Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Genisman and Cline co-owned ECI and Coast. Genisman wanted Cline to buy out his interests and sought to be released from personal guarantees to lenders, including Blumenfeld. Genisman retained the Hopkins law firm. Initial drafts of the transaction documents structured it as a buyout. At some point, Hopkins revised the documents to implement a redemption of Genisman’s interest by the companies. Genisman, signed the documents unaware of the change. In July 2012, Blumenfeld sued Genisman for intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and constructive fraud, alleging that Blumenfeld had loaned $3.5 million to Coast, secured by its assets and the personal guarantees; that he released Genisman from his personal guarantees; that $750,000 remained unpaid when, in 2009, Coast became insolvent; that, in 2012, Blumenfeld learned that the documents called for Coast to pay Genisman $1,115,000; and that he would not have agreed to release Genisman from his personal guarantees had Genisman properly advised him of the terms. Genisman’s new law firm billed Genisman $2,475.40 to defend. Genisman sued Hopkins in December 2013. The court affirmed rejection of the suit as untimely under Code of Civil Procedure 340.6(a), which requires legal malpractice claims be brought one year after actual or constructive discovery. View "Genisman v. Hopkins Carley" on Justia Law

Lloyd Copenbarger, as Trustee of the Hazel I. Maag Trust (the Maag Trust), sued Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, Inc. (MCWE) for declaratory relief and breach of a settlement agreement made to resolve various disputes, including an unlawful detainer action. MCWE was the lessee of a 50-year ground lease (the Ground Lease) of real property (the Property) in Newport Beach. The Property was improved with an office building and marina (the Improvements). The Ground Lease was set to terminate on December 1, 2018. In 2004, MCWE subleased the Property and sold all of the Improvements to NHOM (the Sublease). Starting in 2009, NHOM experienced cash flow problems due to “a shortage of rents.” In June 2011, MCWE commenced an unlawful detainer action against NHOM based on allegations NHOM failed to maintain and undertake required repairs to the Improvements. Six months later, the Maag Trust intervened in the UD Action as a party defendant under the theory that if NHOM were evicted and the Sublease terminated, then the Maag Trust’s security interest created by the Maag Deed of Trust would be destroyed. In August 2012, MCWE, Plaza del Sol, and the Maag Trust entered into a settlement agreement (the Settlement Agreement). The Maag Trust alleged MCWE breached the settlement agreement by failing to dismiss with prejudice the unlawful detainer action and sought, as damages, attorney fees incurred in that action from the date of the settlement agreement to the date on which MCWE did dismiss the action. Following a bench trial, the trial court found MCWE had breached the settlement agreement by not timely dismissing with prejudice the unlawful detainer action. As damages, the court awarded the Maag Trust attorney fees it claimed to have incurred during the relevant time period. On appeal, MCWE did not challenge the finding that its failure to dismiss the unlawful detainer action constituted a breach of the settlement agreement. Instead, MCWE made a number of arguments challenging the damages awarded. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment against MCWE because there was a wholesale failure of proof of the amount of damages on the part of the Maag Trust. Therefore, the Court reversed with directions to enter judgment in favor of MCWE on the Maag Trust’s complaint. View "Copenbarger v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, Inc." on Justia Law

The Association sought a writ of mandate directing the appellate division to vacate its order granting a petition for writ of mandate and directing the trial court to rule on the merits of a special motion to strike, Code of Civil Procedure 425.16, filed by defendant and real party in interest. The Association wanted the trial court to enter a new and different order denying real party in interest's petition for writ of mandate.The Court of Appeal held that the restrictive language of Code of Civil procedure section 92(d), which limits the type of motions to strike that may be brought in a limited civil case, precludes the filing of a special motion to strike under section 425.16. The court reasoned that construing section 92(d) as barring anti-SLAPP motions in limited civil cases was also in harmony with the public policy of economic litigation in such cases. Accordingly, the court granted the Association's petition for writ of mandate. View "1550 Laurel Owner's Association, Inc. v. Appellate Division of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County" on Justia Law

Guerrero came from Mexico to the U.S. with his parents in 1990 at age 11. In 1995, he created a false Social Security number (SSN) to get a job. He secured a legitimate SSN in 2007. He became a U.S. citizen in 2011. He applied to become a correctional officer with the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). He passed written and physical exams and was placed on the eligibility list. CDCR’s background questionnaire asked, “Have you ever had or used a social security number other than the one you used on this questionnaire?” Guerrero answered “yes” and explained. Based on that answer, CDCR informed Guerrero he was no longer eligible to become a correctional officer. The State Personnel Board upheld the decision. Guerro filed a federal suit, citing title VII; California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (Government Code, 12940); national origin discrimination in a state-conducted program (Government Code 11135); 42 U.S.C. 1983; and state equal protection and due process violations. The federal court dismissed the state law claims on Eleventh Amendment grounds, effectively limiting potential money recovery to backpay. To recoup damages, Guerrero filed suit in state court. After Guerrero won judgment in the federal action, the superior court dismissed his state claims under California claim preclusion principles. The court of appeal reversed, reasoning that federal law, not California law, governs the preclusive effect of the federal judgment, and provides an exception to claim preclusion where jurisdictional limitations in a prior suit blocked a request for complete relief. View "Guerrero v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs David and Hedda Schmidt appeal from a judgment entered in favor of defendants Citibank, N.A., as Trustee for Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2007-AR3 Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2007-AR3, and Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (defendants). In January 2007, the Schmidts obtained a $1,820,000 loan, secured by a residence at 2415 Rue Denise in La Jolla, California (the Property). The deed of trust was assigned to Citibank, N.A., as Trustee for Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2007-AR3 Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2007-AR3. The Schmidts defaulted on the loan and entered into a loan modification agreement in February 2013 with their loan servicer at the time, JPMorgan Chase Bank. Within approximately seven months, the Schmidts defaulted on the loan modification agreement. The Schmidts would apply for and be denied loan modification every year from 2013 to 2017. They sued defendants, alleging violations of the Homeowners' Bill of Rights and Business and Professions Code section 17200, seeking to prevent the completion of a trustee's sale of their residence. The defendants moved for summary judgment and presented evidence of extensive and numerous telephone calls between the Schmidts and Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., the loan servicer, during which the Schmidts' financial situation was discussed, as were possible options to avoid foreclosure. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in their favor. On appeal, the Schmidts contended summary judgment should not have been granted because there remained triable issues of fact to be determined. The Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the judgment. View "Schmidt v. Citibank, N.A." on Justia Law

Defendant Arthur Parent, Jr. appealed the amended judgment entered in favor of plaintiff Amanda Quiles on her individual claim for wrongful employment termination in violation of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. In addition to the damages awarded by the jury, the amended judgment awarded Quiles $689,310.04 in attorney fees and $50,591.69 in costs of litigation. Parent challenged the attorney fees and costs awards of the amended judgment only, arguing the trial court erred by awarding costs that were not statutorily authorized and by awarding attorney fees and costs that were jointly incurred by Quiles with her coplaintiffs for whom litigation remained pending. He also argued the trial court otherwise abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees and costs that were unrelated and unnecessary to Quiles’s successful FLSA claim. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that in a case of first impression, federal law applied to the determination of what type of costs are recoverable by a prevailing party in an FLSA action filed in state court. The Court rejected Parent’s argument that the trial court erred by awarding Quiles mediation costs because the parties had contractually agreed to mediate the matter and divide the costs between them. View "Quiles v. Parent" on Justia Law

Marty and Marie Martenay prevailed in an underlying personal injury and loss of consortium action against Elementis. After Marty died, plaintiffs became parties to the action and asserted wrongful death claims against Elementis. A jury found that plaintiffs were entitled to damages and Elementis subsequently challenged the trial court's judgment in favor of plaintiffs.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment and rejected Elementis' contention that the prior 2017 judgment in favor of plaintiffs was void, because the trial court did not err in denying Elementis' Code of Civil Procedure section 473 motion to vacate the 2017 judgment. The court also held that the trial court did not err in denying Elementis a section 877 credit based on Marty's and Marie's settlements. View "Marteney v. Elementis Chemicals Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff AMN Healthcare, Inc. (AMN) appealed a judgment in favor of defendants Kylie Stein, Robin Wallace, Katherine Hernandez, Alexis Ogilvie and Aya Healthcare, Inc. (Aya) and an injunction preventing AMN from enforcing its nonsolicitation of employee provision against individual defendants and its other former employees. AMN and Aya are competitors in the business of providing on a temporary basis healthcare professionals, in particular "travel nurses," to medical care facilities throughout the country. Individual defendants were former "travel nurse recruiters" of AMN who, for different reasons and at different times, left AMN and joined Aya, where they also worked as travel nurse recruiters. AMN sued defendants, asserting various causes of action including breach of contract and misappropriation of confidential information, including trade secrets as set forth in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Civil Code sections 3426 et seq. (UTSA). Defendants filed a cross-complaint for declaratory relief and unfair business competition. The trial court agreed with defendants, granted summary judgment against AMN, and granted summary adjudication of defendants' declaratory relief cause of action in their cross-complaint. After granting such relief, the court subsequently enjoined AMN from enforcing the nonsolicitation of employee provision in their Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure Agreement (CNDA) as to any former (California) AMN employee and awarded defendants attorney fees. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "AMN Healthcare, Inc. v. Aya Healthcare Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, the parties disputed which of their recorded liens against a golf course property had priority. In 2013, defendant, cross-complainant, and respondent, Southern California Investors, Inc. (SCI), recorded a third deed of trust against the golf course property. In 2014, plaintiff, cross-defendant, and appellant, Bear Creek Master Association (BCMA), a homeowners association, recorded an assessment lien against the property. The trial court entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of SCI after determining that SCI’s third deed of trust had priority over BCMA’s later-recorded assessment lien. BCMA appealed, claiming its assessment lien was created by the covenants, conditions, and restrictions governing the golf course property (the GCC&R’s) and “relates back” to their 1984 recordation. The Court of Appeal disagreed: according to the lien provisions of the GCC&R’s, the assessment lien was neither created nor perfected until it was recorded in 2014. Nonetheless, the Court agreed with BCMA’s alternative claim that its assessment lien had priority over SCI’s previously-recorded third deed of trust pursuant to the priority and subordination provisions of the GCC&R’s, even though the assessment lien was recorded after SCI’s third deed of trust was recorded. View "Bear Creek Master Assn. v. Southern Cal. Investors, Inc." on Justia Law

BDE is a licensed C-10 electrical contractor. Labor Code section 108.2(a) requires individuals who perform work as electricians to be certified. Uncertified persons seeking the on-the-job experience necessary for certification may perform electrical work under the direct supervision of a certified electrician. Willful violations may result in the suspension or revocation of a C-10 license. The Contractors’ State License Board alleged that uncertified BDE employees performed work that required certification and that BDE trainees performed work without the required supervision. BDE argued that the Board’s interpretation of the Code was erroneous. An ALJ rejected BDE’s contention that “certified electricians are required only when a device is attached to the wires at the end of the electrical project,” and recommended revocation of BDE’s license. While the administrative proceeding was pending, BDE sought a judicial declaration defining the terms “electrician,” “electrical work,” and “direct supervision” as used in the statute or a declaration that the terms are unconstitutionally vague. The court overruled the Board’s demurrer. The court of appeal disagreed. Since the statutes provide BDE with an administrative remedy, it must exhaust that remedy before seeking redress in court. While statutory interpretation is ultimately a judicial function, BDE can seek a judicial interpretation in an action under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. BDE failed to demonstrate either that exhaustion of its administrative remedy would be futile or that the Board cannot provide an adequate remedy. View "Contractors State Licensing Board v. Superior Court" on Justia Law