Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was charged with reckless driving a vehicle under Vehicle Code section 23103 because he collided with a pedestrian while intoxicated and riding his bike and seriously injured her. The People filed a felony complaint for arrest that alleged reckless driving causing specified injury under Vehicle Code 23105, subd.(a). Vehicle Code section 21200, subd.(a) subjects a bicyclist to all the provisions applicable to the driver of a vehicle. The court concluded that, where as here, it is alleged that a reckless, intoxicated driver of a bicycle inflicted one of the injuries listed in section 23105, section 21200 provides notice that the bicyclist could be subject to the same criminal penalties as a reckless driver of a motor vehicle. Therefore, petitioner was properly charged with violating sections 23103 and 23105. View "Velasquez v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Lincoln and Dowdell were tried before dual juries for offenses arising out of a robbery/carjacking/kidnapping incident in Sunnyvale. The jury trying Lincoln found him guilty as charged: Count One—kidnapping for ransom or extortion; Count Two—kidnapping during a carjacking; Count Three—carjacking; Count Four—kidnapping for robbery; and Count Five—criminal threats. (Pen. Code, 209 (a), 209.5, 215, 209 (b)(1), 422.) The trial court found two prior prison term allegations true and sentenced Lincoln to two concurrent terms of life with the possibility of parole, consecutive to four years. Dowdell was charged with the same counts as Lincoln, except she was not charged with Count Five––criminal threats. The jury trying Dowdell found her guilty of kidnapping for ransom or extortion and kidnapping for robbery. The jury hung on Counts Two and Three. The trial court sentenced Dowdell to life in prison with the possibility of parole. The court of appeal stayed Lincoln’s sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole for Count Two and struck the conviction for carjacking on Count Three is stricken. As to Dowdell, the trial court was ordered to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect that the trial court stayed the sentence on Count Four. The court otherwise affirmed View "People. v. Dowdell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Joanne Peake purchased a home from Marviel and Deanna Underwood. About two years later, Peake brought an action against the Underwoods and the Underwoods' real estate agent, Paul Ferrell. Peake sought to recover damages for defendants' alleged failure to disclose defective subfloors in the home. After the case had been pending for more than one year, Ferrell moved to dismiss and for monetary sanctions against Peake and her counsel Norman Shaw under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, arguing Peake's claims were factually and legally frivolous because the undisputed evidence showed Ferrell had fulfilled his statutory and common law disclosure duties, and Peake had actual notice of facts disclosing prior problems with the subfloors. Peake declined to dismiss the action during the statutory safe harbor period, and instead amended her complaint to add claims similar to claims she had previously dismissed. The trial court found Ferrell met his burden to show Peake's claims were "without legal or evidentiary support" and Peake's continued maintenance of the lawsuit demonstrated "objective bad faith" warranting sanctions. As sanctions, the court dismissed Peake's claims against Ferrell and ordered Peake and her attorney to pay Ferrell for his attorney fees incurred in defending the action. On appeal, Peake and Shaw challenged the sanction order. The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in awarding the section 128.7 sanctions. View "Peake v. Underwood" on Justia Law

The United States and California Supreme Courts explored the constitutional limits of government’s power to punish minors tried as adults. Responding to these decisions, the California Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 260, adding section 3051 to the Penal Code, which provided minors sentenced to a determinate term of years or a life term an opportunity to prove their rehabilitation and secure release on parole after serving a prescribed term of confinement. Xeng Saetern, who was serving a 100-years-to-life sentence for a murder he committed at age 14, argued on appeal of his sentence that in imposing a sentence that is the functional equivalent of life without possibility of parole, the trial court failed to consider the factors of youth set forth in the Supreme Court cases, and thus he should be resentenced. The question of whether section 3051 had the effect suggested by Saetern was pending before the California Supreme Court; ultimately, Saetern’s arguments and his fate would be resolved by the higher court. "Conscious of the ephemerality of our decision and that we are writing on shifting sands, we conclude that even assuming the trial court’s sentencing process failed to comport with the requirements of Miller, the violation was rendered harmless with the enactment of section 3051, which affords Saetern more favorable relief than the sentencing court could provide." View "California v. Saetern" on Justia Law

In 1998, the superior court established a conservatorship over G.H.’s person pursuant to the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, 5000. G.H. has been under continuous conservatorship since that time. In 2012, the Santa Clara County Public Guardian sought to be reappointed G.H.’s conservator, alleging that G.H remained gravely disabled as a result of mental disorder. G.H.’s counsel requested t an evidentiary hearing. On the date of the hearing G.H. was not present in court. The Public Guardian explained that G.H. had refused to submit to a mental examination with the Public Guardian’s doctor, and that it did not intend to transport G.H to court unless G.H. submitted to the mental examination. At a second hearing, the Public Guardian explained that G.H. had again refused to submit to a mental examination with the Public Guardian’s doctor. G.H. was not present at a third hearing. The court granted the reappointment petition, reasoning that G.H.’s failure to submit to a mental examination with the Public Guardian’s doctor authorized the court to impose an evidence sanction or a terminating sanction pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.410. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the court erred in imposing a terminating, as opposed to an evidence sanction. View "Conservatorship of G.H." on Justia Law

Rodriguez, a former Santa Cruz police officer, had served in the Marine Corps during the first Gulf War as a demolition specialist, involved in multiple fire fights and required to collect the bodies of slain comrades. As a police officer, he was injured during a nighttime raid and continued to suffer pain after attempting to return to work. He applied to the city for industrial disability retirement, alleging psychiatric disability due to posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Rodriguez testified to nightmares, drinking, and the destruction of his marriage. The city denied the application. The superior court upheld the denial. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the trial court applied the incorrect standard of review. The court likely did not apply the independent judgment standard in making its decision, and particularly in assessing Rodriguez’s credibility. View "Rodriguez v. City of Santa Cruz" on Justia Law

Povio pleaded no contest to unlawful possession of a controlled substance, Vicodin (Health & Saf. Code 1350(a)); false representation and identification to a peace officer (Pen. Code 148.9); and possession of 28.5 grams or less of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code 11357, subd. (b)). He admitted a prior strike conviction for attempted second degree burglary (Pen. Code 667.5(b), 459, 460(b), 664). The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Povio on three years of formal probation with conditions that he serve nine months in county jail; stay 300 yards away from any playground; and pay a laboratory analysis fee of $50 per count, a probation supervision fee not to exceed $110 per month, a $150 drug program fee, and a $70 AIDS education fee. Povio appealed his sentence. The court of appeal reversed and remanded, with instructions that the court determine, in light of mandatory penalty assessments, Povio’s ability to pay the probation supervision fee under Penal Code 1203.1b; the drug program fee under Health and Safety Code 11372.7; and the AIDS education fee under Health and Safety Code 11377(c). The trial court is to modify the laboratory analysis fee and to modify the 300-yard playground stay-away probation condition to prohibit knowingly coming within 300 yards of a playground. View "People v. Povio" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Ilan Brand appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendants Hyundai Motor America and Allen Used Cars, LLC (Hyundai) after granting Hyundai's nonsuit motion on plaintiff's breach of implied warranty of merchantability lawsuit. Plaintiff argued the trial court erred in granting the motion on grounds that no reasonable jury could have concluded a new vehicle sunroof that spontaneously opens and closes while driving constituted a safety hazard in violation of the implied warranty. The Court of Appeal agreed with plaintiff and reversed the judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Brand v. Hyundai" on Justia Law

Fiore was convicted him of second degree murder with an accompanying enhancement of personal and intentional discharge of a firearm resulting in great bodily injury or death; two counts of attempted murder, with one accompanied by an enhancement of personal and intentional discharge of a firearm; and two counts of first degree robbery. The jury was unable to return verdicts on attempted murder, first degree burglary, resisting an executive officer, and personal use of a firearm that accompanied both robbery counts. Fiore was sentenced to 68 years and eight months to life, plus three additional life sentences, with a term of 15 years to life for the murder, plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the enhancement of personal and intentional discharge of a firearm; a life sentence for both attempted murders, plus a consecutive term of 20 years for one of them based on the personal-discharge enhancement; a term of six years for the first robbery count; a term of two years for the second robbery count; and a term of eight months for evading an officer. The court of appeal reversed the second robbery conviction for cumulative error, but otherwise affirmed, rejecting arguments based on failure to instruct the jury that duress is a defense to felony murder; instructing the jury on the intent necessary to establish an aider and abettor’s liability for robbery; and permitting lay opinion testimony that there was “possible brain tissue and bone matter” on the inside of a vehicle’s front passenger-side door. View "People v. Fiore" on Justia Law

Anthony S., then 15 years old, admitted an assault with a firearm, in which he and a co-defendant seriously wounded Houston, resulting in a hospital bill of more than $400,000. The hospital has not attempted to collect from Houston, having determined that he was indigent and the debt was uncollectable. At a hearing to set restitution, a hospital representative testified that after a debt is written off as uncollectable, the hospital generally makes no further attempt to recover it. Nevertheless, the juvenile court t set restitution at 20 percent of $412,546.89 with a credit of $1,000 for the amount that Anthony had already paid to the victim restitution fund, with Anthony and his parents jointly and severally liable. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the restitution order was contrary to Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 because there was insufficient evidence of economic loss to Houston. View "In re Anthony S." on Justia Law