Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Starline appealed a judgment confirming an arbitration award in a contract dispute between EHM, dba TMZ, regarding Starline's duty to defendant TMZ in a lawsuit brought by Starline's bus drivers. After TMZ filed its petition to confirm the arbitration award, the JAMS appellate panel determined that Starline owed TMZ $41,429.92 in costs. The Court of Appeal affirmed the second judgment granting TMZ's petition to confirm the cost award. The court held that Starline failed to show that the one final judgment rule precluded confirmation of the cost award, and principles of waiver and estoppel did not preclude confirmation of the cost award. View "EHM Productions, Inc. v. Starline Tours of Hollywood, Inc." on Justia Law

Starline appealed a judgment confirming an arbitration award in a contract dispute between EHM, dba TMZ, regarding Starline's duty to defendant TMZ in a lawsuit brought by Starline's bus drivers. After TMZ filed its petition to confirm the arbitration award, the JAMS appellate panel determined that Starline owed TMZ $41,429.92 in costs. The Court of Appeal affirmed the second judgment granting TMZ's petition to confirm the cost award. The court held that Starline failed to show that the one final judgment rule precluded confirmation of the cost award, and principles of waiver and estoppel did not preclude confirmation of the cost award. View "EHM Productions, Inc. v. Starline Tours of Hollywood, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order denying defendants' petition to compel arbitration of plaintiff's Ralph Act and Bane Act claims. The court held that the parties did not incorporate preempted state law into the arbitration agreement. The court also held that the Ralph Act and the Bane Act were preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act to the extent they conditioned the enforceability of arbitration agreements on compliance with special requirements not applicable to contracts generally. View "Saheli v. White Memorial Medical Center" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order denying a petition to compel arbitration as to negligence and elder abuse claims of the deceased, Antonio Avila, and the wrongful death claim brought by his son. The court held that the trial court did not err by finding that no agreement to arbitrate existed as to the son. The court found no error in the trial court's exercise of its discretion under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, subdivision (c), to refuse to enforce the arbitration agreement as to the remaining claims due to the risk of inconsistent judgments. View "Avila v. Southern California Specialty Care, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Tony Muro entered into an employment contract with defendant Cornerstone Staffing Solutions, Inc. (Cornerstone). The contract included a provision requiring that all disputes arising out of Muro's employment with Cornerstone to be resolved by arbitration. It also incorporated a class action waiver provision. In response to this case, which was styled as a proposed class action and alleged various Labor Code violations, Cornerstone moved to compel arbitration and dismiss the class claims. Relying heavily on Garrido v. Air Liquide Industrial, U.S. LP, 241 Cal.App.4th 833 (2015), the trial court concluded the contract was exempted from the operation of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA; 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq.) and was instead governed by California law. It further determined that the California Supreme Court's decision in Gentry v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.4th 443 (2007) (overruled by 59 Cal.4th 348(2014)) continued to provide the relevant framework for evaluating whether the class waiver provision in the contract was enforceable under California law. After applying Gentry to the record here, the court found the class waiver provision of the contract unenforceable and denied the motion to compel arbitration. Cornerstone appeals, but finding no error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Muro v. Cornerstone Staffing Solutions" on Justia Law

A party clearly and unmistakably consents to have an arbitrator decide his own jurisdiction when that party does not object to the arbitrator's jurisdiction in his answer to the arbitration petition, informs the arbitrator that he is voluntarily submitting to the arbitrator's jurisdiction, appears at multiple prehearing conferences, formally asks the arbitrator to impose a bond requirement on the opposing party, and only after the arbitrator denies that request tells the arbitrator that his submission to jurisdiction was conditional on obtaining that bond. The Court of Appeal held that such conduct did constitute clear and unmistakable consent to allow the arbitrator to decide the issue of plaintiff's own jurisdiction. The court also held that plaintiff's challenge to the arbitrator's jurisdiction was untimely and that his challenges to the arbitrator's assessment of his jurisdiction and to the ultimate arbitration award were without merit. View "Douglass v. Serenivision, Inc." on Justia Law

The trial court granted appellant ZB, N.A.'s (ZB) motion to arbitrate respondent Kalethia Lawson's wage and hour claim, which was brought under the provisions of the Private Attorneys General Act (the PAGA), Labor Code section 2698 et seq. The fact Lawson's PAGA claim, of necessity, included not only Labor Code violations committed with respect to her employment, but violations with respect to other employees, and that the arbitration ordered by the trial court included those violations, did not alter the fact the trial court ordered that Lawson's claim be arbitrated. The Court of Appeal held that an order granting a motion to arbitrate is not appealable, and it had no appellate jurisdiction over the trial court's order compelling arbitration. View "Lawson v. ZB, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-respondents Virgil and Glenda Jensen contended they suffered damages caused by a negligently maintained rental truck, rented by his supervisor, Charles Scannell, which blew a tire while Virgil was driving it. Defendant-appellant U-Haul Co. of California (UHCA) appealed the trial court’s denial of its motion to compel arbitration. UHCA contended plaintiffs were bound by the arbitration agreement in the rental contract, even though neither plaintiff was a party to that contract. The Court of Appeal’s review of plaintiffs’ complaint showed that plaintiffs did not rely or depend on the terms of the rental in asserting their claims, and none of their allegations were in any way founded in or bound up with the terms or obligations of that agreement. UHCA, citing to general principles and cases that it contended were analogous, argued that plaintiffs were bound to arbitrate their claims, even though they are not signatories to the agreement between Scannell and UHCA, on any of three theories: third-party beneficiary, agency, or estoppel. The Court of Appeal was not persuaded and affirmed the trial court. View "Jensen v. U-Haul Co. of California" on Justia Law

In 2015, State Farm filed suit against Watts, alleging subrogated product liability claims against Watts arising from a loss that occurred in November 2012. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of Watt's motion to compel arbitration, finding no basis for any vested right to arbitration under the circumstances of this case, where the parties have agreed to be bound by contractual terms and rules determined by a third party. In this case, the parties signed the AF arbitration agreement some years before 2012. In 2015, the AF arbitration agreement excluded product liability claims from the kinds of claims subject to compulsory arbitration under the agreement. View "State Farm General Insurance Co. v. Watts Regulator Co." on Justia Law

This case turned on whether an attorney-in-fact made a “health care decision” by admitting her principal to a residential care facility for the elderly and, in the process, agreeing to an arbitration clause. The trial court found she acted outside the scope of her authority under the power of attorney, and the arbitration clause this appeal seeks to enforce was void. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal’s review centered on the scope of two statutes, the Power of Attorney Law (Prob. Code, sec. 4000 et seq. (PAL)), and the Health Care Decisions Law (Prob. Code, sec. 4600 et seq. (HCDL)), in light of the care a residential care facility for the elderly agreed to provide, and actually provided, in this instance (Health & Saf. Code, sec. 1569 et seq.). For resolution, the Court had to parse the authority of two of the principal’s relatives, one holding a power of attorney under the PAL and one holding a power of attorney under the HCDL. The Court concluded admission of decedent to the residential care facility for the elderly in this instance was a health care decision, and the attorney-in-fact who admitted her, acting under the PAL, was not authorized to make health care decisions on behalf of the principal. As a result of this conclusion, the Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of a motion by the residential care facility to compel arbitration. Because the attorney-in-fact acting under the PAL did not have authority to make health care decisions for her principal, her execution of the admission agreement and its arbitration clause are void. View "Hutcheson v. Eskaton Fountainwood Lodge" on Justia Law