Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant Han Jing Huang filed requests for civil harassment restraining orders against thirty-one defendants who were prominent entertainment personalities, business leaders, poloticians and religious leaders. Finding appellant’s claims to be “patently frivolous,” “patently frivolous on petition[’s] face,” or “frivolous on petition’s face,” the trial court denied with prejudice the applications for permanent injunctions prohibiting harassment. The Court of Appeal consolidated the 31 appeals for disposition. Appellant alleged defendants were “a lot of people with Hollywood background or Scientology background . . . or political background,” who “control[ a] mental department in Texas,” by which “they falsely accuse[ him] and use[] technology from mental department (mind reading) [to] attack[ him] secretly[,] . . . ask[ing] some adults to keep on stalking [him] and harass[ing] and threaten[ing him] by nano probes.” In dismissing the cases, the trial court cited no legal precedent or statute, but relied on its “inherent power” to control its proceedings. As best as could be surmised, the Court of Appeal found appellant raised three challenges to the trial court’s orders dismissing the applications for permanent injunctions prohibiting harassment: (1) that the trial court thrice refused to allow appellant to present evidence; (2) that the trial court interrupted the interpreter and the interpreter was not “professional;” and (3) that the trial judge was not impartial. The Court found no reversible error and affirmed the trial court. View "Huang v. Hanks" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeals’ review centered on the trial court’s partial denial of a special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute, directed at causes of action arising out of the manner in which defendants, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and Robert Barton, in his capacity as Inspector General, conducted interviews with five correctional officers who previously worked at High Desert State Prison. The interviews were conducted as part of an investigation into that institution’s “practices . . . with respect to (1) excessive use of force against inmates, (2) internal reviews of incidents involving the excessive use of force against inmates, and (3) protection of inmates from assault and harm by others.” As relevant here, these officers and the California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA) alleged in their first and second causes of action that defendants violated Penal Code section 6126.5 and Government Code section 3300 et seq. (the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights or the Act) by refusing the officers’ requests to be represented during the interviews. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion as to these causes of action, concluding: (1) defendants carried their threshold burden of demonstrating the gravamen of these causes of action arose from protected activity; but (2) plaintiffs established a probability of prevailing on the merits of these claims. The Court of Appeal agreed defendants carried their burden on the threshold issue, but concluded plaintiffs failed to establish a probability of prevailing on the merits of these causes of action. The Court therefore reversed the portion of the trial court’s order denying the anti-SLAPP motion with respect to the first and second causes of action and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to enter a new order granting the motion in its entirety and dismissing the complaint. View "Blue v. Cal. Office of the Inspector General" on Justia Law

The Contractors’ State License Board sought a writ of mandate and a stay to prevent the “apex deposition” of Forg, the Board’s Registrar of Contractors, a position which makes him the Board’s secretary and chief executive officer. Reversing the trial court, the court of appeal held that under well-established California law, the head of a government agency, such as Fogt, generally is not subject to deposition. “An exception to the rule exists only when the official has direct personal factual information pertaining to material issues in the action and the deposing party shows the information to be gained from the deposition is not available through any other source.” The exception does not apply in this case. View "Contractors' State License Board v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion had sought to strike the first three causes of action of the third amended complaint in their entirety and, alternatively, to strike a number of specific allegations. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism was the sublessor and plaintiff-respondent Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC (NHOM) was the sublessee of real property in Newport Beach. This case was the fourth appeal and the third anti-SLAPP appeal arising out of the sublease and related agreements, business dealings, and disputes. The California Supreme Court, in Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal.5th 376 (2016), held a special motion to strike under the California anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (section 425.16), could be directed to specific allegations of protected activity constituting a claim for relief within a pleaded count that also includes allegations of unprotected activity. Based on Baral, defendants-appellants Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (Cerullo), Plaza del Sol Real Estate Trust (Plaza del Sol) and Roger Artz (collectively Defendants) asserted the trial court erred in denying their anti-SLAPP motion. The Court of Appeal applied Baral and its summary of anti-SLAPP procedures and concluded: (1) many, but not all, of the allegations challenged by Defendants in their anti-SLAPP motion were of protected activity within the meaning of section 425.16(e); and (2) NHOM did not meet its burden of establishing a probability of prevailing on the claims that are based on the allegations of protected activity. The Court therefore reversed, in part, and remanded with directions to grant the anti-SLAPP motion as to the paragraphs of the third amended complaint identified in the Disposition. The Court affirmed in part because, among other things, the bulk of the paragraphs which were the subject of Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion did not arise out of protected activity. View "Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC v. Morris Cerullo etc." on Justia Law

R.W. appeals a judgment of dissolution of his marriage with his former husband, respondent, G.C. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal addressed two of many claims R.W. raised. In particular, R.W. claimed the trial court erred in determining that the parties' date of union was in 2009 when the parties married, rather than in 2004, when they entered into a domestic partnership under New Jersey law. R.W. contended the parties' New Jersey domestic partnership was "substantially equivalent" (Fam. Code, sec. 299.2) to a California domestic partnership such that it could be dissolved pursuant to section 299, and thus, that the court should have considered the date of the parties' domestic partnership to be the date of union for purposes of the dissolution. After interpreting the meaning of "substantially equivalent" in section 299.2 as a matter of first impression, the Court of Appeal concluded that in light of the limited nature of the rights and obligations that the parties obtained in entering into a domestic partnership under New Jersey law, the trial court properly determined that the parties' 2004 New Jersey domestic partnership was not "substantially equivalent" to a California domestic partnership under section 299.2 so as to permit its dissolution under California law. Second, R.W. claimed the trial court erred in failing to divide equally the appreciation of the value of certain real property that the parties acquired as joint tenants during their marriage, as a community asset. Specifically, R.W. argued the trial court erred in applying a formula for apportioning separate and community property interests in the value of the appreciation because the joint title community property presumption contained in section 2581 applied to the property, and the appreciation therefore belonged entirely to the community. To this point, the Court of Appeal agreed with R.W. and concluded the trial court erred in failing to divide the appreciation in value of the marital residence equally. The Court rejected the remainder of R.W.'s claims in the unpublished portions of the opinion. View "Marriage of G.C. and R.W." on Justia Law

In 2005, plaintiffs Randy and Linda Tindell bought a single family manufactured home from defendant Linda Murphy for $320,000. Defendant Christine Bradley provided the appraisal. In 2009 the Tindells were unable to refinance the mortgage because it was a manufactured home, not a modular home. The Tindells filed an amended complaint alleging Murphy and Bradley failed to disclose defects in the property and acted in concert with others in order to conceal these defects and profit from the sale of the property. The trial court sustained Murphy’s demurrer without leave to amend. Subsequently, the court granted Bradley’s motion for summary judgment. The Tindells appealed, challenging the court’s sustaining of Murphy’s demurrer and the granting of Bradley’s summary judgment. After review, the Court of Appeal found no reversible error in those judgments, and affirmed the trial court. View "Tindell v. Murphy" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-homeowners alleged the copper piping in their homes was damaged by a chemical the defendant water districts added to tap water. Adding the chemical was authorized by regulation, however, and it was undisputed that the water districts complied with all statutory and regulatory standards. After a bifurcated bench trial on certain legal issues, the trial court entered judgment for the water districts, finding plaintiffs’ causes of action for nuisance and inverse condemnation were preempted by federal and state laws, and otherwise insufficient on the merits. The plaintiff homeowners appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded plaintiffs’ causes of action failed on the merits, and thus affirmed. View "Williams v. Moulton Niguel Water Dist." on Justia Law

Code of Civil Procedure section 366.2 limits the time to bring a cause of action, not the time to enforce a judgment. After the judgment debtor died, plaintiff purchased one judgment lien at the execution sale of the junior lien and then brought this action to quiet title against defendant's senior lien. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's conclusion that enforcement of defendant's senior lien was barred by section 366.2 for failure to enforce the lien within one year of the judgment debtor's death. View "County Lines Holdings, LLC v. McClanahan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Rae Weiler sought a declaration that defendants Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Investment Services, Inc., et al., had to either: (1) pay plaintiff’s share of the costs in the previously ordered arbitration; or (2) waive their contractual right to arbitrate the underlying claims and allow them to be tried in the superior court. Plaintiff and her husband allegedly lost more than $2 million at the hands of defendants. She sued for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence and elder abuse claims. After being ordered to arbitration and pursuing her claims in that forum for years, plaintiff asserted she could no longer afford to arbitrate. According to plaintiff, if she had to remain in arbitration and pay half of the arbitration costs (upwards of $100,000) she would be unable to pursue her claims at all. Plaintiff initially sought relief from the arbitrators (pursuant to Roldan v. Callahan & Blaine 219 Cal.App.4th 87 (2013)); they ruled it was outside their jurisdiction, and directed her to the superior court. So, plaintiff filed this declaratory relief action in the superior court, again seeking relief under Roldan. The Court of Appeal concluded, based primarily on Roldan, plaintiff may be entitled to the relief she seeks. However, the superior court granted summary judgment to defendants on the grounds the arbitration provisions were valid and enforceable, and that plaintiff’s claimed inability to pay the anticipated arbitration costs was irrelevant. This, the Court found, was error: “Though the law has great respect for the enforcement of valid arbitration provisions, in some situations those interests must cede to an even greater, unwavering interest on which our country was founded - justice for all.” Consistent with Roldan, and federal and California arbitration statutes, a party’s fundamental right to a forum she or he can afford may outweigh another party’s contractual right to arbitrate. In this case, the Court found triable issues of material fact regarding plaintiff’s present ability to pay her agreed share of the anticipated costs to complete the arbitration. The trial court therefore erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment. View "Weiler v. Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Investment Services" on Justia Law

The San Lorenzo Valley Water District acquired real property in Boulder Creek, California from the Dildines. Holloway, a taxpayer within District, filed suit claiming the contract was void under Government Code section 1090, because one of District’s directors, Vierra, had an interest in the contract by nature of his partial ownership in Showcase Realty, which facilitated the property sale, and the fact that his wife was the listing agent for the property. The trial court dismissed on the ground that Holloway lacked standing to assert a claim for conflict of interest. The court of appeal reversed. Holloway has taxpayer standing under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a to challenge the contract and has standing under Government Code section 1092 to bring an action for conflict of interest. There is no challenge to District’s bonds, warrants or other evidence of indebtedness; Holloway was not required to bring a validation action under Water Code section 30066. View "Holloway v. Showcase Realty Agents, Inc." on Justia Law