Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The issues presented by this appeal for the Court of Appeal’s review arose in the procedural context of an anti-SLAPP motion brought by Tamara Kinsella, in defendant Kevin Kinsella’s malicious prosecution complaint. Shortly after Tamara initiated dissolution of marriage proceedings against Kevin, Tamara sued Kevin based on what she contended was his promise, prior to their marriage, that the property and income they acquired during their relationship would belong equally to both of them (Marvin Action). After Tamara voluntarily dismissed the Marvin Action, Kevin sued her for malicious prosecution in the present action. Seeking to have Kevin's malicious prosecution complaint stricken as a SLAPP, Tamara responded with an anti-SLAPP motion. In her effort to establish that Kevin could not show she lacked probable cause to prosecute the Marvin Action, Tamara relied on an interim adverse judgment rule: She (1) presented evidence that the trial court in the Marvin Action denied Kevin's motion for summary judgment, and (2) argued that this interim victory on Kevin's summary judgment motion precluded Kevin from establishing that Tamara lacked the requisite probable cause to file and prosecute the Marvin Action. In opposition, Kevin relied on the fraud exception to the interim adverse judgment rule: He argued that, because Tamara defeated Kevin's summary judgment motion in the Marvin Action by having submitted materially false facts on which the court relied in denying the motion, Tamara was not entitled to rely on the interim adverse judgment rule's presumption that resulted from the denial of his summary judgment motion in the Marvin Action. The trial court ruled that the malicious prosecution complaint was a SLAPP and struck it. Kevin appealed, arguing the trial court erred in determining that he did not establish the requisite probability of prevailing on the merits of his claim against Tamara. The Court of Appeal concurred with Kevin’s argument and reversed. View "Kinsella v. Kinsella" on Justia Law

Non-California residents and former crew members of a vessel filed suit alleging violations of California state wage and hour laws against their employers and the owners of the vessel (petitioners). The trial court denied petitioners' motion for summary judgment on the theories that Louisiana rather than California law governed the employment relationships at issue, and that either the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) or the dormant commerce clause preempted California law with respect to these employees.The Court of Appeal granted petitioners' writ of mandate, holding that the trial court erred because Louisiana law, rather than California law, was applicable in this case. The court held that Louisiana's interest in the application of its laws was stronger than California's interest. Among other things, the employment relationships were formed in Louisiana, between Louisiana-based employers and non-resident employees who traveled to that state to apply for, and accept employment. Furthermore, they received training and orientation in Louisiana and the administrative aspects of their employment were performed in that state. View "Gulf Offshore Logistics, LLC v. Superior Court of Ventura County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the county and others, alleging various civil rights violations stemming from plaintiff's 2015 arrest.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint based on plaintiff's repeated discovery violations. The court held that, to the extent plaintiff argued that the trial judge erred in striking his statement of disqualification, that claim was not reviewable on appeal. The court also held that the trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer in part where nothing in the text of Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a)(4), conditions its operation on compliance with other provisions. Because some of plaintiff's claims did not affect the trial court's judgment dismissing the case based on plaintiff's failure to respond to an order to show cause, the court need not consider those contentions. Finally, plaintiff's remaining claims were rejected. View "Dumas v. Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

Ismael Torres, Jr. sued Design Group Facility Solutions, Inc. (Design) for personal injuries after he fell through a skylight at a construction site. Design moved for summary judgment. The trial court initially denied the motion. Design moved for reconsideration based on new evidence under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008(a). At the hearing on the motion, the trial court granted reconsideration and, at the same time, granted the motion for summary judgment without giving Torres an opportunity to respond to the new evidence. After review, the Court of Appeal found the trial court abused its discretion: “a party unsuccessfully moving for summary judgment cannot circumvent the requirements of section 437c by subsequently moving for reconsideration under section 1008(a).” View "Torres v. Design Group Facility Soultions, Inc." on Justia Law

Irma Yolanda Munoz Soto sued Union Pacific Railroad Company and two of its employees, Scott King and Robert Finch (collectively, Union Pacific), for wrongful death (premises liability and general negligence) after Soto’s 16-year-old daughter was struck and killed by a freight train on an at-grade railroad crossing in Santa Clarita. The court granted Union Pacific’s motion for summary judgment, concluding as to Soto’s premises liability claim Union Pacific had no duty to remedy a dangerous condition because it did not own or control the railroad crossing. As to Soto’s negligence claim, the court ruled Soto could not establish that Union Pacific employees had negligently operated the train. On appeal, Soto argued she raised triable issues of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment. After review, of the evidence and governing law applicable to Soto’s claim, the Court of Appeal concurred there were no triable issues of fact, and summary judgment was appropriate. View "Soto v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Following a child custody hearing in January 2017, the trial court entered an order giving Mother sole custody. In June 2017, Father filed an unsuccessful request to set aside that order. Weeks later, he filed a second unsuccessful request to modify the order. The trial court denied Mother’s request for section 271 sanctions. Months later, she again sought sanctions relating to the June 2017 motion. Father filed an objection but did not challenge the motion on the basis of timeliness. The court ordered Father to pay $10,000 in section 271 sanctions. Father sought reconsideration, arguing for the first time that the sanction request was untimely under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(b). The trial court denied the motion and awarded Mother $3,000 in attorney fee sanctions for having to defend the ex parte motion for reconsideration.The court of appeal affirmed. Rule 3.1702(b) states: “A notice of motion to claim attorney’s fees for services up to and including the rendition of judgment in the trial court—including attorney’s fees on an appeal before the rendition of judgment in the trial court—must be served and filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal.” The timing of a notice of appeal is based on the entry of judgment. The sanctions at issue were awarded for attorney fees incurred after entry of the January 2017 judgment; rule 3.1702 does not apply. View "George v. Shams-Shirazi" on Justia Law

Appellants Baldwin & Sons, Inc.; Baldwin & Sons, LLC; Sunranch Capital Partners, LLC; USA Portola Properties, LLC; Sunrise Pacific Construction; USA Portola East, LLC; USA Portola West, LLC; and SRC-PH Investments, LLC, all appealed an order compelling compliance with administrative subpoenas issued by the State Water Resources Control Board. Appellants were involved (or believed to be involved) in the construction of a large-scale development in the Portola Hills Community in Lake Forest, California. The State Board initiated an investigation into alleged violations of the federal Clean Water Act and California's Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act occurring during construction activities. In connection with its investigation, the State Board issued subpoenas seeking Appellants' financial records. When Appellants refused to produce the requested financial records, the State Board sought a court order compelling compliance with the subpoenas. With the exception of tax returns, the trial court concluded that the information sought was relevant to the State Board's investigation and subject to disclosure pursuant to the investigative subpoenas. Appellants argued on appeal: (1) their financial records were not reasonably relevant to the State Board's investigation; (2) compelling production of their financial records violated their right to privacy; and (3) the protective order did not adequately protect against disclosure of their private financial information to third parties. The Court of Appeal rejected these claims and affirmed the challenged order compelling production of the Appellants' financial records subject to a protective order. View "State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Baldwin & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law

Temporary staffing agency FlexCare, LLC assigned Lynn Grande to work as a nurse at Eisenhower Medical Center (Eisenhower). According to Grande, during her employment at Eisenhower, FlexCare and Eisenhower failed to ensure she received her required meal and rest breaks, wages for certain periods she worked, and overtime wages. Grande was a named plaintiff in a class action lawsuit against FlexCare brought on behalf of FlexCare employees assigned to hospitals throughout California. Her own claims were based solely on her work on assignment at Eisenhower. FlexCare settled with the class, including Grande, and Grande received $162.13 for her injuries, plus a class representative incentive bonus of $20,000. Grande executed a release of claims, and the trial court entered a judgment incorporating the settlement agreement. About a year later, Grande brought a second class action alleging the same labor law violations, this time against Eisenhower, who was not a party to the previous lawsuit. FlexCare intervened in the action asserting Grande could not bring the separate lawsuit against Eisenhower because she had settled her claims against them in the prior class action. The trial court held a trial narrowed to questions as to the propriety of the lawsuit, and ruled Eisenhower was not a released party under the settlement agreement and could not avail itself of the doctrine of res judicata because the hospital was neither a party to the prior litigation nor in privity with FlexCare. Eisenhower petitioned for a petition for a writ of mandate and FlexCare appealed the trial court’s interlocutory order. The Court of appeal concurred with the trial court on grounds that Eisenhower and FlexCare were not in privity, preventing Eisenhower from blocking Grande’s claims under the doctrine of res judicata, and Eisenhower was not a released party under the settlement agreement. Therefore the appellate court denied mandamus relief. View "Grande v. Eisenhower Medical Center" on Justia Law

In a case of first impression, the Court of Appeal was asked to determine whether insurers have the right to appeal a small claims default judgment entered against their insureds. Vanessa Gonzalez sued Jonathan Johnson in small claims court after an auto accident in Orange, California. Johnson did not show up for the small claims hearing, and the small claims court entered a default judgment against him for $10,000, plus $140 in costs. Johnson’s auto insurer was Pacific Pioneer Insurance Company. Pacific Pioneer filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court struck the notice of appeal, and Pacific Pioneer sought to set aside that order. This prompted the trial court to compose a minute order explaining why it had struck the notice: Code of Civil Procedure 116.710(d) precluded a non-appearing “defendant” - which the court equated with Pacific Pioneer - from appealing a small claims judgment. Pacific Pioneer then filed this writ petition, challenging the trial court’s reading of the relevant statutes. The Court of Appeal concluded the insured’s failure to appear in small claims court did not annul the appeal right conferred upon the insurer by Code of Civil Procedure section 116.710(c). The trial court thus erred in striking Pacific Pioneer’s notice of appeal. The Court issued a writ to direct the trial court to vacate its order striking Pacific Pioneer’s notice of appeal, and to reinstate its appeal of the small claims judgment in favor of Gonzalez. View "Pacific Pioneer Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The District Attorney sued defendant in quo warranto, contending that defendant was violating Government Code section 1099, which makes it unlawful to simultaneously hold incompatible public offices. In this case, defendant served simultaneously as a member of the board of directors of the Water Replenishment District of Southern California (WRD) and as mayor of Carson, California.The Court of Appeal held that the District Attorney properly initiated the quo warranto action under Code of Civil Procedure section 803. The court also held that defendant's dual offices were incompatible because they gave rise to a possibility of conflict in duties or loyalties and there was no law compelling or expressly authorizing him to hold both offices. Finally, the court held that the District Attorney was not required to reapply for leave to maintain the quo warranto suit; the order precluding defendant from deposing the District Attorney was not an abuse of discretion; and the trial court did not rely on evidence previously excluded as inadmissible. View "People ex rel. Lacey v. Robles" on Justia Law