Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Business Law
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BioCorRx, Inc. (BioCorRx) was a publicly traded company primarily engaged in the business of providing addiction treatment services and related medication. It issued several press releases that allegedly made misrepresentations and improperly disclosed confidential information about a treatment it was developing for opioid overdose. VDM Biochemicals, Inc. (VDM) specializes in the synthesis and distribution of chemicals, reagents, and other specialty products for life science research. It owned a patent (the patent) for VDM-001, a compound with potential use as a treatment for opioid overdose. In September 2018, VDM and BioCorRx entered into a Mutual Nondisclosure & Confidentiality Agreement (the NDA), which restricted each party’s disclosure of confidential information as they discussed forming a business relationship. A month later, VDM and BioCorRx signed a Letter of Intent to Enter Definitive Agreement to Acquire Stake in Intellectual Property (the letter of intent). The letter of intent memorialized the parties’ shared desire whereby BioCorRx would partner with VDM to develop and commercialize VDM-001. BioCorRx and VDM never signed a formal contract concerning VDM-001. Their relationship eventually soured. BioCorRx filed a complaint (the complaint) against VDM; VDM cross-complained. In response, BioCorRx filed the anti-SLAPP motion at issue here, seeking to strike all the allegations from the cross-complaint concerning the press releases. The Court of Appeal found these statements fell within the commercial speech exemption of California's Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute) because they were representations about BioCorRx’s business operations that were made to investors to promote its goods and services through the sale of its securities. Since these statements were not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, the Court reversed the part of the trial court’s order granting the anti-SLAPP motion as to the press releases. The Court affirmed the unchallenged portion of the order striking unrelated allegations. View "BioCorRx, Inc. v. VDM Biochemicals, Inc." on Justia Law

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An arbitrator found the seller in breach based largely on an assessment of witness credibility. In the arbitrator’s view, defendant Phuong Pham lacked credibility because she used an interpreter during the arbitration proceedings. Reasoning that she had been in the country for decades, engaged in sophisticated business transactions, and previously functioned in some undisclosed capacity as an interpreter, the arbitrator felt that her use of an interpreter at the arbitration was a tactical ploy to seem less sophisticated. The Court of Appeal found here, the arbitrator’s credibility finding rested on unacceptable misconceptions about English proficiency and language acquisition. "These misconceptions, in turn, give rise to a reasonable impression of possible bias on the part of the arbitrator requiring reversal of the judgment and vacating the arbitration award." View "FCM Investments v. Grove Pham, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Occupational Safety and Health (the Division) issued a citation to Granite Construction Company/Granite Industrial, Inc. (Granite Construction) for allegedly violating three regulations relevant here. One was that the company required its employees to wear masks without first providing a medical evaluation to determine their fitness to wear them. And the Division alleged the company violated two other regulations because it exposed its employees to dust containing a harmful fungus— namely, Coccidioides, the fungus that causes Valley fever—and failed to implement adequate measures to limit this exposure. After Granite Construction disputed these allegations, an administrative law judge (ALJ) rejected the Division’s claims. The ALJ reasoned that no credible evidence showed that Granite Construction required its employees to wear masks and no reliable evidence showed that Coccidioides was present at the worksite. But after the Division petitioned for reconsideration, the Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Board (the Board) reversed on these issues and ruled for the Division. The trial court later denied Granite Construction’s petition for writ of administrative mandate seeking to set aside the Board’s decision. The Court of Appeal reversed: the Court agreed insufficient evidence showed its employees were exposed to Coccidioides. But the Court rejected its additional claim that it allowed (rather than required) its employees to wear masks, finding sufficient evidence supported the Board’s contrary ruling on this point. View "Granite Construction Co. v. CalOSHA" on Justia Law

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A limited liability partnership and one of its partners retained a lawyer but limited the scope of representation to having the lawyer represent the partnership in a specific, ongoing case. After the partnership lost the case, the partner sued the lawyer for malpractice. In an amended complaint, the partnership was added as a plaintiff. The partner’s complaint was filed before the statute of limitations ran; the amendment was filed after. The trial court issued its judgment of dismissal, the partner filed a motion for reconsideration along with a proposed second amended complaint. The trial court denied the motion as untimely and without merit because the proffered second amended complaint did not “present any new allegations which could support the claim.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded as a matter of law that the partner has suffered no damage as a result of the attorney’s alleged malpractice to the LLP during the Wells Fargo litigation and that the partner’s malpractice claims were properly dismissed. Further, the court held that given that all damages for any malpractice claims were suffered by and belong to the LLP, there is no “reasonable possibility” that the partner can amend the complaint to state a viable malpractice claim. View "Engel v. Pech" on Justia Law

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Liapes filed a class action against Facebook, alleging it does not provide women and older people equal access to insurance ads. The Unruh Civil Rights Act prohibits businesses from discriminating against people with protected characteristics (Civ. Code 51, 51.5, 52(a)). Liapes alleged Facebook requires all advertisers to choose the age and gender of users who will receive ads; companies offering insurance products routinely tell it to not send their ads to women or older people. She further alleged Facebook’s ad-delivery algorithm discriminates against women and older people.The trial court dismissed, finding Facebook’s tools neutral on their face and concluding that Facebook was immune under the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 230. The court of appeal reversed. Liapes has stated an Unruh Act claim. Facebook, a business establishment, does not dispute women and older people were categorically excluded from receiving various insurance ads. Facebook, not the advertisers, classifies users based on their age and gender via the algorithm. The complaint also stated a claim under an aiding and abetting theory of liability An interactive computer service provider only has immunity if it is not also the content provider. That advertisers are the content providers does not preclude Facebook from also being a content provider by helping develop at least part of the information at issue. View "Liapes v. Facebook, Inc." on Justia Law

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EpicentRx, Inc. and several of its officers, employees, and affiliates (collectively, the defendants) challenged a trial court order denying their motion to dismiss plaintiff-shareholder EpiRx, L.P.’s (EpiRx) lawsuit on forum non conveniens grounds. The defendants sought dismissal of the case based on mandatory forum selection clauses in EpicentRx’s certificate of incorporation and bylaws, which designated the Delaware Court of Chancery as the exclusive forum to resolve shareholder disputes like the present case. The trial court declined to enforce the forum selection clauses after finding that litigants did not have a right to a civil jury trial in the Delaware Court of Chancery and, therefore, enforcement of the clauses would deprive EpiRx of its inviolate right to a jury trial in violation of California public policy. The California Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that enforcement of the forum selection clauses in EpicentRx’s corporate documents would operate as an implied waiver of EpiRx’s right to a jury trial, thus the Court concluded the trial court properly declined to enforce the forum selection clauses at issue, and denied the defendants’ request for writ relief. View "EpicentRx, Inc. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs Dominick Martin and Rusty Rendon filed suit under the Unruh Civil Rights Act for disability discrimination, contending that one of Thi E-Commerce’s Web sites discriminated against the blind by being incompatible with screen reading software. Plaintiffs contended the court erred by concluding that a Web site was not a place of public accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (incorporated into the Unruh Act). Although this was an issue that has split the federal courts (and California Courts of Appeal), the appellate court here concluded the ADA unambiguously applied only to physical places. Moreover, even if the Court found ambiguity and decided the issue on the basis of legislative history and public policy, it would still conclude that the ADA did not apply to Web sites. Plaintiffs alternatively contended they stated a cause of action against Thi E-Commerce on a theory of intentional discrimination. To this, the Court of Appeal concluded the allegations of the complaint did not state a claim under that theory either and affirmed the judgment. View "Martin v. THI E-Commerce, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Law Firm of Fox and Fox (Law Firm) appealed from a judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Chase Bank, N.A. The Law Firm filed this action against Chase, alleging negligence in the disbursement of funds from a blocked account containing estate funds to the sole signatory on the account (as administrator of the estate), Jazzmen Brumfield (Brumfield). The trial court granted Chase’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Law Firm contends it raised triable issues of fact with respect to whether Chase owed a duty to the Law Firm, whether Chase breached any such duty, and whether Chase’s conduct in distributing the funds to Brumfield (who absconded with the funds) was the proximate cause of the Law Firm’s damages.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court concluded Chase owed the Law Firm a duty of care based on the special relationship it had with the Law Firm as an intended beneficiary of the probate court’s order directing that the estate funds be deposited into a blocked account from which withdrawals could only be made “on court order” and Chase’s acceptance of that order by executing the “receipt and acknowledgment of order for the deposit of money into blocked account.” The court explained that although banks do not generally have a duty to police customer accounts for suspicious activity, Chase owed the Law Firm, as an intended beneficiary of the blocked account order and acknowledgment, a duty to act with reasonable care in limiting distributions from the blocked account to those authorized by court order. View "The Law Firm of Fox and Fox v. Chase Bank" on Justia Law

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Geringer Capital, Inc., Roger Geringer and Tricycle Entertainment, LLC (collectively Geringer parties) moved to preclude Jeffrey Konvitz, Blue Rider Finance, Inc.’s counsel of record, from testifying at trial in support of Blue Rider’s claim that the Geringer parties fraudulently induced Blue Rider to enter into a settlement agreement that did not accurately reflect the terms negotiated by the parties. The Geringer parties subsequently clarified that their motion should be considered, in the alternative, a motion to disqualify Konvitz. The court granted the motion and disqualified Konvitz, finding the integrity of the judicial process would be impaired if Konvitz served in dual roles. On appeal, Blue Rider contends the court should have denied the motion due to the Geringer parties’ excessive delay in raising the issue.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court explained that the general rule is that an attorney may serve as both advocate and witness, testifying at trial concerning disputed issues, if the client has provided its informed written consent. Disqualification of counsel, when consent has been given, must be based on a convincing showing of prejudice to the opposing party or the potential for palpable injury to the judicial process. Here, the court wrote that the record is devoid of the evidence necessary to support the disqualification of Blue Rider’s chosen counsel. Further, the court explained that disqualification is not justified absent a convincing demonstration by the moving party of a potential for injury to the integrity of the judicial process. The showing must be based on an adequate factual record, not overarching statements of policy or conclusory allegations by the party seeking disqualification. Accordingly, the court found that it was an error for the trial court not to resolve the Geringer parties’ motion in favor of allowing Blue Rider to be represented by Konvitz, its counsel of choice. View "Geringer v. Blue Rider Finance" on Justia Law

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The principal issue in these cases is whether two corporations, wholly owned by the late entertainer Michael Jackson, had a legal duty to protect plaintiffs from sexual abuse Jackson is alleged to have inflicted on them for many years while they were children. The corporations say they had no duty to protect plaintiffs from Jackson because of their corporate structure, that is, “because they had no ability to control Jackson—their sole owner—or his interactions with [plaintiffs]. Parties cannot be liable for neglecting to exercise powers they simply do not have.” The trial court sustained Defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend in Safechuck’s case and granted summary judgment to Defendants in Robson’s case. Both Plaintiffs appealed, and Robson also appealed a discovery sanctions order against his counsel   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court explained that following the guidance in Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204 (Brown), it concludes that a corporation that facilitates the sexual abuse of children by one of its employees is not excused from an affirmative duty to protect those children merely because it is solely owned by the perpetrator of the abuse. The court explained that while there is no comparable case law to recite it would be perverse to find no duty based on the corporate defendant having only one shareholder. Thus the court reversed the judgments entered for the corporations. One of the plaintiffs also appealed a sanctions order and discovery rulings granting protective orders to nonparty witnesses. The court found no abuse of discretion in those rulings. View "Safechuck v. MJJ Productions, Inc." on Justia Law