Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In August 2007, the initial trustee of two family trusts invested millions in the Rockwater American Municipal Fund, LLC (RAM Fund), a hedge fund engaged in municipal arbitrage. The RAM Fund was managed by Rockwater Municipal Advisors, LLC (RMA), its managing member. In November 2007, Charles Fish Investments, Inc. (CFI) transferred its assets to Rockwater CFI, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of RMA, in exchange for a 15 percent interest in RMA. CFI had an option to unwind the transaction, if its interest in RMA did not meet certain benchmark values. The RAM Fund was devastated by the stock market crash and the trust investments were largely wiped out by 2008. CFI exercised its option to unwind the transaction with RMA and Rockwater CFI, LLC, and obtained a return of the assets originally belonging to it. The successor trustee of the trusts sued the RAM Fund, RMA, Bryan Williams (founder of the RAM Fund and the chief executive officer of RMA), John Hapke (the chief financial officer of the RAM Fund), CFI, and Charles Fish (the chairman and chief executive officer of CFI). After it had seen clips from the movie Wall Street 2 (Twentieth Century Fox 2010) and a power point presentation with eight screens captioned "Greed," a jury awarded the successor trustee a $4.6 million judgment against the RAM Fund, RMA, Williams, and Hapke. The successor trustee was unsuccessful in obtaining a judgment against CFI and Fish. The RAM Fund, RMA, Williams, and Hapke, on the other hand, have each filed an appeal claiming the RAM Fund was simply the victim of the market crash. The successor trustee appealed too, seeking to hold liable CFI and Fish, the defendants who "got away." After review, the Supreme Court: reversed the judgment in favor of RAM, RMA and Willians, and affirmed the judgment against CFI and Fish on actual and constructive fraudulent transfer; to the extent the judgment held the Rockwater Defendants and Hapke liable on the causes of action for fraud by intentional misrepresentation, fraud by concealment, and/or negligent misrepresentation, it was reversed. The judgment in favor of CFI and Fish on those causes of action was affirmed. The judgment against the RAM Fund and Hapke for breach of fiduciary duty and professional negligence was reversed. However, the judgment against RMA and Williams on those causes of action was affirmed. The judgment in favor of CFI and Fish on the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action was affirmed. The ruling that CFI was not liable for the debts of RMA was affirmed. The ruling that Fish was not liable for the debts of CFI was moot, and the judgment in favor of CFI on all causes of action is affirmed. View "Hasso v. Hapke" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Reginald Bradford was convicted by a jury of three counts of second degree burglary and four counts of petty theft with a prior. The offenses were based on incidents in which Bradford took merchandise from various stores. The jury acquitted him of robbery. The trial court found he had five prior felony convictions for which he had served prison terms, including two residential burglaries that were strikes under the three strikes law. Bradford received four consecutive terms of 25 years to life pursuant to the three strikes law, and an additional four years for the enhancements. He appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. Following the enactment of Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, Bradford filed a petition to recall the sentence and for resentencing. The trial court denied the petition, finding him ineligible for relief based on a statutory exclusion that applied if a firearm or other deadly weapon was involved in the commission of the underlying charge. The question this case presented on appeal was whether the trial court erred in finding defendant ineligible for resentencing based on evidence he had a pair of wire cutters at or near the time defendant committed the burglaries/thefts. The Court of Appeal found the trial court's conclusion that the wire cutters were a deadly weapon and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Bradford" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Nancy Lee hired Attorney William Hanley to represent her in a civil suit. After the litigation settled, Lee sought a refund of unearned attorney fees and unused expert witness fees she had advanced to Hanley. Not having received a refund, Lee hired Attorney Walter Wilson and terminated Hanley. Attorney Hanley thereafter refunded certain expert witness fees, but no attorney fees. More than a year after hiring Wilson, Lee filed a lawsuit against Hanley seeking the return of the unearned fees. Hanley filed a demurrer to Lee’s second amended complaint, based on the one-year statute of limitations contained in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6. The court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the action with prejudice. Lee appealed. Upon review, the Court of Appeal held that to the extent a claim is construed as a wrongful act not arising in the performance of legal services, "such as garden variety theft or conversion, section 340.6 is inapplicable. . . . Here, the facts alleged in Lee’s second amended complaint could be construed as giving rise to a cause of action for the theft or conversion of an identifiable sum of money belonging to her. This being the case, we cannot say that Lee’s second amended complaint demonstrates clearly and affirmatively on its face that her action is necessarily barred by the section 340.6 statute of limitations." Because this action had not reached a point where the court could determine whether the wrongful act in question arose in the performance of legal services, and thus, whether or not section 340.6 applied, the demurrer should not have been sustained. View "Lee v. Hanley" on Justia Law

Defendant Kenneth Elder filed what he titled a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to try and recall his 1995 indeterminate life sentence. The statute, enacted pursuant to a November 2012 initiative measure, provides retrospective relief under narrow criteria from indeterminate life sentences imposed for recidivism. Defendant alleged that the crime of which he was convicted (for being a felon unlawfully possessing a gun) was not a "serious" or violent felony and did not otherwise come within any exception to section Penal Code 1170.126, and therefore he was entitled to be considered for resentencing to a determinate sentence of double the term that would otherwise apply to his offense. Treating the filing as a recall petition under the statute, the trial court denied the petition without a hearing, finding defendant did not qualify for relief. Defendant argued on appeal that as a matter of statutory interpretation he could not be armed while committing the crime of unlawful possession of a gun; alternately, he argued that the prosecution had to plead and prove this circumstance in the proceedings underlying his commitment offense. Disagreeing with both claims, the Court of Appeal found the trial court properly concluded that defendant was ineligible for resentencing. View "California v. Elder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, who suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, was found not guilty of attempted murder by reason of insanity. At issue was whether petitioner could refuse antipsychotic medication. The court held that persons who are found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI's) have the same constitutional rights as mentally disordered offenders (MDO's) and sexually violent predators (SVP's) to refuse antipsychotic medication. Therefore, the court issued an order for writ of habeas corpus and directed the Department to refrain from administering antipsychotic medication to petitioner against his will in a nonemergency situation unless the trial court has determined that he is incompetent to refuse the treatment or a danger to others. View "In re Greenshields" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, doing business as iWorld, filed suit against Westfield, a shopping center, alleging that Westfield violated a lease agreement. The trial court stated that Westfield's service of a notice of termination was protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute and that each count was based in part on Westfield's service of the notice. The trial court concluded that the litigation privilege, Civ. Code, 47, subd. (b), "arguably" was a complete defense to the complaint. The court concluded that plaintiff's complaint did not arise from protected activity and was not subject to a special motion to strike. Therefore, plaintiff need not establish a probability of prevailing on her claims and the court need not decide whether she did so. Accordingly, the court reversed the order granting the special motion to strike and the order awarding attorney fees to Westfield. View "Ulkarim v. Westfield, LLC" on Justia Law

Martin began working for California’s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) in 2000, and Sphar began working for CDCR in 2002. They were dismissed in 2004 and challenged their dismissals. In October 2008, an administrative law judge found that the dismissals had been unjustified and revoked them. The ALJ’s decision provided that a hearing would be set if the parties were “unable to agree as to salary, benefits and interest due under Government Code section 19584.The two were reinstated to employment. CDCR sought a writ of mandate to overturn the decision to include merit salary adjustments and physical fitness incentive pay (PFIP), and claimed that the offset to backpay for money earned from other employers should have included overtime pay. The CDCR also challenged the Board’s decision that Sphar would be compensated at salary range “K,” for which he had not qualified at the time of his dismissal. The superior court ordered that the offset include overtime pay, but denied the remainder of the petition. The court of appeal affirmed, concluding that section 19584 authorized the inclusion of merit salary adjustments and PFIP in the award, authorized Sphar to be compensated at salary range “K,” and required the inclusion of overtime pay in the offset. View "Dept. of Corrs. & Rehab. v. State Pers. Bd." on Justia Law

Eric Speight appealed after a jury convicted him of two counts of premeditated, willful, and deliberate attempted murder and found true various enhancements. Speight argued on appeal: (1) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct when she misstated the law concerning homicide and the error was compounded by the trial court’s statements and omission of an instruction on the interaction between attempted murder and attempted voluntary manslaughter; and (2) his sentence was cruel and unusual punishment and he received ineffective assistance of counsel when defense counsel failed to object to part of his sentence. The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial court erred in instructing the jury but concluded Speight was not prejudiced. With respect to his sentencing claim, the Court concluded defense counsel’s performance was deficient regarding sentencing. The judgment was affirmed, Speight's sentence reversed, and the case remanded for a new sentencing hearing. View "California v. Speight" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of second degree robbery of a motel. The court concluded that evidence of a prior robbery was admissible to show a common design or plan. The court also concluded that oral testimony of the contents of a surveillance video showing the robbery did not constitute inadmissible hearsay where it showed the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "People v. Myers" on Justia Law

In April 2008, a particularly cold month in a dry year, young salmon were found fatally stranded along banks of the Russian River system, which drains Sonoma and Mendocino Counties. The deaths were caused by abrupt declines in water level that occurred when water was drained from the streams and sprayed on vineyards and orchards to prevent frost damage. After hearings and preparation of an environmental impact report (EIR), the State Water Resources Control Board adopted a regulation that is likely to require reduction in diversion of water for frost protection under certain circumstances. The regulation does not limit water use, but delegates regulatory authority to local governing bodies composed of the diverting growers. The regulation declares that any water use inconsistent with the programs, once they are approved by the Board, is unreasonable and prohibited. The trial court invalidated the Board’s action. The appeals court reversed. While authority to require a permit for water use by riparian users and early appropriators is beyond the authority of the Board, it has the power to prevent unreasonable use of water. In regulating unreasonable use of water, the Board can weigh public purposes, notably the protection of wildlife habitat, against the commercial use of water by riparian users and early appropriators. The court noted that its ruling was on a facial challenge and did not address the validity of any particular substantive regulation. The Board did not unlawfully delegate its authority and properly certified the EIR. View "Light v. State Water Res. Control Bd." on Justia Law