Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of unauthorized taking of a vehicle. Defendant asked the trial court to reduce his third-strike 25-to-life sentence and resentence him as a second-strike offender. The trial court denied relief impliedly finding that defendant was outside the "spirit" of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, Pen Code 1170.126(f). On appeal, defendant facially challenged the Reform Act, contending that the phrase "pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety" is unconstitutionally vague. The court concluded that the word "unreasonable" is not permissibly vague; the court rejected defendant's contention that the trial court erroneously required the People to prove dangerousness by a preponderance of the evidence where there is no constitutional requirement that the facts be established to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt; and the record contained no evidence that the shackling of defendant impaired or prejudiced his right to testify. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction. View "People v. Flores" on Justia Law

The Project area includes Treasure Island, 404 acres of landfill placed on former tidelands in San Francisco Bay, plus Yerba Buena Island, an adjacent, 160-acre, natural rock outcropping. Treasure Island and the causeway to Yerba Buena Island were constructed in the 1930s for the Golden Gate Exposition. During World War II, the area was converted to a naval station, which operated for more than 50 years. Conditions include aging infrastructure, environmental contamination, deteriorated buildings, and impervious surfaces over 65 percent of the site. In 2011, after more than a decade of planning, study, and input, the board of supervisors approved the Project, amended the general plan and code maps and text, and approved policies and standards for the redevelopment. The Environmental Impact Report (EIR) envisions a new, mixed-use community with about 8,000 residential units (about 25 percent designated as affordable units); up to 140,000 square feet of commercial and retail space; about 100,000 square feet of office space; restoration of historic buildings; 500 hotel rooms; utilities; 300 acres of parks, playgrounds, and public open space; bike and transit facilities; and a new ferry terminal and intermodal transit hub. Construction would be phased over 15-20 years. CSTI unsuccessfully challenged the EIR’s approval under the California Environmental Quality Act, Pub. Res. Code 21000. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the EIR should have been prepared as a program EIR, not a project-level EIR. Opponents claimed that there was insufficient detail about matters such as remediation of hazardous materials, building and street layout, historical resources and tidal trust resources, for “project-level” review. View "Citizens for a Sustainable Treasure Island v. San Francisco" on Justia Law

In 2006, Chamberlain was arrested for possession of child pornography. Three weeks days later, inmates in Theo Lacy Jail in the City of Orange (TLJ) beat Chamberlain to death because they believed he was a child molester. As waves of inmates hit, kicked, stomped, and did other violent things to Chamberlain over the course of about 30 minutes, three Orange County Sheriff’s Department (OCSD) personnel were in an enclosed guard station approximately 68 feet away. OCSD was the lead investigating agency and interviewed hundreds of people, after which Guillen, Petrovich, Aguilar, Carlstrom, and Villafana were convicted of second degree murder of Chamberlain. The appeals court affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, and upholding that the court properly denied a motion to dismiss based on outrageous conduct by the government. While the court committed two evidentiary errors and erred in telling the jury to resume deliberations where it ended before a juror (who had become ill) was replaced, the defendants were not prejudiced by the errors. The court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on one theory of involuntary manslaughter because insufficient evidence supported giving the instruction. View "People v. Guillen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jason Carlsen was severely injured from a fall from a cliff above the Sacramento River. Although he could not recall how or why he fell, he sued his two travel companions, defendants Sarah Koivumaki and Zachary Gudelunas, asserting causes of action for assault and battery, negligence, willful misconduct, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. He claimed defendants put him in peril by bringing him to the edge of a cliff when he was highly intoxicated, leading to his fall, and that they aggravated his injuries by waiting several hours to inform the authorities of the fall. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Sarah, finding that it could not reasonably be inferred from the evidence submitted that she touched or threatened to touch plaintiff or that she breached a duty of care owed to him. Plaintiff contended the trial court erred because "[m]ultiple material issues of fact [existed] relating to [Sarah]'s role in placing [him] in peril at the bottom of the cliff," and "[Sarah] owed [him] an affirmative duty to summon aid so as to protect [him] in the face of the ongoing imminent harm, danger, and medical emergency" and "as a result of a special relationship." The Court of Appeal concluded plaintiff established triable issues of material fact as to the negligence and willful misconduct causes of action, and that on the facts tendered, a jury could have reasonably inferred Sarah had acted to put an inebriated plaintiff in peril at the edge of a cliff. The Court reversed summary judgment entered in favor of Sarah but affirmed the summary judgment as to the assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress causes of action. Zach failed to respond to plaintiff's complaint, and a clerk's default was entered against him. After the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Sarah, plaintiff filed a request for the entry of a default judgment against Zach. The trial court denied plaintiff's request and entered judgment in favor of Zach, finding that plaintiff "failed to prove his case against [Zach]." Plaintiff contended the trial court erred in doing so. The Court of Appeal agreed with plaintiff, and reversed the judgment entered in Zach's favor and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to conduct a hearing to determine whether plaintiff could establish damages and, if so, to enter a default judgment for plaintiff and against Zach. View "Carlsen v. Koivumaki" on Justia Law

In 1992, applicant Michael Hansen was convicted by jury on one count of second degree murder, and one count of shooting at an inhabited dwelling. The Supreme Court affirmed Hansen's conviction. The Supreme Court rejected Hansen's argument that shooting at an inhabited dwelling merged with a homicide that resulted from such a shooting. As such, the offense of shooting at an inhabited dwelling could have formed the basis for a second degree felony-murder conviction. Fifteen years later, the Supreme Court reconsidered the scope of second degree felony-murder and expressly overruled its earlier holding. Relying on "California v. Chun" (45 Cal. 4th 1172 (2009)), Hansen petitioned for the writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the Supreme Court's holding in "Chun" applied to the theory of second degree felony murder presented at his trial, that it was therefore error for his jury to have been instructed that second degree felony murder was a valid theory for a conviction, and that his conviction for second degree murder should have been reversed. The trial court agreed and granted Hansen's petition. The State argued on appeal that the trial court erred in giving "Chun" retroactive effect, and as such, erred in finding reversible error. The Court of Appeal found that the trial court did not err in giving Chun retroactive effect, and affirmed the trial court's order. View "In re Hansen" on Justia Law

Defendant-respondent Stephen Lipworth won a judgment against Plaintiff-appellant Raj Singh, and successfully moved to amend the judgment to add certain aliases Singh used. The trial court then granted Lipworth's application for the sale of certain property that Singh transferred to his wife, who in turn transferred the property to Sunman Mehta. The trial court concluded that "Mehta" was another alias Singh adopted to avoid paying his creditors. The court set aside that series of transfers and ordered the property sold to satisfy the judgment. The order granting Lipworth's application for sale became final after various appeals were dismissed. In the case before the Court of Appeal, Singh, along with his wife Karen and "Mehta," sued Lipworth alleging he used "fraudulent representations" to persuade the trial court in the prior case that Singh was "hiding some properties from his creditors using different names such as Archana Singh and Suman Mehta." After several frivolous motions were decided against Singh, the trial court invited Lipworth to file a motion to require Singh to furnish security or have the case dismissed pursuant to the vexatious litigant statutes. Lipworth did so, and filed both a demurrer and a special motion to strike pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court found Singh to be a vexatious litigant with no reasonable probability of prevailing in the litigation because the lawsuit amounted to an impermissible collateral attack on a prior final judgment and post-judgment orders. The trial court ordered "Raj Singh aka Suman Mehta" to furnish security and dismissed the lawsuit as to plaintiff when no such security was furnished. The trial court then granted the anti-SLAPP motion as to Karen Singh, and awarded attorney fees and costs. Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeal, and Lipworth filed a motion for sanctions against plaintiffs and plaintiffs' counsel pursuant to section 907 and rule 8.276 for bringing a frivolous appeal. The Court of Appeals concluded sanctions were warranted in this case. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment and imposed sanctions against plaintiffs and their attorney. View "Singh v. Lipworth" on Justia Law

In 2012, Westlands Water District and its related distribution districts entered into two-year, interim renewal contracts with the United States Bureau of Reclamation relating to the Bureau’s ongoing provision of Central Valley Project (CVP) water to the Water Districts. When Water Districts approved the interim renewal contracts, they made specific findings that the renewals were exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act. Accordingly, the Water Districts did not undertake their own environmental review prior to such approvals. Thereafter, North Coast Rivers Alliance, Friends of the River, Save the American River Association, the California Sportfishing Protection Alliance and the Winnemem Wintu Tribe all filed a petition for writ of mandate, contending that the interim renewal contracts were not exempt from CEQA and that the Water Districts should have undertaken a full environmental review. The trial court disagreed and denied the petition for writ of mandate. Petitioners appealed the judgment of dismissal. Upon review of the record, the Court of Appeal concluded that the matters contemplated in the interim renewal contracts were exempt from CEQA, including under the statutory exemption for ongoing pre-CEQA projects, and the categorical exemption for the continued operation of existing facilities at the same level of use. Therefore, the Court affirmed the superior court judgment. View "North Coast Rivers Alliance v. Westlands Water Dist." on Justia Law

The eighth addendum to a 1997 environmental impact report for San Jose’s International Airport Master Plan concerns the environmental impacts of recent amendments to the Airport Master Plan, which include changes to the size and location of future air cargo facilities, replacement of air cargo facilities with 44 acres of general aviation facilities, and modification of two taxiways to provide better access for corporate jets. The trial court rejected a challenge under the California Environmental Quality Act, Public Resources Code 21000, which claimed that the amendments constituted a new project and that the changes are substantial and require major revisions to the EIR with respect to noise, greenhouse gas emissions, toxic air contaminants, and the burrowing owl habitat. The appeals court affirmed, finding substantial evidence showing that the master Plan amendments addressed in the eighth addendum will not result in any new significant impacts on noise, air quality, and the burrowing owl habitat that are substantially different from those described in the 1997 EIR and the 2003 supplemental EIR. The city did not violate sCEQA Guidelines by failing to analyze greenhouse gas emissions in the eighth addendum. View "Citizens Against Airport Pollution v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Aaron Campbell met Silvester Leyva at a bar where they exchanged telephone numbers and discussed buying and selling marijuana. A few days later, Campell and defendant-appellant Xavier Fort (among others) went to Leyva's house to get the marijuana. Leyva and his friend, Samuel De La Torre, met Campbell in Leyva's front yard. After De La Torre handed marijuana to Campbell, Campbell pulled a gun and began to back away toward two waiting vehicles. Fort, who was standing near the vehicles, fired his gun in the direction of the house. Leyva was killed by one of the bullets. A jury convicted defendants of first degree murder and two counts of robbery, and found true a robbery special-circumstance allegation. Defendants appealed their convictions: Fort argued that based on the accusatory pleading, the trial court erred in instructing the jury in his case on first degree felony murder only (with robbery as the underlying felony); the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on lesser included offenses. Both defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against them at trial. The Court of Appeals, in the published portion of its opinion, agreed that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on lesser included offenses. In the nonpublished portion, the Court held that the instructional error was harmless, and we rejected defendants' argument that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions of the robbery of Leyva. Furthermore, the Court also concluded that the court's stay of a sentence enhancement term as to Fort constituted an unauthorized sentence, which was corrected. View "California v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Tonna and Nevarez were in a dating relationship for five years. They lived together from 2008 to 2010. Following their 2011 breakup, Tonna continued to try to persuade Nevarez to get back together with him, and went Nevarez’s workplace, a Safeway supermarket, almost daily. Nevarez sometimes responded to his communications and sometimes met with Tonna. Nevarez claims that at one point, Tonna pushed Nevarez against a wall and tried to take her clothes off; another time, he grabbed her arm. Tonna contacted Nevarez’s mother. Nevarez obtained a work transfer and changed her phone number before seeking a restraining order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, Fam. Code, 6200. The restraining order contained personal conduct orders and stay-away orders Tonna claimed that there was insufficient evidence that he committed “abuse” and insufficient evidence that Nevarez feared future abuse. The appeals court affirmed.View "Nevarez v. Tonna" on Justia Law