Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Julian Union Elementary School District (Julian) and Diego Plus Education Corporation (Diego Plus) doing business as Diego Valley Public Charter (Diego Valley, together appellants) appealed an attorney fee award to Sweetwater Union High School District (Sweetwater) made under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. Sweetwater and Julian were public school districts in San Diego County, California. Diego Plus operated the charter schools Diego Valley and Diego Springs Academy (Diego Springs). Diego Plus paid fees to Julian for its Diego Valley charter school program. In March 2015 Sweetwater sent letters to Julian and Diego Valley requesting that they stop operating within Sweetwater's geographic boundaries. In June 2015, after neither Julian nor Diego Valley responded, Sweetwater filed this action to enforce the Charter Schools Act (CSA). In its petition for a writ of mandate, Sweetwater alleged Julian approved a charter petition for Diego Valley and that Diego Valley was operating charter schools outside Julian's geographic boundaries. Appellants claimed Sweetwater did not qualify as a successful party under section 1021.5 because Sweetwater: (1) failed to achieve its primary litigation goal; (2) the relief it achieved was illusory; and (3) its suit was not a catalyst in motivating either Julian or Diego Valley to take or not take any particular action. Even assuming the trial court did not err in awarding Sweetwater successful party status, appellants claim that Sweetwater was not entitled to a fee award because Sweetwater failed to carry its burden of establishing all requirements for a fee award under section 1021.5. Assuming the Court of Appeal rejected its other arguments, appellants claimed the trial court abused its discretion by rubberstamping the amount of attorney fees that Sweetwater requested. On this record, the Court of Appeal could not conclude the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Sweetwater all its requested fees. View "Sweetwater Union HS Dist. v. Julian Union Elementary Sch." on Justia Law

The State sought a writ of mandate to command the trial court to honor the affidavit of prejudice (peremptory challenge) they filed against the trial court judge Joel Agron, under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. The underlying case was a murder prosecution which the State dismissed and refiled the same day along with the peremptory challenge. Respondent, the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, refused to honor the peremptory challenge, deeming it untimely. Relying on Birts v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.App.5th 53 (2018), the court concluded the State was engaged in prosecutorial “gamesmanship” and attempting to “forum shop[],” and held the second complaint was a continuation of the prior case, not a new case, making the peremptory challenge untimely. The State argued this case fell under Paredes v. Superior Court 77 Cal.App.4th 24 (1999), which recognized that when a criminal case was dismissed and refiled, it was a new case for purposes of Section 170.6. They argued Birts did not apply because they weren’t attempting to avoid a ruling of the trial court. The Court of Appeal agreed and therefore directed the trial court to honor the peremptory challenge. View "California v. Super. Ct. (Olivo)" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion for costs of proof after State Farm denied eight of his requests for admissions. The court held that the trial court incorrectly placed on plaintiff the burden to prove that none of the exceptions to an award of costs as set out in Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420, subdivision (b) applied. Rather, State Farm should have carried the burden of proof and failed to do so. Therefore, the court remanded to the trial court to determine the reasonable costs of proof. View "Samsky v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." on Justia Law

January 13, 2017, a Sonoma County Permit and Resource Management Department engineer inspected respondent’s property and observed inadequate and unpermitted retaining walls, one of which directed water to a single point directly above a failed 25-foot bank that had deposited five cubic yards of earth onto Riverview Drive. Unpermitted grading and terracing had contributed to bank failure and deposit of material into a nearby watercourse. On January 19, a rainstorm caused a four-foot wall of mud to slide onto Riverview Drive. Respondent moved earthen materials from the road, resulting in the runoff of materials into a local stream and on neighboring private property. Respondent believed his actions either did not require permits or were emergency measures. Respondent failed to comply with an administrative order requiring him to abate the code violations and pay abatement costs and civil penalties. Sonoma County filed suit. Respondent did not file a responsive pleading. The court entered a default judgment that ordered penalties significantly lower than ordered by the administrative hearing officer. The court of appeal reversed the order imposing civil penalties at the rate of $20 per day and directed the court to modify its judgment to require payment at $45 per day. That provision of the court’s order altered a final administrative order, was entirely unexplained, and provided respondent with a windfall he did not request. View "County of Sonoma v. Gustely" on Justia Law

Manish and Priyanka married in 2014. Manish filed a petition for nullity of marriage in December 2015, alleging that the marriage was voidable based on fraud. Priyanka filed a response, denying the allegations but requesting a dissolution of the marriage due to irreconcilable differences. In May 2016, Priyanka filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO). In September 2016, the trial court denied both Manish’s petition and Priyanka's request for a DVRO. In February 2017, Priyanka filed a new DVRO request, which was granted with a five-year duration. The next day, Manish sought a DVRO against Priyanka. Priyanka denied the allegations but did not file a separate request for another DVRO against Manish. Manish denied committing any acts of domestic violence but admitted sending a letter to Priyanka’s employer. Priyanka denied ever hitting Manish but admitted that on two occasions she pushed him away because he was too close to her. The court made a finding under Family Code Section 6305 that each party has committed acts of domestic violence and entered a mutual restraining order. The court of appeal concluded that the trial court lacked authority to impose a mutual restraining order because Priyanka had not filed a separate written request for such an order as required by section 6305(a)(1). View "Marriage of Ankola" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants Glenn Moss, Jeri Moss, and Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (collectively, Moss) filed a complaint against defendants-respondents Dale Duncan, CPA, and Rogers, Clem & Company, an accountancy organization (collectively, Duncan), alleging professional negligence and unfair business practices. The trial court ruled that these claims were barred by the statute of limitations, resulting in a judgment in favor of defendants. The Moss plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeal agreed with Moss that the applicable statute of limitations did not begin to run until Moss settled the tax deficiency claim with the Franchise Tax Board (FTB). The complaint was therefore timely. The trial court was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Moss v. Duncan" on Justia Law

Christopher Ross appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of the County of Riverside on Ross's claims for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 and for violation of the provisions in the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, sec. 12900 et seq.; FEHA) prohibiting disability discrimination, failure to reasonably accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive process, and failure to prevent disability discrimination. Ross worked for the County as a deputy district attorney. He was assigned to the homicide prosecution unit and was "responsible for however many cases were assigned to [him] by [his] supervisor." In May 2013, Ross learned he was exhibiting neurological symptoms that required evaluation and testing to determine whether he had a serious neurological condition, and told his supervisor he might be very seriously ill with a neurodegenerative disease and needed to undergo medical testing. He requested a transfer to another assignment during the testing. His supervisor declined his request, telling him the district attorney's office would worry about his cases and transferring him if and when he found out he could not continue in his position. Ross also asked not to be assigned any new cases until after he completed the medical testing. His supervisor declined this request without explanation. In late September 2013, Ross met with his supervisor, the chief deputy district attorney, and the assistant district attorney to discuss transferring him from the Homicide Unit to the Filing Unit for the next three months because he was not able to go to trial or accept new cases. In the assistant district attorney's view, Ross's inability to accept new cases or go to trial in the near term made him insufficiently productive to be a member of the Homicide Unit. By April 2014, the County wrote Ross explaining that for the County to engage in a good faith interactive process and to evaluate his request for accommodation the County needed medical documentation from an appropriate healthcare professional or from the board-certified specialist selected to perform the fitness-for-duty examination. Through counsel, Ross deemed himself constructively terminated as of the date of the letter. By June 2014, the County considered Ross to have abandoned his job. The Court of Appeal concluded there were triable issues of material fact on the questions of whether Ross engaged in protected activity under Labor Code section 1102.5 and whether Ross had a physical disability under the FEHA. The Court therefore reversed judgment as to these claims and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Ross v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

The trial court in its role as an independent factfinder had the authority to condition a denial of a new trial motion asserting excessive damages on plaintiff's acceptance of a reduced award in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 662.5. After a jury awarded plaintiff past and future noneconomic damages in his employment action, plaintiff agreed to a remittitur reducing past economic damages, and the trial court denied the city's new trial motion, entering an amended judgment. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in conditionally granting the new trial motion on plaintiff's acceptance of a reduction in damages. View "Pearl v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the trial court's award of fees following a settlement of plaintiff's lawsuit against Mercedes-Benz. Determining that it had jurisdiction, the Court of Appeal held that plaintiff was entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees for legal services performed after the January 2016 Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer to compromise; the trial court erred by failing to use the Lodestar Method for the award of fees incurred after the January 2016 section 998 offer to compromise; and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing costs for plaintiff's first expert. View "Hanna v. Mercedes-Benz USA" on Justia Law

Tanguilig, then 74 years old, sought a restraining order against his neighbor, Valdez, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.03, alleging elder abuse. Tanguilig also sought protection for four members of his family, including his son-in-law Rutledge, all of whom lived in the same house. Tanguilig alleged that Valdez placed his trash cans in a way that blocked access to the Tanguilig driveway and that Valdez assaulted Tanguilig by spraying him with his garden hose through the fence. The court issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting Valdez from engaging in conduct that was abusive to Tanguilig but concluded Tanguilig had provided insufficient facts to support an order restraining Valdez from contact with others; besides family members, Tanguilig asserted that Valdez was harassing workers on his property. Valdez filed a response, denying Tanguilig’s allegations. The court, without swearing anyone in as a witness, heard from Valdez, Rutledge, and Tanguilig about what had occurred. The court found that Tanguilig had provided “reasonable proof by a preponderance of the evidence” of elder abuse and issued a three-year “no harassment” order against Valdez in favor of Tanguilig and the named family members. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning the court’s consideration of statements by Rutledge; the burden of proof; and the court’s consideration, or lack of consideration, of Valdez’s “mens rea.” View "Tanguilig v. Valdez" on Justia Law