Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Berger hired the Varum defendants to design and provide technical support for constructing a building in San Francisco. Significant problems with the design emerged during demolition and construction so that Berger had to purchase an adjacent property. Berger obtained a $2.7 million judgment against the Varum defendants. The Varum defendants appealed but did not post a bond staying enforcement. While that appeal was pending, Berger sued others, alleging they received distributions of money, property, interests in real estate, and other items of value from the Varum defendants without paying adequate consideration. The Varum defendants paid the judgment several months later. Berger acknowledged satisfaction of the judgment and filed a second amended complaint modifying the causes of action in light of the satisfaction of judgment, asserting fraudulent conveyance and conspiracy to defraud. The trial court dismissed the suit. The court of appeal reversed. The common law fraudulent transfer claim gave rise to consequential and punitive damages. Berger alleges the defendants were aware the Varum defendants planned to fraudulently transfer assets to hinder, delay, or defraud Berger; “agreed and intended that the fraudulent transfers be committed”; and that Berger was harmed as a result of such conduct. These allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action for conspiracy. View "Berger v. Varum" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the denial of his petition to compel arbitration of a fee dispute with his former attorneys pursuant to the Mandatory Fee Arbitration Act (MFAA), Business and Professions Code section 6200, et seq. The trial court found that defendant waived his right to arbitration under the MFAA by failing to request arbitration within the required 30 days.The Court of Appeal held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant's appeal because the denial of a petition to compel a MFAA arbitration is not an appealable order. The court held that Code of Civil Procedure section 1294, subsection (a) did not authorize the instant appeal, and the court declined to treat the appeal as a writ petition. Finally, the court held that sanctions were not warranted and LAK could not be awarded attorney fees for representing itself. View "Levinson Arshonsky & Kurtz LLP v. Kim" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Shawn Bennett sued defendant Rancho California Water District (the District) for whistleblower retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5(b). The matter was tried in front of a jury, and the trial court excluded evidence showing Bennett’s relationship with the District was anything other than an employment relationship. Citing an administrative law judge’s prior finding Bennett had been the District’s employee for purposes of retirement benefits eligibility through the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), the trial court concluded the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied and established Bennett had been the District’s employee. To this, the Court of Appeal reversed for a new trial. The Court held a party was not collaterally estopped from litigating an issue when, in a prior proceeding, a dispositive finding had been made, but only by imposing a lesser burden of proof on the party invoking collateral estoppel than that which would have been applied in the subsequent proceeding. The Court found in the prior CalPERS proceeding, the administrative law judge expressly assigned to the District the burden of proving Bennett had been its independent contractor and thereby entirely relieved Bennett of the burden of proof on that issue. The trial court therefore erred by finding the doctrine of collateral estoppel applicable and precluding litigation of Bennett’s employment status. At the retrial, the common law definition of employee will apply to Bennett’s section 1102.5(b) claim. View "Bennett v. Rancho Cal. Water Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Stanley Jozefowicz owned a mobilehome that was damaged in a fire. At the time, Jozefowicz’s mobilehome was insured under an Allstate homeowners policy. Jozefowicz submitted a claim to Allstate for the fire damage and retained Sunny Hills Restoration (Sunny Hills) to perform cleanup, repairs, and remediation of the mobile home. He told his insurer, defendant Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), that Sunny Hills was to be named on all reimbursement checks and was permitted to deposit checks into its own account. The contractor then contacted Allstate for a check, Allstate sent it, and the contractor deposited it. At some point, Jozefowicz and the contractor were having a dispute over the scope and quality of the work. Jozefowicz sued Allstate under California Uniform Commercial Code section 3309, which provided a cause of action on a negotiable instrument where the payee has lost possession of the instrument. Allstate moved for summary judgment, contending section 3309 did not apply because Jozefowicz permitted Allstate to issue checks to the contractor. The trial court agreed. As did the Court of Appeals, which affirmed. View "Jozefowicz v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Nevell Group, Inc. (Nevell) filed a motion to compel arbitration of the claims filed against it by former employee Xavier Nunez. Nevell and the union to which Nunez belonged were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that provided for arbitration of alleged violations of the relevant wage order. The trial court denied the motion based on Nevell’s waiver of its right to compel arbitration, Nevell’s delay in filing its motion, and the prejudice Nunez would suffer if the motion were to be granted. The Court of Appeal agreed: Nevell explicitly waived any right to compel arbitration by advising the trial court in writing that it would not file a motion to compel. Nevell also impliedly waived arbitration by permitting two court-ordered deadlines, by which it was to have filed a motion to compel, to pass, and by engaging in significant discovery and other litigation activities inconsistent with the right to arbitration. The Court determined Nunez would suffer prejudice if Nevell’s motion to compel arbitration were granted at this point because Nevell’s delay in seeking to compel arbitration unnecessarily extended the time the case was pending and caused Nunez to expend resources on litigation activities inconsistent with arbitration, such as class-based discovery, the preparation of a demand package based on a class action, and preparing and serving notice to the putative class members. View "Nunez v. Nevell Group, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal presented an issue regarding the effect of Labor Code section 218.5 on a prevailing party employer’s right to recover contract-based attorney fees from an employee. In this case, Dane-Elec Corporation USA (Dane Corp.) prevailed against Nessim Bodokh, its former chief executive officer, on a complaint to recover on a promissory note and defeated Bodokh’s cross-complaint to recover allegedly unpaid wages. The trial court granted Dane Corp.’s motion to recover attorney fees based on an attorney fees provision in the promissory note. The court found that Bodokh had not brought the wage claim in bad faith and declined to award Dane Corp. attorney fees incurred solely in connection with the wage claim. But the court awarded Dane Corp. attorney fees incurred in defending Bodokh’s wage claim that were inextricably intertwined with the contract claim. Bodokh appealed from the judgment and the order granting Dane Corp.’s motion for attorney fees. The Court of Appeal reversed the order granting Dane Corp.’s motion for attorney fees and remanded. Based on its holding, the Court concluded that under section 218.5(a) Dane Corp. could not recover attorney fees to the extent the wage claim and the breach of contract claim were inextricably intertwined. The matter was remanded for the trial court to recalculate the amount of attorney fees to be awarded to Dane Corp. View "Dane-Elec Corp. v. Bodokh" on Justia Law

Timlick filed a class action complaint, alleging that after defaulting on a loan, Timlick received a collection letter from a third-party debt collector (NES) that did not comply with section 1812.701(b) of the Consumer Collection Notice law because certain statutorily-required language was not in a type-size that was at least the same as used to inform Timlick of the debt, or 12-point type. NES moved for summary judgment on the basis that it cured the alleged violation within the 15-day period prescribed by section 1788.30(d) and sent a letter to Timlick’s attorney, enclosing a revised collection letter. Timlick did not dispute NES’s facts but argued section 1788.30(d) should not apply. The trial court granted NES summary judgment. The court of appeal reversed. A debt collector that violates the minimum type-size requirement for consumer collection letters can utilize the procedure for curing violations under the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, but the trial court erred by dismissing the entire putative class action, as this allowed the debt collector to unilaterally “pick off” the named plaintiff and avoid class action litigation. View "Timlick v. National Enterprise Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

In a third amended complaint, plaintiff-appellant Luis Shalabi sued defendants-respondents Fontana City Police Officer Jason Perniciaro and others for a deprivation of civil rights (42 U.S.C. 1983). Shalabi alleged that on May 14, 2011, Perniciaro wrongfully shot and killed Muhanad Shalabi, who was Shalabi’s father. Shalabi filed his original complaint on December 3, 2013. The trial court dismissed Shalabi’s lawsuit due to it being filed one day beyond the statute of limitations. Shalabi contends the trial court erred by dismissing his lawsuit. The Court of Appeal determined The California statute for calculating the last day of the statute of limitations provided, “The time in which any act provided by law is to be done is computed by excluding the first day, and including the last, unless the last day is a holiday, and then it is also excluded.” Shalabi’s 18th birthday was the triggering event because that was the first day he could file his lawsuit. Shalabi’s 18th birthday was on December 3, 2011. Excluding that day, the Court found the last day for Shalabi to file his complaint was December 3, 2013. Shalabi filed his complaint on December 3, 2013. Therefore, Shalabi’s complaint was timely. The Court reversed the trial court's judgment. View "Shalabi v. City of Fontana" on Justia Law

In 2012, appellant Stephen Taulbee suffered catastrophic injuries after driving his Jeep into the back of a truck parked in a triangular-shaped zone demarcated by the freeway and the exit ramp (gore point). Taulbee and his wife (collectively “appellants”) sued respondent Carlos Aldana, the truck driver, and his employer, respondent EJ Distribution Corporation (collectively “respondents”). The trial court instructed the jury that it could find Aldana negligent per se for parking in the gore point, and that Taulbee could be found negligent per se for driving into the gore point. The court declined to instruct the jury that Aldana also could be found negligent per se for driving into the gore point to park his vehicle, although appellants requested the instruction. After the jury found Aldana was not negligent for parking in the gore point, the court entered judgment for respondents. Appellants argued the trial court erred in refusing to give their requested jury instruction, and that substantial evidence supported their theory Aldana was liable for the traffic collision by driving into the gore point. The Court of Appeal determined the trial court properly declined to give the requested instruction because Aldana’s negligent driving into the gore point was not a proximate cause of the traffic accident. In any event, the Court concluded any instructional error in failing to give the instruction was harmless given the jury’s finding that Aldana was not negligent for parking in the gore point. View "Taulbee v. EJ Distribution Corp." on Justia Law

Richard Molina challenged a trial court’s order denying his petition for writ of mandate to vacate his conviction pursuant to California v. Rodriguez, 55 Cal.4th 1125 (2012). Molina argued, and the Orange County District Attorney (OCDA) conceded, the court erred by denying the petition because Molina acted alone. The Court of Appeal determined mandate was not the proper vehicle to seek relief and although based on the record before the Court, it appeard Molina was entitled to relief, but not by a petition for writ of mandate. The Court declined to suggest to the parties what might be a better vehicle. The case was dismissed without prejudice. View "Molina v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law