Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose out of a property tax refund action brought by Chinese Theatres against the County. After remanding to the Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Board to reduce the value of real property owned by Chinese Theatres and to correct the tax roll, the trial court awarded Chinese Theatres attorney fees under Revenue and Taxation Code section 1611.6.The Court of Appeal reversed the postjudgment order awarding Chinese Theatres fees, holding that Chinese Theatres was not entitled to attorney fees under section 1611.6. The court explained that, under a plain reading of section 1611.6, attorney fees are permitted in a tax refund action where: (1) a county board fails to make requested findings; or (2) the court concludes the board's findings are so deficient that it remands the matter with directions for the board to make findings that "fairly disclose [its] determination" on the point at issue, including a "statement of the method or methods of valuation used in appraising the property." In this case, neither of these circumstances exists and thus Chinese Theatres is not entitled to attorney fees under section 1611.6. View "Chinese Theatres, LLC v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Shahrokh Mireskandari alleged four causes of action against Joseph Scoma, M.D., based on the reports and opinions Scoma provided at the request of a disciplinary tribunal in London, England, as part of the tribunal’s formal proceedings involving Mireskandari, his legal practice, and his license to practice law in the United Kingdom. Mireskandari qualified as a solicitor in 2000, and by 2006 he was the managing partner of a London firm with mostly “black, minority, or ethnic origin” (BME) solicitors and staff. In 2007, Mireskandari publicly disclosed to a member of Parliament problems BME solicitors experienced “at the hands of the Legal Society of England and Wales (‘LSE’) and the Solicitors Regulatory Authority (‘SRA’).” In retaliation, the LSE/SRA began a campaign to discredit Mireskandari: the LSE/SRA hired a Los Angeles law firm; a paralegal working for the firm obtained Mireskandari's education records; and within two weeks of being advised of those records, LSE/SRA launched an investigation into his “educational and work background.” More than two years later, in early April 2011, the Solicitor’s Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) “initiated the proceedings against [Mireskandari] regarding the intervention of [Mireskandari’s] legal practice and his license to practice law in the United Kingdom” (SDT proceedings). At that time, Mireskandari travelled to California. He became seriously ill and requested that the SDT proceedings be adjourned. In support of his request, Mireskandari submitted evidence from California physicians of his illness, his inability to travel to England, and his inability to participate in the SDT proceedings. In response, at the request of the LSE/SRA, the SDT appointed Scoma “as an independent expert (not the expert of the LSE/SRA),” who reported back to the LSE/SRA "I see no reason why he is unable to travel by plane from the USA to the UK.’ ” Based on the SDT proceedings, the SDT struck Mireskandari from the roll of solicitors, thereby preventing him from practicing law in the United Kingdom. This resulted in the permanent closing of the law firm of which he was a partner. Mireskandari suffered damages in excess of $500 million. The trial court sustained without leave to amend Scoma’s demurrer to the complaint and entered judgment in favor of Scoma and against Mireskandari. On the record presented by Mireskandari, the California Court of Appeal found California’s litigation privilege (codified at Civil Code section 47) barred each of Mireskandari’s causes of action. Thus, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Mireskandari v. Gallagher" on Justia Law

When a plaintiff requests entry of judgment by default, a request for attorney fees must be made at the same time or the fees are forfeited. But attorney fees are not forfeited absent such request when defendant contests a default judgment.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion for attorney fees in her lawsuit against defendants. The court concluded, among other things, that plaintiff was not entitled to attorney fees incurred for the period before she obtained the default judgment against defendants because she did not include a request for fees at the time the default judgment was entered. However, the trial court erred by denying attorney fees for plaintiff's successful post-judgment efforts to respond to and defeat defendants' motions to vacate the default judgment. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Vincent v. Sonkey" on Justia Law

Beginning in 2005, petitioner San Joaquin Regional Transit District (District) began discussing with real parties in interest DSS-2731 Myrtle LLC and Sardee Industries, Inc. (collectively, "Sardee") the possible acquisition through negotiated purchase or eminent domain of a two-acre parcel in Stockton on which Sardee operated a manufacturing facility. Correspondence regarding appraisal of the property and Sardee’s rights in eminent domain took place in 2008, but efforts to negotiate a purchase ultimately failed, leading to the filing of an eminent domain complaint in 2010. In April 2011 a stipulated order of possession gave legal possession of the parcel to District with a right of Sardee to occupy a portion of the property as it explored options for a new facility, to wind down its operations and move elsewhere. Sardee undertook to move its Stockton operations to its facility in Lisle, Illinois, which it upgraded to handle ongoing work from its Stockton plant. Under the stipulated order Sardee could occupy the property without charge until March 2012 and until June 30, 2012, by payment of rent. By March 2012 most of its equipment and operations had been relocated; in April 2012 the District abandoned its condemnation action. Following dismissal of the action, Sardee sought damages under Code of Civil Procedure section 1268.620, which permitted an award of damages “after the defendant moves from property in compliance with an order or agreement for possession or in reasonable contemplation of its taking.” District argued the costs involved in closing down Sardee’s Stockton facility and moving all but the items remaining for shipment in March could not be recovered. The trial court disagreed with this all-or-nothing interpretation of the statutory language and concluded Sardee should have been permitted to present its damage claim to a jury, whereupon District filed its petition for writ of mandate, prohibition or other appropriate relief, and sought a stay of the damages trial. The Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court that sufficient evidence supported the court’s finding that Sardee had moved from the property, supporting application of section 1268.620. The District's petition was denied. View "San Joaquin Regional Transit Dist. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Kevyn Menges suffered catastrophic injuries in a motor vehicle accident. Menges, through her guardian ad litem Susan Menges, sued the Department of Transportation (Caltrans) for its negligent construction of an interstate off-ramp. Caltrans moved for summary judgment, asserting design immunity. The trial court granted Caltrans’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, Menges argued: (1) design immunity should not have applied since the approved plans were unreasonable, and the construction of the interstate off-ramp did not match the previously approved design plans; (2) the trial court erred in denying her oral request for a continuance at the summary judgment hearing; and (3) Caltrans’s Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer was unreasonable and invalid, and a portion of the cost award for expert witness fees should have been disallowed. The Court of Appeal determined none of Menges’s arguments had merit, and affirmed the judgment. View "Menges v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

In 2014, Edelweiss filed under seal its qui tam complaint, seeking to recover more than $700 million in false claims allegedly paid by the state and political subdivisions. The defendants were entities involved in the marketing of government-issued variable-rate bonds. The Attorney General reportedly received multiple extensions of the 60-day period for investigation and in October 2015, filed a notice declining to intervene. The next day, Edelweiss successfully moved to further extend the seal to January 2016. Edelweiss’s second motion to extend the seal, (to June) was also granted. Edelweiss filed no further motions to extend the seal but, for two years after the seal period expired, did not move to lift the seal despite two admonitions from the court. In June 2018, Edelweiss finally asked the court to unseal the case but did so incorrectly. Ultimately, the clerk of the court informed Edelweiss that it had unsealed the action around December 4, 2018. Weeks later, Edelweiss began serving the defendants.The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the defendants. The time from October 2015 to December 2018 is included in the three-year period during which service must be accomplished because, even if Edelweiss was unable to serve the summons until the seal was lifted, the continuing of the seal after October 2015 was not a circumstance beyond Edelweiss’s control, Code of Civ. Proc. 583.240. View "Edelweiss Fund, LLC v. JP Morgan Chase & Co." on Justia Law

Heirs contested rights to a family cabin and a federal use permit authorizing the cabin on federal land. Plaintiffs alleged the defendant was wrongfully claiming sole ownership of the cabin and permit, and was threatening to sell the property. Three actions taken by the trial court were the subject of this appeal: (1) the court sustained defendant’s demurrer without prejudice and dismissed the action solely based on lack of jurisdiction; (2) it denied plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify defendant’s attorney; and (3) it denied plaintiffs’ application for injunctive relief filed while this appeal was pending. Plaintiffs contended the trial court erred in each instance. In his cross-appeal, defendant contended the trial court erred by not dismissing the action with prejudice. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed in part and affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court held: (1) the trial court had jurisdiction to try this matter; (2) the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify counsel; and (3) plaintiffs’ application for injunctive relief pending this appeal was now moot. An application for injunctive relief and defendant’s arguments for dismissing with prejudice could be considered by the trial court on remand. View "Capra v. Capra" on Justia Law

Miguel Angel Rojas-Cifuentes (Rojas) brought this representative action against his former employer, American Modular Systems, Inc. (AMS), on behalf of himself, other former and current employees of American Modular, and the State of California. Relying on the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), Rojas sought to recover civil penalties for labor violations that AMS allegedly committed against its nonexempt employees. He alleged that the “core” of these violations concerned “the systematic failure to keep accurate time and payroll records, and systematic failure to compensate employees for substantial portions of their workday.” The trial court rejected Rojas’s PAGA claim following AMS' motion for summary judgment. The trial court noted those seeking to bring PAGA causes of action must, before filing suit, provide notice to a certain state agency of the laws the employer allegedly violated and the “facts and theories” supporting those allegations. Although the court found Rojas provided written notice to the state before he filed suit, it found his notice failed to include sufficient facts and theories to support his claims. It thus rejected his PAGA cause of action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. After Rojas filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking to set aside the court’s decision, the Court of Appeal directed AMS to show cause why the writ should not be issued. Because, unlike the trial court, the Court found Rojas’s PAGA notice supplied sufficient facts and theories to support at least some of his claims, the Court issued a writ of mandate to direct the trial court to set aside its order granting AMS' motion for summary adjudication. View "Rojas-Cifuentes v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Maryam Soheili and Morteza Sohyly (appellants) appeal from a judgment quieting title to a house owned by respondents Joseph and Dinah Trenk. After Sohyly filed suit against Joseph Trenk for malpractice, the parties settled and Joseph agreed to pay $100,000 and executed a promissory note and a trust deed on the property to secure the obligation. Sohyly’s sister, Maryam Soheili, was designated as the beneficiary of the trust deed. After Joseph stopped regular payments on the note after 2003, Sohyly began nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings in 2018.The Trenks then filed this action to clear title to their house, alleging that the trust deed was no longer enforceable. The trial court quieted title in the property in favor of the Trenks, ruling that both the statute of limitations and the Marketable Record Title Act barred enforcement of the trust deed.The Court of Appeal held that a power of sale in a trust deed is enforceable even if the statute of limitations has run on the underlying obligation. In this case, because the trust deed did not state the last date for payment under the promissory note, under Civil Code section 882.020, subdivision (a)(2), appellants would have 60 years to exercise the power of sale in the trust deed. However, the court held that the power of sale is not enforceable for another reason. The court explained that the property presumptively is community property, appellants did not rebut that presumption at trial, and because Dinah did not execute the trust deed, she has the power to void it. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Trenk v. Soheili" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that defendant—who lost the only cause of action in the case—was the prevailing party. The court rejected both parties' arguments based on the definition of prevailing party in the attorney fees provision in their contract, explaining that any such definition would not trump the definition of prevailing party in Civil Code section 1717. The court also concluded that the trial court's consideration of the parties' settlement offers in determining which party achieved the greater relief under section 1717's definition of prevailing party was contrary to precedent. The court rejected defendant's argument that it prevailed because it admitted it owed plaintiff a portion of the contractual damages plaintiff was seeking, and the jury's lump sum award was for less than plaintiff's damages claim at trial. The court explained that defendant's argument is inconsistent with section 1717, subdivision (b)(2), under which a defendant who owes a debt becomes a prevailing party by tendering to the plaintiff the full amount owed and alleging such tender in the defendant's answer. The court reversed the amended judgment only insofar as it orders plaintiff to pay defendant's attorney fees. The court affirmed in all other respects, remanding for further proceedings. View "Waterwood Enterprises, LLC v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law