Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Shortly before turning 18 Andrew committed an armed robbery; his accomplice shot and killed a police officer. After his conviction, Judge Brady sentenced Andrew to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP), plus 24 years. The court of appeal reversed one special circumstance. On remand, Judge Brady sentenced Andrew to LWOP plus 24 years. After a second remand following the U.S. Supreme Court's Miller decision (2012), Judge Brady imposed LWOP plus 23 years, finding Andrew’s actions “were not those of an irresponsible or impulsive child," nor the product of peer pressure, coercion, or surprise and finding no realistic chance of rehabilitation. The court of appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court returned the case with directions to consider whether legislation rendering juvenile LWOP defendants eligible for parole suitability hearings mooted Andrew’s challenge.While Andrew’s appeal was pending Proposition 57 eliminated a prosecutor’s ability to “direct file” charges in criminal court against minors of a certain age. These minors may be tried in criminal court only after the juvenile court conducts a transfer hearing to consider specific factors. The court rejected Andrew’s LWOP challenge but concluded he was entitled to a Proposition 57 hearing. The superior court granted the prosecution's motion to assign that hearing to Judge Brady. The court of appeal rejected a mandamus petition. A conditional reversal and limited remand for a Proposition 57 transfer hearing are not a “new trial” under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.61, which permits parties in civil and criminal actions to move to disqualify an assigned trial judge based on an allegation that the judge is prejudiced against the party. View "Andrew M. v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his counsel appealed from a postjudgment order denying plaintiff's motion to compel the production of documents and imposing $3,456.70 in sanctions against counsel for discovery abuses. The underlying action involved residual payments owed by defendant to plaintiff.The Court of Appeal denied the petition challenging the motion to compel the production of documents, and affirmed the imposition of $3,456.70 in sanctions against counsel. The court held that, although plaintiff lacked standing, counsel had standing to appeal the order and was properly an appellant in this matter. The court also held that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to compel; rejected challenges to the monetary sanctions levied against counsel; held that a separate motion is not required, nor is a separate hearing on discovery sanctions; and held that the trial court did not err in awarding discovery sanctions representing fees and costs incurred. View "Dalessandro v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Wade Robson and James Safechuck filed suit against two of Michael Jackson's corporations, MJJ Productions, Inc. and MJJ Ventures, Inc., for their involvement in Jackson's alleged sexual abuse of Robson and Safechuck. Plaintiffs filed suit after their 26th birthdays, and the trial court concluded their claims were untimely because they did not fall within the narrow exception of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1. However, effective January 1, 2020, section 340.1 was amended to allow a victim to bring claims of childhood sexual assault against third-party nonperpetrators until the victim's 40th birthday.The Court of Appeal reversed the judgments in the corporations' favor and held that the extended limitations period of the revised section 340.1 applied to render plaintiffs' claims timely. In this case, plaintiffs filed their lawsuits before their 40th birthdays and their cases remained pending on appeal. Therefore, they have not reached finality. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Safechuck v. MJJ Productions, Inc." on Justia Law

After Kimberly-Clark spun off its healthcare division to create a new Delaware company called Halyward Health, Halyward filed suit in Los Angeles Superior Court seeking a declaratory judgment that it did not have to provide indemnity for the punitive damages awarded in a recently filed class action concerning surgical gowns sold by Kimberly-Clark.The Court of Appeal held that the indemnification dispute was not sufficiently related to California for courts of the state to exercise personal jurisdiction over Kimberly-Clark. In this case, the litigation did not arise out of or relate to Kimberly-Clark's medical gown sales and marketing in California. Furthermore, the distribution agreement was not a "California-directed" contract conferring personal jurisdiction. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's grant of Kimberly-Clark's motion to quash the service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "Halyard Health, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp." on Justia Law

Defendants solicited and obtained $180,000 from plaintiff produce a documentary on the Syrian refugee crisis. Plaintiff sued, alleging that no “significant” work on the documentary has occurred, that defendants never intended to make the documentary, and that a cinematographer has not been paid and claims the right to any footage he has shot, putting the project in jeopardy. Defendants filed an unsuccessful anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation (Code Civ. Proc. 425.16)) motion to strike, arguing the complaint arises out of acts in furtherance of their right of free speech in connection with an issue of public interest--their newsgathering related to the Syrian refugee crisis, and that plaintiff could not demonstrate minimal merit on his claims because the action is subject to an arbitration provision; plaintiff’s allegations are contradicted by the investor agreement; and the evidence establishes that substantial progress was made. The court found that plaintiff’s claims did not arise out of acts in furtherance of defendants’ protected speech but were “based on the failure to do acts in furtherance of the right of free speech."The court of appeal reversed. Defendants made a prima facie showing that the complaint targets conduct falling within the “catchall” provision of the anti-SLAPP law. Defendants’ solicitation of investments and their performance of allegedly unsatisfactory work on the documentary constituted activity in furtherance of their right of free speech in connection with an issue of public interest. The court erred in denying the motion at the first stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis. View "Ojjeh v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2007, Plaintiffs borrowed $110 million from Bear Stearns to finance the purchase of a San Francisco apartment complex. In 2010, after plaintiffs defaulted, CP purchased the property at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. Plaintiffs sued CP and others, alleging legal claims (breach of contract, fraud, slander of title, trade secret misappropriation), and equitable claims (unfair competition, to set aside the foreclosure sale, and for an accounting). Judge Miller struck plaintiffs’ jury demand based on provisions in the contracts, held a bench trial, and entered judgment for defendants. The court of appeal concluded Judge Miller erred by striking plaintiffs’ jury demand as to the legal claims, finding no error as to the equitable claims, and remanded the legal claims.On remand, Judge Kahn held that Judge Miller’s findings in connection with plaintiffs’ equitable claim for unfair competition necessarily resolved plaintiffs’ legal claims because the substantive law allegations of the legal claims are also alleged as grounds that defendants violated the UCL. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that after the partial reversal, plaintiffs were entitled to relitigate all factual issues relevant to the legal claims; that Judge Kahn violated the remittitur and the law of the case; that under the statutes governing judicial notice and summary judgment, Judge Kahn, could not consider the “truth” of the facts found by Judge Miller and even if Judge Miller’s findings had binding effect, those findings did not dispose of the legal claims. View "Rincon EV Realty LLC v. CP III Rincon Towers, Inc." on Justia Law

In September 2014, a driver was rear-ended by an SUV driven by a Union Pacific employee. The motorist lost control of her car, spinning off the freeway and onto the dirt shoulder, where it struck a roadside light pole. The light pole, which was manufactured by Ameron Pole Products, was designed to “break away” on impact, causing the pole to pass over the impacting vehicle, thereby reducing the force of the collision and concomitant risk of injury. On this occasion, however, the light pole did not break away, but instead remained standing. The driver sustained multiple injuries, including skull fractures, injuries to her brain and face, a fracture of the right scapula, and bilateral chest trauma. The driver sued Union Pacific Railroad Comapny and Ameron. Union Pacific cross-complained against Ameron for equitable indemnity and apportionment. Ameron moved for summary judgment, arguing the driver would be unable to prove causation as a matter of law. Union Pacific opposed the motion, arguing Ameron failed to carry its initial burden or showing judgment as a matter of law. Alternatively, Union Pacific argued the evidence submitted raised triable issues of fact as to whether Ameron’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the driver’s injuries. The trial court entered judgment in Ameron’s favor. The Court of Appeal reversed, concurring with Union Pacific’s alternate grounds. Summary judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Ameron Pole Products LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the adequacy of the Environmental Impact Report (EIR) to accurately estimate the amount of Reactive Organic Gas (ROG) emissions and to adopt all feasible mitigation measures. The challenge arises from the approval of a geothermal plant to be located on fedeal land in Mono County, California. Petitioners also claimed the Great Basin Unified Air Pollution Control District (District) was not the proper lead agency to undertake preparation of the EIR. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the District was the proper lead agency, and that the permit limiting the daily ROG emissions was sufficient evidence of the amount of the emissions. However, the Court determined the District did not adequately analyze whether the additional mitigation measures proposed by petitioners were feasible to limit ROG emissions. Therefore, the Court reversed the part of the judgment relating to the District’s consideration of the proposed mitigation measures, but affirmed in all other respects. View "Covington v. Great Basin Unified Air Pollution Control Dist." on Justia Law

The City of Desert Hot Springs (the City) tried to abate a public nuisance by serving the owner of a dilapidated hotel/motel with notice that it was required to correct numerous building and safety violations. When the owner failed to timely correct the violations or apply for a permit to raze the building, the City sought a declaration that the building constituted a nuisance and, pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 17980.7(c), requested the appointment of a receiver to oversee the building’s rehabilitation. Instead of addressing the notice and opportunity given to the owner of the hotel/motel and the proposed receiver’s qualifications, the trial court here questioned the viability of the proposed receiver’s financial and construction plan. And, having concluded the plan made no economic sense because the value of the property after its rehabilitation would not exceed the costs of rehabilitation plus the additional costs associated with appointment of a receiver, the court denied the City’s request and subsequently dismissed the action. The Court of Appeal concurred with the City which argued the court exceeded its authority under section 17980.7(c). Therefore, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for the trial court to reconsider the City’s request for appointment of a receiver. View "City of Desert Hot Springs v. Valenti" on Justia Law

Beau Gordon, a professional roofer, fell 35 feet through a "camouflaged hole" in a warehouse roof he was inspecting. For the resulting head injury, a jury awarded Gordon approximately $875,000 against the building's owner, ARC Manufacturing, Inc. (ARC) and Joseph Meyers. The primary issue on appeal was whether the trial court correctly refused to instruct on primary assumption of risk where, as here, defendants did not hire or engage Gordon. The Court of Appeal concluded that primary assumption of risk did not apply, rejected appellants' other contentions, and affirmed the judgment. View "Gordon v. ARC Manufacturing, Inc." on Justia Law