Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Donald McCurdy appealed an order denying his petition for relief from the notice requirement of the Government Claims Act. McCurdy had submitted a claim for damages to the County of Riverside over a year after the Court of Appeal granted his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which found that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from a public defender during a probation revocation hearing. The County denied his claim, stating it was not presented within six months of accrual as required by section 911.2. McCurdy applied for leave to file a late claim, which the County also denied. He then filed a petition for relief from the notice requirement in the trial court, arguing his claim did not accrue until the remittitur issued on the writ of habeas corpus and that he had one year to present his claim. Alternatively, he argued that he was misadvised by three attorneys about the claim period.The Superior Court of Riverside denied McCurdy's petition, finding that his claim accrued when his probation was revoked and was therefore untimely under either the six-month or one-year period. The court also found that McCurdy failed to show mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that McCurdy's claim arose in tort and fell under the six-month claims period in section 911.2. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that McCurdy did not show mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Consequently, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order. View "McCurdy v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

Ofek Rachel, Ltd. and M.M.N. Yad David, USA Ltd. obtained a 2016 judgment from an Israeli court against Suki Ben Zion. They then filed a lawsuit in New York to enforce this judgment, resulting in a 2017 judgment against Zion for $5.5 million. Despite claiming to have no assets, Zion was living lavishly. During post-judgment proceedings, Zion revealed that his friend, Chaim Cohen, was covering his expenses. The judgment creditors served a document subpoena on Cohen, which he initially quashed due to procedural defects. A second subpoena led to a court order compelling Cohen to provide unredacted American Express statements. Cohen's non-compliance with this order led to contempt proceedings.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found Cohen guilty of contempt for failing to comply with the discovery order. The court imposed a $3,000 fine and ordered Cohen to pay $185,095.20 in attorney’s fees and $8,964.71 in costs. Cohen appealed, challenging the court's authority to impose attorney’s fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1218, arguing that he was not a party to the original litigation.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that section 1218 allows for the imposition of attorney’s fees against a person who violates a court order in post-judgment enforcement proceedings, even if that person was not a party to the original lawsuit. The court reasoned that the statutory language, legislative intent, and the broader context of post-judgment enforcement mechanisms support this interpretation. The court concluded that Cohen, as a party to the post-judgment enforcement proceedings, was subject to the court's order and liable for attorney’s fees for his contempt. View "Ofek Rachel, Ltd. v. Zion" on Justia Law

Friends of the South Fork Gualala (FSFG) filed a California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) proceeding against the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CalFIRE) regarding the approval of a timber harvesting plan by Richardson Ranch, LLC. FSFG's counsel, Daniel Garrett-Steinman, who suffers from bipolar disorder, requested disability accommodations under rule 1.100 of the California Rules of Court, seeking extensions of time and other procedural relief. The trial court granted six of these requests over eight months but denied the seventh request, leading to this appeal.The Sonoma County Superior Court had previously granted FSFG's petition in part, vacating CalFIRE's approval of the timber plan due to inadequate consideration of various environmental impacts. However, the court denied FSFG's claim that the late publication of a complete response to public comments rendered the approval defective. FSFG argued that the trial court's denial of the seventh accommodation request prevented a fair opportunity to litigate the issue of the incomplete response.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the seventh accommodation request. The appellate court found that the trial court had reasonably concluded that further delays would create an undue financial and administrative burden and fundamentally alter the nature of the expedited CEQA proceeding. The court also noted that FSFG had the option to retain additional counsel, which it failed to do. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed, and respondents were awarded their costs on appeal. View "Friends of the So. Fork Gualala v. Department of Forestry and Fire Protection" on Justia Law

Michael Auer Wolf filed a request for a vocational evaluation of Patricia Mercado in a parentage action, which the Superior Court of Orange County granted. Wolf's request aimed to assess Mercado's ability to obtain employment and her earning capacity for determining child support. Mercado opposed the request, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to order a vocational evaluation as it was not authorized by any statute. She filed an amended petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief.The Superior Court of Orange County initially granted Wolf's request and later his motion to compel Mercado to undergo the vocational evaluation. Mercado appealed, arguing that the court's orders were void due to lack of statutory authority and that they violated her constitutional and discovery rights. The court maintained that child support was at issue and that it could order a vocational evaluation based on public policy and statutory provisions, including Evidence Code section 730.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that Wolf did not establish entitlement to a vocational evaluation under any relevant statutory authority, including sections 3558, 4331, and 4058 of the Family Code. The court emphasized that section 4058 requires a preliminary showing that a vocational evaluation would be in the best interests of the children, which Wolf failed to provide. The court also noted that Evidence Code section 730 did not support the vocational evaluation order as it pertains to neutral experts appointed by the court.The Court of Appeal granted Mercado's petition, ordering the Superior Court to vacate its orders requiring Mercado to undergo a vocational evaluation and to enter a new order denying Wolf's request. The stay order was dissolved, and Mercado was awarded her costs incurred in the proceeding. View "Mercado v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2015, the plaintiff was injured when his vehicle was rear-ended by a truck driven by the defendant, who was employed by KLS Transportation, Inc. The plaintiff experienced significant pain and underwent extensive medical treatment, including surgeries and the implantation of a spinal cord stimulator. The plaintiff filed a personal injury lawsuit against the defendant and KLS, with National Liability & Fire Insurance Company intervening on behalf of KLS.The Superior Court of Sacramento County entered a judgment awarding the plaintiff $3,299,455 in damages for past and future economic earnings and noneconomic loss. The defendants challenged the awards for past and future medical damages, lost earnings, future noneconomic damages, and the award for costs and prejudgment interest. The trial court denied the defendants' motions for a new trial and partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court reversed the awards for past and future medical expenses, finding that the trial court had improperly interpreted the scope of the Hospital Lien Act (HLA) and admitted evidence of the reasonable value of services that exceeded the amounts paid by the plaintiff or his insurer. The court also found that the award for future medical expenses was not supported by substantial evidence, particularly regarding the need for a dorsal root ganglion stimulator. The court affirmed the awards for past and future lost earnings, finding sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusions. The award for future noneconomic damages was also upheld, as the evidence established that the plaintiff would suffer severe pain and emotional distress in the future. The court vacated the award for costs and prejudgment interest and remanded the matter for a new trial limited to the issues of past and future medical expenses. View "Yaffee v. Skeen" on Justia Law

Jack Greener, a Brazilian jiu jitsu (BJJ) student, suffered a fractured neck and spinal cord injury during a sparring session at Del Mar Jiu Jitsu Club, owned by M. Phelps, Inc. Greener sued, alleging negligence by his instructor, Francisco Iturralde, and vicarious liability by M. Phelps, Inc. The defendants argued that the primary assumption of risk doctrine absolved them of liability, as BJJ is an inherently risky sport.The Superior Court of San Diego County instructed the jury using option 2 of CACI No. 471, which holds a sports instructor liable if they unreasonably increased the risks to the student beyond those inherent in the sport. The jury found in favor of Greener, awarding him $46 million in damages. The defendants appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in its jury instructions and verdict form, and in excluding certain evidence.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court correctly instructed the jury on option 2 of CACI No. 471, as the evidence showed that Iturralde's actions unreasonably increased the risk of injury to Greener. The court emphasized that Iturralde, as an instructor with superior knowledge and skill, should be held to a different standard than a student coparticipant. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain evidence, as it was either irrelevant or cumulative.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial court properly applied the increased risk standard and that the exclusion of evidence did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The court suggested that the Judicial Council Advisory Committee on Civil Jury Instructions consider revising CACI No. 471 to minimize confusion and avoid the need to cross-refer to other instructions. View "Greener v. M. Phelps, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2020, Bryce D. Hovannisian and Lindsay E. Hovannisian purchased several tax-defaulted properties at a tax sale from the City of Fresno. Prior to the sale, the City had recorded special assessments for nuisance abatement costs and unpaid penalties against these properties. After the purchase, the County of Fresno issued tax bills to the appellants, which included these special assessments. The appellants sought to pay only the portion of the tax bills excluding the special assessments, arguing that the tax sale should have removed these liens. The County rejected their partial payments, leading the appellants to sue the City and the County to quiet title to the properties.The Superior Court of Fresno County sustained three separate demurrers filed by the City and the County, asserting that Revenue and Taxation Code section 4807 barred the suit as it impeded tax collection. The court granted leave to amend after the first two demurrers but denied it after the third. The court found that the appellants were required to pay the taxes and then seek a refund, rather than challenging the assessments prepayment.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's ruling. The appellate court held that the special assessments were collected at the same time and in the same manner as county taxes, thus falling under the definition of "taxes" in section 4801. Consequently, section 4807 barred the appellants' prepayment suit. The court also found that the appellants had an adequate remedy at law through a refund action, which precluded them from seeking equitable relief. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed, and the appellants were directed to pay the taxes and seek a refund if necessary. View "Hovannisian v. City of Fresno" on Justia Law

Eric Woolard and Breonna Hall, residents of Greenhouse Condominiums, were involved in a physical altercation with their neighbors, Eric Smith and Stacy Thorne, in December 2019. Smith and Thorne sued Woolard, Hall, and Regent Real Estate Services, Inc. (Regent), the management company, for negligence and other claims. Woolard and Hall filed a cross-complaint against Regent and Greenhouse Community Association (Greenhouse), alleging negligence and other claims, asserting that Regent and Greenhouse failed to address ongoing harassment by neighbors, which led to the altercation.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of Regent and Greenhouse, finding no duty of care owed by them to intervene in the neighbor dispute or prevent the altercation. Woolard and Hall's motions to disqualify the trial judge were denied, and they did not seek writ review of these rulings.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the summary judgment, agreeing that Regent and Greenhouse had no duty to intervene in the neighbor dispute or prevent the altercation. The court found that Woolard and Hall failed to establish a legal duty of care breached by Regent and Greenhouse. Additionally, the court noted that claims of housing discrimination were not supported by evidence and were not properly raised as a separate cause of action. The court also held that the disqualification motions were not reviewable on appeal. The judgment in favor of Regent and Greenhouse was affirmed, and they were entitled to their costs on appeal. View "Woolard v. Regent Real Estate Services" on Justia Law

Laura Lazar sued real estate brokers Lynette Bishop, Shen Shulz, Sotheby’s International Realty, Inc., and Shen Realty, Inc. for breach of fiduciary duty related to the sale of her father's Malibu house. Lazar's father, Daniel Gottlieb, had assigned his causes of action to her. The complaint alleged that the brokers failed to disclose a dual agency and did not work to obtain the highest possible sale price, resulting in a sale price significantly lower than the house's value.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that Lazar lacked standing to sue because the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty was not assignable under Civil Code section 954. The court likened the relationship between a real estate broker and client to that of an attorney and client, which involves a highly personal and confidential relationship, making such claims nonassignable. Lazar appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that a cause of action for breach of a real estate broker’s fiduciary duties, which seeks only damages related to property rights and pecuniary interests, is assignable. The court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for the trial court to consider the remaining grounds argued in the defendants' motion. The appellate court found that the transactional nature of the broker-client relationship, unlike the attorney-client relationship, does not involve highly personalized rights of recovery, and thus, the claim is assignable. View "Lazar v. Bishop" on Justia Law

The case involves a monetary dispute between a mother (defendant) and her daughter (plaintiff). The daughter sued her mother and obtained a money judgment. During enforcement proceedings, the mother tendered the judgment amount, prejudgment interest, and interest accrued on a bank account in Shanghai. The dispute centers on whether the mother fully satisfied the judgment.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found that the mother had tendered the full amount owed and granted her motion to require the daughter to acknowledge full satisfaction of the judgment. The daughter appealed, arguing there was no competent evidence to substantiate the interest amount accrued on the Shanghai bank account and that the court abused its discretion by not enforcing an order for a judgment debtor’s examination of the mother. She also complained about a comment by the trial court that she claimed offended due process.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court found no merit in the daughter’s contentions. It held that there was sufficient evidence to conclude the interest was fully paid, noting that the trial court was entitled to consider the totality of the circumstances. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s handling of the debtor examination and rejected the claim of judicial bias based on the court’s comment. The court affirmed the trial court’s order, concluding that the mother had satisfied the judgment and awarded her mandatory attorney fees. View "Merrick v. Lau" on Justia Law