Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to (1) vacate entry of a $3.825 million Kansas judgment, and (2) post a $5,737,500 undertaking to stay enforcement of the sister-state judgment. The court held that, based on the doctrines of res judicata and issue preclusion, defendant was precluded from arguing that Blizzard was guilty of misconduct or that the Santa Barbara Superior Court was misled when it dismissed the 2015 action for breach of oral agreement, conversion, and accounting. The court also held that defendant's argument that the trial court erred in ordering him to post a $5,737,500 undertaking to stay enforcement of the judgment was without merit. The court explained that the superior court has broad discretion in fashioning the terms and conditions of a Sister State Money Judgment Act stay order, and there was no abuse of discretion in this case. View "Blizzard Energy, Inc. v. Schaefers" on Justia Law

After prevailing on a petition for writ of mandate, petitioner filed a motion for attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of attorney fees. The court agreed with the trial court that petitioner failed to establish that the benefit the writ petition achieved was conferred on a sufficiently large enough class of persons to justify an attorney fee award under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.The court explained that the most significant benefit here inured specifically to individual drivers with non-qualifying out-of-state drunk driving convictions, and that benefit and the extent to which that benefit balances against the public benefit from an interest in public safety in the form of California's participation in the Compact are both "pertinent circumstances" the trial court was required to consider. View "Villarreal v. Gordon" on Justia Law

After plaintiff filed an interpleader action to resolve claims about a disputed $19,365 sum, two claimants and defendants failed to appear after having received notice of the trial date. The trial court adjudicated the case on the merits and entered judgment. Claimants then filed a motion for relief under the mandatory provision of subdivision (b) of section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of claimants' motion, holding that the provision for mandatory relief does not apply absent an actual default, default judgment or dismissal. In this case, the trial court decided the case on the merits. View "Shayan v. Spine Care and Orthopedic Physicians" on Justia Law

Six companies affiliated with Warwick Hotels sued companies affiliated with Applied Underwriters, claiming breach of contract and fraud and unfair business practices relating to the purchase of workers’ compensation insurance. Applied moved to stay the action under Code of Civil Procedure 418.10; the parties’ agreement required that claims relating to the agreement be filed in Nebraska, where Applied was incorporated. Applied argued that Warwick’s workers’ compensation program involved employees in New York, Colorado, Texas, and California, and that “[t]he California portion ... was . . . by far the smallest component, representing only 5 percent of the total payroll at issue.” The court stayed the action as to all plaintiffs except two Warwick companies that are incorporated in California. A subsequent statement of decision (SOD) stated: "this trial was limited to Warwick’s California entities only, and the trial determined that damages cannot be ‘allocated or apportioned between California and non-California Warwick entities.’ Because both sides failed to prove the essential element of damages, their arguments on other elements of contract breach need not be reached.” The court of appeal dismissed an appeal. The SOD is not a judgment or an appealable order. The court indicated that judgment cannot be entered until other issues are decided in their proper forum. Once that happens, the stay can be lifted, a final judgment can be entered, and the parties can appeal. View "Warwick California Corp. v. Applied Underwriters, Inc." on Justia Law

Shortly before turning 18 Andrew committed an armed robbery; his accomplice shot and killed a police officer. After his conviction, Judge Brady sentenced Andrew to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP), plus 24 years. The court of appeal reversed one special circumstance. On remand, Judge Brady sentenced Andrew to LWOP plus 24 years. After a second remand following the U.S. Supreme Court's Miller decision (2012), Judge Brady imposed LWOP plus 23 years, finding Andrew’s actions “were not those of an irresponsible or impulsive child," nor the product of peer pressure, coercion, or surprise and finding no realistic chance of rehabilitation. The court of appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court returned the case with directions to consider whether legislation rendering juvenile LWOP defendants eligible for parole suitability hearings mooted Andrew’s challenge.While Andrew’s appeal was pending Proposition 57 eliminated a prosecutor’s ability to “direct file” charges in criminal court against minors of a certain age. These minors may be tried in criminal court only after the juvenile court conducts a transfer hearing to consider specific factors. The court rejected Andrew’s LWOP challenge but concluded he was entitled to a Proposition 57 hearing. The superior court granted the prosecution's motion to assign that hearing to Judge Brady. The court of appeal rejected a mandamus petition. A conditional reversal and limited remand for a Proposition 57 transfer hearing are not a “new trial” under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.61, which permits parties in civil and criminal actions to move to disqualify an assigned trial judge based on an allegation that the judge is prejudiced against the party. View "Andrew M. v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his counsel appealed from a postjudgment order denying plaintiff's motion to compel the production of documents and imposing $3,456.70 in sanctions against counsel for discovery abuses. The underlying action involved residual payments owed by defendant to plaintiff.The Court of Appeal denied the petition challenging the motion to compel the production of documents, and affirmed the imposition of $3,456.70 in sanctions against counsel. The court held that, although plaintiff lacked standing, counsel had standing to appeal the order and was properly an appellant in this matter. The court also held that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to compel; rejected challenges to the monetary sanctions levied against counsel; held that a separate motion is not required, nor is a separate hearing on discovery sanctions; and held that the trial court did not err in awarding discovery sanctions representing fees and costs incurred. View "Dalessandro v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Wade Robson and James Safechuck filed suit against two of Michael Jackson's corporations, MJJ Productions, Inc. and MJJ Ventures, Inc., for their involvement in Jackson's alleged sexual abuse of Robson and Safechuck. Plaintiffs filed suit after their 26th birthdays, and the trial court concluded their claims were untimely because they did not fall within the narrow exception of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1. However, effective January 1, 2020, section 340.1 was amended to allow a victim to bring claims of childhood sexual assault against third-party nonperpetrators until the victim's 40th birthday.The Court of Appeal reversed the judgments in the corporations' favor and held that the extended limitations period of the revised section 340.1 applied to render plaintiffs' claims timely. In this case, plaintiffs filed their lawsuits before their 40th birthdays and their cases remained pending on appeal. Therefore, they have not reached finality. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Safechuck v. MJJ Productions, Inc." on Justia Law

After Kimberly-Clark spun off its healthcare division to create a new Delaware company called Halyward Health, Halyward filed suit in Los Angeles Superior Court seeking a declaratory judgment that it did not have to provide indemnity for the punitive damages awarded in a recently filed class action concerning surgical gowns sold by Kimberly-Clark.The Court of Appeal held that the indemnification dispute was not sufficiently related to California for courts of the state to exercise personal jurisdiction over Kimberly-Clark. In this case, the litigation did not arise out of or relate to Kimberly-Clark's medical gown sales and marketing in California. Furthermore, the distribution agreement was not a "California-directed" contract conferring personal jurisdiction. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's grant of Kimberly-Clark's motion to quash the service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "Halyard Health, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp." on Justia Law

Defendants solicited and obtained $180,000 from plaintiff produce a documentary on the Syrian refugee crisis. Plaintiff sued, alleging that no “significant” work on the documentary has occurred, that defendants never intended to make the documentary, and that a cinematographer has not been paid and claims the right to any footage he has shot, putting the project in jeopardy. Defendants filed an unsuccessful anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation (Code Civ. Proc. 425.16)) motion to strike, arguing the complaint arises out of acts in furtherance of their right of free speech in connection with an issue of public interest--their newsgathering related to the Syrian refugee crisis, and that plaintiff could not demonstrate minimal merit on his claims because the action is subject to an arbitration provision; plaintiff’s allegations are contradicted by the investor agreement; and the evidence establishes that substantial progress was made. The court found that plaintiff’s claims did not arise out of acts in furtherance of defendants’ protected speech but were “based on the failure to do acts in furtherance of the right of free speech."The court of appeal reversed. Defendants made a prima facie showing that the complaint targets conduct falling within the “catchall” provision of the anti-SLAPP law. Defendants’ solicitation of investments and their performance of allegedly unsatisfactory work on the documentary constituted activity in furtherance of their right of free speech in connection with an issue of public interest. The court erred in denying the motion at the first stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis. View "Ojjeh v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2007, Plaintiffs borrowed $110 million from Bear Stearns to finance the purchase of a San Francisco apartment complex. In 2010, after plaintiffs defaulted, CP purchased the property at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. Plaintiffs sued CP and others, alleging legal claims (breach of contract, fraud, slander of title, trade secret misappropriation), and equitable claims (unfair competition, to set aside the foreclosure sale, and for an accounting). Judge Miller struck plaintiffs’ jury demand based on provisions in the contracts, held a bench trial, and entered judgment for defendants. The court of appeal concluded Judge Miller erred by striking plaintiffs’ jury demand as to the legal claims, finding no error as to the equitable claims, and remanded the legal claims.On remand, Judge Kahn held that Judge Miller’s findings in connection with plaintiffs’ equitable claim for unfair competition necessarily resolved plaintiffs’ legal claims because the substantive law allegations of the legal claims are also alleged as grounds that defendants violated the UCL. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that after the partial reversal, plaintiffs were entitled to relitigate all factual issues relevant to the legal claims; that Judge Kahn violated the remittitur and the law of the case; that under the statutes governing judicial notice and summary judgment, Judge Kahn, could not consider the “truth” of the facts found by Judge Miller and even if Judge Miller’s findings had binding effect, those findings did not dispose of the legal claims. View "Rincon EV Realty LLC v. CP III Rincon Towers, Inc." on Justia Law