Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves an appellant, G.G., who sought renewal of a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her former partner, G.S. The original DVRO was issued based on stalking. The appellant and respondent were former romantic partners and parents of two young children. The appellant testified that the respondent had repeatedly attempted to control her during their relationship, including planting a listening device in their home, taking her phone, and following her to work. After the relationship ended, the respondent continued to stalk the appellant, appearing at her home uninvited at least 70 times. The appellant filed a request for a DVRO, which was granted for a two-year period.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially issued the DVRO. After the DVRO was issued, the appellant's unwanted contact with the respondent was reduced, but not entirely eliminated. The appellant filed a request to renew the DVRO two weeks before its expiration, asking that the order be made permanent. The trial court found no evidence that the respondent had intentionally violated the DVRO and concluded that the appellant's fear, while genuine, was not reasonable. The request to renew the DVRO was denied.The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four. The court found that the trial court did not apply the correct legal standard in denying the renewal of the DVRO. The court held that a DVRO can be renewed based on the original facts, regardless of whether they involved physical or non-physical abuse, and renewal is not conditioned on the presence or absence of "ongoing" events. The court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for a new hearing, directing the trial court to reconsider the request for renewal consistent with the legal framework outlined in the decision. View "G.G. v. G.S." on Justia Law

This case involves a wrongful death claim against San Antonio Regional Hospital, brought by Joseph Musharbash, following the death of his adult son, Michael, who was treated for a traumatic brain injury at the hospital. Musharbash alleges that the hospital provided inadequate care by failing to properly evaluate Michael's injuries and undertake appropriate courses of action. Specifically, he claims that surgical intervention was performed too late and that the nursing staff failed to adequately monitor Michael, inform his doctors of his status, and advocate for the need for earlier surgical intervention.The hospital moved for summary judgment, arguing that Musharbash's only expert, Rhona Wang, a certified registered nurse anesthetist, lacked the requisite skill or experience to opine on the standard of care or causation elements of the claim. The trial court denied the hospital's motion for summary judgment, finding that Wang's declaration demonstrated triable issues about the standard of care and causation elements of Musharbash's claim. The hospital then petitioned for writ relief.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, granted the petition. The court found that Wang's qualifications did not establish that she had the specialized knowledge required to opine on the standard of care applicable to an intensive care unit neurosurgeon deciding whether a severe traumatic brain injury requires immediate surgical intervention, or whether that standard of care was breached. The court also found that Wang's declaration did not establish she was competent to opine on causation. As Wang was Musharbash's only proffered expert, her lack of competence to opine on the applicable standard of care and causation was fatal to his claim. The court directed the trial court to vacate its order denying the hospital's motion for summary judgment and to enter a new order granting the motion for summary judgment. View "San Antonio Regional Hospital v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a lawsuit filed by an adult, John Doe D.Y., alleging childhood sexual assault while in elementary school. The plaintiff used fictitious names for all defendants and did not serve any at the time of filing, as required by section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The case was assigned to Judge Katherine A. Bacal. In October 2023, the superior court allowed the plaintiff to serve and name Doe defendants under section 340.1. In November 2023, the plaintiff named Doe 1 as Defendant and Petitioner San Diego Unified School District. The District was served with the complaint in December 2023.The District made its first appearance in January 2024, seeking an automatic extension of time to demur and filed a peremptory challenge under section 170.6 against the judge. The superior court denied the challenge as "untimely" without further explanation. The District then filed a petition for a writ of mandate, arguing that it had timely filed the challenge within 15 days of its first appearance.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One, State of California, concluded that the superior court's review of the certificates under section 340.1 did not constitute a "determination of contested fact issues relating to the merits" under section 170.6(a)(2), and thus did not preclude a subsequent peremptory challenge. The court found that the superior court had erred in ruling the District's peremptory challenge as untimely. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order denying the District's peremptory challenge, and to enter an order granting the challenge and reassigning the case to a different judge. View "San Diego Unified School Dist. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Laleh Taghvaei Mohammadijoo and Ramin Dadashian, who were married in Iran and later settled in California. The couple separated after 12 years of marriage. The main contention revolves around two missing assets: approximately $150,000 in community funds that Mohammadijoo secured through a home equity line of credit (HELOC) and transferred to Iran for her brother to manage, and approximately $170,000 of separate property proceeds that Dadashian inherited from his father’s real estate investments in Iran. Dadashian argued that Mohammadijoo had exclusive management and control over these assets post-separation, and thus, the burden of proof should be shifted to her to account for these missing assets.The trial court declined to shift the burden of proof to Mohammadijoo. It found that there was no credible evidence as to what happened to the funds. The court also sanctioned Mohammadijoo for violating her statutory disclosure obligations but did not charge her with the value of the missing assets.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Two reversed the judgment. The court held that the burden-shifting framework applies when one spouse solely controls and manages a relationship with a third party who directly oversees the management and investment of community funds post-separation. In such a case, the managing spouse must account for the missing assets. The court also extended this burden-shifting framework to missing separate property. Therefore, the trial court erred in declining to shift the burden of proof to Mohammadijoo regarding the missing assets. The case was remanded for a retrial of the community property issues. View "Marriage of Dadashian" on Justia Law

This case involves a lawsuit filed by Cornelius Williams against J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc. (JMM), a supplier of asbestos-cement pipe. Williams alleged that he developed mesothelioma due to secondary exposure to asbestos from his brother Nathan's work with asbestos-cement pipe over a period of more than 20 years. Williams and Nathan did not live together, but had regular close contact during Nathan's employment. The jury found JMM liable under theories of design defect and failure to warn, concluding that the pipe sold by JMM was a substantial factor in increasing Williams' risk of developing cancer. JMM appealed the decision.The trial court dismissed Williams' negligence claim, but not the strict liability claim. The jury found in favor of Williams on his remaining strict liability claim, awarding him significant damages. JMM moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and, in the alternative, for a new trial, arguing that the trial court erred in its interpretation and application of a previous case, Kesner v. Superior Court, to preclude only the negligence cause of action. The motion was denied. JMM also appealed from the judgment and order denying its motion for JNOV.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Two affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court rejected JMM's arguments that (1) judgment must be entered in its favor because, under Kesner, strict liability does not apply to Williams; (2) the judgment must be reversed for lack of substantial evidence; or (3) a new trial is necessary because the trial court abused its discretion on certain evidentiary rulings. View "Williams v. J-M Manufacturing Company" on Justia Law

This case involves a marital dissolution proceeding between Monique Covington Moore and Charles Moore. During the discovery process, Covington served deposition subpoenas for the production of business records on nonparties Rocket Lawyer, Inc. and Acendi Interactive Company, LLC. Both companies objected and refused to comply with most of the subpoenas’ demands. Covington then filed a motion to compel their compliance. The trial court granted the motion in substantial part and ordered each company to pay Covington $25,000 in monetary sanctions. The companies appealed, raising several claims of error regarding the trial court’s rulings.The trial court had found that Rocket Lawyer and Acendi did not act with the requisite substantial justification in resisting the subpoenas. The court ordered them to comply with most of the document demands, subject to a protective order, and imposed monetary sanctions. The companies appealed, arguing that Covington’s motion was untimely, that her attempts to meet and confer were insufficient, and that the monetary sanctions were unreasonable, among other issues.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three affirmed the trial court’s rulings in most respects. However, it agreed with the companies that the fees and costs Covington incurred in mediation as meet and confer attempts after her discovery motions were already filed were not compensable as discovery sanctions. The court reversed the orders in part and remanded for redetermination of the sanctions awards. View "In re Marriage of Moore" on Justia Law

In September 2021, John Sandy Campbell filed a lawsuit against her former employer, the Los Angeles Unified School District, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation for whistleblowing. These allegations were in violation of Labor Code sections 1102.5 and 1106 and Government Code section 12940 (the Fair Employment and Housing Act). The District demurred, arguing that Campbell had not complied with the Government Code’s claim presentation requirement and that the statute of limitations barred her cause of action under the Act. The trial court sustained the District's demurrer without leave to amend, citing Le Mere v. Los Angeles Unified School District and Government Code section 12965, subdivision (c)(1)(C).The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight reviewed the trial court's ruling independently and applied the standard for demurrers. The court agreed with the trial court, stating that a plaintiff suing a public entity for damages must timely present a written claim to the entity before filing suit. Campbell had not demonstrated that she substantially complied with the claim presentation requirement. Furthermore, Campbell's amended complaint did not plead compliance with the claim presentation requirement.Additionally, Campbell's claim for violation of the Act was time-barred. The Department of Fair Employment and Housing had provided Campbell a Right to Sue notice dated October 9, 2018, giving her one year to file a civil action. Campbell did not sue until September 2021, making her suit untimely. The court also rejected Campbell's argument that the discovery rule saved her lawsuit. The court affirmed the judgment and order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and awarded costs to the respondent. View "Campbell v. L.A. Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

The case involves Leah Lorch, who filed a peremptory challenge against Judge Timothy B. Taylor, who was newly assigned to preside over her trial. Lorch's challenge was denied by Judge Taylor, who ruled that the challenge was untimely under the master calendar rule. This rule requires a party to file a challenge to the judge supervising the master calendar not later than the time the cause is assigned for trial. After the denial of the challenge, Judge Taylor proceeded with a two-day jury trial, which resulted in a defense verdict and judgment in favor of the defendant, Kia Motors America, Inc. Lorch then filed a petition within the statutory 10-day period, arguing that her challenge was timely because it was filed before the trial started.The trial court denied Lorch's peremptory challenge, ruling that it was untimely under the master calendar rule. The court also refused to stay the trial, and Judge Taylor immediately began a two-day jury trial, which resulted in a defense verdict and judgment in favor of Kia Motors America, Inc. Lorch then filed a petition within the statutory 10-day period, arguing that her challenge was timely because it was filed before the trial started.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One, held that Lorch's section 170.6 challenge was timely filed before the commencement of the trial and rejected Kia's laches argument. The court also concluded that the Superior Court of San Diego County's local rule, which purports to provide any superior court judge with the power to act as a master calendar department for purposes of assigning cases for trial, is inconsistent with section 170.6 and case law interpreting the statute. The court granted the petition with directions to vacate the void orders and judgment entered by Judge Taylor after denying the peremptory challenge. View "Lorch v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a proposed project to significantly alter the California State Capitol complex. The plaintiff, Save the Capitol, Save the Trees (Save the Capitol), appealed against an order discharging a peremptory writ of mandate issued by the trial court. The writ was issued following a previous court decision that found an environmental impact report (EIR) for the project, prepared by the defendant Department of General Services and the Joint Committee on Rules of the California State Senate and Assembly (collectively DGS), failed to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The writ directed DGS to vacate in part its certification of the EIR and all associated project approvals, and to file a final return to the writ “upon certification of a revised EIR.”The trial court had previously denied two petitions for writ of mandate, one sought by Save the Capitol and the other by an organization named Save Our Capitol!. The Court of Appeal reversed in part and affirmed in part the trial court’s denial. On remand, the trial court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing DGS to vacate in part its certification of the EIR and all associated project approvals. After DGS partially vacated its certification of the EIR and all associated project approvals, it revised, recirculated, and certified the revised final EIR. DGS then partially reapproved the project without one of the project components, the visitor center. DGS thereafter filed its final return and the trial court discharged the writ, over plaintiff’s objection, without determining whether the revised final EIR remedied the CEQA violations the Court of Appeal had identified in its opinion.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District, Save the Capitol argued that the discharge of the writ was premature because the writ not only required DGS to revise and recirculate the defective portions of the EIR, but also to certify a revised EIR consistent with the previous court decision before the writ could be discharged. The court agreed with Save the Capitol, concluding that the trial court must determine that the revised EIR is consistent with the previous court decision before discharging the writ. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Save the Capitol, Save the Trees v. Dept. of General Services" on Justia Law

In 2015, GPT Maple Avenue Owner, LP (GPT) purchased a property that was subject to a lease to Equinix, LLC (Equinix). At the time of GPT’s acquisition, the remaining term of the lease was 26 years. The Los Angeles County Assessor’s Office (Assessor) determined that GPT’s acquisition resulted in a “change in ownership” permitting reassessment for property tax purposes because, at the time of the sale, the remaining term of the lease was under 35 years. This was based on the statutes implementing Proposition 13, which state that whether the transfer of a lessor’s interest in taxable real property results in a change in ownership generally depends on the length of the remaining lease term at the time of the transfer.Equinix appealed the Assessor’s 2015 change in ownership determination to the Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Board, which found in favor of the county. Equinix and GPT then presented a refund claim to the county, which the county denied. Equinix and GPT filed a lawsuit, and the trial court ruled in favor of the county, concluding that, under the “express language” of the relevant statutes, the sale of the Property to GPT in March 2015 resulted in a change in ownership because at the time of sale the remaining term of Equinix’s lease was less than 35 years.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division One, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court found that under the unambiguous language of the relevant statute, the 2015 transaction is a change in ownership permitting reassessment. The court rejected the appellants' arguments that the statute is inconsistent with Proposition 13 and another section in the statutory scheme. The court also rejected the appellants' argument that the statute is inconsistent with the overarching rules set forth in another section of the law. The court concluded that the Legislature was not required to adhere to the task force’s recommendations and that the statute as enacted did not render the law illogical. View "Equinix LLC v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law