Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeal affirmed the appointment of a conservator under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act after a jury found D.C. to be gravely disabled due to a mental disorder. The court held that D.C.'s failure to timely appeal from the trial court's order granting the letters of conservatorship barred appellate review of the merits of that order. The court also held that ample evidence supported the order for involuntary medication and the order after the jury trial continuing that order. In this case, the medical expert testified that D.C. lacked insight about her mental condition, is unable to voluntarily accept meaningful treatment, and required medications to treat her schizophrenia. Although the trial court did not state in its order the specific factors it relied upon in finding by clear and convincing evidence that D.C. was incompetent to give or withhold informed consent, the court found no reversible error. View "Conservatorship of D.C." on Justia Law

In 2012, California enacted legislation known as the California Homeowner Bill of Rights, or HBOR, which imposed specific limitations regarding the nonjudicial foreclosure of owner-occupied residential real property. The trial court granted Rosana Bustos’ ex parte application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and order to show cause regarding preliminary injunction, which sought to prevent a trustee’s sale of her home due to several alleged violations of the HBOR related to her submission of a loan modification application. Central to Bustos’ application was a “blatant violation” of the HBOR’s prohibition against dual tracking--when a mortgage servicer continues foreclosure proceedings while reviewing a homeowner’s application for a loan modification. After the trial court denied Bustos’ request for a preliminary injunction and vacated the TRO, it awarded her $4,260 in attorney fees and costs, finding Bustos was a “prevailing borrower” under the HBOR because she obtained injunctive relief in the form of a TRO against her mortgage servicer, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. On appeal, Wells Fargo argued the trial court erred in interpreting Civ. Code section 2924.12 as authorizing an award of attorney fees and costs to a borrower who obtains a TRO enjoining a trustee’s sale of his or her residence. Wells Fargo alternatively contended the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs to Bustos under the circumstances of this case. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Bustos v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

B.F. (father) purported to appeal a juvenile court order denying his petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388, in which he requested family reunification services and increased visitation with his twin sons, J.F. and C.F. Although the order denying father’s petition was appealable, and father filed his notice of appeal within the time to appeal from that order, the notice of appeal expressly stated father was only appealing the order terminating his parental rights to the boys that was entered 44 days after denial of his petition. Because father’s notice of appeal was clear and unambiguous about what he meant to appeal, the Court of Appeal felt it could not liberally construe it to embrace the omitted order denying the section 388 petition. Therefore, the Court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to review that order. And, because father presented no reasoned argument why the juvenile court erred by terminating his parental rights, father waived his challenge to the sole order properly before the Court. View "In re J.F." on Justia Law

Cynthia Huerta, Maria De Jesus Gonzalez and Andres Gonzalez were the parents of three girls who were tragically killed on Halloween night in 2014 when they were struck by a speeding motorist while they were crossing the street in a marked crosswalk. The driver fled the scene. He was later arrested and pleaded guilty to felony vehicular manslaughter. Huerta and the Gonzalezes sued the City of Santa Ana (the City), alleging a cause of action for damages based on a claim that the crosswalk constituted a “dangerous condition of public property” pursuant to Government Code sections 835 and 835.2. They contended the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the City, arguing there were triable issues of fact related to whether the crosswalk qualified as “a dangerous condition of public property” and whether the City had notice of that dangerous condition before this accident. After review, the Court of Appeal could not find a “dangerous condition of public property” or any “peculiar condition” that would trigger an obligation by the City to modify its street lighting at the accident scene. Moreover, it was undisputed that the driver who hit the girls was exceeding the posted speed limit, and therefore the speed limit was not a proximate cause of these tragic deaths. The Court therefore affirmed judgment in favor of the City. View "Huerta v. City of Santa Ana" on Justia Law

Defendants Merchants Building Maintenance, LLC and Merchants Building Maintenance Company (the MBM defendants) appeal from an order of the trial court denying their joint motion to compel arbitration. The MBM defendants moved to compel arbitration of a portion of plaintiff Loren Mejia's cause of action brought against them for various violations of the Labor Code under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). The MDM defendants moved to compel arbitration of that portion of Mejia's PAGA claim in which she seeks "an amount sufficient to recover underpaid wages." The Court of Appeal reduced the issue presented as whether a court could split a single PAGA claim so as to require a representative employee to arbitrate that aspect of the claim in which the plaintiff sought to recover the portion of the penalty that represented the amount sufficient to recover underpaid wages, where the representative employee has agreed to arbitrate her individual wage claims, while at the same time have a court review that aspect of the employee's claim in which the plaintiff sought to recover the additional $50 or $100 penalties provided for in section 558 of the Labor Code for each violation of the wage requirements. The Court of Appeal concluded that a single PAGA claim seeking to recover section 558 civil penalties could not be "split" between that portion of the claim seeking an "amount sufficient to recover underpaid wages" and that portion of the claim seeking the $50 or $100 per-violation, per-pay-period assessment imposed for each wage violation. The Court affirmed the trial court's order denying the MDM defendants' motion to compel arbitration in this case. View "Mejia v. Merchants Building Maintenance" on Justia Law

A 401k plan that a debtor, like the one in this case, creates and controls with the avowed purpose of protecting his assets from creditors is not a plan principally designed and used for retirement purposes, thereby rendering the funds in that plan fully exempt from levy. The Court of Appeal held that debtor's transferred funds to that 401(k) plan did not negate the partially exempt status those funds previously held while in the individual retirement accounts. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's ruling declaring that the funds were fully exempt from levy and remanded for the trial court to assess the extent of the partial exemption. View "O'Brien v. AMBS Diagnostics, LLC" on Justia Law

After defendant Randal Tyson’s first failed attempt at removing the case to federal court, his codefendant, Dulany Hill, filed a second notice of removal. Hill’s notice of removal was identical to the one Tyson had filed, merely substituting Hill’s name in the place of Tyson's. During this second removal period, the court denied defendant’s untimely motion to strike, which was fully briefed before the second notice of removal was filed. Less than a month later, the federal court again remanded the case. Thereafter, defendant failed to respond to the complaint or to appear for a case management conference. The court entered defendant’s default. Defendant took no further action in the case until eight months after the remand, when he moved to set aside the default. The court denied the motion and entered a default judgment against defendant. Defendant appealed the default judgment, contending the court did not have jurisdiction to rule on his motion to strike while the case was removed to federal court. He claimed the court’s ruling on the motion to strike, while it purportedly lacked jurisdiction, commenced an inappropriate responsive pleading timeline and resulted in a default judgment that the Court of Appeal should set aside. The Court of Appeal concluded the second notice of removal was untimely, frivolous, and duplicative. Under these unique circumstances, the trial court retained jurisdiction to rule on the motion to strike. View "ClipperJet Inc. v. Tyson" on Justia Law

Palm filed suit against Parallel to enforce a judgment obtained in the Senior Courts of England and Wales. At issue on appeal was the admissibility of a document titled Final Costs Certificate.The Court of Appeal held that, without supporting witness testimony to authenticate it, the trial court rightly admitted the Final Costs Certificate under Evidence Code section 1452, subdivision (c). The court explained that, because the seal on this document purports to be of an agency of a nation recognized by the executive power of the United States, subdivision (c) of section 1452 creates a presumption this seal is genuine and its use is authorized. View "Palm Finance Corp. v. Parallel Media LLC" on Justia Law

The California Constitution and Penal Code section 2601, subdivision (d) provide indigent prisoners with the right of meaningful access to the courts to prosecute civil actions. The Court of Appeal held that one of the discretionary measures available to protect the right of access to the courts is the appointment of counsel, and thus the trial court had the discretionary authority to appoint counsel. The court held that the trial court's denial of the motion to appoint counsel was not based on an informed exercise of its discretion, and the appropriate remedy was to remand the matter to the trial court for an exercise of its discretionary authority within the three-step inquiry established in published appellate decisions: Apollo v. Gyaami (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1468, 1485–1487, and Wantuch v. Davis (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 786, 792.The court published a portion of this decision because it resolved issues not reached in those appellate decisions. The court held that the discretionary appointment of an expert pursuant to Evidence Code section 730 is among the measures available to trial courts to ensure indigent prisoner litigants are afforded meaningful access to the courts, and trial courts are responsible for recognizing their discretionary authority to appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants who request the appointment of counsel. Furthermore, an indigent civil litigant may argue on appeal that the right of meaningful access to the courts provides a basis for appointing counsel despite not raising that specific argument in the trial court. View "Smith v. Ogbuehi" on Justia Law

California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) manages contributions made by employees and member school districts to the State Teachers’ Retirement Fund. (Ed. Code 22000.) In 2014, the Baxter petitioners, formerly employed by the Salinas Unified High School District sought to prevent CalSTRS from continuing to reduce their monthly retirement benefit payments and to restore prior monies they claimed CalSTRS had wrongfully withheld to recoup overpayments made as a result of a years-long miscalculation by the District. The trial court held that a three-year limitations period barred CalSTRS from recouping the prior overpayments. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the continuous accrual theory applied. A second suit challenged the reductions. Before the court of appeal addressed Baxter, the trial court granted relief in the second suit, finding CalSTRS’s claims time-barred. The court of appeal followed Baxter, holding that the continuous accrual theory applies. CalSTRS was time-barred from pursuing any claim against teachers as to pension benefit overpayments made more than three years before CalSTRS commenced an action but is not time-barred from pursuing any claim concerning periodic overpayments to teachers and adjustments to teachers’ future monthly benefits, where the payment accrued not more than three years prior to commencement of an action. The reduction in benefits made by CalSTRS did not constitute the commencement of an “action.” CalSTRS constructively commenced an “action” when these teachers filed their verified petition and complaint in the superior court on February 1, 2016. View "Blaser v. State Teachers' Retirement System" on Justia Law