Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Catherine Kuo was killed while volunteering at a food distribution event organized by the Dublin Unified School District (DUSD). Her family and estate sued DUSD for negligence and premises liability, alleging failure to implement and communicate safety protocols. DUSD moved for summary judgment, arguing that Labor Code section 3364.5, which deems school volunteers as employees entitled to workers' compensation benefits, barred the plaintiffs' claims.The Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, granted DUSD’s motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that section 3364.5 applied, providing that workers' compensation was the sole remedy for any injury, including death, sustained by volunteers while performing their duties. The court found that the statute's plain language and legislative history supported this interpretation, and thus, it lacked jurisdiction to grant relief.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the term "any injury" in section 3364.5 unambiguously includes fatal injuries. The court also determined that DUSD’s resolution, which declared volunteers entitled to workers' compensation benefits, satisfied the statutory requirement, even though it did not explicitly use the word "deemed." The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the statute did not apply because DUSD did not treat its volunteers as employees in practice, noting that the statute did not require such conduct.The appellate court concluded that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of DUSD, affirming that workers' compensation was the exclusive remedy for the plaintiffs' claims. View "Kuo v. Dublin Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff William Glickman filed a motion to apportion discovery referee fees to the defendants, Charles S. Krolikowski and Newmeyer & Dillion LLP, due to their incomplete and insufficient discovery responses. The discovery referee recommended that the defendants pay all of the $22,750 in referee fees incurred on recent discovery motions, plus $1,750 for the apportionment motion itself. The trial court overruled the defendants' objections to this recommendation.The defendants appealed the trial court's order, arguing that the unequal allocation of fees was tantamount to monetary sanctions and should be appealable under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(12). They contended that the referee's allocation of fees based on their conduct in causing the fees to be incurred should be treated as a monetary sanction.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the appeal. The court held that an order allocating discovery referee fees is not a sanctions order, even if the fees are allocated based on the referee's perception of the parties' conduct. The court noted that the referee's recommendation did not use the word "sanctions" or cite any legal authority for imposing sanctions. Instead, the recommendation relied on the discretion provided in the court's reference order, which was stipulated to by the parties.The court concluded that the order could not be classified as a "monetary sanction" for purposes of establishing appealability. The court dismissed the appeal, stating that parties must either wait for entry of judgment to appeal this kind of order or file a timely writ petition. The court also rejected the notion that the order could be appealed under the collateral order doctrine, as the payment of discovery referee costs may be reallocated at the end of the lawsuit. View "Glickman v. Krolikowski" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Melissa Mandell-Brown filed a complaint against Novo Nordisk, Inc. and Zamaneh Zamanian, asserting 16 causes of action, including claims for discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and the Labor Code, as well as common law claims for breach of contract, wrongful termination, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by a separate statement of 161 undisputed facts, attorney declarations, and witness declarations. Plaintiff did not file an opposition to the motion or a separate statement.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment after plaintiff failed to file the required opposition or separate statement, despite being granted two continuances. The court found no genuine issues of material fact and concluded that the plaintiff could not prove the elements of her causes of action. Plaintiff appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(3), by granting the motion based on the plaintiff’s failure to file the requisite separate statement. The appellate court noted that the trial court had the discretion to grant the motion for summary judgment when the opposing party fails to comply with the requirement of a separate statement. Given the complexity of the case and the plaintiff's failure to submit any opposition or appear at the hearing, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Mandell-Brown v. Novo Nordisk Inc." on Justia Law

Attorney Steven C. Kim took a lien against his client’s real property to secure his attorney fee. The trial court ordered Kim’s client to convey that property to fulfill a sales contract. Kim’s lien obstructed the sale, and the trial court expunged Kim’s lien. Kim’s client appealed, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, no one sought review in the Supreme Court, and the judgment became final in 2018. Three days later, Kim brought a new suit against the same buyer of the same property, seeking a declaration that his expunged lien was valid and the result in the earlier suit was wrong. The buyer successfully invoked issue preclusion, and Kim now appeals this new defeat.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the buyer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend, reasoning that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred Kim’s effort to relitigate the lien question. The court later also ruled for the buyer on its cross-complaint, and Kim alone appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the judgment. The court held that the earlier litigation precluded relitigation of the lien question. The lien issue was actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit, and Kim was in privity with his client Central Korean. The court found that Kim had a financial interest in the lien question and controlled the litigation in cooperation with his client. The court dismissed Kim’s new arguments about section 1908 of the Code of Civil Procedure as they were raised for the first time in his reply brief. The trial court’s analysis of issue preclusion was deemed correct, and the judgment was affirmed, awarding costs to the respondents. View "Kim v. New Life Oasis Church" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Barbara Politsch obtained a default judgment of approximately $175,000 against Metroplaza Partners, LLC in a premises liability case. However, Metroplaza had sold the property in 2005, over a year before Politsch's injury, and was not served with the summons and complaint. Metroplaza learned of the default judgment in January 2014 but did not act on it based on their counsel's advice. In February 2022, Politsch, with new counsel, renewed the judgment and sought to enforce it. Metroplaza then moved to set aside the default judgment, which the trial court granted under its equitable powers.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Metroplaza's motion to set aside the default judgment, finding that Metroplaza had a meritorious defense, was never properly served, and had an excuse for not acting sooner due to reliance on their attorney's lack of advice. The court also noted the strong preference for cases to be decided on their merits and concerns about potential injustice.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling. It agreed that Metroplaza demonstrated a meritorious defense, a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense initially, and due diligence in seeking to set aside the default judgment once it was discovered. The appellate court emphasized the policy favoring decisions on the merits and the exceptional circumstances of the case, including the fact that Metroplaza was not the correct party to be sued. View "Politsch v. Metroplaza Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

Rachel Moniz and Paola Correa filed separate lawsuits against Adecco USA, Inc. under the Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (PAGA), alleging violations of the Labor Code. Moniz and Adecco settled their case, but Correa challenged the fairness of the settlement. The trial court approved the revised settlement over Correa's objections and awarded attorney’s fees to Moniz’s counsel. Correa's request for a service award and attorney’s fees for her own work was largely denied. Correa appealed, arguing the trial court's analysis of the revised settlement was flawed and that her request for attorney’s fees and a service award should have been granted.The San Mateo County Superior Court overruled Adecco's demurrer in Moniz's case, while the San Francisco Superior Court sustained Adecco's demurrer in Correa's case. Correa's motion to intervene in Moniz's suit was denied, and her subsequent appeal was also denied. The trial court approved Moniz's settlement with Adecco, awarding Moniz a service award and attorney’s fees, but denied Correa’s requests. Correa's motions for a new trial and to vacate the judgment were denied, leading to her appeal.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. While the appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court decided Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc., which disapproved of the reasoning in Moniz II regarding Correa’s standing. The Court of Appeal concluded that Correa and her counsel lacked standing to challenge the judgment based on the Supreme Court's decision in Turrieta. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed. View "Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc." on Justia Law

The Santa Ana Police Officers Association (SAPOA) and certain anonymous City of Santa Ana police officers (Doe Officers) sued the City of Santa Ana, alleging wrongful disclosure of confidential personnel records, failure to investigate a complaint about the disclosure, and denial of a request for related communications. The first amended complaint included four causes of action: violation of Penal Code section 832.7 and Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045, negligence, failure to investigate under Penal Code sections 832.5 and 832.7, and violation of the Meyers-Milias Brown Act (MMBA).The Superior Court of Orange County sustained the City’s demurrer to the first amended complaint without leave to amend, leading to the dismissal of the case. The court found that the Doe Officers could not proceed anonymously without statutory authority or court authorization. It also concluded that the SAPOA lacked standing and that there was no private right of action for the alleged violations of the Penal Code and Evidence Code sections cited.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the judgment as to the Doe Officers, agreeing they lacked authorization to proceed anonymously. It also affirmed the trial court’s decision regarding the first, second, and fourth causes of action, finding no private right of action for damages under the cited statutes and that the SAPOA failed to exhaust administrative remedies for the MMBA claim. However, the appellate court reversed the judgment concerning the third cause of action, holding that the SAPOA had standing to seek mandamus relief to compel the City to investigate the complaint and notify the SAPOA of the disposition, as required by Penal Code sections 832.5 and 832.7. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this cause of action. View "Santa Ana Police Officers Assn. v. City of Santa Ana" on Justia Law

Thomas Armenta and Tiffini Pateras began their relationship in 2012 and had a child, M.A., in 2014. They separated in 2017 and entered a child custody and support agreement. Armenta, a Chumash descendant, works at the Chumash tribal office and earns $114,000 annually, plus $5,000 monthly from the Chumash tribe’s general welfare program. Pateras filed a petition for child support and attorney fees in 2023. The trial court ordered Armenta to pay $448 monthly for temporary child support and $2,000 in attorney fees. Subsequent hearings led to a final order for Armenta to pay $1,053 monthly in child support and $5,000 in need-based attorney fees.The trial court ruled that the $5,000 monthly payments Armenta receives from the Chumash tribe’s general welfare program should be considered as income for calculating child support. Armenta argued that these payments should be excluded as they are not subject to federal income taxation and claimed they were need-based public assistance. However, the court found no evidence that the payments were need-based or restricted to low-income individuals.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that the payments from the Chumash tribe’s general welfare program are income for child support purposes, regardless of their tax status under federal law. The court emphasized that California’s child support statutes aim to ensure parents support their children according to their financial ability, and income is broadly defined to include various sources. The court also rejected Armenta’s claims regarding the need for an evidentiary hearing and the enforcement of a notice to appear, finding no procedural errors. The orders were affirmed, and costs on appeal were awarded to the respondents. View "Pateras v. Armenta" on Justia Law

Glenn and Geneanne Maniago filed a lawsuit against Desert Cardiology Consultants’ Medical Group, Inc. (DCCMG) and Dr. Praveen Panguluri, asserting five causes of action: negligence, loss of consortium, assault, battery, and unfair business practices. Glenn, a scrub technologist, was exposed to HIV patient’s blood during a procedure due to Dr. Panguluri’s actions. The complaint did not allege that Glenn contracted HIV but claimed harm from the exposure.The Superior Court of Riverside County sustained demurrers to most of the claims with leave to amend, overruled the demurrer to Glenn’s negligence claim, and struck the punitive damages allegations. The Maniagos did not request oral argument and did not appear for the hearing. Subsequently, they voluntarily dismissed their entire action with prejudice to expedite an appeal of the adverse rulings.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeal from a voluntary dismissal entered by the clerk at the plaintiffs’ request without a final judicial determination of their claims. The court emphasized that a voluntary dismissal by a plaintiff is a ministerial act and not appealable. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, noting that the appropriate vehicle for challenging interlocutory rulings is a petition for writ of mandate, not an appeal from a voluntary dismissal. View "Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants' Medical Group" on Justia Law

A hospital in Siskiyou County, California, filed a lawsuit against the County of Siskiyou and other defendants, challenging the practice of bringing individuals with psychiatric emergencies to its emergency department under the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act. The hospital argued that it was not equipped or licensed to provide the necessary psychiatric care and sought to prevent the county from bringing such patients to its facility unless they had a physical emergency condition. The hospital also sought reimbursement for the costs associated with holding these patients.The Siskiyou County Superior Court denied the hospital's motion for a preliminary injunction, which sought to stop the county from bringing psychiatric patients to its emergency department. The court found that the hospital had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits and that the burden on the county and the potential harm to the patients outweighed the hospital's concerns.The hospital's complaint included several causes of action, including violations of Medicaid laws, disability discrimination laws, mental health parity laws, and section 17000 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The hospital also alleged breach of an implied-in-fact contract for the costs incurred in providing post-stabilization services to psychiatric patients. The trial court sustained demurrers to the complaint without leave to amend, finding that the hospital failed to identify any clear legal mandate that the county or the Department of Health Care Services had violated.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's judgment of dismissal. The appellate court concluded that the hospital had not identified any mandatory and ministerial duty that the county or the department had violated, which is necessary to obtain a writ of mandate. The court also found that the hospital's breach of contract claim failed because there were no allegations of mutual consent to an implied contract. Consequently, the hospital's appeal from the denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction was dismissed as moot. View "Siskiyou Hospital v. County of Siskiyou" on Justia Law