Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against the City, alleging violations of the California Public Records Act (CPRA) and the California Constitution. The City maintains a website for public records requests but the Department of Water and Power (DWP) does not provide a specific method for such requests. Plaintiff, after receiving an erroneous water bill, submitted multiple records requests through the DWP website but received no response. She later posted a complaint on social media, which led to a phone call from a customer service representative but no records were provided.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the City’s demurrer without leave to amend, concluding that the CPRA does not permit class claims and that plaintiff’s individual claim was insufficient because the City provides a method for submitting CPRA requests through its main website. The court also denied the City’s motion for sanctions, finding plaintiff’s arguments were not frivolous.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court agreed with the trial court that the CPRA does not allow for class claims, as the statutory language and case law limit judicial relief to the individual who made the records request. However, the appellate court found that plaintiff’s individual claim was sufficient, as she alleged that she submitted a request for public records and the City failed to respond within the statutory period. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded with directions to enter a new order sustaining the demurrer as to the class claims and overruling the demurrer to plaintiff’s individual CPRA claim. View "Di Lauro v. City of Burbank" on Justia Law

A former employee, Corbin Williams, worked as an insurance adjuster for Alacrity Solutions Group, LLC, from 2014 until January 2022. Williams typically worked 84-hour weeks but was not paid overtime, violating the Labor Code. In March 2023, over a year after his employment ended, Williams notified the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency of his intent to pursue a PAGA action for these violations. He then filed a lawsuit seeking civil penalties on behalf of other current and former employees but not on his own behalf.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained a demurrer to Williams's complaint without leave to amend, finding the action time-barred. The court noted that Williams had not suffered any Labor Code violations within the one-year statute of limitations period before notifying the Agency, as his employment ended in January 2022. Consequently, the court did not address the defendant's alternative argument regarding Williams's standing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that to be a PAGA plaintiff, an individual must have a timely individual claim for at least one Labor Code violation. Since Williams's individual claims were time-barred, he could not satisfy this requirement. The court rejected Williams's arguments that other aggrieved employees' timely claims could substitute for his own untimely claims and that the continuous accrual doctrine applied. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend, as Williams's proposed amendments would not cure the timeliness defect. View "Williams v. Alacrity Solutions Grp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Zackary Diamond was injured by a punch from a third party during an altercation in the restricted pit area at Bakersfield Speedway. He alleged that the defendants, Scott Schweitzer, Schweitzer Motorsports Productions, and Christian Schweitzer, were negligent in providing security, responding to the altercation, and undertaking rescue efforts. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Diamond's claims were barred by a release and waiver of liability form he signed to enter the pit area. The trial court granted the motion, finding the release clear, unequivocal, and broad in scope, covering the negligent conduct alleged.The Superior Court of Kern County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the release included risks related to racing activities and that the assault was such a risk. The court interpreted the release as covering the type of event that occurred, thus barring Diamond's negligence claims.On appeal, Diamond contended that the release was unenforceable because the injury-producing act was not reasonably related to the purpose of the release, which he described as observing the race from the pit area. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, concluded that the release met the requirements for enforceability: it was clear, unambiguous, and explicit in expressing the intent to release all liability for Diamond's injury; the alleged acts of negligence were reasonably related to the purpose of the release; and the release did not contravene public policy. The court also found that the defendants adequately raised a complete defense based on the signed release and that Diamond failed to rebut this defense. Consequently, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Diamond v. Schweitzer" on Justia Law

Lawrence Marino obtained an 18-month civil harassment restraining order against Mark Alon Rayant in a proceeding where Rayant was not present. Rayant later appeared, arguing he had not received notice of Marino’s restraining order request and that the request was without merit. The trial court terminated the restraining order. Rayant then moved to seal the entire record of the restraining order proceedings, citing concerns that the proceedings had negatively impacted his background checks for job applications and subjected him to increased scrutiny by airport authorities when returning from international travel. The trial court denied the sealing request because Rayant had not made the necessary showing for sealing under the California Rules of Court.Rayant appealed the trial court's decision. He contended that there is no federal constitutional right of public access to records of restraining order proceedings, and therefore the court rules for sealing records, which are based on federal constitutional requirements, are inapplicable. The trial court found that the sealing rules provide an independent, statutory right of public access to court records, creating a broad presumption of public access with only limited exceptions, none of which applied in this case.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the sealing rules under California Rules of Court apply to the records Rayant sought to seal. The court found that Rayant did not meet the high bar for sealing imposed by those rules, as he did not demonstrate an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access, nor did he show a substantial probability that his interest would be prejudiced if the record was not sealed. The court affirmed the trial court's order denying the motion to seal. View "Marino v. Rayant" on Justia Law

Carlos and Ana Carachure filed a lawsuit against the City of Azusa, claiming the City violated article XIII D of the California Constitution by charging sewer and trash franchise fees that exceeded the cost of providing those services and using the fees to fund general city services. The City argued that the Carachures failed to exhaust their administrative remedies because they did not follow the statutory procedures for a refund, which require paying the fees under protest and filing a claim for a refund. The trial court agreed with the City and entered judgment in its favor.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County ruled that the Carachures were required to file a claim for a refund with the City before seeking judicial relief, as they claimed the fees were illegally collected or assessed. The court denied the Carachures' petition for a writ of mandate and entered judgment for the City. The Carachures filed a motion for a new trial and to vacate the judgment, arguing the trial court relied on inapplicable property tax cases and the current version of the Revenue and Taxation Code. The trial court denied the motion.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court held that the Carachures' constitutional challenge to the City's collection and use of franchise fees seeks relief outside the scope of the statutory claims procedure for refunds. The court concluded that the Carachures did not have to file a claim for a refund before bringing this action, as their challenge was not an action for a refund governed by section 5472 and Article 2 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. The judgment was reversed, allowing the Carachures to proceed with their constitutional claims. View "Carachure v. City of Azusa" on Justia Law

Fell Holdings LLC and Stanyan Holdings LLC, misdescribed as California limited liability companies instead of Delaware limited liability companies, filed unlawful detainer proceedings against Fell Street Automotive Clinic, Stanyan Street Automotive Clinic, and Laurence Nasey. Nasey had lost ownership of two properties in San Francisco during a nonjudicial foreclosure but continued operating his businesses through a leaseback arrangement with the new owners, memorialized in a settlement agreement. The agreement allowed Nasey to repurchase the properties, with stipulated judgments against him if he failed to do so.The trial court entered judgments in favor of Fell Holdings and Stanyan Holdings, which were later enforced. Appellants moved to vacate these judgments, arguing that the misdescription of the plaintiffs' corporate status deprived the court of jurisdiction, rendering all judicial actions void. The trial court denied the vacatur motions.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the misdescription of the plaintiffs' corporate status did not automatically void the judgments. Instead, the issue was whether the discrepancy could be cured by amendment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a)(1). The court reversed the trial court's orders denying the vacatur motions and remanded the case, directing the trial court to vacate the judgments and enforcement orders without prejudice. The trial court was instructed to consider any motions by the plaintiffs to amend their complaints to correct the misdescription and to address appellants' arguments regarding the release of Nasey's $202,500 earnest money deposit. The parties were to bear their own costs on appeal. View "1215 Fell SF Owner LLC v. Fell Street Automotive Clinic" on Justia Law

Steven Gomes filed a lawsuit to invalidate ordinances regulating groundwater use in Mendocino, adopted by the Mendocino City Community Services District (the district). The district argued that Gomes’s claims were barred by res judicata due to a prior case, Gomes v. Mendocino City Community Services Dist. (2019) (Gomes I), which challenged the district’s groundwater management program. The trial court found the ordinances contained an invalid attorney’s fee provision but rejected Gomes’s other claims.In Gomes I, the trial court denied Gomes’s petition challenging the district’s 2007 groundwater measures, but the judgment was reversed on appeal. The appellate court found the district had authority to limit groundwater extraction and that the 2007 measures were invalid due to non-compliance with statutory procedures. The district subsequently adopted new ordinances in 2020, which Gomes challenged in the present case.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. Gomes argued the ordinances imposed fees for groundwater extraction that required voter approval, which the district did not obtain. The court concluded that the claim was not barred by Gomes I, as it involved different ordinances and provisions. The court held that the fees imposed by the district were not for the extraction of groundwater and thus did not require voter approval under section 10710. The judgment was affirmed, except for the invalid attorney’s fee provision. View "Gomes v. Mendocino City Community Services Dist." on Justia Law

In 2009, John Roe DZ 20, John Roe DZ 21, and John Roe DZ 22 (Plaintiffs) sued an employee of Doe 3, Family Services Organization (Family Services), alleging childhood sexual assault. The trial court dismissed the claims against the employee with prejudice due to the statute of limitations. In 2022, Plaintiffs filed a new complaint against Family Services based on the same allegations, relying on the revival provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1.Family Services demurred to the complaint, arguing that Plaintiffs’ claims could not be revived under section 340.1, subdivision (q), because they were derivative of the claims litigated to finality in the 2009 action. The trial court overruled the demurrer. Family Services then petitioned for a writ of mandate to direct the trial court to vacate its order and sustain the demurrer without leave to amend.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that a claim for derivative liability against a principal is considered “litigated to finality” under section 340.1, subdivision (q), if a previous suit against the agent for the same damages based on the same operative facts was dismissed with prejudice. Consequently, the court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to sustain the demurrer but allowed Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to potentially allege new facts that could support a cause of action against Family Services. View "Doe 3 v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, a tenured professor at a community college, filed a complaint alleging sexual harassment, retaliation, and related claims against the Los Angeles Community College District and a vice president of student services. The alleged harassment occurred over an eight-month period in 2017, during which the vice president made inappropriate comments and advances towards the plaintiff. The plaintiff also claimed retaliation when she did not comply with his demands, including attempts to move her program and firing her staff.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County presided over the trial, where a jury awarded the plaintiff $10 million in noneconomic damages. The defendants filed motions for a new trial and partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict, citing prejudicial errors in the admission of evidence and excessive damages. These motions were denied by the trial judge, who made inappropriate and irrelevant comments during the post-trial hearing, leading to his disqualification for cause.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and found significant errors in the trial court's evidentiary rulings. The appellate court determined that the admission of 20-year-old newspaper articles and evidence of the vice president's misdemeanor convictions were prejudicial and irrelevant. Additionally, the testimony of a student who had filed a separate harassment complaint against a different administrator was improperly admitted, as it was not closely related to the plaintiff's circumstances and theory of the case.The appellate court concluded that these errors, combined with the excessive damages awarded, warranted a new trial. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial. The defendants were awarded costs on appeal. View "Odom v. L.A. Community College Dist." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Melissa Mandell-Brown, filed a complaint against Novo Nordisk, Inc. and Zamaneh Zamanian, asserting 16 causes of action, including claims for discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and the Labor Code, as well as common law claims for breach of contract, wrongful termination, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by a separate statement of 161 undisputed facts, attorney declarations, and witness declarations.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment after the plaintiff failed to file an opposition or a separate statement in response to the motion. The court granted two continuances to the plaintiff, but she still did not file the required documents or appear at the continued hearing. The court concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the plaintiff could not prove the elements of her causes of action.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(3), by granting the motion based on the plaintiff’s failure to file the requisite separate statement. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, noting that the trial court had the discretion to grant the motion for summary judgment due to the plaintiff's non-compliance with the procedural requirements, especially given the complexity of the case and the multiple continuances already granted. View "Mandell-Brown v. Novo Nordisk Inc." on Justia Law