Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Wife Rachelle Spector filed a request for a temporary order for spousal support and professional fees. The parties filed their respective briefs with supporting declarations and evidence in advance of a February 17, 2017, hearing. The court issued its ruling on February 21, and served the order on the parties via e-mail the next day. The court ordered, among other things, husband to pay wife temporary spousal support and certain professional fees. The first temporary spousal support payment was due on March 1, 2017. Shortly after receiving the 2/21 Order on February 22, husband Phillip Spector sent an email to the judge with a copy to wife, stating “there appears to be an error in your arithmetic” regarding the monthly temporary spousal support figure. Husband, wife, and the judge engaged in several e-mail exchanges regarding the calculations and the effect of the monetary awards and requirements in the 2/21 Order. Husband suggested “that the court relabel it’s [sic] ruling to instead be a Tentative Ruling and let us each argue before making it final.” On February 23, the judge responded, “[q]uite frankly I have the authority to modify the orders and am considering doing so.” She further stated “[w]e can call the notice and orders tentative,” and invited the parties to argue the issues but indicated she “prefer[red] a 5 page written argument from each of [them].” The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal’s review was whether the trial court had the inherent authority to reconsider its own orders and make them effective retroactively. Wife argued the trial court was precluded from doing so pursuant to Family Code sections 3603, 3651(c), and 3653(a), and the various cases interpreting those statutes. The Court of Appeal concluded the court had inherent authority to reconsider its prior order and to apply its modified decision retroactively. Finding no merit in wife’s argument that the court violated her due process rights when it exercised this authority, the appellate court affirmed. View "Marriage of Spector" on Justia Law

The Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters does not permit Chinese citizens to be served by mail, nor does it allow parties to set their own terms of service by contract. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment against SinoType, a Chinese company. In this case, the trial court acknowledged that the service of the summons and petition had not complied with the Hague Service Convention, but concluded that the parties had privately agreed to accept service by mail. The court held, however, that SinoType was never validly served with process, and thus no personal jurisdiction by the court was obtained and the resulting judgment was void as violating fundamental due process. View "Rockefeller Technology Investments (Asia) III v. Changzhou Sinotype Technology Co." on Justia Law

Tan sued Summers and Gomez to resolve a dispute about investment real estate they jointly own in San Francisco, concerning the amount of each party’s ownership interest and corresponding right to receive income and obligation to pay expenses. The parties sought quiet title, partition, and an accounting. Tan moved for summary adjudication, requesting the property be partitioned and sold by private sale with the proceeds to be held in escrow until resolution of the litigation. Although Summers and Gomez also sought partition, they opposed the motion because the sold property would not generate rental income while their interests were litigated. The court granted Tan’s motion, stating: “Judgment is entered for the real property [at issue] to be partitioned and sold by private sale, for all liens to be paid, a referee shall be appointed, and all sale proceeds shall be held in escrow until final resolution of this matter.” The court of appeal reversed. The partition statutes do not allow a court to order the manner of a property’s partition, such as the sale here, before it determines the ownership interests in the property, Code of Civil Procedure 872.720(a). View "Sumners v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Rosa Jensen and Linda Kerr sued their former employer, The Home Depot, Inc., (Home Depot), and their former managers at Home Depot for disability discrimination, wrongful termination, and eight other related claims. Home Depot and the managers (collectively, defendants) demurred to the first amended complaint arguing misjoinder of Jensen and Kerr (collectively, plaintiffs). The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and dismissed plaintiffs’ lawsuit with prejudice. Jensen contended on appeal the trial court erred by dismissing her lawsuit because the court could have ordered severance. “It is an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is a reasonable possibility the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action.” At trial court, the Court of Appeal found plaintiffs made no showing as to how they would amend their complaint to fix the misjoinder issue. Accordingly, the trial court acted reasonably in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend because plaintiffs failed to meet their burden. However, leave to amend may be requested for the first time on appeal; plaintiffs fixed the misjoinder issue by dismissing Kerr. Because the misjoinder issue has been fixed, the Court of Appeal ruled the case may proceed. The judgment of dismissal, as it pertains to Jensen, was reversed. The trial court was directed to enter an order vacating its order denying leave to amend as to the first through seventh causes of action, and enter an order granting leave to amend. The trial court was also directed to deem the first amended complaint to have been amended due to the dismissal of Kerr. View "Jensen v. The Home Depot, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the district court's dismissal of a putative class action against Williams-Sonoma, alleging that the company failed to pay prospective class members reporting-time pay. The plaintiff in this case was a member of a previous wage and hour class action that had settled and he received a share of the settlement proceeds. In this case, the court held that Williams-Sonoma's demurrer was properly sustained without leave to amend on grounds of res judicata because all the claims in this case were based on the same theory as the previous case. Therefore, the court did not reach the other remaining issues. View "Shine v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc." on Justia Law

The California Court of Appeal consolidated cases to address a novel question regarding jurisdiction under the unique and complex cooperative federalism scheme of the federal Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.) (Act). The Act authorized the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Agency) to promulgate national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards. States, however, have the “primary responsibility for assuring air quality” and must each devise, adopt, and implement a state implementation plan (SIP) specifying how the state will achieve and maintain the national air quality standards. The SIP is submitted to the Agency’s administrator (Administrator) for approval. The cases here sought the same relief and practical objective: to invalidate and render unenforceable, in whole or in part (albeit on different grounds), a state regulation known as the Truck and Bus Regulation (Regulation), which was approved by the Administrator as part of and incorporated into California’s SIP. Plaintiff Jack Cody argued the Regulation violated the dormant commerce clause of the United States Constitution because it discriminated against out-of-state truckers by imposing a disproportionate compliance burden on them. Plaintiff Alliance for California Business (Alliance) argued the Regulation was unlawful because part of its mandate conflicted with state and federal safety laws. Defendants, including the California Air Resources Board (Board), raised lack of subject matter jurisdiction under section 307(b)(1) of the Act in both cases on appeal. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether section 307(b)(1) vested exclusive and original jurisdiction over these challenges to the Regulation incorporated into and approved as part of California’s SIP in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court concluded it did and affirmed the judgments for lack of jurisdiction. View "Alliance for Calif. Business v. State Air Resources Bd." on Justia Law

California’s Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), as opposed to the board that administers the system, filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief regarding the proper interpretation of the effect of Government Code section 7522.02 (a)(3) on the pension benefits of transit workers. The CalPERS executive office had announced its own interpretation, which resulted in over 400 pending administrative appeals. As representative parties, the CalPERS executive office named as defendants a transit agency (the Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority (Santa Clara Transit)) and an employee representative for a different Bay Area transit agency (the Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1555), which had been supporting the arguments of their employees and members, and had filed administrative appeals of their own. Santa Clara Transit filed a demurrer, which the trial court sustained, entering judgment in its behalf. Local 1555 then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the trial court granted, entering a separate judgment in its behalf. In each ruling, the trial court concluded that the CalPERS executive office was subject to the procedural prerequisite of the exhaustion of administrative remedies, as the issue was pending in the appeals before the CalPERS board, and the CalPERS executive office had not established any exception to exhaustion in its allegations. The CalPERS executive office separately appealed each judgment. The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals. The CalPERS executive office asserted it could bypass the process in CalPERS regulations for administrative appeals to the CalPERS board and proceed directly to the trial court to obtain a declaratory judgment on its interpretation of section 7522.02(a)(3). It also contended that it was not subject to the general rule that an action for declaratory relief was not appropriate for the review of administrative decisions in lieu of a petition for a writ of mandate. The Court of Appeal found neither position was tenable and affirmed the judgments. View "CalPERS v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. etc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Stephen Bushansky filed a shareholder derivative action on behalf of nominal defendant NantKwest, Inc. Based on a forum selection provision contained in NantKwest's certificate of incorporation, Delaware was designated as the forum for shareholder derivative actions, the trial court dismissed Bushansky's suit. Bushansky argued on appeal that the forum selection provision was never triggered since a condition precedent to its operation was never met: Delaware courts had personal jurisdiction over all indispensable parties named as defendants, and since Delaware courts lacked jurisdiction over one of the defendants at the time the action was filed in California, the condition was not met and, thus, the forum selection provision was not triggered. The California Court of Appeal found the provision, however, did not specify that personal jurisdiction had to be determined as of the date an action is filed and no later. "In fact, it is silent as to when personal jurisdiction in Delaware must exist. Faced with that silence, we - in accord with a well-established principle of contract law - presume that the parties intended a reasonable timeframe for the condition to be fulfilled." The Court found dismissal based on the forum selection clause was proper. View "Bushansky v. Soon-Shiong" on Justia Law

CBL Data Recovery Technologies, Inc. (CBL) appealed an order denying its motion to set aside a default judgment entered in favor of Airs Aromatics, LLC (Airs). Airs sued CBL for breach of contract in 2011. The operative complaint alleged that Airs "suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial, but estimated to exceed $25,000.00." The prayer likewise requested "damages in an amount to be proven." There was no other allegation in the complaint as to the amount of damages sought. CBL filed an answer and engaged in discovery. The parties participated in a settlement conference in which Airs demanded $5 million to settle all claims. In August 2012, the parties stipulated to withdraw CBL's answer and allow Airs to obtain a default. A month later, Airs filed a Request for Court Judgment seeking over $3 million in damages. It also filed a document entitled, "Evidence of Damages" supporting the requested amount. The court held a default prove-up hearing and, in November 2012, entered default judgment against CBL in the amount of $3,016,802.90. Years passed. CBL filed a motion in April 2017 to set aside the default judgment. Citing Code of Civil Procedure sections 580(a) and 585(c), CBL argued the court could not enter a judgment awarding damages greater than that specifically demanded in the complaint. It argued the default judgment was void and requested that it be vacated pursuant to section 473(d). Airs opposed the motion, arguing the default judgment was merely voidable, not void. In addition, Airs argued the court could exercise discretion to deny CBL's motion on equitable grounds. The court held a hearing and denied CBL's motion, finding CBL had adequate notice of the damages sought by Airs. CBL argued to the Court of Appeal the default judgment was void. The Court of Appeal agreed, concluding the default judgment had to be vacated. View "Airs Aromatics v. CBL Data Recovery Technologies" on Justia Law

D.C. Randall, Jr., the dismissal of his operative second amended complaint against Ditech Financial, LLC (Ditech) after the trial court sustained Ditech's demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend. Randall contended the court erred in its ruling as to his causes of action for violation of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and for violation of the state unfair competition law (UCL) because these causes of action stated or can be amended to state viable claims. The Court of Appeal concluded the complaint stated a claim under section 1692f(1) of the FDCPA and could be amended to state a claim under section 1692f(6). Consequently, the complaint could also be amended to state a claim under the UCL. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court and remanded the matter with directions to conduct further proceedings. View "Randall v. Ditech Financial, LLC" on Justia Law