Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted defendants-appellants Leopoldo Chavez and Edward Elias of two counts of first degree murder, and found true special circumstances of robbery-murder and multiple murders. The jury further found that Chavez and Elias were armed with a firearm. Following their convictions, the court sentenced Chavez and Elias to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment each, without the possibility of parole, plus an additional consecutive year. The court later recalled the sentences to consider whether to impose a lesser punishment because Chavez and Elias were under the age of 18 at the time of their offenses. After a further hearing, the court declined to modify the sentences. Chavez and Elias appealed, contending that the evidence was insufficient to convict them of first degree murder or to support the special circumstances findings. Furthermore, they argued: (1) the court erred in instructing the jury using a modified version of CALCRIM No. 376; (2) the court erred by not instructing the jury regarding the natural and probable consequences doctrine; (3) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct during closing arguments; (4) the sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole violated the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution because they were juveniles at the time of their offenses; and (5) the court erred by imposing parole revocation fines. The Court of Appeal concluded there was sufficient evidence to support Chavez's and Elias's murder convictions as well as the jury's felony-murder and multiple-murder special circumstances findings. The Court rejected defendants' claims that they were prejudiced by instructional error and that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. Because defendants were sentenced before "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S.Ct. 2455) and "People v. Gutierrez" (58 Cal.4th 1354 (2014)) were decided and, because the record did not show that the trial court had the opportunity to directly consider the ultimate issue presented in those cases, the Court of Appeal reversed the life sentences without possibility of parole and remanded for resentencing in light of Miller and Gutierrez. The Court also agreed the trial court erred in imposing parole revocation fines. View "California v. Chavez" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Darrell Chenault appealed his convictions on 13 counts of lewd acts on a child under 14 years of age, and two counts of forcible lewd acts on a child under 14 years of age. On appeal, he argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing a support dog to be present during the testimony of two child witnesses without individualized showings of necessity; and (2) the presence of the support dog was inherently prejudicial and violated his federal constitutional rights to a fair trial and to confront the witnesses against him. Because the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the support dog to be present during the testimony of the two child witnesses, it affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Chenault" on Justia Law

Mark Ganoe filed suit against multiple corporations, including Metalclad, after he was diagnosed with mesothelioma, alleging that the disease was caused by his exposure to asbestos from when he worked at the Goodyear plant. Ganoe died during the pendency of this action and the case was converted to a survival and wrongful death action. The trial court granted summary judgment to Metalclad. The court concluded that the evidence supported a reasonable inference that plaintiffs could show causation. Therefore, the trial court erred in finding that plaintiffs had failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the court reversed and awarded plaintiffs their costs on appeal. View "Ganoe v. Metalclad Insulation Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant Kenneth Wesley Brown was convicted of possession of a "short-barreled shotgun." Defendant had been found in possession of the weapon in his home. California's statutory definition of "short-barreled shotgun" includes a shotgun with a barrel less than 18 inches long or with an overall length of less than 26 inches, regardless of the length of the barrel. The barrel of defendant's shotgun was one quarter inch longer than the minimum length of 18 inches, but the overall length was 25 and a half inches - too short by half an inch. He appealed, contending the statute, on its face and as applied, violated the Second Amendment's right to bear arms and equal protection. He also claimed the trial court erred in denying his motion for acquittal due to the insufficiency of evidence, and made instructional errors. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded that California's ban on shotguns with an overall length of less than 26 inches did not violate the Second Amendment or equal protection. The Court also rejected defendant's other contentions. View "California v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Lori Rhea was employed at General Atomics in a salaried position that qualified her as an exempt employee for the purposes of overtime pay under the federal and California wage and hour laws. The issue this case presented to the Court of Appeal centered on plaintiff's employer, General Atomics' employment practice of requiring exempt employees to use their annual leave hours when they are absent from work for portions of a day. Although "Conley v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co." (131 Cal.App.4th 260 (2005)) established that California law does not prohibit an employer "from following the established federal policy permitting employers to deduct from exempt employees' vacation leave, when available, on account of partial-day absences," plaintiff contended that Conley was wrongly decided, or in the alternative, that even under Conley, General Atomics was not permitted to deduct from an exempt employee's leave bank when the employee is absent for less than four hours. The Court of Appeal concluded that plaintiff's contentions were without merit, and accordingly it affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of General Atomics. View "Rhea v. General Atomics" on Justia Law

Hardin suffered complete blindness and permanent, severe and painful scarring after she took Lamotrigine, the generic form of the medication Lamictal. Hardin sued the prescribing physician, the manufacturer, the store where she bought the prescription (Safeway), WKH, which produced the drug information pamphlet (monograph), and PDX, a software provider that distributes drug information to pharmacy customers. Unlike physician package inserts and patient medication guides, which are FDA-mandated, WKH monographs are not regulated or reviewed by the FDA, but are produced as part of a self-regulating action plan required under 110 Stat. 1593. The WKH monograph was the only information received by Hardin when she first filled her prescription for Lamictal. The abbreviated warning used by Safeway and provided to Hardin omitted the “Black Box” warning: “BEFORE USING THIS MEDICINE” that stated: “SERIOUS AND SOMETIMES FATAL RASHES HAVE OCCURRED RARELY WITH THE USE OF THIS MEDICINE. Hardin says that had she been provided this warning, she would not have taken the medication. WKH moved to strike Hardin’s claims against it under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the “anti-SLAPP” (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation ) statute.. The trial court ruled that WKH’s production of drug monographs was protected speech concerning a public issue or an issue of public interest and that Hardin had no probability of prevailing because she could not establish that WKH owed her any duty. The court denied PDX’s motion to strike, finding that the activity underlying PDX’s alleged liability was the reprogramming of its software to permit Safeway to give customers an abbreviated, five-section monograph that omitted warnings instead of the full eight-section version that included those warnings. The court of appeal affirmed. View "Hardin v. PDX, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, a thief stole a health care provider’s computer containing medical records of about four million patients. The plaintiffs filed an action under the Confidentiality Act, seeking to represent as a class, all of the patients whose records were stolen, with a potential award of about $4 billion against the health care provider. The health care provider demurred to the complaint and moved to strike the class allegations, but the trial court overruled the demurrer and denied the motion to strike. On petition of the health care provider, the Court of Appeal issued an alternative writ of mandate to review the trial court’s rulings. After that review, the Court concluded that plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action under the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act because they did not allege that the stolen medical information was actually viewed by an unauthorized person. The Court therefore granted the health care provider’s petition for a peremptory writ of mandate and directed the trial court to sustain the health care provider’s demurrer without leave to amend and dismiss the action. View "Sutter Health v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Defendant provides residential real estate brokerage services in Seattle, Washington. Plaintiff lives in California. In 2009 the parties executed a form contract drafted by defendant. Defendant engaged plaintiff as a Contract Field Agent (CFA) as “an independent contractor.” In 2013, plaintiff filed suit on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals, alleging defendant improperly classified CFAs as independent contractors when they were actually employees under California’s Labor Code and Unfair Competition Laws and claimed unpaid overtime, missed meal and rest periods, inaccurate and untimely wage statements, waiting time penalties, and unreimbursed business expenses. Defendant sought arbitration under the Agreement, which provides that it is to be governed by the laws of the state of Washington. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that the arbitration clause was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA); that the arbitration clause did not apply to plaintiff’s statutory claims because those claims were based on statutes, not the contract; and noted “unrebutted evidence of substantial procedural unconscionability.” The court of appeal reversed, Under California law, there is a strong policy favoring the enforcement of choice-of-law provisions and, even under California law, plaintiff’s unconscionability claim lacks merit. View "Galen v. Redfin Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioner and his employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier agreed to a stipulated award after petitioner was injured during the course and scope of his employment as a roofer. After a timely petition to reopen, the appeals board rescinded the disability rating at issue, concluding that there was no good cause to reopen the case. Petitioner sought review of the appeals board's decision. The court concluded that when petitioner brought his petition to reopen, the evidence clearly established that the stipulated award was inequitable. Moreover, substantial evidence did not support the appeals board's decision to deny the petition to reopen. Therefore, the court annulled the decision of the appeals board and remanded with directions to reinstate the award of the workers' compensation judgment entered in April 2013. View "Benavides v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board et al." on Justia Law

Olive Lane Industrial Park owned real property that was taken by eminent domain. Within four years after the eminent domain order, Olive Lane acquired another parcel of property. About five years after the eminent domain order, for purposes of calculating property taxes on its new property, Olive Lane filed a request with the San Diego County tax assessor to transfer the condemned property's base year value to the replacement property, as permitted by California Constitution, article XIIIA. The County denied Olive Lane's request as untimely. After evaluating the constitutional and statutory provisions as a whole, the Court of Appeal concluded the Legislature did not intend to deprive a taxpayer who loses property through eminent domain of the right to obtain prospective application of the base year value transfer in the event the replacement property is acquired within the four-year statutory period but the claim is filed after the four-year period. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Olive Lake Industrial Park v. Co. of San Diego" on Justia Law