Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Karen Hayes appealed a judgment denying her writ of mandate petition seeking an order directing the Temecula Valley School District (District) to reinstate her as a middle school principal. The District removed Hayes as principal and reassigned her to a teaching position for the 2015-2016 school year under its statutory authority to reassign a school principal without cause. Hayes contended the court erred in denying her writ petition because: (1) the District's notice of the no-cause reassignment was untimely as the governing school board (Board) did not approve the notice until two days after the statutory deadline; (2) her removal was in fact "for cause" and therefore she was entitled to a hearing and due process before the removal and reassignment; and (3) her placement on paid administrative leave violated statutes and internal District policies. On the first issue, the Court of Appeal determined the notice was timely because the statutes did not require school board preapproval for an Education Code section 44951 notice to be valid. The remaining contentions were without merit on the factual record reviewed by the Court. View "Hayes v. Temecula Valley Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Franklin Eng appealed a judgment in favor of defendants Michael Patrick Brown and Gerald Levy following a jury trial. Eng claimed that Brown and Levy breached their fiduciary duties to him as purported partners or joint venturers in the ownership and operation of the Tin Fish Gaslamp, a seafood restaurant in San Diego. The jury found that Eng, Brown, and Levy entered into a partnership or joint venture, but it was terminated when they formed a corporation, B.L.E. Fish, Inc. to purchase and operate the restaurant. Eng's claim for breach of fiduciary duty based on a partnership or joint venture was therefore unsupportable. Eng argued on appeal that, among other things:(1) the trial court erred by denying his request, in a motion in limine, that the court find that the parties created a partnership as a matter of law; (2) the court erred by denying his motion in limine seeking to exclude any evidence or argument that B.L.E. Fish merged with or superseded the partnership; (3) the court erred by granting Brown and Levy's motion to amend their answer to assert an affirmative defense based on merger or supersession; (4) the court erred by denying Eng's motion for directed verdict; (5) the court committed instructional error (and a related error in the special verdict) regarding merger and supersession; (6) the court erred in its response to a juror question during deliberations; (7) the court erred by denying Eng's motion to amend his complaint to add a claim for breach of fiduciary duties based on the parties' corporate relationship; (8) the court erred by denying Eng's motion to strike the testimony of a defense expert witness; and (9) the court erred by denying Eng's ex parte application for the release of juror contact information. Finding no reversible errors, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Eng v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 1991, Mendez was found not guilty by reason of insanity and was committed to the Napa State Hospital. In 2003, he stabbed another patient with a homemade weapon. He was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and committed as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) (Penal Code 2962). His commitment was twice extended. At trial, the prosecution called three expert witnesses. At the request of the prosecution, the court modified the jury instructions to state, “Because of his severe mental disorder, he presently represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others if released into the community unsupervised.” The court of appeal reversed for a new trial. Two experts testified Mendez had not recently engaged in violent acts, he behaved well, was stable when medicated, complied with rules, and presented a low to moderate risk for violence. Both testified about past instances when Mendez had stopped taking his medication and opined he would go off medication and become a danger if released to the community. In light of those expert opinions, the incorrect modification of the instructions, and the extensive argument about what would happen if the jury declined to order Mendez recommitted, it is reasonably probable a more favorable result would have been reached without the error. View "People v. Mendez" on Justia Law

A plaintiff is "imprisoned on a criminal charge" within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 352.1 if he is serving a term of imprisonment in the state prison. Plaintiff filed suit alleging breach of contract and related claims against defendants. In this case, plaintiff's causes of action accrued while he was in pretrial custody at the Los Angeles County Jail. The Court of Appeal held that none of the statutes of limitations at issue were tolled as a result of plaintiff's pretrial incarceration in the county jail, and thus the trial court properly sustained defendants' demurrer without leave to amend on statute of limitations grounds. View "Austin v. Medicis" on Justia Law

A plaintiff is "imprisoned on a criminal charge" within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 352.1 if he is serving a term of imprisonment in the state prison. Plaintiff filed suit alleging breach of contract and related claims against defendants. In this case, plaintiff's causes of action accrued while he was in pretrial custody at the Los Angeles County Jail. The Court of Appeal held that none of the statutes of limitations at issue were tolled as a result of plaintiff's pretrial incarceration in the county jail, and thus the trial court properly sustained defendants' demurrer without leave to amend on statute of limitations grounds. View "Austin v. Medicis" on Justia Law

The Foxes filed suit against 18 defendants in February 2017, claiming that Ms. Fox, age 81, sustained personal injuries as a result of her exposure to asbestos and asbestos-containing products, from approximately 1954-1963. Out of concern for Ms. Fox’s declining health, the Foxes moved for trial preference under Code of Civil Procedure 36(a). Ms. Fox now suffers from stage IV lung cancer, metastasized to her femur, clavicle, and spine, and from asbestosis, asbestos-related pleural disease, severe coronary artery disease, and anemia. She receives chemotherapy treatments every three weeks and is in partial remission but the side effects have been severe. Her attorney stated: “[f]or [Ms. Fox] to effectively participate and assist in her trial, so that her interests will not be prejudiced, it is imperative that the trial be held as soon as possible.” The Foxes submitted medical records confirming Ms. Fox’s medical diagnoses. Only two of 18 defendants opposed the Foxes’ motion and did not offer substantive argument. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeal directed the superior court to schedule a trial within 120 days. On this record, the absence of more specifics about Ms. Fox’s prognosis was insufficient reason to deny the request for calendar preference. View "Fox v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether plaintiff West Coast Air Conditioning Company, Inc. (West Coast) was entitled to recover under a promissory estoppel theory its bid preparation costs in the stipulated amount of $250,000, after it successfully challenged the award of a public works contract by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to real party in interest Hensel Phelps Construction Co. (HP). The court found HP's bid to update the Ironwood State Prison Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning System illegal and nonresponsive as a matter of law. As a result, the court granted West Coast's request for a permanent injunction, preventing HP from performing any additional work on the subject project. HP had only performed about 8 percent of the contract when the injunction issued, and although West Coast ultimately proved it was the lowest responsible bidder when granting the injunction, the court refused to command CDCR to award West Coast the contract for the subject project, despite the court's finding in a previous order that West Coast should have been awarded the contract. The Court of Appeals concluded the trial court properly exercised its authority in awarding West Coast its bid preparation costs of $250,000. The Court rejected CDCR's argument that West Coast, as a matter of law, was not entitled to recover such costs because West Coast's bid allegedly was nonresponsive and because West Coast had obtained a permanent injunction without any additional relief. View "West Coast Air Conditioning Co. v. Cal. Dept. of Corr. & Rehab." on Justia Law

Quanta, a Taiwanese company, entered into a contract to manufacture and sell cellular telephones to Japan Communications, a Japanese company. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that suitable alternative forums exist and that California had no public interest in burdening its courts with an action lacking any identifiable connection to the state. In this case, the parties negotiated a forum selection clause mandating that any dispute be resolved in a California court under California law, but nothing in the creation, performance, or alleged breach of the contract had any connection to California. View "Quanta Computer Inc. v. Japan Communications Inc." on Justia Law

The Legislature exempted a government claim to a local public entity on a childhood sexual abuse action from the claim presentation requirement of the Government Claims Act, but permitted local public entities to impose their own claim presentation requirements. The Court of Appeal granted a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order overruling petitioners' demurrers to Jane Doe's first amended complaint, and to enter a new order sustaining their demurrers. The demurrers were based on Doe's failure to present a government claim to petitioner school district before commencing her judicial action against petitioners. In this case, Doe failed to allege timely compliance with the district's claim presentation requirement, or an excuse for failure to comply. Therefore, the court held that petitioners' demurrers to the first amended complaint should have been sustained. View "Big Oak Flat-Groveland Unified School District v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2003, after a lengthy period of employment as a firefighter with the United States Forest Service, George Corley accepted a position with the San Bernardino County Fire Protection District as a battalion chief. Corley was promoted to the rank of division chief in 2005. In May 2011, the County of San Bernardino's Chief Executive Officer, Greg Devereaux, appointed Mark Hartwig as Fire Chief for the District. Chief Hartwig terminated Corley's employment with the District in February 2012. At the time of his discharge, Corley was 58 years old, and was the oldest of the District's six division chiefs. Corley filed this action against the District. A jury trial was held on a single cause of action for age discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, section 12900 et seq.). The jury rendered a special verdict in which it found that Corley's age was a substantial motivating reason for the District's termination of his employment and awarded damages for lost earnings. On appeal, the District contended the trial court erred in denying its request to instruct the jury pursuant to a provision in the Firefighters' Procedural Bill of Rights (section 3254 (c)). The District also claimed the trial court erred in instructing the jury that "the use of salary as the basis for differentiating between employees when terminating employment may be a factor used to constitute age discrimination" if the employer's termination policy adversely affected older workers. The District further contended there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's award of damages based on its implicit finding that Corley would have been promoted but for the District's discrimination. Furthermore, the District claimed the trial court abused its discretion in applying a multiplier in awarding Corley statutory attorney fees. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal interpreted section 3254 (c) and concluded the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury pursuant to this provision. In unpublished portions of the discussion, the Court concluded the District failed to establish any reversible error with respect to its remaining claims. View "Corley v. San Bernardino County Fire Protection Dist." on Justia Law