Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Alliance challenged the approval of a project comprising a fuel station, convenience store, and quick serve restaurant on The Alameda and the adoption of a mitigated negative declaration for the project. The Alliance sought to compel the preparation of an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code 21000). In March 2016, the trial court issued a “Peremptory Writ of Mandate of Interlocutory Remand for Reconsideration of Potential Noise Impacts,” requiring the city to set aside the resolutions, reconsider the significance of potential noise impacts, and take further action consistent with CEQA. The Alliance did not appeal from that decision but appealed from the December 2016 “Final Judgment on Petition for Writ of Mandamus,” which determined that the city’s supplemental return complied with the peremptory writ and with CEQA. The court of appeal affirmed, concluding that the March 2016 decision was the final judgment and the December 2016 decision was a post-judgment order. The court rejected claims that the city was required to prepare an EIR because there was substantial evidence in the record supporting a fair argument that the proposed project may have significant, unmitigated traffic and noise impacts and that the project violated the municipal code governing “formula retail businesses.” View "Alliance of Concerned Citizens Organized for Responsible Development v. City of San Juan Bautista" on Justia Law

Mariana L. initiated a paternity and child support action in San Diego County against David L., a Connecticut resident. The trial court denied David's motion to quash service, and he sought writ review. The question this case presented for the Court of Appeal’s consideration was whether California could exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident in a paternity action where the mother and young child live in California and conception occurred in another state? On the particular facts presented, the Court answered this question in the negative and issued a writ of mandate to prevent the exercise of jurisdiction. David's knowledge that Mariana resided in California and the foreseeability of California effected (a child) from their out-of-state sexual intercourse were insufficient to establish the requisite minimum contacts. Specific jurisdiction must rest on David's own suit-related contacts with California, not merely a plaintiff who lives here. California thus cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over David in this paternity and child support action. View "David L. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

S.Y. and Omar were married in 2013 and had one child, A. On August 29, 2016, Omar was physically violent with S.Y. Omar also grabbed S.Y., forced her and A. out of the house, and locked the door. S.Y. obtained a temporary restraining order against Omar, and Omar obtained temporary restraining orders against S.Y., S.Y.'s mother, and her brother. S.Y.'s order granted her sole legal and physical custody of A., but this order was not properly served on Omar. After hearing evidence from all parties, the court denied the mutual requests for permanent restraining orders and dismissed the temporary orders. There was a report to the Health and Human Services Agency that Omar had emotionally abused A., but the agency closed this referral after investigation. Omar filed a marital dissolution action against S.Y. in October 2016. Three weeks later, he filed a request for an order for joint legal custody and primary physical custody of A. At a preliminary hearing in 2017, the family court awarded S.Y. physical custody of A., with Omar to have supervised visitation twice a week for five hours each time. The visits were to be supervised by Omar's sister, with conditions. The court ordered sole legal custody to S.Y. because she and Omar were not communicating well. S.Y. did not let Omar see A. or talk with him on the phone from the time she moved out in August 2016 until February 2017. The trial court made an initial custody order, finding that, based on S.Y.'s contemporaneous statements to the police and the photographs of her injuries, Omar had been domestically violent toward her. The court applied the Family Code section 3044 presumption and found that Omar had rebutted the presumption that an award of custody to him would be detrimental to A.'s best interest. S.Y. contended the trial court erred when it found Omar rebutted the presumption, and requested the Court of Appeal vacate the trial court's interim order granting joint legal and de facto joint physical custody to both parents, direct the trial court to enter a new order after reconsidering the section 3044 presumption of detriment, and award costs to her. The Court agreed that the trial court erred in considering Omar's greater fluency in English as a factor rebutting the presumption of detriment due to his domestic violence. However, the Court concluded that evidence other than language fluency substantially supported the trial court's ruling that Omar had rebutted the presumption of detriment, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting joint legal and physical custody to both parents. View "S.Y. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Halbig, a “school safety and security expert and consultant” living in Florida, began an independent investigation of the 2012 shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School and established an organization, “Sandy Hook Justice.” Halbig believed that GoFundMe canceled his Sandy Hook Justice campaign because of a letter from the “Sandy Hook Defense Group” and discovered “defamatory posts” about himself on several websites and social media sites. Halbig sued five “John Doe” defendants in Florida for defamation for those postings. To determine the identities of the posters, Halbig served a subpoena on Google requiring the production of documents and information revealing the identity of the person maintaining http://sandyhookanalysis.blogspot.com. Google notified the account holder of the subpoena. That person, “Roe,” sought to quash the subpoena under Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.11 and requested fees and costs under section 1987.2(c). Before the hearing, Halbig withdrew the subpoena. At the subsequent hearing, the trial court found that Roe was the “prevailing party” under section 1987.2(c) and awarded attorney’s fees and costs to Roe. The court of appeal agreed that Roe was the prevailing party under section 1987.2(c), but concluded that the trial court erred in setting the amount of attorney’s fees. View "Roe v. Halbig" on Justia Law

In 2014, Wife was married to Andres Marin (the victim). Wife and the victim shared four children: Andres, Jazmyn, Christal, and Julyan. On March 1, 2014, at approximately 6:30 a.m., the victim left the Family’s residence in Corona to ride his mountain bike up Santiago Peak in the Cleveland National Forest. The bike ride would be approximately 55 miles. The victim was scheduled to arrive back home at 2:00 p.m. When he did not, his Wife called police. Wife was able to speak to her husband on the trail: he had been injured, and she was concerned about falling temperatures the later it took him to come home. Riverside County Sheriff’s Lieutenant Zachary Hall was the “Incident Commander” for the case. Lieutenant Hall was not trained in search and rescue techniques, and dismissed Wife’s concerns for her husband’s safety, particularly overnight when the temperatures dropped. The victim ultimately was found by volunteers trained to respond to wilderness emergencies; he died of hypothermia. The victim’s family sued the County of Riverside (the County) for: (1) wrongful death; (2) negligence; (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (4) a deprivation of constitutional rights (42 U.S.C. 1983). The trial court sustained the County’s demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend. The Family contended on appeal the trial court erred. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed as to the causes of action for wrongful death, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. View "Arista v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal granted defendant's petition for writ of mandate and ordered the trial court to dismiss the entire action under Code of Civil Procedure sections 583.310 and 583.360. The panel held that an order staying responsive pleadings and outstanding discovery requests, while also requiring the parties to negotiate and agree on a case management plan and to prepare and file a joint statement specifically addressing case-related issues in multiple areas (and also allowing the parties to informally exchange documents), does not "effect a complete stay of the prosecution of the action" within the meaning of Gaines v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co., 62 Cal.4th 1081, 1087, and Bruns v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc., 51 Cal.4th 717, 730.In this case, the trial court erred when it concluded that the five-year period was tolled for 43 days because of such a stay, issued at the outset of the case. In the alternative, even if the court assumed the 43-day tolling period was permissible, the trial court's order granting trial preference and setting the trial for April 10, 2018, was a manifest abuse of discretion. View "Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County" on Justia Law

Hart suffers from mesothelioma, caused by exposure to asbestos. In 1976-1977, Hart worked on a McKinleyville sewer project, for Christeve, cutting asbestos-cement pipe, manufactured by Johns-Manville. Hart had no access to information regarding the pipe supplier. Glamuzina a foreman on the project, testified that he observed Hart cut and bevel asbestos-cement pipe without any respiratory protection; knew Johns-Manville manufactured the pipe based on a stamp on the pipe; and believed Keenan supplied the pipe, based on seeing invoices that contained “their K.” Christeve’s then-bookkeeper testified that she did not know whether Keenan supplied asbestos-cement pipe to McKinleyville. Keenan’s corporate representative testified he had “no information” that Keenan sold anything that was used in the McKinleyville project.. A jury found that Hart was exposed to asbestos-cement pipe supplied by Keenan; awarded economic damages, non-economic damages, and damages for loss of consortium; and allocated fault among 10 entities, finding Keenan 17% at fault. The court of appeal reversed, concluding that Glamuzina’s testimony about the invoices was inadmissible hearsay and there was no other evidence Keenan supplied the pipes. The wording on these invoices constitued out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted: that Keenan supplied the pipes. Glamuzina lacked personal knowledge of who the supplier was. View "Hart v. Keenan Properties, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1996, California voters adopted Proposition 218 (as approved by voters Gen. Elec. Nov. 5, 1996, eff. Nov. 6, 1996 [as of Nov. 14, 2018], archived at ) (Proposition 218) to add article XIII C to the California Constitution by which they expressly reserved their right to challenge local taxes, assessments, fees, and charges by initiative. At issue in this case was whether section 3 of article XIII C to the California Constitution silently repealed voters’ right to challenge by referendum the same local levies for which they expressly preserved their power of initiative. The City of Dunsmuir (City) rejected a referendum measure submitted by one its residents, Leslie Wilde. The City rejected the referendum even though there was no dispute Wilde gathered sufficient voter signatures to qualify the referendum for the ballot to repeal Resolution 2016-02 that established a new water rate master plan. The City’s concluded its resolution establishing new water rates was not subject to referendum, but only voter initiative. Wilde petitioned for a writ of mandate in superior court to place the referendum on the ballot. At the same time, Wilde gathered sufficient voter signatures to place an initiative on the ballot to establish a different water rate plan. The trial court denied Wilde’s petition, and the City’s voters rejected Wilde’s initiative, Measure W. On appeal, Wilde contended the trial court erred in refusing to order the City to place her referendum on the ballot. The Court of Appeal concluded this appeal was not moot, and that the voters’ rejection of Wilde’s initiative water rate plan did not establish that the voters would necessarily have rejected Wilde’s referendum on the City’s water rate plan. On the merits, the Court concluded the voters’ adoption of Proposition 218 did not abridge voters’ right to challenge local resolutions and ordinances by referendum. The trial court erred in finding the City’s water rate plan was an administrative decision not subject to voter referendum. The resolution adopting an extensive water upgrade project funded by a new water rate plan was legislative in nature and therefore subject to voter referendum. View "Wilde v. City of Dunsmuir" on Justia Law

SI 59 appealed from a judgment of dismissal following a demurrer to its second amended complaint against defendants, as well as the post judgment award of attorney fees. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Civil Code section 1668 negates a contractual clause exempting a party from responsibility for fraud or a statutory violation only when all or some of the elements of the tort are concurrent or future events at the time the contract is signed. The court also held that section 1668 does not negate such a clause when all the elements are past events. The court explained that, regarding the element of damages, which is necessary for tort liability, this means that at least some form of economic or physical damage has occurred. In this case, the negligence claim was barred by the general release and the negligent misrepresentation claim was not pleaded with the requisite specificity. The court rejected the remaining arguments and held that the issue of attorney fees was moot. View "SI 59 LLC v. Variel Warner Ventures, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were class representatives of current and former employees of defendant Pacific Bell Telephone Company who installed and repaired video and internet services in customers’ homes. They appealed a judgment in favor of defendant following cross-motions for summary judgment or summary judgment. Plaintiffs sought compensation for the time they spent traveling in an employer-provided vehicle--loaded with equipment and tools--between their homes and a customer’s residence (the worksite) under an optional and voluntary Home Dispatch Program. The trial court, like federal courts that have considered the question under California law, concluded the travel time was not compensable. The Court of Appeal agree and affirmed, finding: (1) the Home Dispatch Program was not compulsory; and (2) simply transporting tools and equipment during commute time was not compensable work where no effort or extra time is required to effectuate the transport. View "Hernandez v. Pacific Bell Telephone Co." on Justia Law