Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Vehicle Code section 13365(a) directs the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to suspend a person’s driver’s license “[u]pon receipt of notification of a violation of" section 40508(a) (the Misdemeanor Statute), which makes it a misdemeanor for a traffic offender to “willfully violat[e]” his written promise to appear in court. Plaintiffs challenged the DMV policy of suspending driver’s licenses upon notification of a failure to appear even without notification that this failure violated the Misdemeanor Statute. The DMV provides courts with electronic and paper methods to notify it of a person’s failure to appear; both require the court to indicate the “sections violated.” The DMV will suspend a driver’s license regardless of whether the form indicates that the Misdemeanor Statute is one of the sections violated. The trial court denied the petition.The court of appeal reversed, rejecting DMV’s argument that it is authorized under section 13365(a) to suspend a license upon receiving notification pursuant to the Notification Statutes. Notification of a violation of the Misdemeanor Statute is required before the DMV suspends a license pursuant to section 13365(a). The Notification Statute is broader and authorizes permissive notification upon violation of a “written promise to appear . . . , or . . . an order to appear in court." An order to appear in court is not equivalent to a written promise to appear. The Misdemeanor Statute also requires that the failure to appear be willful.” View "Hernandez v. Department of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

This appeal challenges the legality of lease-leaseback agreements used by school districts for construction and modernization projects. The trial court entered judgment dismissing plaintiff's remaining conflict of interest claims because the challenged projects had all been completed, which it held rendered the reverse validation action moot.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of dismissal, holding that allowing plaintiff's claims to proceed long after the projects have been finished would undermine the strong policy of promptly resolving the validity of public agency actions. In this case, the lease-leaseback agreements were subject to validation, and plaintiff's conflict of interest claims necessarily challenge the validity of the agreements, regardless of label or remedy. Because the projects were completed, plaintiff's claims are moot. View "McGee v. Torrance Unified School District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff David Hester was a reality television star on “Storage Wars.” Plaintiff made the winning bid and purchased the contents of a self-storage unit at an auction held by defendant, Public Storage. Defendant learned it had mistakenly sold the goods about half an hour after the sale was complete. The unit’s occupant had paid his past due rent weeks before the auction, but defendant’s computer system incorrectly marked the unit for sale. Due to this error, defendant immediately rescinded the deal based on two documents plaintiff had signed that contained clauses allowing defendant to void the sale for any reason. Plaintiff claimed defendant’s rescission was invalid and sued for breach of contract and conversion, among other claims. Defendant moved for summary judgment on the contract and conversion claims on grounds it had properly voided the sale under the null and void clauses. The trial court granted defendant’s motion. Plaintiff appealed, arguing summary judgment was inappropriate because the null and void clauses were invalid because: (1) they were precluded by various statutes governing self-storage auction sales; and (2) he agreed to them under duress. After review, the Court of Appeal disagreed, and rejected plaintiff’s argument that defendant was required to file an unlawful detainer action to retake possession of the purchased goods after it rescinded the sale. View "Hester v. Public Storage" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal summed up the issue before it on appeal in this matter: a fight between the tax entities who negotiated favorable passthrough agreements before their redevelopment agencies were dissolved, and those who did not, for their pro rata share of the residual pool of money in the redevelopment property tax fund left for distribution after the successor agencies first paid the passthrough agreements in full, enforceable obligations, and administrative costs. Seven cities filed a petition for mandamus and declaratory relief against Tracy Sandoval, the auditor-controller for the County of San Diego (Auditor) challenging the methodology the Auditor used to distribute the residual pool of former tax increment, a method that favored San Diego County and, at least, three community college districts, all of whom had passthrough agreements with their former redevelopment agencies. The trial court agreed with Cities and granted their petition. Auditor appealed. The Court of Appeal concluded there was no plain meaning to be attributed to the applicable statutory language. The Court felt compelled nonetheless to construe the "mangled" statutes as it found them, and offered direction to auditor-controllers throughout California. The Court accepted nearly all of Cities’ contentions, including their premise that the fundamental purpose of Health & Safety Code section 34188, was to include passthrough payments as part of a taxing entity’s Assembly Bill No. 8 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) pro rata share and thereby equalize the tax distributions to those taxing entities with favorable passthrough agreements and those without. The Court reversed the trial court's decision to grant the Cities' petition for a writ of mandate. "Without deciding on the constitutionality of Cities’ interpretation of the statutes, we can say their interpretation raises substantial doubt as to the constitutionality of Cities’ methodology, adding support to our conclusion the trial court erred and Auditor’s methodology must prevail." View "City of Chula Vista v. Sandoval" on Justia Law

The Insalacos own property atop of a slope. At the bottom of the slope is Wilkie Creek. Hope Lutheran Church owns property on the other side of the creek. After a landslide made their house uninhabitable, the Insalacos sued the Church and adjoining landowners, including the Du/Wongs. They alleged that water runoff from the Church caused the creek to rise, which caused their backyard to flood. The flooding saturated the soil in their backyard, which caused the landslide. The Du/Wongs filed a cross-complaint, alleging tort causes of action related to the landslide and seeking indemnification. The court granted the Church summary judgment.The court of appeal reversed The trial court erred in denying a timely motion by the Insalacos for a continuance to take additional discovery (a site inspection) and oppose the summary judgment motion. They presented a detailed declaration from their attorney explaining the particular facts essential to opposing the motion that may exist but could not then be presented. As to the Du/Wongs, concededly material facts were disputed. The Church placed at issue how much rain fell on the date of the incident, whether there are “two ways in which water flow in a creek could destabilize a slope,” and whether the channel of Wilkie Creek is stable and shows no evidence of recent erosion. View "Insalaco v. Hope Lutheran Church of West Contra Costa County" on Justia Law

Third Laguna Hills Mutual (a homeowner’s association, “the HOA”) filed a complaint alleging homeowner Jeff Joslin violated its covenants. Joslin filed a cross-complaint alleging the HOA unlawfully prevented him from renting out his home. The HOA filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the cross-complaint: “It is clear that Joslin is suing the [HOA] for suing him.” The court denied the motion. The HOA appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of the HOA's anti0SLAPP motion. "The filing of a complaint is a protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute (the right to petition). But to some degree, every party that files a cross-complaint is suing because it is being sued. Here, Joslin’s cross-complaint arises from the HOA’s alleged tortious acts, but not from the HOA’s protected act of filing a complaint." View "Third Laguna Hills Mutual v. Joslin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants James and Maria Mosley rented out a home they owned that defendant-respondent Pacific Specialty Insurance Company (PSIC) insured under a homeowners’ policy (the Property). The Mosleys’ tenant started growing marijuana in the Property. To support his marijuana-growing operation, the tenant re-routed the Property’s electrical system to steal power from a main utility line. The tenant’s re-routed electrical system caused a fuse to blow, which started a fire that damaged the Property. PSIC denied coverage, citing a provision in the Mosleys’ policy that excluded any loss associated with “[t]he growing of plants” or the “manufacture, production, operation or processing of . . . plant materials.” The Mosleys sued, but the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company, finding that the Mosleys had control over their tenant's conduct. A divided Court of Appeals reversed, finding no evidence the Mosleys were aware of their tenant's marijuana growing operation, and because the record was silent as to what the Moseleys could or should have done to discover it. "[T]he Mosleys did not use the Property in a prescribed way that would have allowed PSIC to suspend their insurance and deny all coverage. More importantly, contrary to PSIC’s assertion and the trial court’s finding, there was no evidence Mosleys knowingly increased a risk of fire hazard. In addition, a fact issue remains as to whether [the Tenant's] hazard-increasing conduct was within their control. If it was, then PSIC properly denied coverage. But by denying the Mosleys coverage for Lopez’s conduct, regardless of the Mosleys’ control over or knowledge of it, the Policy did not provide 'substantially equivalent' coverage to that required under [Insurance Code] section 2071." View "Mosley v. Pacific Specialty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The trial court found defendants Peng Xufeng and Jia Siyu filed a frivolous anti-SLAPP motion against Changsha Metro Group Co., Ltd. (Changsha). The trial court ordered defendants to pay Changsha $61,915 for Changsha’s attorneys’ fees in opposing the anti-SLAPP motion. Defendants appealed, contending the trial court erred in awarding attorneys’ fees to Changsha because: (1) defendants were not given a 21-day safe harbor period; and (2) Changsha requested fees in its opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion, rather than in a separate motion. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Changsha Metro Group Co., Ltd. v. Xuefeng" on Justia Law

The trial court had approved a stipulated protective order that authorizes a party to label documents produced in discovery Highly Confidential or Confidential and limits disclosure accordingly. In support of its opposition to Facebook's anti-SLAPP motion, Six4Three submitted a massive declaration by attorney Godkin with over 200 exhibits, many of which were copies of documents that Facebook had labeled Highly Confidential or Confidential. Six4Three filed a redacted, public version and lodged conditionally under seal an unredacted copy. Facebook then moved to seal the exhibits to the Godkin declaration that consisted of copies of documents that Facebook had designated confidential. The court continued the hearing on that motion then issued its order denying Facebook’s anti-SLAPP motion as untimely but granting that of the individual defendants. The resolution of neither motion depended on any of the contested exhibits. The court of appeal affirmed the order that denied Facebook's anti-SLAPP motion but reversed the order as to the individual defendants.In the interim, the trial court issued an order striking 182 exhibits, in whole or in part, based on irrelevance or on the improper submission of entire documents, and sealing 22 full exhibits and certain pages of four exhibits that were deposition transcripts. Six4Three filed a notice of appeal; media entities filed motions to unseal the documents submitted by Six4Three. The court of appeal dismissed; Six4Three is not “aggrieved” by the sealing order, so as to have standing to appeal it. View "Six4Three, LLC v. Facebook, Inc." on Justia Law

Goros, age 92, filed suit alleging that Kindred Healthcare violated the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (Welf. & Inst. Code 15600) by failing to timely obtain medical treatment for her after she suffered a stroke while a patient at their nursing home. After Goros’s death about two years later, her daughter substituted in as successor in interest and added a claim for wrongful death. The trial court granted the defendants summary judgment, predicated on the exclusion of the opinion of the plaintiff’s expert on the issue of causation.The court of appeal affirmed. The plaintiff’s expert failed to provide any basis for his opinions and stated only that “his opinion is based on his experience and documented medical literature.” The plaintiff cites no evidence contradicting the court’s finding that her expert did not have the education or experience to render an opinion about the cause or treatment of Goros’s stroke, as required by Evidence Code section 720(a). Qualifications on a related subject matter are insufficient. View "Lowery v. Kindren Healthcare Operating, Inc." on Justia Law