Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Board of Directors (the Board) of Bear Valley Community Hospital (Bear Valley) refused to promote Dr. Robert O. Powell from provisional to active staff membership and reappointment to Bear Valley's medical staff. Dr. Powell appealed the superior court judgment denying his petition for writ of mandate to void the Board's decision and for reinstatement of his medical staff privileges. Dr. Powell practiced medicine in both Texas and California as a general surgeon. In 2000, the medical executive committee of Brownwood Regional Medical Center (Brownwood), in Texas, found that Dr. Powell failed to advise a young boy's parents that he severed the boy's vas deferens during a hernia procedure or of the ensuing implications. Further, the committee found that Dr. Powell falsely represented to Brownwood's medical staff, on at least two occasions, that he fully disclosed the circumstances to the parents, behavior which the committee considered to be dishonest, obstructive, and which prevented appropriate follow-up care. Based on the committee's findings, Brownwood terminated Dr. Powell's staff membership and clinical privileges. In subsequent years, Dr. Powell obtained staff privileges at other medical facilities. In October 2011, Dr. Powell applied for appointment to the medical staff at Bear Valley. On his initial application form, Dr. Powell was given an opportunity to disclose whether his clinical privileges had ever been revoked by any medical facility. In administrative hearings generated by the Bear Valley Board’s decision, there was a revelation that Dr. Powell had not been completely forthcoming about the Brownwood termination, and alleged the doctor mislead the judicial review committee (“JRC”) about the circumstances leading to that termination. Under Bear Valley's bylaws, Dr. Powell had the right to an administrative appeal of the JRC's decision; he chose, however, to bypass an administrative appeal and directly petition the superior court for a writ of mandamus. In superior court, Dr. Powell filed a petition for writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure sections 1094.5 and 1094.6, seeking to void the JRC's/Board's decision and to have his medical privileges reinstated. The trial court denied the petition, and this appeal followed. On appeal of the superior court’s denial, Dr. Powell argued he was entitled to a hearing before the lapse of his provisional staff privileges: that the Board surreptitiously terminated his staff privileges, presumably for a medical disciplinary cause, by allowing his privileges to lapse and failing to act. The Court of Appeal determined the Bear Valley Board had little to no insight into the true circumstances of Dr. Powell’s termination at Brownwood or the extent of his misrepresentations, thus the Board properly exercised independent judgment based on the information presented. In summary, the Court of Appeal concluded Bear Valley provided Dr. Powell a fair procedure in denying his request for active staff privileges and reappointment to the medical staff. View "Powell v. Bear Valley Community Hospital" on Justia Law

Los Angeles County fired Merritt, a supervisor in the Department of Children and Family Services, for failing to adequately supervise a social worker, Clement, and approving Clement’s closure of a case of suspected child abuse without first consulting the Department’s records, as required by Department policy. Those records indicated the child (eight-year-old Gabriel) was at risk of further abuse and that the file should not have been closed. Less than two months later Gabriel’s mother and her boyfriend beat Gabriel to death. A Civil Service Commission hearing officer found Merritt negligent, but set aside the discharge and imposed a 10-day suspension. Without reading the record or receiving further evidence, the Commission adopted the findings, substituting a 30-day suspension. The Superior Court concluded the Commission set forth insufficient findings to support its decision and remanded. Merritt’s counsel acknowledged that the interlocutory order would not be subject to appellate review. Nevertheless, Merritt appealed. The court of appeal dismissed. While an otherwise nonfinal order remanding a matter to an administrative agency may be appealable if it affects substantial rights and may, as a practical matter, be unreviewable after resolution of the merits, the order from which Merritt purported to appeal left key issues for future resolution. The propriety of that order can be resolved in any future appeal from a final judgment. View "County of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission" on Justia Law

Gordon B., in propria persona, appealed from the trial court's denial of his request to renew an elder abuse restraining order against his neighbor. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, agreeing with Gordon B. that the trial court erred by denying his request for lack of evidence that further significant abuse occurred since the original restraining order was issued. On the record before the court, it could not determine whether the error was harmless. Accordingly, the court reversed for a further hearing on Gordon B.'s request to renew the protective order, at which hearing the trial court should determine whether Gordon B. had a reasonable apprehension of future abuse that was sufficient to warrant renewal of the original protective order. View "Gordon B. v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Gordon B., in propria persona, appealed from the trial court's denial of his request to renew an elder abuse restraining order against his neighbor. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, agreeing with Gordon B. that the trial court erred by denying his request for lack of evidence that further significant abuse occurred since the original restraining order was issued. On the record before the court, it could not determine whether the error was harmless. Accordingly, the court reversed for a further hearing on Gordon B.'s request to renew the protective order, at which hearing the trial court should determine whether Gordon B. had a reasonable apprehension of future abuse that was sufficient to warrant renewal of the original protective order. View "Gordon B. v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff 1901 First Street Owner, LLC (First Street), appealed a judgment which interpreted the meaning and application of Government Code section 65995 (b)(1), in a manner favorable to defendant Tustin Unified School District (the District). First Street developed an apartment complex. The underlying dispute arose after the City of Santa Ana (the City) had calculated the square footage of the development for purposes of assessing a school impact fee. The District disputed the City’s method of calculating the assessable space and filed an administrative appeal. Before that appeal was resolved, the City revised its calculation in the District’s favor, prompting First Street to file an administrative appeal. First Street prevailed in its administrative appeal and subsequently filed the present lawsuit against the District, alleging various tort causes of action and seeking declaratory relief and a writ of mandate ordering the District to refund the excess school fees. The court dismissed the tort claims pursuant to an anti-SLAPP motion, which the Court of Appeal affirmed in a separate appeal. The case proceeded on the declaratory relief claim and writ petition, as well as a cross-complaint by the District for an administrative writ of mandate. The court found in favor of the District, and First Street appealed. At issue was whether the square footage of interior space outside the individual apartment units should have been included in the calculation of school impact fees. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in favor of the District. View "1901 First Street Owner v. Tustin Unified School District" on Justia Law

Appellant Thomas Guarino appealed a superior court order granting an “anti-SLAPP” (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) motion to strike his First Amended Complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The motion was filed by defendants County of Siskiyou (County), individual members of the Board of Supervisors Marcia Armstrong, Grace Bennett, Michael Kobseff, Ed Valenzuela, and Jim Cook (the Board), as well as County Administrator, Tom Odom (collectively, defendants). Guarino also appealed the trial court’s order sustaining demurrers without leave to amend that were filed on behalf of the County, the Board, and Odom. Guarino was appointed as Siskiyou County’s County Counsel for a term of four years, beginning November 2008. The County began an investigation into Guarino’s actions in 2011 in response to a complaint by Guarino’s subordinate, Paula Baca. The County retained an outside law firm (Cota Cole LLP) to conduct the investigation, the legality of which was questioned by Guarino. This law firm also investigated Guarino’s claim that Baca had violated her duty of loyalty to the County Counsel’s office. The investigation into Baca’s activities resulted in a written report in November 2011 “which entirely exonerated [Guarino] and informed him that it was provided ‘for the purpose of closing the above-referenced matter. Nothing in the investigation may or will be used for any disciplinary purpose and therefore, the investigation report, as indicated, will remain a confidential document.’ ” In December 2011, Guarino was appointed to a second term as county counsel to commence in November 2012. A subsequent investigation followed, which resulted in a September 7, 2012, report that also exonerated Guarino, while at the same time recommending the privatization of the County Counsel’s Office. Guarino filed his complaint arising from the investigations into his conduct arising from the Baca matter and leading up to the privatization of his post. Because the Court of Appeal affirmed the order granting the Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 motion, it did not decide whether the trial court erred in sustaining defendants’ demurrers. View "Guarino v. County of Siskiyou" on Justia Law

In a complex custody proceeding involving two states and three different venues, N.S. (Mother) appealed the denial of her motion to recover attorney's fees, travel expenses, and childcare costs from D.M. (Father) associated with the parties' litigation in Santa Clara County, California and Illinois. She claimed she incurred expenses in both places to challenge Father's Illinois petitions and return the custody case to Santa Clara County, where the initial custody determination was made. On appeal, she argued the trial court erred in denying expenses under Family Code sections 7605 (a) and 3452 (a). After review, the Court of Appeal determined Mother was not entitled to recover expenses under section 3452, but she could seek a need-based fee and cost award under section 7605. Therefore, the Court vacated the order and remanded for the trial court to consider her request under that statute. View "N.S. v. D.M." on Justia Law

In a complex custody proceeding involving two states and three different venues, N.S. (Mother) appealed the denial of her motion to recover attorney's fees, travel expenses, and childcare costs from D.M. (Father) associated with the parties' litigation in Santa Clara County, California and Illinois. She claimed she incurred expenses in both places to challenge Father's Illinois petitions and return the custody case to Santa Clara County, where the initial custody determination was made. On appeal, she argued the trial court erred in denying expenses under Family Code sections 7605 (a) and 3452 (a). After review, the Court of Appeal determined Mother was not entitled to recover expenses under section 3452, but she could seek a need-based fee and cost award under section 7605. Therefore, the Court vacated the order and remanded for the trial court to consider her request under that statute. View "N.S. v. D.M." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in an action interpreting defendant 13359 Corp.’s offer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998 to pay a "total sum" of $12,500 "exclusive of reasonable costs and attorney[ ] fees, if any" as preserving plaintiff's right to seek attorney fees and costs in a subsequent motion. The court held that the trial court's interpretation of the 998 offer was correct, and the trial court did not err in imposing the penalties for plaintiff's not accepting defendant's 998 offer in Code of Civil Procedure section 998, subdivision (c)(1). View "Timed Out LLC v. 13359 Corp." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal granted Disney's petition for a writ of mandate and directed the superior court to consider Disney's motion to transfer venue on the merits. The court held that the superior court erred in determining that the motion was time-barred. In this case, plaintiffs filed suit alleging breach of contract claims, as well as claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, arising out of visits to Disneyland Park in Anaheim. The contracts alleged annual passes and daily admission tickets contain venue selection clauses establishing Orange County, California as the proper venue for any litigation. The court held that the strict time requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 396a, which requires the court to grant a timely motion, did not bar Disney’s motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 397, which gives discretion to the court. The court explained that failure to comply with section 396b did not automatically waive a party's rights, and principles of statutory construction supported Disney's motion. View "Walt Disney Parks & Resorts U.S., Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law