Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In August 2011, Long was shot by a third-party assailant in the Candlestick Park parking lot after a professional football game. Long sued the San Francisco Forty-Niners, Ltd. in state court, alleging breach of contract, negligence, and liability under the rescue doctrine. In 2013, Long learned that Ltd. had converted into a Delaware LLC and filed an identical complaint against the LLC and Ltd.'s general partner, in federal court. Long voluntarily dismissed the state court action in July 2013, less than a month before trial. Subsequently, the federal court dismissed the federal case for lack of diversity jurisdiction. Long filed another state suit, against LLC, in November 2013, with the same allegations. The court dismissed the suit as time-barred, having been filed more than two years after the shooting; the court rejected an argument that the statute of limitations was equitably tolled while the federal case was pending. The court of appeal affirmed. Although LLC was on notice of Long’s claims from the beginning of the first state court action, the doctrine of equitable tolling was not intended to burden a defendant or the courts with having to repeatedly re-start litigation that was almost fully adjudicated, simply because the plaintiff had a last-minute change of mind about the forum. The factual allegations do not establish reasonable and good-faith conduct. View "Long v. Forty Niners Football Co." on Justia Law

These appeals arose from five dismissals entered against plaintiffs Roger Gifford and Kimberly Olson on their separately initiated litigation under the Ralph M. Brown Act (the Act) against the Hornbrook Community Services District (the District) and the resulting costs and attorney fee awards to the District. They contended the District’s Board of Directors violated the Act by failing to adequately describe several items it acted on over the course of three District meetings and for unreasonably limiting public comment. Plaintiffs sought to invalidate the Board’s resulting actions pursuant to Government Code section 54960.1, and also to obtain a declaration to determine the applicability of the Act to the Board’s actions pursuant to section 54960. The District contended that because it substantially complied with the Act, plaintiffs were barred from relief. The Court of Appeal agreed with this standard but only for causes of action under section 54960.1 and not for those under section 54960. On the merits of plaintiffs’ claims, the Court agreed the court erred in dismissing all but one of their complaints. Furthermore, the Court agreed the court erred in awarding costs and attorney fees to the District in all cases. View "Olson v. Hornbrook Community Services Dist." on Justia Law

This case arose out of an allegedly negligent surgery performed on real party in interest Jamie Harper at the Modoc Medical Center. Harper did not present a claim to petitioner Last Frontier Healthcare District, doing business as the Modoc Medical Center (Last Frontier), within a year of her surgery. Respondent superior court originally granted Harper’s petition for relief from the claim presentation requirement based in part on its erroneous conclusion that Harper’s giving notice of her intent to sue extended the time to file her application for leave to present a late claim with Last Frontier. Last Frontier filed a petition for writ of mandate and/or prohibition with the Court of Appeal to challenge the superior court's order. The Court of Appeal issued an alternative writ and the trial court responded by issuing a new order properly denying Harper’s petition for relief from the claim presentation requirement: "Giving notice of an intent to file a medical malpractice action under Code of Civil Procedure section 364 does not alter the jurisdictional deadlines underlying an application for relief from the Government Claims Act requirement of presenting a timely claim to a public entity before bringing an action for damages against it." The Court of Appeal denied Last Frontier's petition for mandamus relief because the relief requested was no longer needed. View "Last Frontier Healthcare Dist. v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Minor Charlotte C. contended the juvenile court erred in denying her counsel's request for her relatives' RFA assessment information. She argued a number of statutory and regulatory exceptions allowed minor's counsel to access such information, including Welfare and Institutions Code section 317. Charlotte argued minor's counsel had an obligation to review her relative's RFA information due to allegations the relative had used methamphetamine and had engaged in an incident of domestic violence. Charlotte argued the error in denying minor's counsel access to RFA information was prejudicial because counsel was forced to make an uninformed decision concerning her best interests.In a second appeal, Charlotte argued her due process rights were violated at a hearing under section 361.3 in which she was not permitted to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses about information obtained during her relatives' RFA assessment. The Court of Appeal concluded minor's counsel was entitled to receive a copy of her client's case file, including any RFA-related information, upon request pursuant to sections 317(f) and 827. Here, minor's counsel's request for RFA information was overbroad and she would not have been entitled to the relatives' "RFA-related information" under the standard as defined today. With respect to the claim that her due process rights were violated at the section 361.3 hearing, because Charlotte did not request a new trial or a reversal of the order placing her with her relatives, and error was harmless. The Court reversed the juvenile court's finding it does not have the authority to review or release the relatives' RFA information that is pertinent to section 361.3 to minor's counsel. View "In re Charlotte C." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued to set aside "fraudulent and voidable transactions” implemented to “hide millions of dollars in assets” after plaintiffs obtained a $68 million judgment in 2016. Plaintiffs added Admiring Dawn, a Hong Kong entity as a defendant. Plaintiffs retained ABC to work with the Hong Kong Central Authority to serve Admiring Dawn. In July 2017, the Central Authority issued a certificate stating it was unable to serve Admiring Dawn. Plaintiffs twice unsuccessfully attempted to serve Admiring Dawn via mail with return receipt requested. Admiring Dawn changed its name to Whyenlee. Plaintiffs filed a Third Amended Complaint naming Whyenlee as a defendant. Plaintiffs retained a Hong Kong-based law firm, CFN, which advised plaintiffs they could personally serve Whyenlee through an agent in Hong Kong and did not need to effect service through a judicial officer or public official. Plaintiffs used an agent to serve Whyenlee personally and sent the service documents via first class mail to Whyenlee. Whyenlee moved to quash service, arguing that plaintiffs failed to comply with the Hague Service Convention. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the motion. Submitting a request to a central authority is not the only method of service approved by the Convention. The Hong Kong agent who personally provided Whyenlee with the summons was, under Hong Kong law, a “competent person[] of the State of destination” to serve process without first making a request to the Central Authority View "Whyenlee Industries Ltd. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Sixty-nine current and former residents of mobilehome park Terrace View Mobile Home Estates filed a lawsuit against the park's owners, Terrace View Partners, LP, Thomas Tatum, Jeffrey Kaplan, and management company, Mobile Community Management Company (collectively, defendants). The operative first amended complaint, styled as a class action, included 12 causes of action based on allegations that defendants' failure to maintain the park in "good working order and condition" created a nuisance that, along with unreasonably high space rent increases, made it difficult or impossible for park residents to sell their mobilehomes. After the court denied plaintiffs' motion for class certification, the parties and the court agreed to try the case in phases, with the first phase involving 16 residents living in 10 spaces in Terrace View. A first-phase jury returned a special verdict finding defendants liable and awarded the individual plaintiffs economic and noneconomic damages for: intentional interference with property rights, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, nuisance (based on substantially failing to enforce the park's rules and regulations), breach of contract/breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, and negligence/negligence per se. The jury found defendants were not liable for nuisance based on failing to provide and maintain the park's common facilities and physical improvements in good working order and condition, and were not liable for elder financial abuse against five plaintiffs. After the jury was discharged, the court issued an order on plaintiffs' cause of action alleging defendants violated Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq., the "unfair competition law" (UCL). The court ruled that a "catch-up" provision in defendants' long-term leases that could greatly increase rent at the end of a lease term was unfair in violation of the UCL. The judgment also reflected the court's rulings at the beginning of trial that certain other provisions in the parties' lease agreements violated California's Mobilehome Residency Law or were otherwise unlawful. Defendants appealed. The Court of Appeal concluded the jury's award of compensatory damages and punitive damages had to be reversed. Although the jury's award of economic damages may have included unspecified amounts that could be upheld on appeal if the special verdict form had segregated them, "it is clear from the record that the vast majority of the economic damages awarded represented reimbursement for overpayment of rent and diminution in value of homes caused by high rent. Because the award of such damages cannot be sustained under any of the theories of liability presented to the jury and it is impossible to sever any properly awarded damages from improperly awarded damages." The Court therefore reversed the entire award of compensatory damages and the attendant awards of punitive damages and attorney fees and costs to plaintiffs. View "Bevis v. Terrace View Partners, LP" on Justia Law

This appeal focused on circumstances in which local water and irrigation districts were entitled to subvention for unfunded state mandates. The Commission on State Mandates (Commission). The Commission denied consolidated test claims for subvention by appellants Paradise Irrigation District (Paradise), South Feather Water & Power Agency (South Feather), Richvale Irrigation District (Richvale), Biggs-West Gridley Water District (Biggs), Oakdale Irrigation District (Oakdale), and Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District (Glenn-Colusa). The Commission determined the Water and Irrigation Districts had sufficient legal authority to levy fees to pay for any water service improvements mandated by the Water Conservation Act of 2009. The trial court agreed and denied a petition for writ of mandate brought by the Water and Irrigation Districts. On appeal, the Water and Irrigation Districts presented a question left open by the Court of Appeal’s decision in Connell v. Superior Court, 59 Cal.App.4th 382 (1997). Based on the statutory language, Connell held local water districts were precluded from subvention for state mandates to increase water purity levels insofar as the water districts have legal authority to recover the costs of the state-mandated program. In so holding, Connell rejected an argument by the Santa Margarita Water District and three other water districts that they did not have the “practical ability in light of surrounding economic circumstances.” This appeal considered whether the passage of Proposition 218 changed the authority of water and irrigation districts to recover costs from their ratepayers so that unfunded state mandates for water service had to be reimbursed by the state. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding the Water and Irrigation Districts possessed statutory authority to collect fees necessary to comply with the Water Conservation Act. Thus, under Government Code section 17556(d), subvention was not available to the Water and Irrigation Districts. The Commission properly denied the reimbursement claims at issue in this case because the Water and Irrigation Districts continued to have legal authority to levy fees even if subject to majority protest of water and irrigation district customers. View "Paradise Irrigation Dist. v. Commission on State Mandates" on Justia Law

In 2012, the County of Amador (County) certified a final environmental impact report (EIR) and approved the Newman Ridge Project (Project), an aggregate quarry and related facilities near Ione owned by real parties in interest Newman Minerals and others (Applicants). Ione Valley Land, Air, and Water Defense Alliance, LLC (LAWDA) filed a petition for writ of mandate under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) challenging the certification and approval. The trial court granted the petition as to traffic impacts because the 2012 draft EIR did not accurately portray the data from the traffic impact study and did not disclose traffic information in a manner reasonably calculated to inform the public and decision-makers. The errors required correction and recirculation of the EIR as to traffic issues only. As to all other issues, the petition was denied. After the County issued a partially recirculated draft EIR in 2014, certified the partially recirculated EIR, and again approved the Project, LAWDA again filed a petition for writ of mandate. The trial court denied the petition, and LAWDA appealed, contending the trial court erred by denying the petition: (1) as to impacts other than traffic impacts; and (2) as to traffic impacts. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded: (1) the arguments relating to impacts other than traffic impacts were precluded by res judicata; and (2) LAWDA failed to establish that CEQA statutes and guidelines required reversal as to traffic impacts. View "Ione Valley Land, Air, and Water etc. v. County of Amador" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Roger Myers, Dave Billings, Greg Neyhart, and Jim Mestas were nonexempt maintenance technicians for Raley’s grocery stores. Plaintiffs alleged they were required to drive company vehicles carrying their own tools as well as specialized tools, and they were not allowed to run personal errands without special permission or carry passengers who were not Raley’s employees except in an emergency. Despite Raley’s control over their driving time, they were not compensated for the time they spent driving to their first store or driving home from the last store they service each day. They claimed Raley’s uniform practice violated California law. These uniform policies and practices, according to the technicians, presented common issues of fact and law and their legality were particularly well suited to a class action. In denying class certification, the trial court made the conclusory finding plaintiffs failed to establish that a well-defined community of interest exists and that the common issues of fact and law predominate. The Court of Appeal determined that because the trial court’s cursory finding rendered its review "impossible," and because cases decided after the trial court’s ruling exposed the dangers of employing the wrong legal criteria, asking the wrong questions, or inflating the significance of the opposing parties’ evidence, the Court of Appeal remanded this case back to the trial court for reconsideration in light of Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 59 Cal.4th 522 (2014) and Jones v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 221 Cal.App.4th 986 (2013), and for a statement of reasons to ensure the court did not use improper criteria or rely on erroneous legal assumptions. View "Myers v. Raley's" on Justia Law

In 2008 Alvarez pled not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) to felony assault with a firearm on a firefighter or peace officer, with a firearm enhancement, and was committed to Napa State Hospital for a maximum commitment term of 18 years. His case remained largely inactive other than for the submission of periodic reports, Penal Code section 1026(f), until June 2017, when Alvarez’s attorney issued subpoenas to Napa State Hospital under Alvarez’s 2008 criminal case number, requesting extensive information. Alvarez did not file any petition or proceeding in connection with the subpoenas. Nor did he move to re-open discovery or otherwise seek permission to serve the subpoenas. The court granted motions to quash, reasoning that it continued to have jurisdiction over issues pertaining to defendant’s confinement but a confined NGI defendant cannot promulgate wide-ranging discovery on third parties that is not relevant to any existing controversy. The court of appeal affirmed. A court’s continuing jurisdiction over NGI cases does not support a generalized right of defendants to promulgate discovery to third parties unrelated to any active legal matter. View "People v. Alvarez" on Justia Law