Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case arose out of the purchase of a used 2007 BMW vehicle by plaintiff-appellant Michael Tun from defendant-respondent Plus West LA Corporation, dba CA Beemers (CA Beemers). Defendant-appellant Wells Fargo Dealer Services, Inc., an incorporated division of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (collectively Wells Fargo), subsequently accepted assignment of Tun's retail installment sales contract (RISC) under an agreement with CA Beemers and/or defendant and respondent West LA Corporation, dba California Beemers (California Beemers) (sometimes collectively dealer). Tun listed 11 causes of action in a third amended complaint, all based primarily on his contention that dealer knowingly and intentionally failed to disclose that the vehicle had suffered "frame/unibody damage" from a prior collision, which damage Tun further alleged "existed at the time it was sold" to him and which "substantially decreased the value of the vehicle." Tun alleged he first learned the vehicle had been in a prior collision when he took it to a mechanic near his home, after he experienced problems while driving the vehicle. After a multi-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the dealer, finding dealer had not committed fraud, breached its contract with Tun or otherwise engaged in conduct that violated the Consumers Legal Remedies Act. The jury also found that Wells Fargo was not derivatively liable as holder of the RISC. Following the verdicts, the trial court granted Tun's new trial motion only as to Wells Fargo, despite the fact Wells Fargo was only liable to the extent, if at all, dealer was liable. In granting the motion, the trial court determined it had erred in ruling pretrial that Tun could not comment to the jury regarding Wells Fargo's tender under section 2983.4—a statute awarding a party prevailing under the Automobile Sales Financing Act (hereafter ASFA) reasonable attorney fees and costs—of the amount Tun had paid under the RISC ($15,700). Wells Fargo appealed, arguing that the court had correctly ruled in limine that Tun could not comment on Wells Fargo's tender under section 2983.4 because that tender could not be treated as a judicial admission of liability; that the tender was irrelevant to the issues decided by the jury, which focused on the conduct of dealer in connection with the sale of the vehicle; that, even assuming error, Tun could not establish prejudice; and that the new trial order was improper because there were no issues left to try, inasmuch as Wells Fargo's liability, if any, was derivative of dealer's, and dealer was exonerated. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded the trial court erred in granting Tun a new trial against Wells Fargo because the Court concluded the court's pretrial ruling precluding comment on the Wells Fargo tender was not legal error. The Court rejected Tun's cross-appeal. View "Tun v. Wells Fargo Dealer Services" on Justia Law

The California Integrated Waste Management Act obligated local agencies to enact comprehensive waste management plans that would eventually divert half of their trash from landfills, Pub. Res. Code, 41780(a)(1), (2), and authorized local governments to issue franchises and licenses to private entities to provide services relating to the collection, transport, handling and disposal of solid waste. Plaintiff hauls waste under franchise agreements with cities in Sonoma County. Defendant, a waste management consultant, prepared a report for one of plaintiff’s competitors that questioned the accuracy of statements in plaintiff’s public reports about the percentages of the waste materials it collected that were recycled and thereby diverted from landfills. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged defendants’ report was false and defamatory and injured plaintiff’s business. Defendant filed an “anti-SLAPP” motion to dismiss. The trial court held defendants met their burden of showing plaintiff’s claims involve speech concerning a matter of public interest and are covered by the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure 425.16 -425.18.4, but denied defendants’ motion finding that plaintiff demonstrated a probability of success on the merits. The court of appeal reversed, plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of falsity regarding defendants’ estimated diversion rates. View "Industrial Waste & Debris Box Service v. Murphy" on Justia Law

Nearly ten years ago, U-Haul Co. of California (UHC) sued Robinson, one of UHC’s independent dealers, for breach of contract and unfair competition after he terminated their contract and began renting Budget trucks from the former UHC dealership. UHC alleged a covenant not to compete in its dealer contract prohibited Robinson from offering the products of UHC’s competitors while a Yellow Pages ad, running at UHC’s expense, was still promoting Robinson’s business. Robinson sought a judicial declaration that the covenant was void due to fraud in the inducement. After UHC lost its request for a preliminary injunction and dismissed its complaint, Robinson filed a separate action alleging malicious prosecution by UHC in the prior lawsuit and violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200, the unfair competition law (UCL). A jury awarded Robinson $195,000 in compensatory damages for malicious prosecution. The trial court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting U-Haul from initiating or threatening judicial proceedings to enforce the noncompetition covenant. It awarded Robinson $800,000 in attorney’s fees as a private attorney general on his UCL cause of action. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the injunction was proper and the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Robinson to file a late motion for attorney’s fees. View "Robinson v. U-Haul Co. of Cal." on Justia Law

Defendants Eric Schrier, Frank Frederick, and Angela Martinez had been employed in various capacities by plaintiff SG Homecare, Inc. before abruptly leaving to start a competing firm, defendant Verio Healthcare, Inc. SG Homecare filed the underlying complaint, alleging the individual defendants breached their contractual and fiduciary duties, and misappropriated trade secrets. Schrier and his wife cross-complained against SG Homecare and its owner, Thomas Randall Rowley (together, the “SG parties”), alleging wrongful termination and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant Verio Healthcare and the individual defendants were represented by Donald Wagner of the firm Buchalter Nemer, PLC. Shortly after the cross-complaint was filed, the SG Parties moved to disqualify Buchalter Nemer. The motion was based on an assertion that shortly before the individual defendants’ departure from SG Homecare, Buchalter Nemer executed a retainer agreement with SG Homecare and was either currently representing SG Homecare, or, alternatively, the present litigation was substantially related to Buchalter Nemer’s prior representation of SG Homecare (requiring disqualification in either event). Adding to mix: Wagner, as a member of the California State Assembly, relied on statutory entitlement to a continuance and extension of time of the entire litigation. The trial court denied the motion for a stay without explanation. Defendants petitioned the Court of Appeals court for a writ of mandate to order the trial court to grant the stay. The Appeals court summarily denied the petition, but the California Supreme Court granted review and remanded back to the Appeals court with instructions to issue an order to show cause. The Court of Appeals issued that order and denied the writ, namely because it found that the trial court acted within its discretion in its finding that the stay would "defeat or abridge the other party's" right to relief. View "Verio Healthcare v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

SCOPE filed suit alleging that the trial court erred in denying its writ of mandate claim because the Agency’s acquisition of Valencia Water Company is unlawful. The court concluded that the court does not have to dismiss the appeal as untimely under the streamlined procedures available for validating certain acts of public agencies, Code Civ. Proc., 860 et seq., because the validation procedures invoke a court’s in rem jurisdiction, and that subject matter jurisdiction attaches only if there is a statutory basis for invoking those procedures and proper notice. Because that basis is absent here and because estoppel does not apply to subject matter jurisdiction, the validation procedures’ accelerated timeline for appeal is inapplicable. The court also concluded that there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s factual finding that the purveyor did not become the agency’s alter ego in this case. The agency did not violate article XVI, section 17 of the California Constitution for two reasons - namely, the provision reaches only stock acquisitions that extend credit and the provision’s exception for stock ownership applies to any “mutual water company” and any other “corporation” (whether or not it is a mutual water company). Thus, the fact that the corporate purveyor in this case was not a mutual water company is of no significance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Santa Clarita Org. v. Castaic Lake Water Agency" on Justia Law

In 2003, several class action lawsuits were filed against automobile manufacturers and trade associations, alleging antitrust conspiracy, Bus. & Prof. Code, 167201, and unfair business practices, Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200, on behalf of individuals who purchased or leased new vehicles in California within a certain time period. The lawsuits, which were eventually coordinated, alleged conspiracy to restrict the movement of lower-priced Canadian vehicles into the U.S. market, to avoid downward pressure on U.S. new vehicle prices. After years of litigation, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the two remaining defendants, Ford U.S. and Ford Canada, concluding that there was not sufficient evidence of an actual agreement among Ford and the other manufacturers to restrict the export of new vehicles from Canada to the U.S. The court of appeal affirmed with respect to Ford U.S., but concluded that the admissible evidence was sufficient to demonstrate a material factual issue as to whether Ford Canada participated in an illegal agreement to restrict the export of automobiles. The court noted an expert economic analysis indicating that the manufacturers would not have continued to restrict exports during the alleged conspiracy period absent an agreement that none of them would break ranks and reap the profits available in the export market; parallel conduct by the manufactures during the same period; and deposition testimony. View "In re: Auto. Antitrust Cases I and II" on Justia Law

The Medical Marijuana Regulation and Taxation Ordinance (Proposition D), L.A. Mun. Code, 45.19.6 et seq., bans medical marijuana businesses, but grants certain qualifying businesses a limited immunity from enforcement of the ordinance. Immune medical marijuana businesses may continue their operations if they comply with the numerous restrictions enumerated in Proposition D. Plaintiff filed suit against Progressive, a medical marijuana business, to abate a public nuisance, for injunctive relief, and for civil penalties, based on defendants’ violation of Proposition D, and sought a preliminary injunction barring defendants from operating their medical marijuana business. The trial court granted the preliminary injunction, finding that defendants had not complied with Proposition D’s LiveScan requirement. The trial court later denied defendants’ motion to dissolve the injunction, after defendants attempted to demonstrate that they had “cured” their violation of Proposition D’s LiveScan requirement. The court held that Proposition D does not allow a medical marijuana business which fails to comply with the ordinance to have limited immunity under the ordinance. Accordingly, because Progressive is such a business, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People ex rel. Feuer v. Progressive Horizon" on Justia Law

The Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) appealed a judgment entered in favor of Erna Parth, in connection with actions she took while simultaneously serving as president of the Association and on its Board of Directors (Board). The court granted Parth's motion for summary judgment as to the Association's claim for breach of fiduciary duty on the basis of the business judgment rule and an exculpatory provision contained in the Association's Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The court had previously sustained Parth's demurrer to the Association's claim for breach of governing documents without leave to amend, finding that the Association failed to allege a cognizable breach. On appeal, the Association argued that the trial court erred in its application of the business judgment rule and that there remained material issues of fact in dispute regarding whether Parth exercised reasonable diligence. After review of the matter, the Court of Appeal agreed that the record contained triable issues of fact that should not have been resolved on summary judgment. Therefore the Court reversed the judgment in favor of Parth. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "Palm Springs Villas II HOA v. Parth" on Justia Law

Shareholders of Diablo Controls submitted a written demand to inspect Diablo’s accounting books and records; the minutes of proceedings of shareholders, the board, and committees of the board; and certain other records. The demand requested the inspection take place at Diablo’s California office. The requested records were located in a Diablo office in Illinois. Diablo shipped records to California and made them available for inspection at its counsel’s California office. The shareholder found those records to be incomplete and sought a writ of mandate, claiming violation of Corporations Code section 1601. After the petition was filed, Diablo mailed the shareholders copies of additional records and made other records available for inspection at its counsel’s California office. The shareholders claimed the records were still incomplete. Diablo argued that section 1601 only obligated it to make the records available for inspection at its Illinois office. The trial court agreed and dismissed the action. The court of appeal affirmed; section 1601 requires that the records be made available for inspection at the office where such records are kept, even if the office is out of state. View "Innes v. Diablo Controls, Inc." on Justia Law

The trial court granted anti-SLAPP motions, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, against a city‘s exclusive agent in its action for breach of, and interference with, the agency contract and related causes of action. The court concluded that the alleged wrongful conduct in plaintiffs‘ tortious breach of contract cause of action is the City‘s violation of the terms of the Exclusive Agency Agreement (EAA) by allowing someone other than Rand Resources to act as its agent with respect to efforts to bring an NFL franchise to the City. Thus, the cause of action is not premised upon protected free speech or the right to petition for redress of grievances. The alleged wrongful conduct in plaintiffs‘ promissory fraud cause of action is the false representation regarding renewal of the EAA. Although the basis of the cause of action is a statement, the gravamen of the cause of action is the manner in which the City conducted itself in relation to the business transaction between it and Rand Resources, not the City‘s exercise of free speech or petitioning activity. The gravamen of the fourth cause of action with respect to the City is the City‘s violation of the terms of the EAA and the manner in which the City conducted itself in relation to the business transaction between it and Rand Resources, not the City‘s exercise of free speech or petitioning activity. The alleged wrongful conduct at the heart of plaintiffs‘ interference with contract and interference with prospective economic advantage causes of action is again the Bloom defendants‘ efforts to usurp Rand Resources‘s rights and role under the EAA. As addressed with respect to the fourth cause of action, this conduct arises from the Bloom defendants‘ private conduct of their own business, not their free speech or petitioning activities. Accordingly, the court reversed the order granting the anti-SLAPP motions and reversed the award of attorney fees. View "Rand Resources LLC v. City of Carson" on Justia Law