Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The judgment creditors in this case obtained, per Code of Civil Procedure section 708.410, a lien on “[t]he rights of [the] judgment debtor to money or property under any judgment” in a certain lawsuit. In the course of that suit, the judgment debtor paid money to another party pursuant to an adverse judgment, but, following reversal of that judgment, the trial court ordered that money to be returned to the judgment debtor. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether the judgment creditors’ lien attached to the money ordered returned to the judgment debtor. Unlike the Court of Appeal concluded it potentially did, though the Court found further factual review was required to resolve the issue. The trial court's decision was reversed in part and remanded for reconsideration. View "Gilman v. Dalby" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Mosanthony Wilson and Nancy Urschel brought a putative wage-and-hour class action against defendant The La Jolla Group (LJG). Plaintiffs worked for LJG as signature gatherers on behalf of political campaigns and political action committees. LJG classified them as independent contractors and paid them per signature submitted. In the underlying lawsuit, plaintiffs alleged that LJG misclassified them and, as employees, they were entitled to a minimum wage, overtime pay, meal and rest breaks, expense reimbursement, timely final wage payment, and itemized wage statements. Plaintiffs moved for certification of a class of LJG signature gatherers, which the trial court denied. Plaintiffs appealed the order denying class certification, contending the trial court erred by finding common questions did not predominate and the class action procedure was not superior to individual actions. They also contended the court erred by not granting a related motion for reconsideration. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed that on the current record, the trial court erred by declining to certify a class for one cause of action, for failure to provide written and accurate itemized wage statements. The Court therefore reversed the order denying class certification in part, as to that cause of action only, and remand for reconsideration. Otherwise, the Court concluded the trial court did not err and affirmed. View "Wilson v. The La Jolla Group" on Justia Law

Father and Mother lived together for a few years and are the parents of Minor, who was born in 2014. By 2018, Mother was raising her children—Minor and Minor’s three older half-siblings—on her own, and she did not know Father’s whereabouts. The Alameda County Social Services Agency filed a juvenile dependency petition on behalf of the children, listing Father’s name but stating his address was unknown. On November 12, 2019, the Agency filed a status review report for the six-month review hearing; 13 months after the original petition was filed, the Agency first listed an address for Father as the California State Prison. Father subsequently was deemed Minor’s presumed father and was released from custody. The juvenile court summarily denied his motion under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to set aside prior findings, without a hearing.The court of appeal set aside the juvenile court’s order setting a hearing under section 366.26 to consider termination of parental rights, guardianship, or another permanent plan. Father sufficiently raised the possibility that the Agency failed to use due diligence to locate him and sufficiently stated a notice violation to warrant an evidentiary hearing. View "In re R.A." on Justia Law

After plaintiff filed suit against defendant and won a judgment for $133,792.11 plus postjudgment interest, plaintiff sought attorney fees of $271,530, which were later increased to $287,640 in the trial court and now to $292,140 in this court. The trial court awarded $90,000 in attorney fees.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's award of attorney fees, concluding that the trial court used sound discretion to limit the attorney fees to $90,000. The trial court began with the conventional lodestar calculation and gave good reasons for concluding that 600 plus hours was reasonable. However, the court reversed the trial court's ruling that plaintiff had no basis to collect the $90,000 award from an insurance company called Wesco that had posted a surety bond for defendant. Rather, the court concluded that the liability of the surety is commensurate with the liability of its principal. In this case, by statute, the court concluded that defendant must pay the attorney fees as a matter of costs and so too must Wesco. Accordingly, the court remanded for the trial court to amend the judgment to make surety Wesco liable for the $90,000 fee award as an item of costs. View "Karton v. Ari Design & Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Rabineau served MLG with a statutory offer to compromise, but the offer did not specify how MLG could accept it. MLG's counsel hand-wrote MLG's acceptance onto the offer itself and filed a notice of acceptance with the trial court. The trial court then entered judgment in favor of MLG pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 998, subdivision (b)(1). The Legislature enacted section 998 to encourage and expedite settlement of lawsuits before trial. At issue is whether the purported acceptance of a section 998 offer lacking an acceptance provision gives rise to a valid judgment.The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court correctly found the judgment was void and affirmed the trial court's grant of Rabineau's motion to vacate the judgment. The court explained that California appellate courts have consistently followed Puerta v. Torres (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1267, to hold that a section 998 offer lacking an acceptance provision is invalid, and therefore an offeree's failure to accept it does not trigger any of section 998's cost-shifting provisions. Furthermore, application of general contract principles to conclude a section 998 offer is valid, even if it does not have an acceptance provision, would conflict with the language of section 998, which clearly provides otherwise. Finally, the court rejected arguments based on equity. View "Mostafavi Law Group, APC v. Larry Rabineau, APC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jason Varney was a master dock builder, and star of a cable television show called “Docked Out.” He was also the president and sole shareholder of plaintiff Varney Entertainment Group, Inc. (Varney). Defendant Avon Plastics Inc., d/b/a/ Master Mark Plastic Products (Avon), manufactured products used to build docks. Plaintiff’s operative complaint alleged claims for breach of contract and for unauthorized commercial use of name or likeness in violation of Civil Code section 3344. Defendant served a statutory offer to compromise under Code of Civil Procedure section 998, offering to have a $250,000 judgment entered against it on both claims, plus attorney fees and costs through the date of the offer. Less than a week later, while its section 998 offer was still pending, defendant offered to enter into a stipulated judgment for $191,626.03 on the contract claim only, and further offered that plaintiff would be the prevailing party on that claim for purposes of awarding attorney fees and costs. Plaintiff accepted the second offer and never responded to the section 998 offer. Two months later, at the beginning of trial, plaintiff dismissed its remaining section 3344 claim without prejudice so it could refile that claim in a different jurisdiction. Defendant moved for attorney fees and costs based on section 3344’s fee shifting provision and its unaccepted section 998 offer. The trial court denied its motion, and the Court of Appeal affirmed: "Section 3344 does not provide a basis for awarding the defendant its fees or costs here because the defendant was not the prevailing party on that claim within the meaning of section 3344. And section 998 does not provide a basis for shifting fees or costs to the defendant because the defendant’s offer to enter into a stipulated judgment extinguished its prior section 998 offer." View "Varney Entertainment Grp. v. Avon Plastics" on Justia Law

Appellants Area 55, LLC, and SAB Holdings, LLC appealed a trial court order granting the special motion to strike their first amended complaint for malicious prosecution and the related judgment of dismissal in favor of Respondents Nicholas & Tomasevic, LLP (N&T), Craig Nicholas, and Alex Tomasevic. Appellants included the successors to Vinturi, Inc. (Vinturi), which developed and sold the “ ‘Vinturi Essential Wine Aerator’ for wine-lovers who want to enhance their experience of drinking wine.” Vinturi started selling the Vinturi Aerator in 2006. As sold to the public, the box contained the Vinturi body with a decorative black silicone band, a rubber stand, and a filter screen -- parts all made in China, transported to the United States, and assembled in the United States. From 2006 until 2010, Vinturi sold its aerator in the United States with the statement “ ‘VINTURI IS MANUFACTURED IN THE USA’ ” printed on the bottom panel of the box. Attorney Nicholas filed various consumer fraud claims, challenging Appellants claim the aerator was made in the U.S. when the components were made in China. Appellants were successful in getting two class action cases dismissed. In 2018, Appellants filed the present case for malicious prosecution, resulting in the grant of Respondents' "SLAPP" motion on appeal. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in ruling that Appellants could not establish the prior action was not terminated on its merits. "Thus, for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute, the court erred in ruling that Appellants did not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits of their malicious prosecution claim." In addition, in its de novo review, the Court exercised discretion to reach the additional issues raised by the parties in the motion and opposition: Appellants made a sufficient prima facie showing of the remaining elements of their claim, and Respondents did not defeat Appellants’ claim as a matter of law. Accordingly, the order granting Respondents’ special motion to strike the complaint was vacated and reversed. On remand, the trial court was directed to enter a new and different order denying Respondents’ special motion. View "Area 55 v. Nicholas & Tomasevic" on Justia Law

A subcontractor built a retaining wall that collapsed years later, causing damage to a nearby residential lot. The homeowner sued the subcontractor, obtained a default judgment, and then sued the subcontractor’s insurance company to enforce the default judgment. The insurance company moved for summary judgment, arguing the homeowner’s damages occurred long after the insurance policy had expired, and therefore the insurance company had no duty to cover the default judgment. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. On appeal, the homeowner alleged “continuous and progressive” damage began to occur shortly after the subcontractor built the retaining wall during the coverage period of the insurance policy. The insurance company disagreed. The Court of Appeal determined that was a triable issue of material fact, thus reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Guastello v. AIG Specialty Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Fragoza filed suit under the Private Attorneys General Act (Lab. Code 2698) in Alameda County Superior Court, alleging that she formerly worked for Crestwood in Solano County and that Crestwood systematically violates the Labor Code at its treatment centers located throughout California by neglecting to properly compensate non-exempt employees for all hours worked; failing to provide accurate and itemized wage statements; failing to allow non-exempt employees to take rest/meal breaks or to pay premiums for missed breaks; and failing to timely pay wages owed on termination. She sought civil penalties (Lab. Code 2699(a), (f)) on behalf of the state and aggrieved Crestwood employees. Crestwood moved to transfer venue to Sacramento County (where its principal place of business is located), arguing that venue is not proper in Alameda County because Fragoza worked only in Solano County.The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Alameda County is a proper venue under either Code of Civil Procedure section 3931 or section 395.5 because Crestwood is a corporation and operated two facilities in Alameda County, which “is a county ‘where the obligation or liability arises.” The court of appeal denied Crestwood mandamus relief. The allegations regarding Fragoza’s employment with Crestwood are necessary to establish standing, not venue. View "Crestwood Behavioral Health, Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Respondent David Collins suffered serious injuries following his arrest by San Diego County Sheriff's Deputies for public intoxication. After a three-week trial, a jury found in favor of Collins on his negligence claims against the two deputies involved in the arrest and two nurses employed by the County of San Diego (County) who attended to Collins while in jail. On appeal from the subsequent judgment and the denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), the County raised five claims of error: (1) the jury’s finding that the deputies had a reasonable basis to arrest Collins foreclosed his claim of negligence against the deputies; (2) the court erred by instructing the jury it could find the deputies liable for injuries caused by private physicians who treated Collins after he was released from custody; (3) the court erred by failing to instruct the jury it could not hold defendants liable for an injury Collins sustained while in jail; (4) governmental immunity requires reversal of the judgment against one of the nurse defendants; and (5) the court erred in its calculation of the amount of setoff the defendants were entitled to based on Collins’s prior settlement with the private physicians and their employer. The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments and affirmed the judgment. View "Collins v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law