Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Thee Sombrero, Inc. (Sombrero) owned commercial property. Pursuant to a conditional use permit (CUP), Sombrero’s lessees operated the property as a nightclub called El Sombrero. Crime Enforcement Services (CES) provided security guard services at the club. In 2007, after a fatal shooting, the CUP was revoked and replaced with a modified CUP, which provided that the property could be operated only as a banquet hall. In a previous action, Sombrero sued CES, alleging that CES’s negligence caused the shooting, which in turn caused the revocation of the CUP, which in turn caused a diminution in value of the property. It won a default judgment against CES. Sombrero then filed this direct action against Scottsdale Insurance Company (Scottsdale), CES’s liability insurer. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Scottsdale, ruling that Sombrero’s claim against CES was for an economic loss, rather than for “property damage” as defined in and covered under the policy. The Court of Appeal held Sombrero’s loss of the ability to use the property as a nightclub constituted property damage, which was defined in the policy as including a loss of use of tangible property. View "Thee Sombrero, Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A Division of Safety and Health (DOSH) inspector inspected an Oakland site at which Ram served as the general contractor and cited Raam as a “controlling employer” for a safety violation, Lab. Code 6317. An ALJ and the Appeals Board upheld the citation. After the ALJ issued a decision upholding the citation, Raam filed a timely petition for reconsideration with the Appeals Board. On April 8, 2016, 35 days after the Appeals Board’s denial was issued, filed and served, Raam filed a petition for writ of mandate with the Alameda County Superior Court. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the petition as untimely, rejecting an argument that the statute was ambiguous. Section 6627 mandates that an “application for writ of mandate must be made within 30 days after a petition for reconsideration is denied, or, if a petition is granted or reconsideration is had on the appeals board’s own motion, within 30 days after the filing of the order or decision following reconsideration.” View "Raam Construction, Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Board" on Justia Law

The City of San Diego approved a development project at Balboa Park. Most of Balboa Park's Central Mesa was a National Historic Landmark District and the Cabrillo Bridge is a National Historical Landmark. The purpose of the project was to restore pedestrian and park uses to Balboa Park's Central Mesa and to alleviate vehicle and pedestrian conflicts. A new bridge, 'Centennial Bridge,' would connect the eastern end of Cabrillo Bridge to the western side of the Alcazar parking lot. From that point a new 'Centennial Road' would traverse through the Alcazar parking lot exiting to the east, continue to the south past a new Organ Pavilion [underground] parking structure and then connect to Presidents Way. Additional parkland would be provided atop the new parking structure. A tram would provide service from the parking structure to the Plaza de Panama with possible expansion to serve other areas of the Park. Excavation activities required for construction of the underground parking structure would require that the project dispose of excess soils within the inactive Arizona Street Landfill." Save Our Heritage Organisation (SOHO) appealed a judgment denying its petition for writ of mandamus challenging the approval by the City of an environmental impact report (EIR) addendum for revisions to the project. SOHO contended the City's approval of the addendum violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) in two respects: (1) CEQA Guidelines section 15164 was invalid because CEQA contained no authority for the addendum process and the addendum process conflicted with CEQA's public review requirements; and (2) the City approved the project revisions without making new findings under section 21081. The Court of Appeal concluded SOHO did not meet its burden of establishing the addendum process was invalid. Furthermore, the Court concluded the City was not required to make findings under section 21081. View "Save Our Heritage Organisation v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jesus Garcia filed a wage and hour lawsuit against Border Transportation Group, LLC (BTG), its owner Erik Ortega, and BTG employee Martha Ortega. Some of Garcia's claims were based on Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) wage orders; others were not. The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on all eight causes of action on the basis that Garcia was an independent contractor, not an employee. After Garcia's appeal was fully briefed, the California Supreme Court issued a ruling in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.5th 903 (2018), clarifying the employee-independent contractor question as to wage order claims. The Court of Appeal concluded Dynamex compelled the conclusion that defendants did not meet their burden on summary judgment to show no triable issue of material fact as to Garcia's wage order claims. As to those claims discussed in the nonpublished portion of the Court’s opinion, Garcia forfeited appellate review of the trial court's decision that he was not an employee under the standard articulated in S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations, 48 Cal.3d 341 (1989). Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded with instructions to enter a new order denying summary adjudication of the wage order causes of action and granting summary adjudication as to the non-wage-order causes of action. View "Garcia v. Border Transportation Group, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2016, the California Legislature created two new statutes to address a financial crisis plaguing the workers’ compensation system, however, the remedy came at a significant cost to all participating medical providers and related entities. Specifically, the new anti-fraud scheme cast a very broad net to halt all proceedings relating to any workers’ compensation liens filed by criminally charged medical providers, as well as any entities “controlled” by the charged provider (noncharged entities). The Legislature created this new scheme because existing laws permitted charged providers to collect on liens while defending their criminal cases, allowing continued funding of fraudulent practices. Pursuant to these two new statutes, the Government gained authority to automatically stay liens filed by charged providers and noncharged entities, without considering if the liens were actually tainted by the alleged illegal misconduct. Michael Barri, Tristar Medical Group (Tristar), and Coalition for Sensible Workers’ Compensation Reform (CSWCR) petitioned the Court of Appeal seeking a peremptory or alternative writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief directing the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) to perform its duties and adjudicate Tristar’s lien claims and not enforce certain unconstitutional provisions contained in newly enacted anti-fraud legislation. The Court of Appeal declined petitioner’s request to issue a peremptory or alternative writ of mandate, prohibition, or other relief directing the WCAB to adjudicate the stayed liens and not enforce the newly enacted anti-fraud legislation. The Court rejected Barri’s assertion the suspension and special lien hearing were really criminal proceedings hidden under a “civil label.” The Legislature clearly stated its intention was to enact a civil regulatory scheme and remedy; the Court determined the Legislature exerted its plenary power to create a civil regulatory scheme designed to prevent the unnecessary processing and payment on liens tainted by fraud and other misconduct. “[T]he anti-fraud legislation at issue may have some punitive aspects, but it primarily serves important nonpunitive goals.” View "Barri v. WCAB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jose Sandoval was severely burned by an "arc flash" from a live circuit breaker while working with contractor TransPower Testing, Inc. and its principal Frank Sharghi, at a cogeneration plant owned by defendant Qualcomm Incorporated (Qualcomm). The jury returned a special verdict finding that Qualcomm retained control over the safety conditions at the jobsite; that it negligently exercised such control; and that its negligence was a substantial factor in causing Sandoval's harm. The jury found Sandoval's employer, ROS Electrical Supply (ROS), not liable, and apportioned fault between the defendants. Following the verdict, Qualcomm moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and for a new trial. The trial court denied the JNOV motion but granted the motion for new trial on the theory the jury had improperly apportioned liability. Qualcomm appealed order denying its JNOV motion, arguing Sandoval failed to proffer any evidence to show that Qualcomm, as the hirer of an independent contractor, "affirmatively contributed" to Sandoval's injury under the "retained control" exception to the general rule that a hirer is not liable for the injuries of an independent contractor's employees or its subcontractors; the order only partially granting its new trial motion; and the original judgment. Sandoval appealed the order granting Qualcomm a new trial on the apportionment of fault issue. The Court of Appeal concluded substantial evidence supported the jury's finding that Qualcomm negligently exercised retained control over the safety conditions at the jobsite. Therefore, the Court concluded the trial court properly denied Qualcomm's JNOV. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it granted Qualcomm a limited new trial only on the issue of apportionment of fault as between Qualcomm and TransPower. View "Sandoval v. Qualcomm Incorporated" on Justia Law

This case involved a challenge to a Water Code section 13269 waiver of waste discharge requirements for irrigated agricultural land. Discharge requirements could be waived “if the state board or a regional board determines . . . that the waiver is consistent with any applicable state or regional water quality control plan and is in the public interest.” In 2012, the Central Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board modified the waiver. Monterey Coastkeeper, San Luis Obispo Coastkeeper, California Sportfishing Protection Alliance, and Santa Barbara Channelkeeper (collectively Coastkeeper) petitioned for a writ of mandate, challenging the modified waiver. They contended it did not meet the requirements of the Water Code and applicable state water policies. The trial court agreed in part, and issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the State Board to set aside the modified waiver and issue a new waiver consistent with its decision. The State Board and various agricultural interests as interveners appealed, contending the trial court erred in comparing the modified waiver (unfavorably) to a 2010 draft of the 2012 waiver, failing to defer to the State Board’s expertise and apply a presumption of correctness, and ignoring the appropriate reasonableness standard. They raised specific objections to several of the trial court’s findings. The Court of Appeal agreed with appellants as to two of their points; the trial court’s findings as to the inadequacy of the tiering and monitoring provisions of the modified waiver were not supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the Court modified the judgment accordingly and otherwise affirmed. View "Monterey Coastkeeper v. Water Resources Control Board" on Justia Law

After plaintiff-appellant Joshua Pagnini failed to respond to a demurrer filed by defendants-respondents Union Bank, N.A. and Unionbancal Mortgage Corporation, the trial court sustained the demurrer and entered judgment in favor of respondents. Appellant appealed the court’s denial of his motion for relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 (b). The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court was obligated to grant relief under the mandatory provision of Section 473(b), where appellant presented a sworn declaration from his counsel attesting that counsel mistakenly failed to respond to the demurrer by timely filing an amended complaint. Respondents’ demurrer was effectively a “dismissal motion” and appellant’s counsel’s mistaken failure to respond to the motion obligated the trial court to relieve appellant from counsel’s error. The trial court's order was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Pagnini v. Union Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Acting under Probate Code section 16440(b), the trial court denied a petition brought by Orange Catholic Foundation and Kevin Vann, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Orange (collectively, the Church) to remove Rosie Mary Arvizu from her position as trustee of the Josephine Kennedy Trust (Trust) and for damages. The Trust gave a life estate in Kennedy’s house (the Residence) to Paul Senez, her very dear family friend of over 60 years, provided that he pay for certain expenses related to the Residence. The Trust further provided that upon Senez’s death, the Residence was to be sold and the proceeds were to be given to the Church for the benefit of the needy elderly and abused children. The Church alleged that Arvizu (Kennedy’s niece and the successor trustee) breached her duties as trustee by: (1) improperly using Trust funds to pay expenses that should have been borne by Senez (who was elderly, destitute, suffering from dementia, and unable to cover the expenses himself); (2) failing to evict Senez when he could not pay those expenses; and (3) not promptly renting out or selling the Residence after Senez’s death (a delay which occurred in part due to Arvizu’s cancer treatment and other health issues, and which fortuitously benefited the Church because the Residence appreciated by $136,000 during the period of Arvizu’s inaction). Finding no abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "Orange Catholic Foundation v. Arvizu" on Justia Law

R.B. (father) and D.R. (mother) were citizens of India who were married in India. They came to California, where they had their only child, a daughter, born in October 2013. In December 2016, the father allegedly slapped the child and hit the mother. In February 2017, the mother discovered that the father was involved with another woman. She immediately left for India with the child. In 2017, the mother obtained a restraining order in India giving her sole custody of the child. Shortly thereafter, the father obtained an ex parte order (later stayed) in California giving him sole custody of the child. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that it had jurisdiction, but that India was a more appropriate forum. It therefore stayed the California proceeding. The father appealed, contending the trial court erred by finding that India was a more appropriate forum, because: (1) India did not have concurrent jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA); and (2) the trial court misevaluated the statutorily relevant factors. In the published portion of its opinion, the California Court of Appeal held India could be an inconvenient forum even if it did not have concurrent jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. In the nonpublished portion, the Court found no other error. Hence, the Court affirmed. View "R.B. v. D.R." on Justia Law