Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Miguel Angel Rojas-Cifuentes (Rojas) brought this representative action against his former employer, American Modular Systems, Inc. (AMS), on behalf of himself, other former and current employees of American Modular, and the State of California. Relying on the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), Rojas sought to recover civil penalties for labor violations that AMS allegedly committed against its nonexempt employees. He alleged that the “core” of these violations concerned “the systematic failure to keep accurate time and payroll records, and systematic failure to compensate employees for substantial portions of their workday.” The trial court rejected Rojas’s PAGA claim following AMS' motion for summary judgment. The trial court noted those seeking to bring PAGA causes of action must, before filing suit, provide notice to a certain state agency of the laws the employer allegedly violated and the “facts and theories” supporting those allegations. Although the court found Rojas provided written notice to the state before he filed suit, it found his notice failed to include sufficient facts and theories to support his claims. It thus rejected his PAGA cause of action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. After Rojas filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking to set aside the court’s decision, the Court of Appeal directed AMS to show cause why the writ should not be issued. Because, unlike the trial court, the Court found Rojas’s PAGA notice supplied sufficient facts and theories to support at least some of his claims, the Court issued a writ of mandate to direct the trial court to set aside its order granting AMS' motion for summary adjudication. View "Rojas-Cifuentes v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Maryam Soheili and Morteza Sohyly (appellants) appeal from a judgment quieting title to a house owned by respondents Joseph and Dinah Trenk. After Sohyly filed suit against Joseph Trenk for malpractice, the parties settled and Joseph agreed to pay $100,000 and executed a promissory note and a trust deed on the property to secure the obligation. Sohyly’s sister, Maryam Soheili, was designated as the beneficiary of the trust deed. After Joseph stopped regular payments on the note after 2003, Sohyly began nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings in 2018.The Trenks then filed this action to clear title to their house, alleging that the trust deed was no longer enforceable. The trial court quieted title in the property in favor of the Trenks, ruling that both the statute of limitations and the Marketable Record Title Act barred enforcement of the trust deed.The Court of Appeal held that a power of sale in a trust deed is enforceable even if the statute of limitations has run on the underlying obligation. In this case, because the trust deed did not state the last date for payment under the promissory note, under Civil Code section 882.020, subdivision (a)(2), appellants would have 60 years to exercise the power of sale in the trust deed. However, the court held that the power of sale is not enforceable for another reason. The court explained that the property presumptively is community property, appellants did not rebut that presumption at trial, and because Dinah did not execute the trust deed, she has the power to void it. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Trenk v. Soheili" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that defendant—who lost the only cause of action in the case—was the prevailing party. The court rejected both parties' arguments based on the definition of prevailing party in the attorney fees provision in their contract, explaining that any such definition would not trump the definition of prevailing party in Civil Code section 1717. The court also concluded that the trial court's consideration of the parties' settlement offers in determining which party achieved the greater relief under section 1717's definition of prevailing party was contrary to precedent. The court rejected defendant's argument that it prevailed because it admitted it owed plaintiff a portion of the contractual damages plaintiff was seeking, and the jury's lump sum award was for less than plaintiff's damages claim at trial. The court explained that defendant's argument is inconsistent with section 1717, subdivision (b)(2), under which a defendant who owes a debt becomes a prevailing party by tendering to the plaintiff the full amount owed and alleging such tender in the defendant's answer. The court reversed the amended judgment only insofar as it orders plaintiff to pay defendant's attorney fees. The court affirmed in all other respects, remanding for further proceedings. View "Waterwood Enterprises, LLC v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law

Two ambulance employees filed a class action lawsuit against several ambulance entities claiming the entities violated wage and hour laws by requiring the employees to remain on call during their rest breaks. One day after the court denied plaintiffs’ class certification motion, California voters passed Proposition 11, enacting provisions requiring ambulance employees to remain reachable by a communications device during their work shifts, including rest breaks. Plaintiffs challenged the denial of class certification. Defendants opposed these arguments on their merits, and also moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the claims were moot. The Court of Appeal agreed the appeal was moot and therefore dismissed the appeal. The Court rejected plaintiffs’ contentions that Proposition 11 was not retroactive and/or that a retroactivity finding was unconstitutional because it would interfere with their vested rights. Based on its mootness determination, the Court did not reach the merits of the court’s order denying plaintiffs’ class certification motion, nor did it discuss the factual issues pertaining only to the merits issues. View "Calleros v. Rural Metro of San Diego" on Justia Law

California jurors “shall be selected at random, from a source or sources inclusive of a representative cross-section of the population of the area served by the court,” Code Civil Procedure, 197(a). “The list of registered voters and the Department of Motor Vehicles’ list of licensed drivers and identification cardholders" in the area served by the court are appropriate source lists. Marin County Local Rules state that after those source lists are combined, duplicates eliminated, and disqualified individuals purged ... a master list will be produced by using the complete randomization technique.The defendant in a Marin County capital murder case sought discovery in connection with his claim that Marin County juries were not selected from a fair cross-section of the community. He sought the county’s master list of prospective jurors, citing “Pantos,” which held a court’s “master list of qualified jurors . . . is a judicial record subject to public inspection and copying.” The court denied the request, finding that Pantos was no longer good law in light of subsequent statutory developments.The court of appeal reversed, concluding Pantos is still good law, at least as to the names and zip codes appearing on master jury lists. Section 197(c)’s new prohibition on the disclosure of information furnished by the DMV does not prohibit disclosure of master or qualified jury lists as public records. Privacy rights do not preclude disclosure of the names and zip codes on those lists. View "Alfaro v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration of its opinion in light of Ward v. United Airlines, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 732, and Oman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 762. In the prior opinion, the court held that Louisiana law governed the employment relationships at issue here. However, after considering the Supreme Court's recent guidance on the matter, the court concluded that California law applies and that the trial court correctly denied petitioner's motion for summary judgment.Ward and Oman establish that California's wage and hour laws apply to workers who perform all or most of their work in California. For workers who perform work in multiple jurisdictions, this test is satisfied if the worker performs some work in California and is based in California. In this case, the crew members of the Adele Elise performed the majority of their work within the boundaries of California. Furthermore, the port of Port Hueneme, where the Adele Elise was docked, and the entire Santa Barbara Channel are inside the state. Therefore, under Ward and Oman, the crew members are entitled to the protection of California law because they performed all or most of their work in California. Finally, the court concluded that there is no preemption. The court denied the petition for writ of mandate. View "Gulf Offshore Logistics, LLC v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Anna Sandoval-Ryan signed admission documents on behalf of her brother, Jesus Sandoval, following his admission to Sacramento Post-Acute (Post- Acute), a skilled nursing facility owned by Oleander Holdings, LLC (Oleander) and Plum Healthcare Group, LLC (Plum Healthcare). Among the documents plaintiff signed were two agreements to arbitrate claims arising out of the facility’s care for Sandoval. Sandoval’s condition deteriorated while being cared for at the facility, and he was transferred to a hospital where he later died. Plaintiff sued defendants Post-Acute, Oleander, and Plum Healthcare in superior court; she brought claims on her own behalf and on behalf of Sandoval. Defendants moved to compel arbitration of plaintiff’s claims. The trial court denied the motion on the basis the agreements were invalid because they were secured by fraud, undue influence, and duress. Defendants appealed the trial court’s ruling, contending the parties agreed to allow the arbitrator to decide threshold questions of arbitrability, and the trial court erred by deciding the issue instead. Absent clear and unmistakable language delegating threshold arbitrability issues to the arbitrator, the Court of Appeal concluded defendants’ claim lacked merit. View "Sandoval-Ryan v. Oleander Holdings" on Justia Law

Plaintiff 347 Group, Inc. (347 Group) sued and obtained a default judgment against defendant Philip Hawkins Architect, Inc. (Architect, Inc.) for breach of contract. Defendants Philip Hawkins, as an individual, and Design-Build, Inc. (Design Build) were also named in the lawsuit, although were not defaulting parties. Instead, 347 Group dismissed its breach of contract cause of action against Hawkins and Design Build but maintained causes of action for fraudulent conveyance and conspiracy, seeking to establish Hawkins and Design Build were alter egos of Architect, Inc. and liable under the contract with Architect, Inc. After Design Build and Hawkins prevailed on those causes of action, they moved for attorney fees. The trial court denied the motion finding an attorney fees award improper because 347 Group dismissed its contract cause of action and the remaining tort causes of action did not allow for an attorney fees award. On appeal, Hawkins argued the trial court erred and he was entitled to attorney fees because he was sued as an alter ego. The Court of Appeal determined Hawkins was indeed entitled to a prevailing party determination and whatever attorney fees the contract allowed him to recover. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for consideration of fees. View "347 Group, Inc. v. Philip Hawkins Architect, Inc." on Justia Law

VeriPic, and its CEO, Kwan, sued a competitor, Foray, and affiliated individuals, including Foray’s president, Hennings, alleging business disparagement. Before trial, Foray and Hennings moved for sanctions against the plaintiffs’ former counsel, the Grellas law firm, seeking monetary sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030(a), for misuse of the discovery process. The trial court sua sponte issued an order to show cause ordering the plaintiffs and Grellas to show why sanctions should not issue for “egregious and deliberate” “litigation abuse” in their filings. All the defendants subsequently moved for sanctions. The court ultimately ordered various sanctions against Kwan and VeriPic, including dismissal with prejudice of VeriPic’s remaining claims, for plaintiffs’ fraud on the court. However, the court denied the defendants’ motion for monetary sanctions against plaintiffs and Grellas for misuse of the discovery process.The court of appeal reversed in part, finding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the request for monetary sanctions against VeriPic and Kwan. The defendants have not carried their burden of showing error by the trial court in declining to impose sanctions on Grellas. There is no substantial evidence that Grellas advised the plaintiffs to engage in the misuse of the discovery process. View "Kwan Software Engineering, Inc. v. Hennings" on Justia Law

Macanthony Canady petitioned the superior court for a writ of habeas corpus seeking early parole consideration under Proposition 57. He asserted the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (Department) regulation purporting to implement Proposition 57 was inconsistent with the Proposition. Specifically, the Department’s regulation did not consider conduct credits inmates earned while incarcerated in the calculation of inmates’ nonviolent early parole eligible dates.The trial court agreed with Canady and invalidated the Department’s regulations as contradicting the stated purposes of the Proposition. The Attorney General appealed, contending the order had to be reversed because the Department’s regulation was: consistent with the plain language of the Proposition, authorized by the broad discretion granted to it by the Proposition, and consistent with the voters’ intent in passing the Proposition. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the trial court's order. View "In re Canady" on Justia Law