Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Pangilinan separated from her husband, who lives in the Philippines, in 2006 when she moved to the U.S. She began a relationship with Palisoc in February 2008. H. was born in November 2008. Pangilinan’s husband’s name was listed on H.’s birth certificate and on baptism invitations as H.’s father. Palisoc had a relationship with H. until the end of Palisoc’s relationship with Pangilinan in July 2011, but never publicly acknowledged that H. was his son. In August 2011, Pangilinan sought a declaration that Palisoc was H.’s father and sought child support. The court found that Family Code section 7540’s conclusive presumption did not apply because Pangilinan and her husband were not cohabiting when H. was conceived or born, but refused to order genetic testing. Reasoning that Pangilinan’s action was an action to establish the nonexistence of a parent-child relationship between her husband and H. under former section 7630, subdivision (a)(2), the court concluded that her action was untimely and declared her husband the father. The appeals court reversed, finding that the trial court prejudicially erred in finding Pangilinan’s petition to be untimely and in failing to entertain her request for genetic testing. View "Pangilinan v. Palisoc" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree residential robbery, assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, and kidnapping. On appeal, defendant contended, inter alia, that because he received life sentences as a result of the Three Strikes law, the trial court erred in imposing a consecutive 10-year term for the gang enhancement on each count rather than the 15-year minimum parole eligibility requirement found in section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5). The court concluded, based upon People v. Jones, that because defendant's life sentences are the result of a penalty provision (the Three Strikes law), they are life sentences within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5). The trial court erred in imposing the 10-year gang enhancement pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C) and, instead, should have imposed the 15-year minimum parole term. The court modified the judgment to correct the error and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law

In 1995, Smith was charged with three counts of lewd and lascivious acts upon a child of 14 or 15 by a person at least 10 years older; five counts of oral copulation with a person under the age of 16 by a person over the age of 21; four counts of sexual penetration of a person under age 16 by a person over age 21; and two counts of sexual intercourse between a person under the age of 16 and over the age of 21. He was then 34 years old; the victim was 14 years old. Smith pleaded no contest to four counts and the prosecution moved for dismissal of the remaining charges. Smith’s probation expired successfully in 1999. In 2013, Smith unsuccessfully moved to dismiss pre-1997 sex offenses under Penal Code section 1203.4, which provides that in any case “in which a defendant has fulfilled the conditions of probation,” the defendant “shall” be permitted to withdraw his plea and enter a plea of not guilty, whereupon the court “shall” dismiss the accusations. Based on amendments to section 1203.4 while and after Smith’s probation, the appeals court reversed as to some counts and affirmed as to others. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Department of Fair Employment and Housing alleged that Ottovich owned or managed a Fremont apartment building. He advertised an apartment available for rent. Coleman called and expressed interest. He asked who would be living in the apartment, and she stated that she, her husband, and their young daughter would live there. Defendant responded that he would not rent the apartment to her. Coleman told him, “That’s discrimination.” He replied that he did not have to show her the apartment or rent it to her, and hung up. The Department alleged a “familial status” discrimination violation of Government Code section 19255, and sought compensatory and treble damages. Ottovich moved to dismiss the complaint as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP). The trial court denied the motion as frivolous, and awarded plaintiff $2,500. After several discovery abuses by Ottovich, followed by sanctions and warnings, the court entered a default judgment against him. The court vacated the default, but continued to treat his answer as stricken and treated the complaint’s allegations as judicially admitted. A jury assessed damages at $8,705. The appeals court affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court was required to reinstate his answer when it vacated the default judgment. View "Dept. of Fair Emp't & Hous. v. Ottovich" on Justia Law

Wellesly owned real property subject to a first deed and a junior mechanic's lien. The holder of the mechanic's lien subsequently filed suit to foreclose its lien, arguing that the lien was not eliminated by a foreclosure. The court held that, under well-established California law, the senior beneficiary's lien and title ordinarily do not merge when a deed in lieu of a foreclosure is given if there are junior lienholders of record; the foreclosure after acceptance of the deed was therefore valid and eliminated all junior liens, including plaintiff's mechanic's lien; and the third party now owns the property free of all such junior encumbrances. Accordingly, the court reversed the superior court's foreclosure order on the mechanic's lien. View "Decon Group v. Prudential Mort." on Justia Law