Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Unions, representing employees in five Sheriff’s Department bargaining units, entered into collective bargaining agreements with the County of Los Angeles that contained grievance procedures for resolving complaints concerning the interpretation or application of the agreements. The grievance procedures consisted of progressive steps culminating in arbitration. The Unions filed class grievances seeking overtime pay for “donning and doffing” and related activities (putting on, taking off, and maintaining their uniforms and equipment) and “off-the-clock” supervisory activities by certain employees. The county denied the grievances; the Unions filed requests for class arbitration of the grievances, which the Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission (ERCOM) granted. The County sought a declaratory judgment that ERCOM’s order granting class or consolidated arbitration violated the parties’ agreements. The trial court refused to compel such arbitrations, ruling that Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 gave it discretion, in the interest of judicial economy, to stay the arbitration while it resolved issues between the parties that were not subject to arbitration, which resolution might make arbitrations unnecessary. The court of appeal reversed, holding that all of the issues between the parties were subject to individual arbitrations. View "Ass'n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Cnty. of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former employees of Pacific Bell, took early retirement, with the option to take a pension or a lump sum payment. All chose the lump sum, persuaded to do so by Kearney, with whom each plaintiff had significant interaction, having first learned of her from presentations made at the Pacific Bell premises. All became clients of Kearney, in connection with which they signed some documents, by which Kearney came to manage and invest their retirement proceeds, in some cases for years. Dissatisfied, plaintiffs sued Kearney and AIG Financial Advisors, the successor to the company where Kearney originally worked. AIGFA filed a petition to compel arbitration, supported in part by a declaration of Kearney. Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the petition. That arbitration occurred, with the arbitrators ultimately issuing an award rejecting plaintiffs’ claims. After judgment was entered on the award, plaintiffs appealed. The court of appeal reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. View "Ashburn v. AIG Fin. Advisors, Inc." on Justia Law

Before it was acquired by DirecTV, 180 Connect entered into an employment arbitration agreement with Marenco, which prohibited filing a class or collective action, or a representative or private attorney general action. After acquiring 180 Connect, DirecTV retained employees, including Marenco. Marenco later filed suit, alleging that DirecTV had issued debit cards in payment of wages to a putative class of employees. Plaintiffs who used their cards to withdraw cash at ATM machines were required to pay an activation fee and a cash withdrawal fee, resulting in DirecTV’s failure to pay plaintiffs’ full wages in violation of the Unfair Competition Law and Labor Code 212. DirecTV moved to compel arbitration of Marenco’s individual claims, and stay the class claims. Marenco argued that DirecTV lacked standing to enforce the agreement and that the agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable under California law. The U.S. Supreme Court then issued its 2011 decision, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts the California rule of unconscionability. The trial court ordered arbitration of Marenco’s individual claims, holding that DirecTV had standing; the class action waiver is not unconscionable; and prohibition of representative actions does not violate the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 157). The court of appeal affirmed. View "Marenco v. DirecTV, LLC" on Justia Law

Ironwood Country Club appealed an order that denied its motion to compel arbitration of the declaratory relief action brought by plaintiffs William S. Cobb, Jr., and Elizabeth Richards, who were former members of Ironwood, and Patrick J. Keeley and Helen Riedstra, who were then-current members. The motion to compel was based on an arbitration provision Ironwood incorporated into its bylaws four months after plaintiffs' complaint was filed. In 1999, the Club entered into an agreement with each of its 588 members, whereby each member loaned the club $25,500 to fund the Club's purchase of additional land. The members were given the option of paying the funds in a lump sum or by making payments over a period of 20 years into a "Land Purchase Account." In connection with the loans, the Club represented that if any member sold his or her membership before the loan was repaid, the Club would be "absolutely obligated to pay the Selling Member the entire amount then standing in the Member's Land Purchase Account." Moreover, any new member would be required to pay, in addition to the regular initiation fee, an amount equal to the hypothetical balance in a Land Purchase Account, as well as the "remaining unamortized portion of the Land Purchase Assessment." In reliance on the Club's representations, the members voted to approve the land purchase and enter into the loan agreements. Three of the plaintiffs paid the lump sum, and one plaintiff elected to make monthly payments into a Land Purchase Account. In April 2012, Ironwood represented that it had repaid the $25,500 Land Purchase Assessment to 10 resigned members whose memberships were subsequently purchased by new members, since 2003. However, plaintiffs alleged that despite the Club's initial description of how the funds would be generated to reimburse resigning members, it "inexplicably failed" to require new members to pay the equivalent of the Land Purchase Assessment when they joined. The trial court held that Ironwood's subsequent amendment of its bylaws was insufficient to demonstrate that any of these plaintiffs agreed to arbitrate this dispute, and that if Ironwood's basic premise were accepted, it would render the agreement illusory. Ironwood argued: (1) that its new arbitration provision was fully applicable to this previously filed lawsuit because the lawsuit concerned a dispute which was "ongoing" between the parties; and (2) that its right to amend its bylaws meant that any such amendment would be binding on both current and former members. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court's conclusions, and affirmed the order. View "Cobb v. Ironwood Country Club" on Justia Law

When Cruise applied for employment with Kroger in 2007, she completed an employment application, which contained a clause requiring arbitration of employment-related disputes and incorporating by reference Kroger’s Mediation & Binding Arbitration Policy. When Cruise sued, alleging employment discrimination, thel court denied Kroger’s motion to compel arbitration, ruling that Kroger failed to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement. The court was not persuaded the undated four-page arbitration policy attached to Kroger’s moving papers was extant at the time Cruise read and signed the employment application, and that it was the same Arbitration Policy to which the employment application referred. The court of appeal reversed. The arbitration clause in the employment application, standing alone, was sufficient to establish the parties agreed to arbitrate their employment-related disputes, and that Cruise’s claims against Kroger fall within the ambit of the arbitration agreement. The only impact of Kroger’s inability to establish the contents of the 2007 Arbitration Policy is that Kroger failed to establish the parties agreed to govern their arbitration by procedures different from those prescribed in the California Arbitration Act, so the arbitration will be governed by the CAA, rather than by the procedures set forth in the Arbitration Policy. View "Cruise v. Kroger Co." on Justia Law

Montano filed a putative class action against Wet Seal, alleging that it failed to offer all required meal and rest periods to its California non-exempt retail employees; failed to provide all regular and overtime pay when due or when employment terminated; and failed to provide accurate semi-monthly itemized wage statements, in violation of the Labor and Business and Professions Codes, Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order No. 7, and Title 8 of the California Code of Regulations. She included a representative claim under the Private Attorneys General Act. Montano propounded discovery requests and Wet Seal responded with objections but no substantive information. Montano moved to compel discovery responses. Before the hearing, Wet Seal moved to compel arbitration of Montano’s individual claims and to stay the action pending completion of arbitration, based on a “Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims." The trial court ultimately denied the motion for arbitration and granted the discovery motion. The court of appeal affirmed. View "Montano v. Wet Seal Retail, Inc." on Justia Law

Bower was hired by Inter-Con in 2007 and executed an arbitration agreement, covering claims for compensation and wages. In 2008, Bower executed a second arbitration agreement that added clauses prohibiting claims on behalf of a class or in a representative capacity and covering claims for breaks and rest periods. After his 2011 termination, Bower filed a putative class action, claiming failure to: provide meal and rest periods, pay wages, provide accurate itemized wage statements, pay wages upon termination, with claims under the Unfair Competition Act and the Private Attorneys General Act. Instead of moving to compel arbitration, Inter-Con answered, asserting, as an affirmative defense, that Bower’s claims were subject to arbitration. Inter-Con responded to discovery, but objected based on the arbitration agreement, and agreed to provide responses only to Bower in his individual capacity. Inter-Con did respond to an interrogatory concerning the number of class members employed during the class period and propounded its own discovery. Bower moved for leave to file an amended complaint to allege a broader class and additional theories and to compel further discovery responses. Inter-Con then moved to compel arbitration. The court held that “Defendant waived the right to arbitrate by propounding and responding to class discovery.” The court of appeal affirmed. View "Bower v. Inter-Con Sec. Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants in this action. But the complaint explicitly acknowledged it was “ancillary to” contemplated private arbitration of disputes arising out of the parties’ contractual relationship. The trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and the parties stipulated to stay the action “pending arbitration.” Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed this action (purportedly without prejudice) after the claims were submitted to an arbitrator for final resolution and the arbitrator had issued an interim award in favor of defendants. The interim arbitral award was made final without substantive revision, except for adding plaintiff’s attorney fees and costs incurred in the arbitration. The trial court denied defendants’ motion to vacate the dismissal, reasoning that the arbitration and this case were separate proceedings and that plaintiffs had dismissed this action before trial commenced. After its review, the Court of Appeal disagreed with this reasoning and reversed: this lawsuit was based on the same causes of action submitted to the arbitrator; it differed only in the remedies sought. Once the hearing on the merits of the parties’ dispute commenced at the arbitration, it was too late for plaintiffs to dismiss this action without prejudice and thereby avoid an attempt by defendants to recover attorney fees as the prevailing party in this action. View "Mesa Shopping Center-East v. O Hill" on Justia Law

Gilda filed for dissolution of marriage. She and former husband, Murray, agreed to resolve property and support issues through mediation, during which they purportedly exchanged financial disclosure declarations mandated by the Family Code. They executed a marital settlement agreement, which was incorporated into a stipulated judgment. Shortly after entry of judgment, Gilda learned that Murray recently sold a company he founded during the marriage. In the settlement agreement, Gilda relinquished her community share of the company for $10 million. Murray received approximately $75 million from the sale. Gilda sought to set aside the judgment on grounds of fraud and duress and served discovery on Murray requesting the financial disclosure declarations that were exchanged prior to entry of judgment. Murray refused to produce the declarations, asserting they were covered by the mediation confidentiality statutes, insofar as they constituted writings that were prepared for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, mediation. (Evid. Code, 1119(b).) The trial court a motion to compel on mediation confidentiality grounds. The court of appeal vacated, noting the Family Code’s stated public policy to promote “full and accurate disclosure of all assets and liabilities” in dissolution proceedings View "Lappe v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-respondent Sharon McGill sued defendant-appellant Citibank, N.A. for unfair competition and false advertising in offering a credit insurance plan she purchased to protect her Citibank credit card account. She brought claims under California’s unfair competition law (UCL), false advertising law (FAL), and Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), seeking monetary damages, restitution, and injunctive relief to prevent Citibank from engaging in its allegedly unlawful and deceptive business practices. Citibank petitioned to compel McGill to arbitrate her claims based on an arbitration provision in her account agreement. The trial court granted the petition on McGill’s claims for monetary damages and restitution, but denied the petition on the injunctive relief claims. Citibank appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the case for the trial court to order all of McGill’s claims to arbitration. View "McGill v. Citibank" on Justia Law