Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Sarah Sumner was the dean of A.W. Tozer Theological Seminary (Tozer Seminary), part of defendant Simpson University in Redding, California. Although Sumner had a written employment agreement, her employment was terminated by Robin Dummer in his capacity as acting provost of the university on the ground Sumner was insubordinate. In response to Sumner’s complaint alleging breach of contract, defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground Sumner’s employment was within the ministerial exception, an affirmative defense, and that as a result judicial review of her employment-related dispute was precluded by the First Amendment. The trial court agreed, and granted summary judgment. Sumner argues the ministerial exception was not applicable because she was not a minister, and the facts were in dispute as to whether Simpson University was a religious organization. She argues that even assuming the ministerial exception is applicable, it did not preclude enforcement of her contract and tort claims. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court correctly concluded that Simpson University was a religious organization and that Sumner was a minister for purposes of the ministerial exception, but that her contract cause of action was not foreclosed by the ministerial exception. Defendants failed to show that resolution of Sumner’s contract claim would excessively entangle the court in religious matters. However, her tort causes of action were part and parcel of the actions involved in her termination, and were therefore barred by the ministerial exception. View "Sumner v. Simpson University" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Amy Arlene Turner and Joseph Zeleny sought damages from defendant Seterus, Inc. (Seterus) in their wrongful foreclosure lawsuit on the theory that Seterus had “frustrated [their] lawful attempt, pursuant to [Civil] Code [section] 2924c, to cure their default more than five days prior to the noticed foreclosure sale.” The trial court sustained Seterus’s demurrer to their third amended complaint without leave to amend. On appeal, plaintiffs contended the trial court erred. The Court of Appeal agreed in part and reversed the judgment with instructions to the trial court to vacate its order sustaining Seterus’ demurrer to the third amended complaint in its entirety without leave to amend and to instead enter a new order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend as to the causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and breach of contract, and overruling the demurrer as to the causes of action for intentional and negligent misrepresentation, negligence, wrongful foreclosure, and unlawful business practices. View "Turner v. Seterus, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jessica Ayon appealed an adverse summary judgment in a personal injury case. Late one evening in May 2013, Brittini Zuppardo was driving home from her boyfriend’s house while talking on the phone with Michelle Halkett. Zuppardo was defendant Esquire Deposition Solution’s (Esquire) scheduling manager; Halkett was a court reporter for Esquire. Zuppardo’s vehicle struck plaintiff, who suffered significant injuries. The issue here at trial was whether Esquire could be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior. In their depositions, both Zuppardo and Halkett testified they were good friends and were talking about family matters on the evening of the accident. It was not within Zuppardo’s job description to call court reporters after hours for work purposes, though on rare occasions she had done so. Plaintiff contended a jury could have inferred from evidence admitted at trial that the two did not, in fact, have a close friendship, and that the call concerned work matters, not personal matters. Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(e) provided that “summary judgment shall not be denied on grounds of credibility,” with certain exceptions. The Court of Appeal determined no execution could be applied in this case; ultimately, plaintiff had no evidence that Zuppardo was operating within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident. Plaintiff attacked Zuppardo’s and Halkett’s credibility. "But that is not enough, and thus the court correctly granted summary judgment." View "Ayon v. Esquire Deposition Solutions" on Justia Law

Dave Jones, in his capacity as Insurance Commissioner of the State of California (the Commissioner), appealed an order enjoining him from enforcing three regulations, adopted in 1992, to implement the unfair claims settlement practices provision of the Unfair Insurance Practices Act (UIPA). The injunction was issued at the conclusion of the first phase of a trial in which PacifiCare Life and Health Insurance Company challenged the Commissioner’s finding that it had committed over 900,000 acts and practices in violation of the Insurance Code. The Court of Appeal reversed the order imposing the injunction in its entirety. The trial court determined the first regulation was inconsistent with the language of section 790.03(h), which it concluded had been interpreted by the California Supreme Court in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies 46 Cal.3d 287 (1988), and in Zhang v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.4th 364 (2013), to apply only to insurers engaged in a pattern of misconduct. The appellate court determined the Supreme Court’s only binding interpretation of that statutory language was found in Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal.3d. 880 (1979), which held that section 790.03(h) could be violated by an insurer’s single knowing act. Consequently, the Court was bound by that precedent. View "PacifiCare Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Jones" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Moss Bros. Toy, Inc. (MBT) appealed an order granting defendant-respondent Ernesto Ruiz’s anti-SLAPP motion, or special motion to strike MBT’s entire first amended complaint (FAC) against Ruiz. The FAC alleged MBT was Ruiz’s former employer and that Ruiz breached two March 2010 arbitration agreements with MBT by failing to submit Ruiz’s employment- related claims against MBT to arbitration, and by instead filing a lawsuit for his employment-related claims against MBT’s agent, Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (MBAG). MBT claimed the anti-SLAPP motion was erroneously granted because the FAC was not based on protected activity, but was instead based on Ruiz’s breach of his March 2010 arbitration agreements with MBT. MBT also claimed it demonstrated a probability of prevailing on its claims alleged in the FAC. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the order granting the anti-SLAPP motion. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court discussed that the entire FAC was based on protected activity, namely, Ruiz’s act of filing his lawsuit against MBAG for his employment-related claims in case No. CIVDS2107201, even though the FAC was also based on Ruiz’s alleged breach of the 2010 arbitration agreements. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, the Court explained that MBT failed to demonstrate the probability of prevailing on its claims against Ruiz as alleged in the FAC. View "Moss Bros. Toy, Inc. v. Ruiz" on Justia Law

Guadalupe Ontiveros, as minority shareholder in Omega Electric, Inc. (Omega), sued majority shareholder Kent Constable, his wife Karen, and Omega, asserting direct and derivative claims arising from a dispute over management of Omega and its assets. In response to Ontiveros's claim of involuntary dissolution of Omega, Appellants filed a motion to stay proceedings and appoint appraisers to fix the value of Ontiveros's stock. The superior court granted the motion, staying the action. Ontiveros then tried to dismiss his claim for involuntary dissolution without prejudice, but the court clerk would not accept his filing because the matter had been stayed. Ontiveros thus filed a motion, asking the court to revoke its order granting Appellants' motion, or in the alternative, to reconsider and then vacate the order. The court treated that motion as a motion for leave to file a dismissal with prejudice under Code of Civil Procedure section 581 (e), granted the motion, and allowed Ontiveros to dismiss his cause of action for involuntary dissolution of Omega. Without the existence of that claim, the court found no basis on which to stay the action and order an appraisal of the stock. As such, the court lifted the stay, terminating the procedure. Appellants appealed, contending the court abused its discretion in granting Ontiveros's motion. In addition, Appellants argued the trial court improperly interpreted section 2000 in granting the motion. Ontiveros countered by arguing the trial court's order was not appealable. The Court of Appeal determined Appellants presented an appealable issue, and was persuaded the trial court abused its discretion here: the superior court relied upon that code section as a mechanism to lift the stay and terminate the section 2000 special proceeding, misapplying the law. Consequently, the trial court's order was reversed. View "Ontiveros v. Constable" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Harley-Davidson, Inc. and its subsidiaries (Harley-Davidson) formed a multistate enterprise with numerous functionally integrated subsidiary corporations. It contended that defendant California Franchise Tax Board's (Board) tax scheme violated the commerce clause of the federal Constitution, arguing it burdened interstate enterprises by providing a benefit to intrastate enterprises not available to interstate enterprises. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Board, finding that whether or not the state's tax law unduly burdened interstate commerce, the state had a legitimate reason for treating in-state and out-of-state unitary businesses differently that could not be served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives - to accurately measure, apportion and tax all revenue acquired in California by an interstate unitary business. After independent review, the Court of Appeal also found there was a legitimate state interest to require combined reporting of taxable income of interstate unitary businesses, to accurately measure and tax all income attributable to California, that outweighed any possible discriminatory effect. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court. View "Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd." on Justia Law

The subject of four 2014 juvenile petitions, G.C., claimed that the juvenile court erroneously failed to expressly declare her three 2014 Vehicle Code section 10851 violations for driving or taking a vehicle to be either felonies or misdemeanors. The dispositional order for the three 2014 section 10851 offenses was entered on November 19, 2015. G.C.’s notice of appeal was filed on February 1, 2016. The court of appeal dismissed that notice of appeal as untimely. G.C. raised no issues as to any other orders. The court published its opinion to express disagreement with the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decision in In re Ramon M. which held that a failure to make an express declaration may be challenged in an appeal from a subsequent dispositional order. “The California Supreme Court has “steadfastly adhered to the fundamental precept that the timely filing of an appropriate notice of appeal or its legal equivalent is an absolute prerequisite to the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.” View "In re G.C." on Justia Law

This appeal challenged the trial court’s denial of a special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute,, directed at a cross-complaint asserting causes of action arising from a civil enforcement action brought by Feather River Air Quality Management District against Harmun Takhar for multiple violations of state and local air pollution laws. Specifically, this case involved dust. Takhar owned a piece of property in Yuba County. In June 2014, he began the process of converting that property from pasture land to an almond orchard. This process required the clearing, grading, and disking of the land in order to prepare the site for planting. The earthwork generated dust that was carried from Takhar’s property and deposited onto neighboring properties. These neighboring property owners complained to the District. District staff contacted Takhar, informed him the dust emissions were impacting neighboring properties causing a public nuisance, and requested he take reasonable precautions to prevent the dust from reaching the affected properties, such as waiting for the wind to change directions before engaging in earthwork. Violations were ultimately imposed, and an offer to settle the civil penalties was made. Takhar did not take the District up on its settlement offer and instead continued with his clearing activities. The District then brought a civil enforcement action against Takhar. The Court of Appeal concluded Takhar did not demonstrate he qualified for an exemption to the anti-SLAPP statute. The causes of action alleged in Takhar’s cross-complaint arose from protected petitioning activity and he did not establish a probability of prevailing on the merits of these claims. The Court therefore remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to grant the anti-SLAPP motion and dismiss the cross-complaint. View "Takhar v. California ex rel. Feather River Air Quality Management Dist." on Justia Law

Villanueva and the class (Plaintiffs) alleged that Fidelity, an underwritten title company that handled Plaintiffs’ escrow accounts, engaged in unlawful conduct under the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200) in charging overnight mail delivery fees, courier fees, and document preparation or “draw deed” fees that were not listed in its schedule of rates filed with the Department of Insurance in violation of Insurance Code 12401–12410.10, 12414.27. Fidelity argued that the lawsuit was barred by the statutory immunity in section 12414.26 for matters related to rate-making. The trial court rejected Fidelity’s immunity claim and granted Plaintiffs injunctive relief under the UCL, but denied their restitution claims. The court of appeal reversed. Fidelity’s immunity defense is not subject to the forfeiture doctrine because it implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction; this claim is subject to the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Insurance Commissioner because it challenges Fidelity’s activity related to rate-making. The court directed the trial court to enter a new order awarding costs to Fidelity. View "Villanueva v. Fidelity National Title Co." on Justia Law