Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Orange County Water District (the District) appealed a postjudgment order awarding The Arnold Engineering Company approximately $615,000 in costs of proof under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420 based on the District's failure to admit certain fact-specific requests for admission (RFAs) during discovery. The District argued the trial court erred in making the award because: (1) the District had reasonable grounds to believe it would prevail on the matters at issue under section 2033.420 (b)(3); and (2) even if it did not, Arnold did not adequately substantiate its costs with admissible evidence. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court abused its discretion in awarding costs for certain RFAs because the District reasonably relied on percipient witness testimony, undisputed scientific testing, and the opinions of a qualified expert in denying the RFAs. Furthermore, the Court determined certain evidence, namely expert witness invoices, was inadequate to support an award under the circumstances here because it did not distinguish between recoverable and nonrecoverable costs. The case was remanded for a new order awarding reasonable costs of proof. View "Orange County Water Dist. v. The Arnold Engineering Co." on Justia Law

Court facilities and court operations assessments must be subject to an ability to pay determination. The Court of Appeal reversed the order imposing assessments under Government Code section 70373 and Penal Code section 1465.8, holding that, for those unable to pay, these assessments inflict additional punishment. In this case, defendant was an indigent and homeless mother of young children who pleaded no contest to driving with a suspended license. The court agreed with defendant that imposing the fees and fine without considering her ability to pay violates state and federal constitutional guarantees because it simply punishes her for being poor. Therefore, the execution of the restitution fine must be stayed until and unless the People demonstrate that defendant has the ability to pay the fine. View "People v. Duenas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Riverside County Department of Child Support Services (the County) filed a complaint against defendant-respondent Michael Lee Estabrook (Father), seeking $288 per month in child support, as well as any healthcare expenses, for J.L., Father’s alleged daughter, whose mother, J.L. (Mother), was receiving public assistance. Father requested and received a judgment of non-paternity, and dismissed the County’s complaint with prejudice. On appeal, the County argued: (1) the family court erred by not ordering genetic testing; (2) the family court’s decision to apply the marital presumption was not supported by substantial evidence; (3) the family court erred by permitting Father to assert the marital presumption because the presumption may only be raised by the spouses who are in the marriage; and (4) the family court’s finding of non-paternity was not supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeal determined the family court erred by not ordering genetic testing; the family court’s decision to apply the marital presumption was not supported by substantial evidence; and the family court’s judgment of non-paternity was not supported by substantial evidence. View "County of Riverside v. Estabrook" on Justia Law

Bann-Shiang Liza Yu hired Automatic Teller Modules, Inc. (ATMI), a general contractor, to design and build a hotel. After the hotel opened, Yu filed a complaint against ATMI for construction defects, praying for “not less than $10 million dollars” in damages. ATMI filed a cross-complaint against its subcontractors, including Fitch Construction and Fitch Plastering (collectively the Fitch Entities). ATMI’s cross- complaint prayed for “compensatory damages according to proof.” Yu and ATMI settled their lawsuit. Subsequently, ATMI assigned its cross-complaint rights to Yu, who obtained a $1.2 million default judgment against the Fitch Entities. Yu then sued the alleged insurers of the Fitch Entities, in order to collect on her default judgment. But the trial court voided the underlying default judgment, finding that ATMI’s cross-complaint did not state an amount of damages. On appeal, Yu argued the damage amount of “not less than $10 million dollars” stated in her initial complaint was “incorporated by reference” in ATMI’s cross-complaint against its subcontractors. The Court of Appeal disagreed: the purported incorporation by reference was “for identification and informational purposes only”; ATMI’s cross-complaint did not state an amount of alleged damages, the cross-complaint merely prayed for “damages according to proof.” View "Yu v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

The employer, Luxor Cabs, obtained workers' compensation insurance through AUCRA under an EquityComp program. The EquityComp workers’ compensation insurance program has garnered nationwide attention from administrative agencies and judicial tribunals. In 2016, the California Insurance Commissioner issued an administrative decision concluding that the EquityComp program violated state insurance laws and that the reinsurance participation agreement (RPA) between AUCRA and the insured employer, in that case, was void as a matter of law. In 2018, the Fourth Appellate District came to a similar decision in a case essentially identical to this one involving arbitrability under an RPA. Luxor, unhappy with AUCRA's handling of claims, filed suit. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of AUCRA’s motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the terms of an RPA between an employer, Luxor Cabs, and AUCRA. The trial court properly rejected an argument that the validity of the arbitration clause should, itself, have been referred to arbitration in accordance with the RPA’s “delegation clause.” Both the delegation clause and the arbitration provision in the RPA were void and unenforceable because they each separately constituted an “endorsement” to the Policy which was not properly vetted and approved as required by Insurance Code section 11658. View "Luxor Cabs, Inc. v. Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Co." on Justia Law

Three factors are especially pertinent in determining whether the offeree had enough facts to evaluate a settlement offer under Code of Civil Procedure section 998: (1) how far into the litigation the 998 offer was made; (2) the information available to the offeree prior to the 998 offer's expiration; and (3) whether the offeree let the offeror know it lacked sufficient information to evaluate the offer, and how the offeror responded. The Court of Appeal applied these factors here and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that plaintiff's 998 offer was not made in good faith. Therefore, the court affirmed the order denying plaintiff prejudgment interest. View "Licudine v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center" on Justia Law

A jury trial is guaranteed for the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act's nominal statutory damages claims brought before 2013 under Civ. Code section 56.36, subdivision (b)(1), but not for attorneys' fees claims under section 56.35. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for a jury trial on both the nominal statutory damages claims and a remaining compensatory damages claim in this case. The court noted that the attorneys' fee claim should be addressed, if at all, by the trial court via post trial motion. View "Brown v. Mortensen" on Justia Law

Petitioner Yaron Lief and real party in interest Pnina Nissan met in Israel in 2010. Nissan moved to San Diego and married Lief in 2011. They had a son in 2014. Lief filed a marital dissolution action against Nissan in 2017. The family court bifurcated the issue of custody and visitation, held a trial on Nissan's request to move with the child to Israel, and tentatively granted the request. The court ultimately entered a judgment granting Nissan's move-away request on November 7, 2018. After receiving notice from Nissan that she intended to depart for Israel with the child on November 22, Lief filed an ex parte application with the family court for an order preventing the move-away until after December 7, when the 30-day stay of the judgment granting the move-away request would have expired. The court ruled its August 10, 2018 order tentatively granting Nissan's move-away request started the stay period running, denied Lief's application on November 21, and ordered Lief to turn over the child to Nissan that evening. Lief petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate and requested an immediate stay of the ex parte order purporting to allow Nissan to move to Israel with the child on November 22, 2018. The Court of Appeal found the family court erred when it ruled the 30-day statutory stay commenced with its August 10 decision, tentatively granting Nissan's move-away request: the court's oral statement of its decision at the end of the August 10 hearing was not a judgment or order. The period began to run when the family court filed the judgment granting Nissan's move-away request on November 7. "To correct the family court's error in ruling the stay began to run on August 10, 2018, issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is appropriate." View "Lief v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Jose Robles, Christopher Rymel, and David Hagins sued defendant Save Mart Supermarkets, Inc., alleging various state law statutory employment claims. After successfully moving to sever, Save Mart moved to compel arbitration as to each plaintiff. The motions were heard together, and the trial court denied the motions by substantively identical orders. Save Mart appealed in each case. The original complaint alleged each plaintiff had been employed as an order selector at Save Mart’s Roseville Distribution Center (Rymel was also a forklift driver). Each alleged an industrial injury and torts stemming from their injuries under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). Hagins also alleged he was retaliated against after he reported a workplace safety hazard, purportedly a whistleblower violation under Labor Code section 1102.5. Save Mart alleged plaintiffs were members of Teamsters Local 150 and were employed by Save Mart under a CBA that covered the pleaded disputes. Save Mart argued that resolving the disputes would require interpretation of the CBA or would be “substantially dependent” on such interpretation, that the claims were “inextricably intertwined” with parts of the CBA, and that judicial resolution of them would infringe on the arbitration process set forth in the CBA. Plaintiffs opposed the motions, arguing the pleaded claims did not fall within the scope of the CBA. The Court of Appeal concurred plaintiffs' claims did not require an interpretation of the CBA, and that their claims fell outside the scope of the CBA: "Save Mart explains that disputes about the employee termination and production norm provisions of the CBA are intended to be resolved through grievances. As an abstract proposition we do not disagree. But ...plaintiffs retain an independent (nonnegotiable) state law right to be free of discipline caused by protected activity, such as whistleblowing (Hagins) or exercising his FEHA rights (all plaintiffs)." View "Rymel v. Save Mart Supermarkets" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants Jamie and Kelly Etcheson brought an action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (commonly known as the "lemon law") against defendant and respondent FCA US LLC (FCA) after experiencing problems with a vehicle they had purchased new for about $40,000. After admitting the vehicle qualified for repurchase under the Act, FCA made two offers to compromise under Code of Civil Procedure section 998: one in March 2015, to which plaintiffs objected and the trial court found was impermissibly vague, and a second in June 2016, offering to pay plaintiffs $65,000 in exchange for the vehicle's return. Following the second offer, the parties negotiated a settlement in which FCA agreed to pay plaintiffs $76,000 and deem them the prevailing parties for purposes of seeking an award of attorney fees. Plaintiffs moved for an award of $89,445 in lodestar attorney fees with a 1.5 enhancement of $44,722.50 for a total of $134,167.50 in fees, plus $5,059.05 in costs. Finding the hourly rates and amount of counsels' time spent on services on plaintiffs' behalf to be reasonable, the trial court tentatively ruled plaintiffs were entitled to recover $81,745 in attorney fees and $5,059.05 in costs. However, in its final order the court substantially reduced its award, concluding plaintiffs should not have continued to litigate the matter at all after FCA's March 2015 section 998 offer. It found their sought-after attorney fees after the March 2015 offer were not "reasonably incurred," and cut off fees from that point, awarding plaintiffs a total of $2,636.90 in attorney fees and costs. Pointing out their ultimate recovery was double the estimated value of FCA's invalid March 2015 section 998 offer, which they had no duty to counter or accept, plaintiffs contended the trial court abused its discretion by cutting off all attorney fees and costs incurred after that offer. The Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the order and remanded back to the trial court with directions to award plaintiffs reasonable attorney fees for their counsels' services, including those performed after FCA's March 2015 offer, as well as reasonable fees for services in pursuing their motion for fees and costs. View "Etcheson v. FCA US LLC" on Justia Law