Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Officer Woelkers saw 15-year-old J.G. walking across a parking lot toward his brother, D.G. Woelkers parked his patrol vehicle, without turning on lights or siren, and “casually” approached the brothers. He was wearing his uniform. J.G. said they were going to a party. Officer Klier arrived in his patrol vehicle to “assist.” Woelkers asked D.G. for identification, and D.G. gave him a Honduran identification card. J.G. stated that he had no identification and gave a name. J.G. Woelkers ran a check and learned that no California driver’s license or identification card had issued to either boy. The boys consented to a pat-down and the officers found nothing illegal. Meanwhile, two more officers arrived, displaying a gun. J.G. agreed to a search of his backpack. Woelkers located a semiautomatic pistol inside. The D.A. filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602(a) alleging felony possession of a concealed firearm by a minor. J.G. first admitted that allegation, then successfully moved to withdraw his plea, and moved to suppress the pistol from being introduced into evidence. The juvenile court denied the motion. The court of appeal reversed. The totality of the circumstances would have conveyed to a reasonable person—juvenile or adult—that he was not free to refuse the request. Woelkers clearly conveyed that he suspected the brothers of unlawful activity. He asked them whether they had anything “illegal,” conducted a records check, and searched them, physically restraining them, while the police presence and show of force grew. View "In re J.G." on Justia Law

In 1996 when the Legislature established defendant California High-Speed Rail Authority, it declared the need for an intercity rail system operating at high speeds to complement the existing infrastructure of highways and airports. At the heart of the dispute in this case is the Authority's decision that trains travelling between those destinations should travel through the Pacheco Pass rather than further north at the Altamont Pass. Petitioners challenged the adequacy of the revised final program environmental impact report/environmental impact statement (PEIR/EIS) and the approval of the Pacheco Pass network alternative as the route for the high-speed train (HST) system to connect the San Francisco Bay Area and the Central Valley. They contended the revised final PEIR violates the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) because it: (1) provided an inadequate where to elevate the track along the San Francisco Peninsula; (2) used a flawed revenue and ridership model; and (3) had an inadequate range of alternatives, specifically because it rejects an alternative proposed by an expert consulting company (Setec). The Authority moved to dismiss, arguing that federal law preempted any CEQA remedy. The Court of Appeal found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Town of Atherton v. Cal. High-Speed Rail Auth." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit seeking an injunction to prevent Yelp, a popular website, from making claims about the accuracy and efficacy of its "filter" of unreliable or biased customer reviews. The trial court granted Yelp's special motion to strike plaintiff's complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 because Yelp's statements at issue were matters of public interest. The court concluded that Yelp's representations about its review filter constitute commercial speech squarely within the public speech exemption of section 425.17, subdivision (c) where Yelp's statements about its review filter consists of representations of fact about Yelp's website that are made for the purpose of obtaining approval for, promoting, or securing advertisements on Yelp's website, and Yelp's statements were made in the course of delivering Yelp's website. Further, Yelp's intended audience is an actual or potential buyer or customer, or a person likely to repeat the statement to, or otherwise influence, an actual or potential buyer or customer. The court rejected Yelp's assertion that the federal Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 230, barred plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's order. Finally, plaintiff shall be given an opportunity to move to amend his complaint to substitute the real party in interest in this action as plaintiff. View "Demetriades v. Yelp, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eastern Municipal Water District (EMWD) hired general contractor S.J. and Burkhardt, Inc. (SJB) for a public works construction project in 2006. Safeco Insurance Company (Safeco) executed performance and payment bonds for the project. Plaintiff Golden State Boring & Pipe Jacking, Inc. (GSB) was a subcontractor for the project, completing its work by September 2006, but it did not receive payment. In March 2008, SJB sent a voluntary default letter to Safeco. In July 2008, GSB sued SJB, EMWD, and Safeco for the unpaid amounts under the contract, separately seeking payment from Safeco under its payment bond. EMWD filed a cross-complaint to interplead retained sums. Safeco made a motion for summary judgment on the cause of action for payment under the bond on the ground that GSB’s claim was untimely. The trial court granted the motion, finding that there had been three cessations of labor that triggered GSB’s duty to file a stop notice in order to secure payment under Safeco's payment bond. At a subsequent court trial on the contract claims, GSB was awarded judgment against SJB, and Safeco was awarded judgment on the interpleader action. GSB appealed the summary judgment ruling, arguing: (1) the trial court erroneously overruled its objections to evidentiary matters presented in support of Safeco’s summary judgment; and (2) the court erred in finding the action was untimely. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Golden State v. Eastern Municipal Water Dist." on Justia Law

Marvin Estuardo Catalan pleaded guilty to four felonies, including grand theft, identity theft, and two counts of forgery. The court imposed a four-year hybrid or split sentence comprised of a one-year, four-month jail term followed by two years and eight months of mandatory supervision on specified terms and conditions. After Catalan violated the terms of his mandatory supervision, the trial court revoked and reinstated his supervision and added 550 days to his jail sentence. Catalan argued on appeal the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence exceeding the recommended term under the Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Catalan" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of violating Penal Code section 288.3, subdivision (a), which prohibits contacting a minor for the purpose of committing various crimes, including, as alleged here, sexual penetration with a person under the age of 18 years. The court ordered defendant placed on formal probation for five years subject to various conditions, including that defendant serve 240 days in the Orange County jail. Defendant’s interactions with the victim were entirely over the Internet, primarily through chat rooms. At the time he met "Jane Doe," she was 14 years old and he was 59 years old, but he represented himself to be only two or three years older than her. The two developed a close relationship, and when Jane Doe was 16 years old, they began having cybersex, which involved watching pornographic videos together, describing various sexual acts they would do to one another, and masturbating together. Defendant was in California during these online interactions, and Jane Doe was in Indiana. Defendant raised numerous contentions on appeal: Jane Doe was not a minor because the age of consent in Indiana was 16 years old, and in any event, he could not have caused the sexual penetration from thousands of miles away; his conviction under section 288.3 violated his constitutional rights to equal protection, privacy, and free speech; and his conviction violated the dormant commerce clause. The Court of Appeal affirmed: "[d]efendant’s seduction of Jane Doe under false pretenses, together with his repeated suggestions that she masturbate, satisfied the statutory elements of intending to participate in causing sexual penetration. Even if Jane Doe was an adult for purposes of applying Indiana law, she was a minor for purposes of applying California law. And we reject the various constitutional challenges defendant raises to the validity of section 288.3 and his conviction in particular." View "California v. Shapiro" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendants James Sweeney II and Patrick Ryan of 65 counts of white-collar crime (all relating to the sale of securities) and found true three special allegations. The court sentenced Sweeney to 33 years and Ryan to 31 years. The court also imposed restitution. On appeal, both defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on count 68 and the convictions on counts 67, 68, 69, 70, and 71, primarily involving multi-level marketing programs. Ryan also claimed various sentencing errors, including those related to fines and restitution.3 Sweeney makes similar arguments. The Court of Appeal found sufficient evidence for count 68. The Court also upheld convictions on counts 67 through 71. View "California v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

The trial court ordered plaintiff and her attorney to pay attorney's fees and costs under Code of Civil Procedure 1038. The attorney appealed. The court held that section 128.7 provides for attorney fees sanctions against an attorney; the Attorney General here elected not to seek section 128.7 relief; and, unless and until the Legislature amends section 1038 to authorize an award of "sanctions" against counsel, defense costs and fees may not be imposed against counsel pursuant thereto. Therefore, the award against the attorney is reversed and the attorney is awarded costs on appeal. View "Settle v. State of California" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of charges related to his use of counterfeit $20 bills to pay for his $100 dinner at Outback Steakhouse. After admitting he had a prior violent and serious conviction, as well as prior nonviolent and nonserious theft-related felony convictions, he was sentenced to 5 years and 4 months in state prison. The court held that defendant can only be convicted of a single count of theft and that defendant may be convicted of felony petty theft rather than the misdemeanor charge of defrauding an innkeeper. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, modified in part, and affirmed in part. View "People v. Rader" on Justia Law

The District and UTLA petitioned the court, challenging the trial court's ruling that the District was required to produce unredacted Academic Growth Over Time (AGT) scores, as well as the location codes which identify the school to which each teacher is assigned. The court held that the unredacted AGT scores are exempt from disclosure under the catch-all exemption in section 6255 of the California Public Records Act, Gov. Code, 6250 et seq., because the public interest served by not disclosing the teachers' names clearly outweighs the public interest served by their disclosure. Therefore, the court granted the separate petitions for writ of mandate by the District and UTLA to the extent they challenged the trial court's ruling on this issue. However, the court remanded for further proceedings regarding disclosure of the location codes. View "Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law