Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-respondent J.W., through her guardian ad litem, sued defendant-appellant Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. (Watchtower) and others for: (1) negligence; (2) negligent supervision/failure to warn; (3) negligent hiring/retention; (4) negligent failure to warn, train, or educate J.W.; (5) sexual battery; and (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress. J.W. was raised as a Jehovah’s Witness. In July 2006, J.W. and Gilbert Simental belonged to the Mountain View Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses. Prior to July 2006, at a different congregation, Simental served as a ministerial servant and as an elder. Upon joining the Mountain View congregation, Simental served as an elder. In July 2006, J.W. and three other girls were invited to a slumber party at Simental’s home. Simental had a daughter near the age of J.W. and the other invited girls. While in his backyard pool, Simental sexually molested J.W. and another girl (Doe 1) in separate incidents. Doe 1’s sister, Doe 2, had previously been molested on two occasions by Simental. Doe 1 and Doe 2 told their mother about Simental molesting them. The mother contacted an elder of the congregation, a judicial committee was convened, and Simental admitted he molested Doe 2 on two occasions, and that he molested Doe 1 twice on July 15. In two criminal cases, Simental was ultimately found guilty of molesting Doe 1, Doe 2, and J.W. In her civil suit against Watchtower, J.W. moved to compel further discovery responses. The trial court’s order compelled Watchtower to produce all documents Watchtower received in response to a letter sent by Watchtower to Jehovah’s Witness congregations on March 14, 1997, concerning known molesters in the church (1997 Documents). By November 2014, Watchtower had not produced the 1997 Documents, and J.W. moved for terminating sanctions. At a hearing on the sanctions motion, the trial court offered Watchtower four days to produce the 1997 Documents. Watchtower declined the offer and refused to produce the 1997 Documents. The trial court granted the motion for terminating sanctions and struck Watchtower’s answer. The trial court clerk entered Watchtower’s default. After considering evidence, the trial court entered judgment in favor of J.W. and awarded her $4,016,152.39. Raising multiple issues of alleged error, Watchtower appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed judgment. View "J.W. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are four parents and their children residing throughout California and a California nonprofit corporation, A Voice for Choice, Inc. This case rose constitutional challenges to Senate Bill No. 277, which repealed the personal belief exemption to California’s immunization requirements for children attending public and private educational and child care facilities. Plaintiffs sued claiming Senate Bill No. 277 violated their rights under California’s Constitution to substantive due process, privacy, and a public education. The trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrer to plaintiffs’ complaint without leave to amend and plaintiffs appealed. On appeal, plaintiffs also raised an additional argument that Senate Bill No. 277 violated their constitutional right to free exercise of religion, although they did not allege a separate cause of action on that basis in their complaint. The Court of Appeal found "[p]laintiffs' arguments are strong on hyperbole and scant on authority." Finding no violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Love v. California Dept. of Education" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a former version of Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5, the trial court ordered CPF Vaseo Associates, LLC (CPF) and its counsel, John Byrne, to pay Bruce and Barbara Gray (the Grays) just over $30,000 in fees and costs. Yet a mandatory procedural prerequisite to that award was never fulfilled. The motion requesting sanctions was served and filed on the same day, and no safe harbor period was afforded for CPF and Byrne to correct the challenged conduct. While a panel of the Court of Appeal previously determined that no such safe harbor applied to a sanctions motion like the one here, the Legislature's subsequent clarifying amendment of the section and the contrary opinion of another court convinced the Court to now reach a different conclusion. For that reason, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "CPF Vaseo Associates, LLC v. Gray" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal held that a default judgment was void on its face based on improper service. In this case, the trial court ordered plaintiffs to publish the summons "in The Orange County Register, a newspaper of general circulation published at Orange County, California." Plaintiffs published notice in the Laguna News-Post instead. Therefore, plaintiffs' failure to comport with the trial court's publication requirements rendered the judgment void and plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary were unpersuasive. The court reversed the trial court's order denying the motion to vacate and remanded for vacatur of the judgment. View "Calvert v. Binali" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Travelers Property Casualty Company of America, the Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut, and St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company (collectively, Travelers) filed this action against certain subcontractors to recover attorneys’ fees and costs Travelers incurred in defending developers Westlake Villas, LLC and Meer Capital Partners, LLC (collectively, Westlake) in a prior construction defect action. Travelers' claims were based on alleged subrogation to the rights of its additional insured, Westlake. The Westlake entities were suspended corporations under Revenue and Taxation Code section 23301, and could not assert these claims on their own behalf. Defendant Engel Insulation, Inc. moved for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that Travelers was also barred under this statute from prosecuting these claims. On appeal, Travelers contended the trial court erred in granting Engel’s motion without leave to amend. The Court of Appeal disagreed: an insurer could not file its own action to assert claims solely as a subrogee of a suspended corporation. View "Travelers Property Casualty Co. of Amer. v. Engel Insulation, Inc." on Justia Law

Employee Edwards filed a putative class action lawsuit against employer Heartland for wage and hour violations. Employees Torres and Martinez filed a separate, later putative class action lawsuit against Heartland for similar violations. After Edwards entered into a proposed class action settlement with Heartland and amended her complaint to encompass the claims asserted by Torres and Martinez, Torres and Martinez filed a motion to intervene in Edwards’ lawsuit. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeal affirmed. The Torres plaintiffs were not entitled to mandatory intervention mandatory intervention under Code of Civil Procedure section 387(b): their ability to protect their interest would not be practically impaired or impeded by the settlement in Edwards because they could opt out of or object to the settlement. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying permissive intervention; they do not need to intervene to seek discovery; as objectors, they may seek discovery to ensure sufficient information has been provided to evaluate the fairness of the settlement. View "Edwards v. Heartland Payment Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2014, the court of appeal decided a case that involved the legitimacy of certain retirement benefits regularly paid by the Oakland Police and Fire Retirement Board to members and beneficiaries of the Oakland Police and Fire Retirement System (PFRS). The Retired Oakland Police Officers Association and individual PFRS pensioners then sought attorney fees under California’s private attorney general statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 and the federal Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. 1988. The trial court determined that fees were not warranted under either statute. The court of appeal found an award of attorney fees under section 1021.5 to be proper. The Association was a prevailing party and several facts, including the relative poverty of the Association and its members, are all valid considerations in a section 1021.5 fee analysis and tip the scales decisively in favor of a fee award, especially when considered alongside the more modest estimated monetary value of the case discussed above. in successfully litigating to protect both procedural and substantive public pension rights on these facts, the Association was vindicating important rights affecting the public interest. The Association’s actions protected the pensions of the 590 living pensioners and their families, a clear economic benefit. View "City of Oakland v. Oakland Police and Fire Retirement System" on Justia Law

Finance Holding Company, LLC (Finance) obtained a judgment against Dominque Molina for about $50,000 plus interest and attorney fees. In judgment enforcement proceedings, Finance sought documents from Molina's employer, The American Institute of Certified Tax Coaches, Inc. (Institute). Finance requested numerous categories of business, tax, and bank records, without limiting the request to information relevant to Molina. The court overruled the Institute's objections and ordered the Institute "to produce for inspection and copying all the demanded documents." On appeal, the Institute argued the document production order was overbroad under the statute governing third party discovery in judgment enforcement proceedings. The Court of Appeal determined the order was appealable, and statutorily overbroad: the court did not have the authority to order the expansive document production that went far beyond the statutory guidelines. The Court remanded for the trial court to narrow the order to require production only of those documents pertaining to Molina's compensation, property, or services, and/or the Institute's debts owed to Molina. View "Finance Holding Co., LLC v. The American Inst. of Certified etc." on Justia Law

Amanda Meleski was injured when Albert Hotlen ran a red light and collided with her vehicle. Unfortunately, Hotlen was deceased at the time of the lawsuit, and he had no estate from which she could recover. However, Hotlen had purchased a $100,000 insurance policy from Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) covering the accident. Meleski brought her action pursuant to Probate Code sections 550 through 555, which allowed her to serve her complaint on Allstate and recover damages from the Allstate policy, but limited her recovery of damages to the policy limits. Meleski attempted to settle the matter before going to trial by making an offer pursuant to section 998 for $99,999. The offer was not accepted, and at trial a jury awarded her $180,613.86. Because the offer was rejected and Meleski was awarded judgment in excess of her offer to compromise, she expected to recover her costs of suit, the postoffer costs of the services of expert witnesses, and other litigation costs. Meleski argued on appeal that she should have been able to recover costs in excess of the policy limits from Allstate, since it was Allstate that had refused to accept a reasonable settlement offer prior to trial. The trial court disagreed, and Meleski filed this appeal, arguing Allstate was a party within the meaning of section 998 for purposes of recovering costs, and that such costs were recoverable from the insurer despite the limitation on the recovery of “damages” found in Probate Code sections 550 through 555. The Court of Appeal agreed and reversed judgment: "Even though the decedent’s estate is the named defendant in actions under Probate Code sections 550 through 555, this is a legal fiction. The insurance company accepts service of process, hires and pays for counsel to defend the action, makes all decisions regarding settlement of the litigation, is responsible for paying the judgment in favor of the plaintiff if such judgment is rendered, and makes the decision whether or not to appeal an adverse judgment. There is no actual person or entity other than the insurance company to do any of this. This is a reality we will not ignore. Moreover, we find it manifestly unfair that section 998 could be employed by Allstate to recover costs from the plaintiff (which costs it would have no obligation to pay to the estate), but Allstate would have no corresponding responsibility to pay costs merely because it is not a named party." View "Meleski v. Estate of Hotlen" on Justia Law

In 2015, the California Governor issued a proclamation convening a special session of the Legislature for certain specified purposes, including to “[i]mprove the efficiency and efficacy of the health care system, reduce the cost of providing health care services, and improve the health of Californians.” Pertinent to this appeal, the Legislature enacted the End of Life Option act, which legalized physician-assisted suicide for the terminally ill. During a special session, the Legislature passed the Act. Plaintiffs were five individual physicians along with a professional organization that promoted ethical standards in the medical profession (collectively the Ahn parties), who asserted causes of action for violations of due process, of equal protection, and of California constitutional limitations on the power of the Legislature to act in special session. In February 2018, the Ahn parties filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. After hearing argument, the trial court ruled that it would grant the motion, without leave to amend. On May 24, 2018, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the Ahn parties, and enjoined enforcement of the Act. Days later, three nonparties5 (collectively the Fairchild parties) filed an ex parte application to vacate the judgment, which was denied. The State filed a petition for writ of mandate to the Court of Appeal along with a request for an immediate stay. The Court granted a temporary stay, during which the Fairchild parties filed an appeal of the judgment, contending that, as a result of the denial of their ex parte application to vacate the judgment, they had standing to appeal and, in that appeal, to challenge the judgment on the merits. The Ahn parties disputed this. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal’s review was not whether the Fairchild parties are parties to the appeal, but only whether they were parties to this writ proceeding. Admittedly, the State’s writ petition did not name the Fairchild parties, nor did the Fairchild parties formally move to intervene. “However, a person can become a party to an action, even if not named in the complaint, by appearing and participating without any objection by the other parties. We see no reason why this principle should not also apply to a writ proceeding. This is not to say that they are necessarily proper parties.” The Court ultimately concluded the Ahn parties lacked standing on any of the theories they asserted in this appeal. The Court was unclear whether, on remand, they would be able to amend their complaint so as to allege standing, whether the trial court will grant them leave to do so, or whether they will be able to prove up their amended allegations. “It is possible (though by no means certain) that we will see this case again; if so, however, at least we will be sure that the constitutional issue is properly presented.” The Court issued a writ of mandate to direct the superior court to vacate its order granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings and to vacate the judgment. View "California v. Superior Court (Ahn)" on Justia Law