Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Chois consulted in 2003 with defendants, who advised the Chois that an IRC 412(i) Plan retirement account would provide tax advantages, asset protection, and steady income. It required several steps including the purchase of “whole life” insurance for eventual exchange for American General Universal Life “Platinum” policies. The initial purchase was $1,275,000; a second purchase cost $439,000. The policies comprised 70-75 percent of the Plan portfolio. The IRS audited the Chois in 2006. Defendants changed their advice. Plaintiffs sued, alleging cash losses attributable to loss in value and that they were required to pay $440,000 in back taxes and interest, plus $60,000 in penalties, and faced future payments to the Franchise Tax Board of California and anticipated IRS penalties of $600,000. Defendants cross-complained for indemnity and comparative fault against American General. The trial court found the claims time-barred. The court of appeal affirmed, upholding a determination that the limitations period began to run in September 2007, when plaintiffs were “on notice” that the IRS would impose penalties, not in 2010 when penalties were assessed; the court declining to consider any tolling effect created by the ongoing fiduciary relationship; and application of the 2007 “notice” date as a bar to all claims. View "Choi v. Sagemark Consulting" on Justia Law

Property owners who purchased through a foreclosure sale sued the bank that sold the house, alleging that they were mislead the bank’s deed of trust was the first deed of trust, when another remained on the property, and was not extinguished by the foreclosure sale. Wells Fargo assigned any claim against the title insurer it had to David and Lina Hovannisian (the property owners), and the Hovannisians sued First American Title Insurance Company, alleging breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. First American moved for summary judgment, arguing its title insurance coverage had terminated, and no benefits were due. The motion was granted, and the Hovannisians appealed, arguing First American failed to establish that coverage did not continue under the title policy or there were no benefits due under the policy. They also contended triable issues of fact existed regarding their bad faith claim. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding First American showed, based on the facts Wells Fargo and the Hovannisians presented before and after the underlying action was filed, that there was no potential for coverage under the policy. The Hovannisians did not learn about the first deed of trust until after they purchased the property at the foreclosure sale without warranty. Thus, the only potential claim they had against Wells Fargo was for the alleged misrepresentations for which there was no liability or loss under the policy. View "Hovannisian v. First American Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2005, Nicholas and Mary Conroy refinanced their home with a mortgage loan secured by a deed of trust on the property. Five years later, the Conroys stopped making payments and defaulted on their loan. In an effort to avoid foreclosure, the Conroys filed suit against defendants Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., successor by merger to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc.; Fidelity National Title Insurance Company aka Default Resolution Network, LLC; and HSBC Bank USA, N.A. as trustee for Merrill Lynch Mortgage Backed Securities Trust, Series 2007-2 (Wells Fargo). The trial court sustained Wells Fargo’s demurrer without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal. On appeal, the Conroys contended the trial court erroneously dismissed their claims. After review, the Court of Appeal found the Conroys’ operative complaint did not state valid causes of action for intentional or negligent misrepresentation because they did not properly plead actual reliance or damages proximately caused by Wells Fargo. The trial court properly determined the Conroys could not assert a tort claim for negligence arising out of a contract with Well Fargo. For lack of detrimental reliance on any of Wells Fargo’s alleged promises, the Conroys did not set forth a viable cause of action for promissory estoppel even under a liberal construction of the operative complaint. Because Wells Fargo considered and rejected a loan modification for the Conroys before that date, section 2923.6 does not apply to them. The plain language of section 2923.7 requires a borrower to expressly request a single point of contact with the loan servicer. The Conroys’ operative complaint did not allege they ever requested a single point of contact, and the Conroys did not state they could amend their cause of action to allege they actually requested one. The trial court properly dismissed the Conroys’ Unfair Competition Law claim because it was merely derivative of other causes of action that were properly dismissed. View "Conroy v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

A trustee's acts in recording a notice of default, a notice of sale, and a trustee's deed upon sale in the course of a nonjudicial foreclosure are privileged under Civil Code section 47. The Court of Appeal held that plaintiff did not state a cause of action for slander of title based on the recording of those documents. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's order sustaining a demurrer to plaintiff's slander of title claim without leave to amend. View "Schep v. Capital One" on Justia Law

From 1999-2010, Wilcox made loans to Hardwick. In 2013, Hardwick filed suit to recover usurious interest and prevent Wilcox from foreclosing on the property securing his loans. Wilcox countersued for breach of contract and judicial foreclosure. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Hardwick, finding that usurious interest payments made over the course of the relationship offset the principal debt and that Hardwick could recover $227,235.83 in interest payments he made during the two years before the filing of the lawsuit. Under California law, when a loan is usurious, the creditor is entitled to repayment of the principal sum only. He is entitled to no interest whatsoever. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Wilcox’s arguments that, in a forbearance agreement, Hardwick waived his usury claim with respect to any loan payment he made before April 2012 and that the statute of limitations barred Hardwick’s claim with respect to any loan that was paid off more than two years before the lawsuit was filed.The court reasoned that the payments made before the two-year limitations period were applied to offset principal, so only the later payments were subject to recovery. View "Hardwick v. Wilcox" on Justia Law

When defendant HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (HSBC) notified plaintiff Stanley P. Berman in writing that HSBC was denying his application for a loan modification, HSBC told him he had 15 days to appeal the denial. Under the law, however, Berman actually had 30 days to appeal. Berman brought this action for injunctive relief under Civil Code section 2924.12 on the theory that “the denial letter . . . [wa]s a material violation of sub[division] (d) [of section 2923.6] in that [the letter] only provide[d] fifteen days for appeal.” The trial court sustained HSBC’s demurrer to Berman’s complaint without leave to amend based on the conclusion that Berman had not alleged a violation of section 2923.6. On Berman’s appeal, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred: the denial letter constituted a material violation of section 2923.6 because it substantially misstated the time Berman was allowed by the law to appeal HSBC’s denial of his application for a loan modification. Moreover, the Court found no merit in any of HSBC’s alternate arguments for affirming the trial court. View "Berman v. HSBC Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Bank, alleging violations of the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq., and California's unfair competition law (UCL), Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200 et seq., fraudulent omission/concealment, and injunctive relief. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The trial court applied the doctrines of res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) based on plaintiff's prior unsuccessful lawsuit against the Bank for breach of contract. The court concluded that the Bank's demurrer was properly sustained without leave to amend where the TILA claim was not subject to claim preclusion or issue preclusion, but was time-barred; plaintiff adequately alleged injury in fact and had standing to pursue a UCL claim, but the UCL claim was time-barred; the fraudulent omission/concealment claim was likewise time-barred; plaintiff's request for injunctive relief necessarily failed as well; and the Bank's demurrer was properly sustained without leave to amend. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ivanoff v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

This case stems from the simultaneous refinancing of a home equity line of credit by two different lenders in 2006, which resulted in a dispute over the priority of their recorded deeds of trust. On appeal, Bank of New York Melon challenged the dismissal of its suit against Citibank. The court reversed the judgment sustaining Citibank's demurrers to Bank of New York Melon's first and second amended complaints, that alleged all of Bank of New York Melon's causes of action were barred by the three-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 338. The court concluded, however, that Bank of New York Melon has stated a claim for equitable subrogation, which is not subject to the statute. The court considered all other theories in the first and second amended complaint to be variations of that cause of action, rather than independent causes of action, as they assert no independent right for which relief may be granted under California law. The court explained that the claim for equitable subrogation is not subject to the statute and is not time-barred. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded. View "Bank of New York Mellon v. Citibank" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Andrew and Kathi Kalnoki (the Kalnokis) appealed a judgment dismissing their second amended complaint for wrongful foreclosure-related causes of action after the trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrers without leave to amend (case No. C073207, the foreclosure appeal). They separately appealed an order after judgment awarding attorney fees to defendants (case No. C075062, the attorney fees appeal), and an order disbursing funds the Kalnokis deposited with the court under Code of Civil Procedure section 1170.5 to delay the trial in an unlawful detainer action filed against them regarding the residential property at issue here (case No. C079144, the rental disbursement appeal). The Court of Appeal consolidated all three appellate cases for argument and decision. Finding that the Kalnokis failed to allege a cause of action on any theory, the Court affirmed the judgments dismissing the second amended complaint with prejudice. The Court also concluded the trial court properly awarded attorney fees. The Court found, however, that the court erred in disbursing to Wells Fargo the rental funds on deposit with the court. The Court therefore reversed the rental disbursement order and order that the funds be returned to the Kalnokis. View "Kalnoki v. First American" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a series of lawsuits challenging Chase's efforts to foreclose upon his real property. In this appeal, plaintiff challenges a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained the demurrer of Chase. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for violation of the Homeowners Bill of Rights, lack of standing to foreclose, illegal substitution of trustee, and fraud. The court also concluded that the trial court properly considered the declaration of Chase's counsel, among other things, before denying plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. Finally, the court explained that principles of res judicata are fatal to the present lawsuit and theoretical future lawsuits seeking to vindicate the same primary right. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gillies v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law