Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Sacramento City Council acted in a quasi-judicial capacity as adjudicators after an eight-to-three vote by the Sacramento Planning and Design Commission granting a conditional use permit for a gas station in the shopping center zone of a local residential development. The real parties in interest appealed the decision to the City Council. In such matters, council members must be neutral and unbiased. The developers sued, claiming that one City Council member was neither, and entered deliberations on the issue with his mind already made up. The trial court agreed and, upon review of the record, so did the Court of Appeal. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order granting the petition for writ of mandate and ordering the city to rescind the decision on the appeal, and to hold a new hearing on the appeal at which the councilmember would be recused from participating. View "Petrovich Development Co., LLC v. City of Sacramento" on Justia Law

In June 2018, plaintiffs-respondents Suzanne Yang and Doc Yang Medical Corporation sued defendants-appellants Tenet Healthcare Inc. doing business as John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital (the hospital), its medical staff, and individual doctors, alleging defamation and nine other causes of action. Defendants filed a special motion to strike (anti-SLAPP motion) targeting only the defamation cause of action. Dr. Yang alleged that since March 2016, defendants conspired to drive her practice out of business in various ways, including by making defamatory statements. Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion contended that the statements were protected activity because they were made in connection with the hospital’s peer review process, and because they were made in furtherance of the exercise of the right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. Defendants also contended that Dr. Yang could not demonstrate a probability of prevailing because she consented to the peer review process that the statements were purportedly in connection with, and because the statements were privileged. Applying the California Supreme Court's recent opinion in FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify, Inc., 7 Cal.5th 133 (2019), and concluded defendants’ conduct arose from protected activity because their allegedly defamatory statements were made in connection with an issue of public interest. Furthermore, the Court concluded Dr. Yang did not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits. The Court therefore reversed the trial court, which denied the anti-SLAPP motion. View "Yang v. Tenet Healthcare Inc." on Justia Law

In 2018, Landlord served Tenants with a Notice of Termination of Tenancy “in furtherance of [Landlord’s] withdrawal of the Property from residential rental use.” After the withdrawal date, Landlord filed unlawful detainer (UD) actions against Tenants under the Ellis Act. (Gov. Code, 7060) as unlimited civil cases. Landlord brought summary judgment motions for restitution of the premises based on Tenants’ holdover under the Ellis Act and the San Francisco rent ordinance. Landlord waived damages, estimated at $92-105 per day. After those motions were granted, Tenants moved to reclassify the actions as limited civil cases, arguing Landlord waived all unlawful detainer damages and that it was impossible for Landlord to meet the $25,000 minimum judgment amount for an unlimited civil matter.The trial court denied the motions for reclassification and entered judgments for possession in favor of Landlord. The court of appeal denied Tenants’ petition for a writ of mandate. Under the plain language of Code of Civil Procedure section 403.040(e), a UD action, filed as an unlimited civil case, need not be reclassified as a limited civil case if the landlord waives its claim to damages for the purpose of obtaining a judgment for possession by way of a motion for summary judgment. View "Hiona v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Nelson, a California attorney specializing in asbestos defense, was employed by Tucker. Tucker’s personnel handbook stated that all documents, including email and voicemail, received, created, or modified by any attorney are Tucker's property. In 2008, Nelson exchanged e-mails with Gradient, a scientific consult on litigation, about medical research articles relating to causes of mesothelioma. Counsel in a Kentucky litigation matter served Tucker with a subpoena seeking documents related to payments made by Tucker to Gradient to fund medical research articles and communications between Tucker and Gradient regarding such articles. Tucker withheld certain documents on the basis of attorney-client and the attorney work-product privileges but produced the e-mails authored by Nelson, who had left the firm. Nelson, subpoenaed for a deposition, claimed the e-mails contained his privileged attorney work-product and demanded they be sequestered and returned to him.Nelson filed suit, claiming that as a result of Tucker’s production of his e-mails, his work-product was available on the Internet and disseminated to asbestos plaintiffs’ attorneys, interfering with his ability to work effectively and resulting in his termination from his new firm. After Tucker’s unsuccessful attempt to compel arbitration and unsuccessful anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court ruled in favor of Nelson. The court of appeal reversed, concluding that Tucker, not Nelson, was the holder of the attorney work-product privilege with respect to the emails. On remand, the trial court granted Tucker judgment. The court of appeal affirmed. Each of Nelson’s claims was barred by the law of the case or by the litigation privilege, Civil Code 47(b). View "Nelson v. Tucker Ellis, LLP" on Justia Law

In petitioning the trial court to amend a judgment to add an alter ego defendant, the plaintiff may proceed by either a motion in the original action, or by complaint in an independent action on the judgment.In a previous action, plaintiff recovered a judgment for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty against Magnolia Home Loans. In this case, plaintiff filed suit against defendant, alleging that defendant incorporated Magnolia Home Loans. The trial court granted defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the theory that the only proper procedure for naming a person an alter ego is by motion in the original action.The Fifth Circuit reversed and held that it does not matter whether the petition alleging defendant is an alter ego of the corporation is labeled a complaint or a motion, or whether the petition is assigned a case number different from the underlying action. Rather, the substantive question is whether defendant is, in fact, an alter ego. Furthermore, the court held that the complaint is not barred by the statute of limitations. View "Lopez v. Escamilla" on Justia Law

Augustine Caldera was a prison correctional officer who sometimes stuttered when he spoke. In 2010, Caldera filed a lawsuit against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and his supervisor alleging disability discrimination. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding a stutter constituted a disability under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). A jury found in Caldera’s favor and awarded $500,000. The court granted a motion for new trial because it found the damage award excessive. The Court of Appeal reversed on procedural grounds. After nearly a decade of litigation, Caldera sought about $2.4 million in statutory attorney fees (a $1.2 million “lodestar” and a 2.0 “multiplier”). The court awarded a little over $800,000. Caldera appealed. The Court of Appeal determined Caldera could not find a local attorney to take his discrimination lawsuit, so he hired an out-of-town firm. But when calculating attorney fees, the court set the attorneys’ hourly rate based on a lower local rate, rather than a higher out-of-town rate. The court then applied the extrinsic "Ketchum" factors to the hourly rate, rather than applying a multiplier to the lodestar. "In sum, Caldera’s attorneys were not adequately compensated consistent with the purposes of the FEHA." Thus, the Court reversed the trial court’s order for attorney fees. View "Caldera v. Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

In 2000, the Fasslers obtained a Wells Fargo (WF) home equity line of credit (HELOC), secured by a deed of trust (DOT). In 2003, they secured a $530,000 World Savings home loan, then obtained another WF HELOC. In 2004, they refinanced, using a $682,500 Countrywide Loan (secured by a DOT) to pay off World Savings and eliminate the HELOC balances. WF never issued any reconveyance of its DOTs. In 2005-2008, the Fasslers drew upon both HELOCs; as of 2016, the outstanding balances totaled over $224,000. In 2007, they refinanced the Countrywide Loan with a $1 million WaMu loan They defaulted. WaMu foreclosed. In 2008, LaSalle obtained title at a nonjudicial foreclosure auction. The following month, WF recorded a notice of default and election to sell under its DOT. The Huangs purchased the property from LaSalle in February 2009. In August 2009, WF recorded its notice of trustee’s sale. The Huangs received the notice when it was posted on their door.The Huangs' suit to quiet title was rejected as time-barred because, more than three years before they filed suit, they were aware of a recorded notice of trustee’s sale. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the notice of sale did not disturb or otherwise interfere with the Huangs’ possession sufficiently to start the running of the limitations period. After receiving the notice of sale, the Huangs provided it to their title insurer. The trustee’s sale did not take place as scheduled; the Huangs heard nothing substantive about the matter for years, while they continuously lived in the home. View "Huang v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

T-Mobile USA, Inc. (T-Mobile) appeals a judgment entered on a $5 million jury verdict in favor of former employee Stephen Colucci in a workplace retaliation case. T-Mobile primarily challenged the punitive damages award, arguing insufficient evidence was presented at trial that a T-Mobile agent engaged in retaliatory conduct, or that the agent's actions were malicious or oppressive. Alternatively, T-Mobile argued the $4 million punitive damages award was constitutionally excessive. Stephen Colucci worked for T-Mobile from 2007 until 2014 as the manager of a store in Ontario, California. A series of incidents ranging from a medical accommodation request, defamatory comments made by co-workers, and an allegation that Colucci was running a side business while on duty for his T-Mobile store. On day, complaining of back pain, Colucci was permitted to leave work for the day; while away, Robson recommended to HR that T-Mobile terminate Colucci for "cause" (conflict of interest), notwithstanding no loss prevention investigator interviewed Colucci or any co-workers about Colucci's alleged side-dealings while on T-Mobile time. In making this decision, Robson admittedly bypassed T-Mobile's progressive discipline policy, which might have included a warning or less severe consequence before resorting to termination. Information about the alleged conflict of interest had come almost entirely from the associate; at no point did anyone speak to Colucci about a purported conflict. Unaware of any pending termination, Colucci submitted a formal request to HR for a medical leave of absence. Colucci also lodged a second complaint to T-Mobile's integrity line, reporting that Robson was discriminating against him and neglecting to resolve the defamation incident. Undeterred, Robson proceeded with processing Colucci's termination. Ultimately, a jury returned a unanimous verdict in Colucci's favor on his claim of retaliation, awarding $1,020,042 in total compensatory damages for past and future economic losses, and past and future noneconomic damages and/or emotional distress. After review, the Court of Appeal reduced the punitive damages award to an amount one and one-half times the amount of compensatory damages, but otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "Colucci v. T-Mobile USA, Inc." on Justia Law

While Michael Tilkey and his girlfriend Jacqueline Mann were visiting at her home in Arizona, they got into an argument. Tilkey decided to leave the apartment. When he stepped out onto the enclosed patio to collect his belongings, Mann locked the door behind him. Tilkey banged on the door to regain entry, and Mann called police. Police arrested Tilkey and charged him under Arizona law with criminal damage deface, possession or use of drug paraphernalia, and disorderly conduct, disruptive behavior. Domestic violence charges were attached to the criminal damage and disorderly conduct charges. Tilkey pled guilty to the disorderly conduct charge only; the other two charges were dropped. After Tilkey completed a domestic nonviolence diversion program, the disorderly conduct charge was dismissed. Before the disorderly conduct charge was dismissed, Tilkey's company of 30 years, Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), terminated his employment based on his arrest for a domestic violence offense and his participation in the diversion program. Allstate informed Tilkey it was discharging him for threatening behavior and/or acts of physical harm or violence to another person. Following the termination, Allstate reported its reason for the termination to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA); that information was accessible to any firm that hired licensed broker-dealers like Tilkey. Tilkey sued Allstate for wrongful termination in violation of Labor Code section 432.7 and compelled, self-published defamation. At trial, Allstate presented evidence that it would have terminated his employment based on after-acquired evidence that Tilkey had circulated obscene and inappropriate e-mails using company resources. The jury returned a verdict in Tilkey's favor on all causes of action, advising the court that it did not find Allstate's after-acquired evidence defense credible. Allstate appealed, contending: (1) it did not violate section 432.7, so there was no wrongful termination; (2) compelled self-published defamation per se was not a viable tort theory; (3) it did not defame Tilkey because there was not substantial evidence its statement was not substantially true; (4) punitive damages were unavailable in compelled self-publication defamation causes of action; (5) the defamatory statement was not made with malice; and (6) the punitive damages awarded here were unconstitutionally excessive. The Court of Appeal agreed Allstate did not violate section 432.7 when it terminated Tilkey's employment based on his plea and his participation in an Arizona domestic nonviolence program, and reversed that judgment. The Court also agreed that compelled self-published defamation was a viable theory, and affirmed that judgment. The Court determined the pubitive damages awarded here were not proportionate to the compensatory damages for defamation, and remanded for recalculation of those damages. View "Tilkey v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, and waiting time penalties from two residential care facilities with a sole member, Chou. A hearing officer awarded $2.5 million. Chou’s liability was $2.2 million. The trial court allowed the defendants to file appeals conditionally, subject to being stricken if their petition to waive the bond requirement was denied. Chou submitted a declaration stating that he and the businesses lacked the financial ability to pay the awards or to make the deposit; that he had contacted bonding companies but could not provide required security; and that he was willing to provide financial statements, for the court’s in camera review, citing his bankruptcy and divorce. Plaintiffs submitted evidence that, while the action was pending, Chou had transferred title to four residential care facilities, and another property to trusts and LLCs of which Chou’s wife was the sole manager; that the value of the four properties collectively exceeded five million dollars; and that a fifth property had been purchased for $1,050,000. Chou cited mortgage debt, claiming that the properties were transferred for “an estate plan.”Chou was not present at the hearing. The trial court stated that there were no witnesses regarding the defendants’ financial position and found Chou’s assertions not credible. The court rejected, as untimely, Chou’s attorney’s offer to arrange for Chou to come to court and denied the request for a waiver of the requirement of an undertaking, dismissing the appeals from the award. The court of appeal affirmed. The trial court provided an adequate hearing, consistent with due process. View "Cardinal Care Management, LLC v. Afable" on Justia Law