Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff 1901 First Street Owner, LLC (First Street), appealed a judgment which interpreted the meaning and application of Government Code section 65995 (b)(1), in a manner favorable to defendant Tustin Unified School District (the District). First Street developed an apartment complex. The underlying dispute arose after the City of Santa Ana (the City) had calculated the square footage of the development for purposes of assessing a school impact fee. The District disputed the City’s method of calculating the assessable space and filed an administrative appeal. Before that appeal was resolved, the City revised its calculation in the District’s favor, prompting First Street to file an administrative appeal. First Street prevailed in its administrative appeal and subsequently filed the present lawsuit against the District, alleging various tort causes of action and seeking declaratory relief and a writ of mandate ordering the District to refund the excess school fees. The court dismissed the tort claims pursuant to an anti-SLAPP motion, which the Court of Appeal affirmed in a separate appeal. The case proceeded on the declaratory relief claim and writ petition, as well as a cross-complaint by the District for an administrative writ of mandate. The court found in favor of the District, and First Street appealed. At issue was whether the square footage of interior space outside the individual apartment units should have been included in the calculation of school impact fees. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in favor of the District. View "1901 First Street Owner v. Tustin Unified School District" on Justia Law

Appellant Thomas Guarino appealed a superior court order granting an “anti-SLAPP” (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) motion to strike his First Amended Complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The motion was filed by defendants County of Siskiyou (County), individual members of the Board of Supervisors Marcia Armstrong, Grace Bennett, Michael Kobseff, Ed Valenzuela, and Jim Cook (the Board), as well as County Administrator, Tom Odom (collectively, defendants). Guarino also appealed the trial court’s order sustaining demurrers without leave to amend that were filed on behalf of the County, the Board, and Odom. Guarino was appointed as Siskiyou County’s County Counsel for a term of four years, beginning November 2008. The County began an investigation into Guarino’s actions in 2011 in response to a complaint by Guarino’s subordinate, Paula Baca. The County retained an outside law firm (Cota Cole LLP) to conduct the investigation, the legality of which was questioned by Guarino. This law firm also investigated Guarino’s claim that Baca had violated her duty of loyalty to the County Counsel’s office. The investigation into Baca’s activities resulted in a written report in November 2011 “which entirely exonerated [Guarino] and informed him that it was provided ‘for the purpose of closing the above-referenced matter. Nothing in the investigation may or will be used for any disciplinary purpose and therefore, the investigation report, as indicated, will remain a confidential document.’ ” In December 2011, Guarino was appointed to a second term as county counsel to commence in November 2012. A subsequent investigation followed, which resulted in a September 7, 2012, report that also exonerated Guarino, while at the same time recommending the privatization of the County Counsel’s Office. Guarino filed his complaint arising from the investigations into his conduct arising from the Baca matter and leading up to the privatization of his post. Because the Court of Appeal affirmed the order granting the Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 motion, it did not decide whether the trial court erred in sustaining defendants’ demurrers. View "Guarino v. County of Siskiyou" on Justia Law

In a complex custody proceeding involving two states and three different venues, N.S. (Mother) appealed the denial of her motion to recover attorney's fees, travel expenses, and childcare costs from D.M. (Father) associated with the parties' litigation in Santa Clara County, California and Illinois. She claimed she incurred expenses in both places to challenge Father's Illinois petitions and return the custody case to Santa Clara County, where the initial custody determination was made. On appeal, she argued the trial court erred in denying expenses under Family Code sections 7605 (a) and 3452 (a). After review, the Court of Appeal determined Mother was not entitled to recover expenses under section 3452, but she could seek a need-based fee and cost award under section 7605. Therefore, the Court vacated the order and remanded for the trial court to consider her request under that statute. View "N.S. v. D.M." on Justia Law

In a complex custody proceeding involving two states and three different venues, N.S. (Mother) appealed the denial of her motion to recover attorney's fees, travel expenses, and childcare costs from D.M. (Father) associated with the parties' litigation in Santa Clara County, California and Illinois. She claimed she incurred expenses in both places to challenge Father's Illinois petitions and return the custody case to Santa Clara County, where the initial custody determination was made. On appeal, she argued the trial court erred in denying expenses under Family Code sections 7605 (a) and 3452 (a). After review, the Court of Appeal determined Mother was not entitled to recover expenses under section 3452, but she could seek a need-based fee and cost award under section 7605. Therefore, the Court vacated the order and remanded for the trial court to consider her request under that statute. View "N.S. v. D.M." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in an action interpreting defendant 13359 Corp.’s offer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998 to pay a "total sum" of $12,500 "exclusive of reasonable costs and attorney[ ] fees, if any" as preserving plaintiff's right to seek attorney fees and costs in a subsequent motion. The court held that the trial court's interpretation of the 998 offer was correct, and the trial court did not err in imposing the penalties for plaintiff's not accepting defendant's 998 offer in Code of Civil Procedure section 998, subdivision (c)(1). View "Timed Out LLC v. 13359 Corp." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal granted Disney's petition for a writ of mandate and directed the superior court to consider Disney's motion to transfer venue on the merits. The court held that the superior court erred in determining that the motion was time-barred. In this case, plaintiffs filed suit alleging breach of contract claims, as well as claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, arising out of visits to Disneyland Park in Anaheim. The contracts alleged annual passes and daily admission tickets contain venue selection clauses establishing Orange County, California as the proper venue for any litigation. The court held that the strict time requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 396a, which requires the court to grant a timely motion, did not bar Disney’s motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 397, which gives discretion to the court. The court explained that failure to comply with section 396b did not automatically waive a party's rights, and principles of statutory construction supported Disney's motion. View "Walt Disney Parks & Resorts U.S., Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Karen Hayes appealed a judgment denying her writ of mandate petition seeking an order directing the Temecula Valley School District (District) to reinstate her as a middle school principal. The District removed Hayes as principal and reassigned her to a teaching position for the 2015-2016 school year under its statutory authority to reassign a school principal without cause. Hayes contended the court erred in denying her writ petition because: (1) the District's notice of the no-cause reassignment was untimely as the governing school board (Board) did not approve the notice until two days after the statutory deadline; (2) her removal was in fact "for cause" and therefore she was entitled to a hearing and due process before the removal and reassignment; and (3) her placement on paid administrative leave violated statutes and internal District policies. On the first issue, the Court of Appeal determined the notice was timely because the statutes did not require school board preapproval for an Education Code section 44951 notice to be valid. The remaining contentions were without merit on the factual record reviewed by the Court. View "Hayes v. Temecula Valley Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Franklin Eng appealed a judgment in favor of defendants Michael Patrick Brown and Gerald Levy following a jury trial. Eng claimed that Brown and Levy breached their fiduciary duties to him as purported partners or joint venturers in the ownership and operation of the Tin Fish Gaslamp, a seafood restaurant in San Diego. The jury found that Eng, Brown, and Levy entered into a partnership or joint venture, but it was terminated when they formed a corporation, B.L.E. Fish, Inc. to purchase and operate the restaurant. Eng's claim for breach of fiduciary duty based on a partnership or joint venture was therefore unsupportable. Eng argued on appeal that, among other things:(1) the trial court erred by denying his request, in a motion in limine, that the court find that the parties created a partnership as a matter of law; (2) the court erred by denying his motion in limine seeking to exclude any evidence or argument that B.L.E. Fish merged with or superseded the partnership; (3) the court erred by granting Brown and Levy's motion to amend their answer to assert an affirmative defense based on merger or supersession; (4) the court erred by denying Eng's motion for directed verdict; (5) the court committed instructional error (and a related error in the special verdict) regarding merger and supersession; (6) the court erred in its response to a juror question during deliberations; (7) the court erred by denying Eng's motion to amend his complaint to add a claim for breach of fiduciary duties based on the parties' corporate relationship; (8) the court erred by denying Eng's motion to strike the testimony of a defense expert witness; and (9) the court erred by denying Eng's ex parte application for the release of juror contact information. Finding no reversible errors, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Eng v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 1991, Mendez was found not guilty by reason of insanity and was committed to the Napa State Hospital. In 2003, he stabbed another patient with a homemade weapon. He was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and committed as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) (Penal Code 2962). His commitment was twice extended. At trial, the prosecution called three expert witnesses. At the request of the prosecution, the court modified the jury instructions to state, “Because of his severe mental disorder, he presently represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others if released into the community unsupervised.” The court of appeal reversed for a new trial. Two experts testified Mendez had not recently engaged in violent acts, he behaved well, was stable when medicated, complied with rules, and presented a low to moderate risk for violence. Both testified about past instances when Mendez had stopped taking his medication and opined he would go off medication and become a danger if released to the community. In light of those expert opinions, the incorrect modification of the instructions, and the extensive argument about what would happen if the jury declined to order Mendez recommitted, it is reasonably probable a more favorable result would have been reached without the error. View "People v. Mendez" on Justia Law

A plaintiff is "imprisoned on a criminal charge" within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 352.1 if he is serving a term of imprisonment in the state prison. Plaintiff filed suit alleging breach of contract and related claims against defendants. In this case, plaintiff's causes of action accrued while he was in pretrial custody at the Los Angeles County Jail. The Court of Appeal held that none of the statutes of limitations at issue were tolled as a result of plaintiff's pretrial incarceration in the county jail, and thus the trial court properly sustained defendants' demurrer without leave to amend on statute of limitations grounds. View "Austin v. Medicis" on Justia Law