Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Baldwin & Sons, Inc.
Appellants Baldwin & Sons, Inc.; Baldwin & Sons, LLC; Sunranch Capital Partners, LLC; USA Portola Properties, LLC; Sunrise Pacific Construction; USA Portola East, LLC; USA Portola West, LLC; and SRC-PH Investments, LLC, all appealed an order compelling compliance with administrative subpoenas issued by the State Water Resources Control Board. Appellants were involved (or believed to be involved) in the construction of a large-scale development in the Portola Hills Community in Lake Forest, California. The State Board initiated an investigation into alleged violations of the federal Clean Water Act and California's Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act occurring during construction activities. In connection with its investigation, the State Board issued subpoenas seeking Appellants' financial records. When Appellants refused to produce the requested financial records, the State Board sought a court order compelling compliance with the subpoenas. With the exception of tax returns, the trial court concluded that the information sought was relevant to the State Board's investigation and subject to disclosure pursuant to the investigative subpoenas. Appellants argued on appeal: (1) their financial records were not reasonably relevant to the State Board's investigation; (2) compelling production of their financial records violated their right to privacy; and (3) the protective order did not adequately protect against disclosure of their private financial information to third parties. The Court of Appeal rejected these claims and affirmed the challenged order compelling production of the Appellants' financial records subject to a protective order. View "State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Baldwin & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law
Grande v. Eisenhower Medical Center
Temporary staffing agency FlexCare, LLC assigned Lynn Grande to work as a nurse at Eisenhower Medical Center (Eisenhower). According to Grande, during her employment at Eisenhower, FlexCare and Eisenhower failed to ensure she received her required meal and rest breaks, wages for certain periods she worked, and overtime wages. Grande was a named plaintiff in a class action lawsuit against FlexCare brought on behalf of FlexCare employees assigned to hospitals throughout California. Her own claims were based solely on her work on assignment at Eisenhower. FlexCare settled with the class, including Grande, and Grande received $162.13 for her injuries, plus a class representative incentive bonus of $20,000. Grande executed a release of claims, and the trial court entered a judgment incorporating the settlement agreement. About a year later, Grande brought a second class action alleging the same labor law violations, this time against Eisenhower, who was not a party to the previous lawsuit. FlexCare intervened in the action asserting Grande could not bring the separate lawsuit against Eisenhower because she had settled her claims against them in the prior class action. The trial court held a trial narrowed to questions as to the propriety of the lawsuit, and ruled Eisenhower was not a released party under the settlement agreement and could not avail itself of the doctrine of res judicata because the hospital was neither a party to the prior litigation nor in privity with FlexCare. Eisenhower petitioned for a petition for a writ of mandate and FlexCare appealed the trial court’s interlocutory order. The Court of appeal concurred with the trial court on grounds that Eisenhower and FlexCare were not in privity, preventing Eisenhower from blocking Grande’s claims under the doctrine of res judicata, and Eisenhower was not a released party under the settlement agreement. Therefore the appellate court denied mandamus relief. View "Grande v. Eisenhower Medical Center" on Justia Law
Pacific Pioneer Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct.
In a case of first impression, the Court of Appeal was asked to determine whether insurers have the right to appeal a small claims default judgment entered against their insureds. Vanessa Gonzalez sued Jonathan Johnson in small claims court after an auto accident in Orange, California. Johnson did not show up for the small claims hearing, and the small claims court entered a default judgment against him for $10,000, plus $140 in costs. Johnson’s auto insurer was Pacific Pioneer Insurance Company. Pacific Pioneer filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court struck the notice of appeal, and Pacific Pioneer sought to set aside that order. This prompted the trial court to compose a minute order explaining why it had struck the notice: Code of Civil Procedure 116.710(d) precluded a non-appearing “defendant” - which the court equated with Pacific Pioneer - from appealing a small claims judgment. Pacific Pioneer then filed this writ petition, challenging the trial court’s reading of the relevant statutes. The Court of Appeal concluded the insured’s failure to appear in small claims court did not annul the appeal right conferred upon the insurer by Code of Civil Procedure section 116.710(c). The trial court thus erred in striking Pacific Pioneer’s notice of appeal. The Court issued a writ to direct the trial court to vacate its order striking Pacific Pioneer’s notice of appeal, and to reinstate its appeal of the small claims judgment in favor of Gonzalez. View "Pacific Pioneer Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Insurance Law
People ex rel. Lacey v. Robles
The District Attorney sued defendant in quo warranto, contending that defendant was violating Government Code section 1099, which makes it unlawful to simultaneously hold incompatible public offices. In this case, defendant served simultaneously as a member of the board of directors of the Water Replenishment District of Southern California (WRD) and as mayor of Carson, California.The Court of Appeal held that the District Attorney properly initiated the quo warranto action under Code of Civil Procedure section 803. The court also held that defendant's dual offices were incompatible because they gave rise to a possibility of conflict in duties or loyalties and there was no law compelling or expressly authorizing him to hold both offices. Finally, the court held that the District Attorney was not required to reapply for leave to maintain the quo warranto suit; the order precluding defendant from deposing the District Attorney was not an abuse of discretion; and the trial court did not rely on evidence previously excluded as inadmissible. View "People ex rel. Lacey v. Robles" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law
Fenimore v. The Regents of the University of California
The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion for leave to amend the complaint. The court held that the foundation of the ruling was an incorrect timing computation about the statute of limitations. In this case, the Hospitals conceded that the trial court's timing computation was in error and the statute of limitations did not bar plaintiff's motion for leave to file his second amended complaint. View "Fenimore v. The Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure
Roger v. County of Riverside
Douglas Roger, an orthopedic surgeon, sued respondents Riverside County (the County) and its sheriff’s department after they falsely reported he had been charged with a felony. In an earlier civil action, the Riverside Superior Court held Roger in civil contempt for refusing to produce his patients’ medical records in discovery, and remanded him to jail, where he spent 52 days in custody. When the sheriff’s department booked him into custody, they incorrectly entered his civil violation in their electronic database as a felony charge, and then reported that inaccurate charge to the California Department of Justice (DOJ), creating a false criminal record for Roger. Among other things, he alleged he lost a lucrative hospital contract he had maintained for the previous 12 years as a result of the respondents’ error. The trial court sustained respondents’ demurrer to Roger's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim and later disposed of the remaining causes of action at the summary judgment stage. The court concluded Roger had failed to state a section 1983 claim as a matter of law because he had not alleged facts “establishing the nature of [respondents’] training program” and therefore failed to allege the training was so obviously inadequate as to amount to deliberate indifference to inmates’ civil rights. The court dismissed the defamation claims because the undisputed evidence showed Roger had failed to comply with the claim presentation requirements in the Government Claims Act by filing a late claim for damages with the County. The court concluded the writ claim failed because the undisputed evidence showed respondents had fixed the error in Roger’s record during the litigation, and therefore their recordkeeping errors amounted to a past wrong, not a present controversy. Finally, the court concluded there was no legal basis for declaratory relief because respondents were under no ministerial duty to act— that is, to maintain correct records.
On appeal, Roger challenged the court’s dismissal of each of his claims. After review, the Court of Appeals determined there was merit to all of Roger's claims and reversed judgment. View "Roger v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law
Hedayatzadeh v. City of Del Mar
Farid Hedayatzadeh (Hedayatzadeh) appealed following the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the City of Del Mar (the City) in his lawsuit arising out of the death of his 19-year-old son, who was struck by a train on an oceanfront bluff in Del Mar on property owned by North County Transit District (NCTD). Specifically, Hedayatzadeh argued the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on his single cause of action alleging a dangerous condition of public property based primarily on the City's failure to erect any barriers to prevent pedestrians from accessing NCTD's train tracks. On the night at issue, Javad Hedayatzadeh and his friends walked around the guardrail at the end of 13th Street, down an unimproved dirt embankment, and crossed the train tracks. The group then walked northbound on the west side of the tracks to a spot where they sat and smoked marijuana. They knew they were trespassing on NCTD property. At various points along the railroad right-of-way, NCTD has installed signs stating "No Trespassing," "Danger" and "Railroad Property." Javad noticed a freight train coming from the south and told his friends that he was going to use his phone to take a video "selfie" of himself next to the train. As Javad was near the train tracks taking the selfie, he was struck by the train and killed. After filing an unsuccessful claim under the Government Claims Act, Javad's father, Hedayatzadeh, filed this lawsuit against the City, NCTD, and BNSF Railway Company, which allegedly operated the freight train. The Court of Appeal concluded that, as a matter of law, the City's property at the end of 13th Street did not constitute a dangerous condition of public property even though the City did not take action to prevent pedestrians from accessing the train tracks on NCTD's adjacent right-of-way by walking around the guardrail at the end of the street. View "Hedayatzadeh v. City of Del Mar" on Justia Law
Amezcua v. L.A. County Civil Service Commission
The Court of Appeal affirmed the district court's judgment denying a petition for writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1085 and 1094.5. Plaintiff alleged that the Department improperly extended his probation; he became a permanent employee 12 months after his hire date; and as a permanent employee, he was entitled to a hearing before discharge.The court held that there was no prohibition against the Department acting unilaterally so long as the other requirements of rule 12.02(B) of the Los Angeles County Civil Service Rules were met; rule 12.02 expressly permits the Department to exclude from the calculation of the probationary period, those times when an employee is absent from duty, and makes no reference as to whether that absence is paid or unpaid; the court interpreted the term "absent from duty" to mean that an employee is missing from his or her obligatory tasks, conduct, service, or functions, arising from his or her position, here, the position of deputy sheriff; and plaintiff failed to articulate what, if any, duties he was required to perform during the period he was on Relieved of Duty status. View "Amezcua v. L.A. County Civil Service Commission" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law
Menezes v. McDaniel
Following protracted postjudgment litigation over the transfer of title of real property from Natache Menezes (Wife) to Tim McDaniel (Husband), the trial court issued $200,000 in sanctions against Wife, pursuant to Family Code section 271. Wife challenged the sanctions, contending they improperly included anticipated attorney fees and costs, and the amount was not supported by substantial evidence showing they were tethered to attorney fees and costs. The Court of Appeal concluded the superior court did not abuse its discretion by awarding the sanctions, including the anticipated fees and costs. However, the matter was remanded for the trial court to ensure that the bases for the $200,000 award included only expenses tethered to attorney fees and costs. View "Menezes v. McDaniel" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Family Law
St. Myers v. Dignity Health
Plaintiff Carla St. Myers worked as a nurse practitioner at a rural clinic that was part of a medical center owned and operated by defendant Dignity Health. During the three years she worked there, she submitted over 50 complaints about working conditions and was also the subject of several investigations based on anonymous complaints. All the investigations concluded the complaints against St. Myers were unsubstantiated and no action was taken against her. She found another job and resigned. But claiming her resignation was a constructive termination due to intolerable working conditions, St. Myers sued Dignity Health and Optum360 Services, Inc., setting forth three causes of action for retaliation under various statutory provisions and constructive discharge in violation of public policy. The complaint sought both general and punitive damages. The trial court granted the separate motions of Dignity Health and Optum360 for summary judgment and St. Myers appealed those judgments. As to Optum360, the Court of Appeal found St. Myers failed to establish a triable issue of material fact that Optum360 was her employer, a prerequisite under the pleadings for all her claims. As to Dignity Health, the Court found St. Myers failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to any adverse employment action. Accordingly, the Court affirmed summary judgment. View "St. Myers v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law