Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A construction company paid its employee only for the hours he worked at a jobsite. But rather than driving his vehicle directly from his home to the jobsite, the company expected the employee to first commute to the company’s “yard,” then drive a company truck from the yard to the jobsite, transporting coworkers and materials. One day, while driving from his home to the yard, the employee collided with a motorcyclist, who sued the construction company. The trial court granted the defendant-company summary judgment, finding that the employee was commuting to his “work,” and therefore he was not acting within the scope of his employment. However, the Court of Appeal found a material, triable issue: the location of the “workplace.” If the yard was the employee’s “workplace,” then he apparently was on an ordinary commute and he was not acting within the scope of his employment. In this lawsuit, defendant inferred from the undisputed facts that its yard was the employee’s “workplace,” even though it paid its employee only from the time he arrived at the jobsite. But if the employee’s jobsite was his “workplace,” as plaintiff inferred, then the employee was arguably on a business errand to the yard for the employer’s benefit, and that business errand would have started when the employee left his home. The Court could not state as a matter of law that the employee was not on a business errand while commuting from his home to the employer’s yard. Thus, it reversed the trial court’s granting of defendant’s summary judgment motion. View "Sumrall v. Modern Alloys, Inc." on Justia Law

After Thomas, a member of the Board of Directors of Applied Medical Corporation, was removed from the Board in January 2012, Applied exercised its right to repurchase shares of its stock issued to Thomas as part of stock incentive plans. Thomas objected to the repurchase price, and in August 2012 Applied filed suit. In June, 2015, the trial court granted summary judgment against Applied. The court of appeal affirmed as to Applied’s fraud-based claims, but reversed as to Applied’s claims based on breach of contract and conversion. A conversion claim may be based on either ownership or the right to possession at the time of conversion. Applied’s fraud claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations; the court rejected Applied’s argument that those claims, first alleged in 2014, were timely under either the discovery rule or the relation back doctrine. View "Applied Medical Corp. v. Thomas" on Justia Law

In 2007 a fire spread from defendant Lambirth Trucking Company’s storage site to plaintiff Vincent Scholes’ property. Scholes’ sued alleging negligent trespass, intentional trespass, and strict liability against Lambirth. Lambirth demurred to the third amended complaint, arguing it was barred by the statute of limitations and failed to state a viable claim for intentional trespass or strict liability. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Proceeding in pro per, Scholes appealed, arguing the trial court erred in finding his claims barred by the statute of limitations and by failing to grant Scholes leave to amend. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "Scholes v. Lambirth Trucking Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the president and CEO of American Apparel, filed suit against Standard General, alleging several causes of action stemming from his claim that Standard General's press release, regarding investigations into allegations against plaintiff, contained false and defamatory information about him. The trial court granted Standard General's anti-SLAPP motion, Code Civ. Proc., 425.16. The court held that plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden of showing there was a minimal chance his claims would succeed at trial. In this case, the court rejected plaintiff's claim that the press release falsely stated he was investigated by an independent third party because such a claim did not allege a falsehood about plaintiff himself. Furthermore, because the press release did not articulate why plaintiff was terminated, plaintiff's allegation that it falsely stated he was terminated for "cause" did not constitute an actionable defamation. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's order. View "Charney v. Standard General, LP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a member of the HOA, requested inspection of the HOA's membership list and other records. After the HOA largely denied the request, plaintiff filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking to compel the HOA to allow him to inspect and copy the requested records. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that plaintiff sought the information for an improper purpose; and the HOA's challenge to disclosing the membership list was not barred by statute. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's judgment requiring disclosure of the membership list, and otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "Tract No. 7260 Assn. v. Parker" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Muhammad Iqbal appealed the grant of summary judgment entered against his complaint for personal injuries. In 2011, plaintiff sued Yosemite Auto Sales, Inc. (Yosemite Auto), its owner Eyad Kaid, and Alla Abuziadeh, individually and doing business as Jimmy’s Tow (collectively, the former defendants), for personal injuries. He alleged Yosemite Auto retained him to determine why a vehicle it owned would not start. Unknown to plaintiff, Abuziadeh earlier towed the vehicle to Yosemite Auto and disconnected the transmission shift linkage to do so. He allegedly did not reconnect the shift linkage after towing the car. The trial court ruled the complaint was barred by a general release plaintiff had previously executed that immunized “affiliates” of the defendants in the former case, and defendant Imran Ziadeh was such an affiliate. The Court of Appeal concluded as a matter of law defendant was not a protected “affiliate,” as that term was commonly understood, and reversed. View "Iqbal v. Ziadeh" on Justia Law

Richard Sheley (decedent) formed and operated a corporation, George's Pest Control, Inc. Cross-complainant/respondent Nancy Sheley, the decedent's wife at the time of his death, owned a 25 percent share in the corporation. After the decedent's death in 2011, cross-defendants/appellants Linda Harrop and Valerie Richard, decedent's daughters from a prior marriage, owned a 75 percent share in the corporation. After appellants assumed control, the corporation commenced an action against respondent. An amended complaint added appellants as plaintiffs. Respondent filed a cross-complaint against appellants. Appellants filed an anti-SLAPP special motion to strike the cross-complaint. The trial court granted the motion as to respondent's fourth cause of action, sounding in intentional infliction of emotional distress, but otherwise denied the motion. On appeal, appellants argued that the trial court erred in denying their special motion to strike the first, second, and third causes of action in respondent's cross-complaint because the alleged conduct arose out of their constitutional right to petition, and respondent could not establish a probability of prevailing on the merits. Alternatively, appellants contended the trial court should have granted their motion as to the specific allegations involving protected activity in the first, second, and third causes of action. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that some of respondent's allegations in the remaining three causes of action arose out of protected activity. Furthermore, the Court concluded that, as to those particular allegations which were based on protected activity, respondent failed to establish that the claims were legally sufficient and factually substantiated. Therefore, the Court modified the trial court's order by granting appellants' motion to strike the specific claims founded on allegations of protected activity in each remaining cause of action in the cross-complaint. View "Sheley v. Harrop" on Justia Law

Stephen Kaplan appeals from a judgment confirming a $30 million arbitration award against him. This matter arose when several investors (plaintiffs1) sued Kaplan and a limited liability company (referred to as Houston LLC2) alleging defendants breached fiduciary duties pertaining to plaintiffs' investment in a self-storage facility located in Texas. Plaintiffs sought compensatory damages and declaratory relief, but did not seek punitive damages. After the court granted defendants' unopposed motion to compel the matter to private arbitration, the arbitration hearing was stayed while Kaplan was criminally prosecuted for his conduct in soliciting and handling investments in self-storage facilities, including the property at issue in plaintiffs' lawsuit. After Kaplan pled guilty to a wire fraud charge in the criminal action but before his sentencing hearing, a telephonic arbitration hearing was scheduled. The arbitrator awarded plaintiffs $30,835,152.57 without specifying the grounds or nature of the award. Kaplan then requested that the arbitrator vacate or modify the award, but the assigned arbitrator recused himself from all further arbitration proceedings and the arbitration administrator declined to reassign the case. Although the award did not specify the nature of the damages, the parties agreed a substantial portion of the award consists of punitive damages. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the judgment had to be reversed: the arbitrator exceeded his authority by awarding punitive damages without adequate prior notice to Kaplan, in violation of the parties' arbitration agreement and fundamental procedural fairness principles. View "Emerald Aero, LLC v. Kaplan" on Justia Law

In the seventh appeal arising from a 20-year multi-phase litigation, the issue presented for the Court of Appeal’s review centered on whether the trial court had authority to award approximately $281,000 in receivership fees to one of the prevailing parties under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (c). The trial court denied the cost request on the grounds the matter was previously decided when the court terminated the receivership and approved the receiver’s final accounting. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court retained authority to exercise its discretion and consider whether the receivership fee should be paid by one party or shared between the parties. Therefore, the Court reversed the order granting the motion to tax costs and remanded the matter to permit the court to exercise its discretion on this limited issue. In all other respects, the trial court’s postjudgment order was affirmed. View "Southern Cal. Sunbelt v. Banyan, Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging nine causes of action as to seven limited partnership transactions. The gravamen of the suit was that a private placement memoranda’s description of a real estate commission to be paid by the seller of the property at closing was false. Defendants filed or joined motions for a general reference, and the trial court granted the motions, appointing a referee. The referee found all causes of action barred by the governing statutes of limitations because, when plaintiff received and reviewed the private placement memoranda, he was either aware or, as a reasonable person, should have conducted the due diligence required to inform himself that the purchase price recited in the private placement memoranda had been increased over that for which the property otherwise could have been purchased to facilitate payment of the fee labeled "real estate commission." The trial court then granted defendants' motion for entry of judgment. The court concluded that the private placement memoranda attached as exhibits to plaintiff's first amended complaint, rather than the conclusory allegations in the pleading itself, establish that plaintiff had inquiry notice, if not actual notice, of the alleged wrongdoing at the time the transactions closed. Therefore, all of plaintiff's causes of action are time-barred, the delayed discovery rule does not apply, and the demurrers of all defendants were properly sustained without leave to amend. The court also concluded that any error in ordering a general reference was harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Stella v. Asset Management Consultants" on Justia Law