet argued the arbitration clause was not enforceable because it was not signed by Janet or an agent pursuant to a valid power of attorney for healthcare. The court of appeal reversed the denial of Atria’s petition, holding that Randall was authorized to enter into the arbitration agreement. View "Gordon v. Atria Management Co." on Justia Law

Isabel Garibay appealed a trial court's confirmation of a class action settlement reached between Josue Uribe and Crown Building Maintenance Company (Crown). Uribe sued Crown as an individual regarding alleged Labor Code violations for failure to reimburse him for the cost of uniform cleaning and required footwear as a day porter doing janitorial-type work. Uribe’s suit also included a cause of action in a representative capacity for civil penalties and injunctive relief under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). The parties reached a settlement conditioned on Uribe filing an amended complaint converting his lawsuit into a class action on his Labor Code claims and including unreimbursed employee cell phone usage costs as an additional basis for both his Labor Code and PAGA causes of action. Garibay, an unnamed member of the class once it was formed, had earlier filed in the Alameda County Superior Court a putative class action asserting Labor Code claims for unreimbursed cell phone use by Crown employees, together with a representative PAGA cause of action on that basis. When Uribe and Crown sought preliminary approval of their agreement to settle Uribe’s lawsuit on a class-wide basis, the trial court authorized Garibay to intervene as a named party in the lawsuit to oppose the settlement. The trial court later granted Uribe’s motion for preliminary approval of the settlement, and then Crown and Uribe’s joint motion for final approval. Meanwhile, the Judicial Council had referred Crown’s petition to coordinate Uribe’s and Garibay’s lawsuits to the presiding judge of the Alameda court to appoint a judge to hear the petition; that appointment remained pending at the time the judgment in Orange County was entered. After the parties advised the Alameda court no stay had been entered in the coordination proceedings, the court subsequently entered judgment. Garibay challenged the settlement after the trial court declined to rule on both Crown’s motion to dismiss Garibay’s complaint in intervention and Garibay’s motion to vacate the judgment. The Court of Appeal found Uribe's PAGA notice did not encompass a claim for unreimbursed cell phone expenses, making the notice was inadequate to support Uribe’s PAGA cause of action on that theory in his lawsuit. And because Uribe and Crown’s agreement did not allow for severance of nonviable settlement terms, judicial approval of a settlement that included Uribe’s PAGA cause of action could not survive review. The Court therefore reversed the judgment. View "Uribe v. Crown Building Maintenance Co." on Justia Law

In this California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) case, the Court of Appeal granted the petition for writ of mandate and directed respondent Los Angeles Superior Court to vacate its order awarding attorney fees to Charter and to conduct a new hearing to reconsider Charter's motion for attorney fees. At issue is whether an employer's arbitration agreement authorizes the recovery of attorney fees for a successful motion to compel arbitration of a FEHA lawsuit even if the plaintiff's opposition to arbitration was not frivolous, unreasonable or groundless.The court concluded that, because a fee-shifting clause directed to a motion to compel arbitration, like a general prevailing party fee provision, risks chilling an employee's access to court in a FEHA case absent Government Code section 12965(b)'s asymmetric standard for an award of fees, a prevailing defendant may recover fees in this situation only if it demonstrates the plaintiff's opposition was groundless. In this case, no such finding was made by the superior court in the underlying action before awarding real party in interest Charter its attorney fees after granting Charter's motion to compel petitioner to arbitrate his FEHA claims. View "Patterson v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Defendant RGIS, LLC (RGIS) appealed a trial court’s order denying its petition to compel arbitration of representative claims under the Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (PAGA). In denying the petition, the trial court followed the California Supreme Court’s decision in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal.4th 348 (2014), which held that individual employees cannot contractually waive their right to bring a representative action under the PAGA, and this state law rule was not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). RGIS argued that the Supreme Court’s holding in Iskanian was subsequently abrogated by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Epic Systems Corporation v. Lewis, __ U.S. __ [138 S.Ct. 1612] (2018). The Court of Appeal found, however, that Epic Systems did not consider the same issue concerning the nonwaivable nature of PAGA claims decided by Iskanian. Accordingly, and along with every published appellate decision that has decided this issue, the Court rejected the argument and followed Iskanian. Although it agreed with the multitude of reported cases addressing this issue, the Court published this opinion because this was an issue of first impression for this district. View "Williams v. RGIS, LLC" on Justia Law

Caballero, who reads and writes only in Spanish, signed a two-page “RESIDENT FACILITY ARBITRATION AGREEMENT” when his mother, Maria, was admitted to Premier Care. The Arbitration Agreement is in English. Three years after signing the agreement Caballero and his siblings brought a wrongful death action against Premier Care and others. In denying Premier Care’s petition to compel arbitration, the trial court found it had failed to sufficiently inform Caballero of the Arbitration Agreement’s contents.The court of appeal reversed. A party who does not understand English sufficiently to comprehend the contents of a contract in that language is required to “have . . . it read or explained to him.” Caballero signed the Arbitration Agreement notwithstanding his limited English skills and that neither Caballero nor any family member provided evidence of the circumstances surrounding the signing. The Premier Care representative also had no specific recollection of the transaction, so there is no evidence that Caballero either requested assistance in understanding the document or was prevented from obtaining such assistance. The Arbitration Agreement complies with the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 1295 for arbitration clauses in medical service contracts and “is not a contract of adhesion, nor unconscionable nor otherwise improper.” View "Caballero v. Premier Care Simi Valley, LLC" on Justia Law

After Holdings defaulted on a loan to purchase a commercial aircraft, Banc filed suit alleging that Holdings breached the terms of the loan documents in various respects. Banc also alleged it had a right to sell the aircraft in the possession of Jet Edge as collateral for the loan and to recover money owed by Jet Edge to Holdings based on a subordination agreement. Furthermore, Banc asserted claims for breach of the aircraft usage agreement and conversion. The trial court granted Holdings and Jet Edge's petition to compel arbitration, finding that the American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules provided for delegation of the determination of whether the parties' dispute arose out of the arbitration clause and thus the arbitrator should decide whether Banc's claims were arbitrable.The Court of Appeal granted Banc's petition for writ of mandate compelling the trial court to vacate its order granting Holdings's petition to compel arbitration. The court agreed with Banc that the trial court erred in relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer and White Sales, Inc. (2019) ___ U.S. ___ [139 S.Ct. 524, 529]. The court explained that the court, in Schein, considered who should decide whether the parties' dispute arising from a specific contract with an arbitration clause was arbitrable. In this case, however, the question on Holdings's petition to compel arbitration was whether the parties agreed to arbitrate their dispute over the loan documents, which did not have arbitration clauses, a question the court must decide in the first instance. View "Banc of California, NA v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In this dispute over internet names, DotConnect appealed to ICANN's internal dispute resolution program and told the arbitrators they should grant it seven procedural advantages during the arbitration—advantages like interim relief and an independent standard of review. The arbitrators accepted DotConnect's arguments and gave DotConnect the advantages it sought, but the arbitrators did not award the .africa name to DotConnect. ICANN ultimately rejected DotConnect and awarded ZA the rights to .africa. DotConnect then filed suit against ICANN in Los Angeles Superior Court, where the trial court ruled against DotConnect on grounds of judicial estoppel.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's application of judicial estoppel and concluded that DotConnect has estopped itself from suing in court by convincing ICANN's arbitrators DotConnect could not sue in court. In this case, DotConnect took two contrary positions; DotConnect took these positions in quasi-judicial and judicial settings; DotConnect used its initial position—"we cannot sue in court"—to persuade the panel to award DotConnect seven legal victories; DotConnect's positions are totally inconsistent; DotConnect did not take its initial position as the result of fraud, ignorance, or mistake; and the trial court had an ample basis to decide, in its discretion, to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel to this case. The court rejected DotConnect's arguments to the contrary. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment in all respects and awarded costs to respondents. View "DotConnectAfrica Trust v. Internet Corporation for Assigned Names & Numbers" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, AmeriHome, in a putative class action lawsuit for unpaid overtime compensation and unlawful business practices. The superior court granted AmeriHome's motion to compel arbitration, ordered arbitration of plaintiff's individual claims, and dismissed the class claims.In light of the uncertainty of the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's appeal from the order compelling arbitration and the absence of any delay or prejudice our intervention at this stage would cause, the court found this an appropriate case in which to exercise its discretion to treat the appeal from that order as a petition for writ of mandate. The court denied the petition on the merits, concluding that Labor Code section 229 does not exempt plaintiff's wage claim from arbitration. In this case, neither the choice-of-law provision nor the arbitration agreement contains "unambiguous language" making it "unmistakably clear" that the parties intended to incorporate section 229 while agreeing to arbitrate "any dispute or controversy arising out of or relating to" plaintiff's employment at AmeriHome.The court also concluded that the superior court properly exercised its discretion under Code of Civil Procedure 1281.2 to order arbitration of plaintiff's individual claims. The court explained that the superior court reasonably concluded the conditions for invoking the third-party litigation exception did not exist because plaintiff's lawsuit did not arise out of the same transaction as the Brooks action, and there was no likelihood of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. Furthermore, even when the third-party litigation exception applies, the superior court has discretion to "order arbitration among the parties who have agreed to arbitration." Therefore, the court affirmed the order dismissing the putative class claims, dismissed the order compelling arbitration, and denied the petition for writ of mandate. View "Nixon v. AmeriHome Mortgage Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from an order denying its petition to compel arbitration of Labor Code claims pursued by former employees, who contend that their lawsuit is limited to recovering civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA).The Court of Appeal again interpreted the California Supreme Court's decision in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, to mean "that PAGA representative claims for civil penalties are not subject to arbitration" under a predispute arbitration agreement. In this case, the PAGA claims alleged in the former employees' complaint are owned by the state and are being pursued by the former employees as the state's agent or proxy. The court explained that the arbitration agreements at issue are not enforceable as to the PAGA claims because the state was not a party to, and did not ratify, any of those agreements. Furthermore, after the former employees became representatives of the state, they did not agree to arbitrate the PAGA claims. Consequently, under the rule of California law recognized in Esparza v KS Industries, L.P. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1228, 1234, and many other decisions of the Court of Appeal, the court concluded that the PAGA claims cannot be forced into arbitration based on agreements made by the former employees before they became authorized representatives of the state. Accordingly, the trial court correctly applied this rule of law.The court also concluded that defendant's argument that arbitration is compelled by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and federal preemption fails for similar reasons. The court concluded that the FAA does not reach the PAGA claims alleged in this case and, therefore, federal law does not preempt the rule of California law stating PAGA claims are subject to arbitration only if the state, or the state’s authorized representative, consents to arbitration. View "Herrera v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc." on Justia Law

Code of Civil Procedure section 1288 requires that a petition to vacate an arbitration award must be filed and served no later than 100 days after service of the award. Section 1288.2 imposes the same deadline on a response to a petition to confirm an arbitration award when the response requests that the award be vacated. These deadlines are jurisdictional.The Court of Appeal did not reach the substantive issue because it agreed with LFG that defendant did not timely request that the arbitration award be vacated. The court concluded that neither defendant's petition to vacate the arbitration award nor her request to vacate the award in her response to LFG's petition to confirm were filed within the 100-day limit. Therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant's request and the arbitration award must be confirmed. View "Law Finance Group, LLC v. Key" on Justia Law