Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
Lacayo v. Catalina Restaurant Group Inc.
Defendants-appellants Catalina Restaurant Group, Inc., Carrows Restaurants, Inc., Carrows Family Restaurants, Inc., Coco’s Bakery Restaurants, Inc. and Coco’s Restaurants, Inc. (collectively, Catalina Defendants) appealed the partial denial of their motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff-respondent Yalila Lacayo (Lacayo) was an employee of Catalina Defendants, and filed a plaintiff’s class action complaint on behalf of herself and others similarly situated (Class Members) against Catalina Defendants in superior court alleging numerous wage and hour violations under the Labor Code, and an injunctive relief claim under California’s unfair competition law (UCL). Catalina Defendants responded by filing a motion to compel arbitration of Lacayo’s individual claims, including the UCL claim, and dismissal of the class claims (Motion). The trial court granted the Motion as to Lacayo’s individual claims; refused to dismiss the class claims, instead letting the arbitrator decide if the class claims were subject to arbitration or a class action waiver; and denied the Motion as to the UCL claim; and stayed the matter until after arbitration was completed. Catalina Defendants on appeal argued the trial court erred by: (1) refusing to enforce the individual arbitration agreement according to its terms; and (2) refusing to compel arbitration of Lacayo’s UCL claim. In supplemental briefing, both parties addressed whether Catalina Defendants could appeal the trial court’s order granting arbitration of individual claims but refusing to dismiss the classwide claims, leaving the decision for the arbitrator. The Court of Appeal found Catalina Defendants could not appeal the portion of the Motion that granted arbitration for Lacayo’s individual claims and the refusal to dismiss the class claims. The Court of Appeal only addressed the order finding that the UCL claim was not subject to arbitration, and affirmed the trial court's order denying defendants' Motion as to the UCL claim. View "Lacayo v. Catalina Restaurant Group Inc." on Justia Law
Scott v. City of San Diego
In 2015, San Diego Police Department Sergeant Arthur Scott sued the City of San Diego (City), alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). Scott rejected a $7,000 offer to compromise made by the City under Code of Civil Procedure section 9981 and proceeded to trial, where the City prevailed. The trial court awarded the City a total of $51,946.96 in costs incurred after it served its Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer, even though the trial court had found that plaintiff's FEHA claims were not frivolous. While this appeal was pending, the Legislature amended FEHA's cost provision statute to specifically state that, notwithstanding section 998 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a prevailing defendant may not recover attorney fees and costs against a plaintiff asserting non-frivolous FEHA claims. The Court of Appeal found that with this amendment, the Legislature sought to clarify existing law, rather than to change it: "A statute that merely clarifies, rather than changes, existing law is properly applied to transactions predating its enactment." The Court therefore applied the amended statute in this case and reversed the trial court's award of costs to the City. View "Scott v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law
Huckey v. City of Temecula
Plaintiff-appellant Charles Huckey sued defendant and respondent, City of Temecula (the City), for injuries he sustained from tripping and falling on a defective city sidewalk. He alleged the sidewalk defect was a dangerous condition of public property. The trial court granted the city’s motion for summary judgment on the ground the sidewalk defect was trivial as a matter of law. The sidewalk was vertically uneven between two concrete panels, and the height differential was 9/16 of an inch, three feet and one foot from the sidewalk’s right edge, and one and 7/32 inches (1.21875 inches), at the right edge, as plaintiff was walking when he fell. On appeal, plaintiff argued: (1) the City did not meet its initial burden of making a prima facie evidentiary showing that he could not establish that the sidewalk defect was a dangerous condition, or presented a substantial risk of injury; and (2) the court erroneously concluded that the sidewalk defect was trivial as a matter of law. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the City met its initial burden on its motion, and plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of material fact. All of the papers adduced on the motion show that the sidewalk defect was trivial as a matter of law. View "Huckey v. City of Temecula" on Justia Law
Cole v. Hammond
Defendants moved for mandatory dismissal of a breach of contract action for failure to bring the case to trial within five years, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 583.360. The Court of Appeal held that the appeal was timely that the trial court erred in denying defendants' motion for mandatory dismissal pursuant to section 583.360, and instead granting plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal. In this case, plaintiff failed to provide any viable basis to oppose defendants' motion to dismiss. On remand, defendants may choose to move for attorney fees based on their contention that they are the prevailing parties, pursuant to a clause in their rental agreement. View "Cole v. Hammond" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure
Severson & Werson v. Sephery-Fard
The law firm filed a Petition for Workplace Violence Restraining Orders, identifying 14 lawsuits in which its employees had been involved with Sepehry-Fard, and citing several incidents involving false allegations and threats. The firm alleged that Sepehry-Fard is a member of the “sovereign citizen movement,” whose members believe they don’t answer to governmental authority; they have been known to commit murder and physical assault. The court granted specific temporary protective orders pending the hearing, without notice to Sepehry-Fard, and set the hearing for September 5. On the Notice of Court Hearing, the court indicated the firm had to have the petition and associated documents personally served on Sepehry-Fard at least five days before the hearing. While the form permitted the firm to ask for less than five days’ notice, the firm left that section blank. The proof of service indicated personal service to Sepehry-Fard on September 1, four days before the hearing date. Sepehry-Fard did not appear. The court conducted a hearing and entered a three-year restraining order with terms nearly identical to those in the temporary order. The court filed the Workplace Violence Restraining Order After Hearing on September 6. A deputy had that order personally served on Sepehry-Fard on September 8. The court of appeal reversed, finding the Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8 requirement of five days’ notice jurisdictional. rendering the order void in the absence of the party who did not receive that notice. View "Severson & Werson v. Sephery-Fard" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law
Hollingsworth v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County
The Supreme Court has made clear that when a civil action and a workers' compensation proceeding are concurrently pending, "the tribunal first assuming jurisdiction" should determine exclusive jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal granted plaintiffs' petition for writ of mandate, holding that the superior court exercised jurisdiction first and thus it had jurisdiction to decide which tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction. Therefore, the superior court erred by staying the civil case to allow the WCAB to decide the issue, and the WCAB erred by proceeding without deference to the superior court. View "Hollingsworth v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law
Bontilao v. Superior Court
In 1999, Bontilao was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced by the Santa Clara County Superior Court to 15 years to life in prison. In 2018, Bontilao filed a habeas corpus petition, challenging a 2017 decision by the Board of Parole Hearings denying him parole, Bontilao sent a letter, requesting the identity of the judge assigned to adjudicate his habeas petition. The court notified Bontilao that the petition had been assigned to Judge Weinstein but later notified Bontilao that Judge Weinstein was unavailable, and the matter was reassigned to Judge Zecher “for all purposes.” The order was mailed to Bontilao on June 29, 2018. The court extended the time for the order on Bontilao’s petition. Bontilao received the order on July 3. On July 23, Bontilao delivered for mailing a challenge against Judge Zecher under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. On August 16, Judge Zecher struck the challenge as untimely under the all-purpose assignment rule. Bontilao's mandamus petition was summarily denied. The California Supreme Court transferred the matter back. The court of appeal issued an order to show cause, appointed counsel for Bontilao, provided the Board the opportunity to file a return, and gave Bontilao the opportunity to file a reply. The court of appeal then concluded that the order naming the assigned judged constituted an all-purpose assignment under section 170(a)(2) and that Bontilao’s challenge was not timely. View "Bontilao v. Superior Court" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights
Sacramentans for Fair Planning v. City of Sacramento
Plaintiff Sacramentans for Fair Planning contended the City of Sacramento violated zoning law and the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) when it approved entitlements for real party 2500 J Owners, LLC, to construct a high-rise condominium building in the City’s Midtown area. The project was not consistent with the general plan and zoning code standards for building intensity and height. But the City approved it pursuant to a general plan policy authorizing more intense development than zoning otherwise allowed if the project provided a significant community benefit. The City also conducted a streamlined CEQA review. CEQA authorized the less intense review for a type of residential mixed-use development such as the proposed project which, because of its proximity to mass transit services, may help reduce regional greenhouse gas emissions by generating less use of motor vehicles. In a petition for writ of mandate, plaintiff argued that approving the project under the general plan policy violated constitutional law and an implied-in-law zoning contract that required identical uses in a zoning district to be treated uniformly and prohibited a delegation of legislative authority without sufficient standards to govern its use. Plaintiff also claimed the City violated CEQA because the streamlined review did not analyze all of the project’s environmental effects. The trial court denied plaintiff’s petition. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order and judgment. View "Sacramentans for Fair Planning v. City of Sacramento" on Justia Law
Ortiz v. Dameron Hospital Assn.
Plaintiff Nancy Ortiz sued her former employer and former supervisor, Dameron Hospital Association (Dameron) and Doreen Alvarez (collectively defendants), alleging that she was discriminated against and subjected to harassment based on her national origin (Filipino) and age (over 40) at the hands of Alvarez, and that Dameron failed to take action to prevent it in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (the FEHA). Ortiz claimed she was forced to resign due to the intolerable working conditions created by Alvarez in order to accomplish Alvarez’s goal of getting rid of older, Filipino employees, like Ortiz, who, in Alvarez’s words, “could not speak English,” had “been there too long,” and “ma[d]e too much money.” Defendants moved for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding that Ortiz could not make a prima facie showing of discrimination because she could not show that she suffered an adverse employment action, and could not make a prima facie showing of harassment because she cannot show that any of the complained of conduct was based on her national origin or age. The trial court determined that the remaining causes of action as well as the claims for injunctive relief and punitive damages were derivative of the discrimination and harassment causes of action and thus had no merit. Ortiz appealed, contending there were triable issues of material fact as to each of her causes of action, except retaliation, and her claims for injunctive relief and punitive damages. The Court of Appeal agreed in part, and reversed judgment. The trial court was directed to vacate its order granting summary judgment, and to enter a new order granting summary adjudication of Ortiz’s retaliation cause of action and request for punitive damages as to Dameron but denying summary adjudication of her discrimination, harassment, and failure to take necessary steps to prevent discrimination and harassment causes of action, her claim for injunctive relief, and her request for punitive damages as to Alvarez. View "Ortiz v. Dameron Hospital Assn." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law
Galvan v. Dameron Hospital Assn.
Plaintiff Shirley Galvan sued her former employer and former supervisor, Dameron Hospital Association (Dameron) and Doreen Alvarez (collectively defendants), alleging that she was discriminated against and subjected to harassment based on her national origin (Filipino) and age (over 40) at the hands of Alvarez, and that Dameron failed to take action to prevent it in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (the FEHA). Galvan claimed she was forced to resign due to the intolerable working conditions created by Alvarez in order to accomplish Alvarez’s goal of getting rid of older, Filipino employees, like Galvan, who, in Alvarez’s words, “could not speak English,” had “been there too long,” and “ma[d]e too much money.” Defendants moved for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding that Galvan could not make a prima facie showing of discrimination because she could not show that she suffered an adverse employment action, and could not make a prima facie showing of harassment because she cannot show that any of the complained of conduct was based on her national origin or age. The trial court determined that the remaining causes of action as well as the claims for injunctive relief and punitive damages were derivative of the discrimination and harassment causes of action and thus had no merit. Galvan appealed, contending there were triable issues of material fact as to each of her causes of action, except retaliation, and her claims for injunctive relief and punitive damages. The Court of Appeal agreed in part, and reversed judgment. The trial court was directed to vacate its order granting summary judgment, and to enter a new order granting summary adjudication of Galvan's retaliation cause of action and request for punitive damages as to Dameron, but denying summary adjudication of her discrimination, harassment, and failure to take necessary steps to prevent discrimination and harassment causes of action, her claim for injunctive relief, and her request for punitive damages as to Alvarez. View "Galvan v. Dameron Hospital Assn." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law