Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

An association (plaintiff, Friends of Spring Street) filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief at superior court, challenging a determination by defendant Nevada City (the City) that real parties in interest Mollie Poe and Declan Hickey had the right to resume operation of a bed and breakfast facility in a residential district of the City despite the fact that, years earlier, voters had passed an initiative measure repealing the provisions in the City’s municipal code allowing such facilities. Plaintiff also challenged a 2015 City ordinance relating to the discontinuance of nonconforming uses subject to conditional use permits. The trial court upheld the City’s ruling with respect to the bed and breakfast and upheld the 2015 ordinance. In Friends I, the Court of Appeal concluded that "while the trial court did not err in upholding the 2015 ordinance, the court did err in upholding the [C]ity’s ruling with respect to the bed and breakfast." On remand, the trial court vacated its prior decision on the bed and breakfast issue and entered judgment in favor of plaintiff on that issue with respect to its petition for writ of mandate. The trial court further directed the City to file a return to the writ, indicating it had set aside its challenged decision. The City complied. Plaintiff then moved for costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 and attorney fees under section 1021.5; the City and Real Parties opposed. The trial court granted the City’s and Real Parties’ motions to strike plaintiff’s memorandum of costs and denied plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees. Plaintiff appealed, but finding plaintiff was entitled to fees, the Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for : (1) a determination of the amount of costs to be awarded to plaintiff, if any, in accordance with section 1032 and the applicable legal principles; and (2) a determination whether the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement renders an attorney fee award appropriate and, if so, the amount to be awarded. View "Friends of Spring Street v. Nevada City" on Justia Law

Ryze’s headquarters and principal place of business was in Noblesville, Indiana. In 2014, Ryze hired Nedd, a California resident, to work for Ryze in El Cerrito. In 2017, Ryze terminated Nedd’s employment. Nedd filed a wrongful termination suit in Contra Costa County, under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The Employment Agreement between Ryze and Nedd contained a forum selection clause, stating that “any claim of any type brought by Employee against [Ryze] … must be maintained only in a court sitting in" Indiana. The court declined to stay or dismiss the case, stating that forum selection clauses will not be enforced when contrary to California public policy and that enforcing the forum selection clause would be contrary to Labor Code section 925 and Government Code section 12965 (governing venue in FEHA cases). The court of appeal directed the trial court to vacate its order. Labor Code section 925 establishes a policy prohibiting employers from requiring California employees from agreeing to litigate in a different forum as a prerequisite to employment, but by its plain language states that it applies to agreements “entered into, modified, or extended on or after January 1, 2017.” The FEHA venue statute has no bearing on the forum selection clause. View "Ryze Claim Solutions LLC v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A federal lawsuit, to which 49 states and the District of Columbia had joined, ended in a settlement agreement (the National Mortgage Settlement, or "NMS"), the terms of which the federal court formally entered as consent judgments in 2012. The NMS provided $2.5 billion to be paid to the states; California's share of the settlement funds was approximately $410 million. The California Legislature enacted Government Code section 12531, creating a special deposit in the treasury where 90 percent of the $410 million would be deposited. The director of finance received approval for various expenditures from the National Mortgage Special Deposit Fund “to offset General Fund costs of programs that support public protection, consumer fraud enforcement and litigation, and housing related programs” during specified fiscal years. In 2014, plaintiff community groups sued seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Governor, the director of finance, and the controller, seeking the immediate return of approximately $350 million they alleged was unlawfully diverted from the National Mortgage Special Deposit Fund to the General Fund in contravention of both section 12531 and the federal consent judgments. Rejecting defendants’ contention 12531(e) permitted the director of finance to use the National Mortgage Special Deposit Fund to offset General Fund expenditures, the trial court reasoned such a reading of the statute would “raise serious doubts about the legality of the statute, not only as to whether the Legislature may override a federal judgment, but also whether the Legislature constitutionally may delegate to an agency the authority to decide how millions of dollars of state funds shall be spent with virtually no guidance or direction from the Legislature.” The trial court concluded $331,044,084 was unlawfully appropriated from the National Mortgage Special Deposit Fund. Nevertheless, noting it lacked authority to order the Legislature to appropriate funds, the trial court declared an obligation to restore the unlawfully diverted funds. After the Court of Appeal issued its original opinion in this case, defendants petitioned the California Supreme Court for review. While that petition was pending, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed into law Senate Bill No. 861 (2017 – 2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 331 (SB 861)), amending section 12531 to add subdivision (h). Thereafter, the Supreme Court transferred the matter to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of the new 12531(h). Having done so, and giving SB 861 all due consideration, the Court confirmed the conclusions reached in its original opinion. View "National Asian American Coalition v. Newsom" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's orders denying Mesa, Hill, and Olive's motions to enforce settlement agreements under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. Although the trial court denied the motions on the merits, the court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the motions because Mesa, Hill, and Olive's requests for dismissal were not section 664.6 requests for the trial court to retain jurisdiction. In this case, the requests for dismissal were not signed by the "parties" as that term in section 664.6 has been uniformly construed by California courts.The court noted that the parties could have easily invoked section 664.6 by filing a stipulation and proposed order either attaching a copy of the settlement agreement and requesting that the trial court retain jurisdiction under section 664.6 or a stipulation and proposed order signed by the parties noting the settlement and requesting that the trial court retain jurisdiction under section 664.6. View "Mesa RHF Partners, LP v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Lieselotte Herzog (the Decedent) died intestate on October 17, 2013. In April 2014, the probate court issued letters of administration appointing Winnfred Herzog (Nephew) as the administrator of the estate. Kemp & Associates, Inc. (Kemp), a firm specializing in locating heirs, held a power of attorney for Maurene Schraff Nadj (Half Sister). In July 2016, Kemp petitioned the probate court for a determination that Half Sister was the Decedent’s sole heir. The probate court denied Kemp’s petition with prejudice for insufficient evidence. Kemp appealed, arguing the probate court erred: (1) by bifurcating the issue of whether Half Sister was the Decedent’s heir; (2) by concluding Kemp did not meet its burden of proof; and (3) by ruling Kemp’s evidence was inadmissible. In addition, Kemp contended Nephew lacked standing to oppose Kemp’s petition. Finding no reversible errors, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Estate of Herzog" on Justia Law

Tucker filed suit in December 2003, under the unfair competition law, challenging Cingular’s marketing of mobile phone monthly rates. Plaintiff Hodge was added after Tucker lost standing. After several years of motions, discovery, and appellate proceedings, Hodge filed a fifth amended complaint in 2011. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the class allegations without leave to amend and sustained the demurrer to the individual fraud claims with leave to amend. Following a remand, the operative seventh amended complaint was filed in August 2013. Cingular successfully moved to strike the class claims, arguing Hodge had changed her plan and lacked standing. The court of appeal again remanded. The trial court then dismissed for failure to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310, which requires an action to “be brought to trial within five years after the action is commenced.” Plaintiffs argued that the pretrial order dismissing the class claims qualified as a “trial” for purposes of section 583.310. In class action lawsuits, such a pretrial order is treated as a final judgment and is immediately appealable under the “death knell doctrine.” The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal. A death knell order does not constitute a trial under the five-year dismissal statute and an appellate decision reversing such an order does not trigger the statute’s three-year extension. View "Rel v. Pacific Bell Mobile Services" on Justia Law

After obtaining money judgments against Shazad Berenjian, Pang Yen Chen sued him and his brother Sharmad for fraudulent transfer under the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (UVTA). Chen alleged Shazad and Sharmad had attempted to thwart Chen’s attempts to execute on the judgments by colluding in a sham lawsuit, stipulating to a judgment, and allowing Sharmad to execute on the judgment. The trial court sustained a demurrer with leave to amend, but Chen allowed dismissal to be entered against him and pursued this appeal. The primary issue presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether, on the face of Chen’s complaint, the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47(b) barred the cause of action for fraudulent transfer under the UVTA. The Court concluded the litigation privilege of section 47(b) did not bar the fraudulent transfer cause of action as alleged because the gravamen of that cause of action was the noncommunicative act of transferring assets by executing on a judgment. The Court therefore reversed. View "Chen v. Berenjian" on Justia Law

In July 2012, Maguire, represented by attorney Bornstein, brought an unlawful detainer action against Connelly. In September 2012, Maguire voluntarily dismissed the unlawful detainer action. On September 16, 2014, Connelly sued Maguire and Bornstein for malicious prosecution, alleging the two “actively were involved in brin[g]ing and maintaining” the unlawful detainer action, which ended in appellant’s favor; “no reasonable person in [Maguire and Bornstein’s] circumstances would have believed that there were reasonable grounds” to bring and/or maintain the action; and Maguire and Bornstein “acted primarily for a purpose other than succeeding on the merits” of the action. The trial court dismissed, citing the one-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6(a), governing “[a]n action against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission, other than for actual fraud, arising in the performance of professional services.” The court of appeal affirmed, recognizing that finding section 340.6(a) applicable to malicious prosecution claims against attorneys will result in a one-year statute of limitations for such claims, while a two-year statute of limitations will apply to malicious prosecution claims against litigants. View "Connelly v. Bornstein" on Justia Law

Walter Ward took out a secured loan in 2007 without indicating whether he signed the deed of trust (DOT) conveying his property to the lender in his individual capacity or in his capacity as sole trustee of the trust in which his property was held. That DOT was never recorded. Years later, the lender's successor, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase) asked for a replacement to foreclose. Walter refused, prompting Chase to sue. The trial court sustained two general demurrers to Chase's complaint, entered a judgment of dismissal, and awarded contractual attorney fees and costs to Walter's son, David Ward, the successor trustee of the trust that held the property. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether Chase could reframe its action by amendment to omit a fatal allegation in its original complaint. Because the Court conclude it could, notwithstanding the sham pleading doctrine, the court should have granted leave to amend. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and the postjudgment order and direct the court to enter a new order sustaining the general demurrers with leave to amend. View "JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Ward" on Justia Law

Yuri Vanetik and his father, Anatoly (Tony), were involved with a number of interrelated companies in the business of oil exploration in Russia. Yuri approached his friend, Elliot Broidy, about investing in one of those companies, Terra Resources (Terra). Broidy agreed to invest $750,000, with the written agreement his investment would go only to efforts to start production on the oil wells. Farmers & Merchants Trust Company (F&M Trust) was the trustee and administrator of the simplified employee pension plan (SEP) for Broidy’s individual retirement account (IRA). F&M Trust acquired stock in Terra. Broidy later learned that his investment had not been used in connection with the oil wells - it had been used to pay off Yuri’s and Tony’s preexisting debts. Broidy and Tony orally agreed that Tony would pay back the $750,000, but Tony failed to do so. F&M Trust then sued Yuri and Tony for breach of written and oral contracts, and for fraud. F&M Trust also sued Richard Weed (the attorney for Yuri, Tony, and the oil exploration companies) for fraud. The jury found in favor of F&M Trust on all causes of action, and awarded compensatory and punitive damages against Yuri, Tony, and the Weed defendants. Judgment was entered against Yuri and Tony; the trial court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) in favor of the Weed defendants. On appeal, the Court of Appeal concluded substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict against Yuri and Tony on the claims for breach of written contract, breach of oral contract, and fraud. The jury’s special verdict findings on the contract and fraud claims neither resulted in inconsistent verdicts, nor required F&M Trust to make an election of remedies. However, F&M Trust failed to offer substantial evidence supporting the punitive damages awards against Tony and Yuri, so the Court reversed those punitive damage awards. The trial court properly granted JNOV in favor of the Weed defendants on the fraud causes of action. View "Farmers & Merchants Trust Co. v. Vanetik" on Justia Law