Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2003, the Legislature enacted Water Code section 1525, which required the holders of permits and licenses to appropriate water to pay an annual fee according to a fee schedule established by the Board. At the same time, the Legislature enacted sections 1540 and 1560, which allowed the Board to allocate the annual fee imposed on a permit or license holder who refuses to pay the fee on sovereign immunity grounds to persons or entities who contracted for the delivery of water from that permit or license holder. Plaintiffs Northern California Water Association, California Farm Bureau Federation, and individual fee payors claimed that the annual fee imposed in fiscal year 2003-2004 constituted an unlawful tax, as opposed to a valid regulatory fee because it required fee payors to pay more than a de minimis amount for regulatory activities that benefited nonfee-paying right holders. Plaintiffs also claimed that the fees allocated to the water supply contractors violated the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution because they exceeded the contractors’ beneficial interests in the USBR’s water rights. The California Supreme Court previously ruled sections 1525, 1540, and 1560 were constitutional on their face. The Supreme Court found that the record was unclear as to: (1) “whether the fees were reasonably apportioned in terms of the regulatory activity’s costs and the fees assessed;” and (2) “the extent and value of the [contractors’ beneficial] interests.” Accordingly, the Supreme Court directed the Court of Appeal to remand the matter to the trial court to make findings on those issues. Following a 10-day bench trial, the trial court issued a statement of decision that determined inter alia that the statutory scheme as applied through its implementing regulations imposed a tax, as opposed to a valid regulatory fee, by allocating the entire cost of the Division’s regulatory activities to permit and license holders, while nonpaying-water-right holders who benefit from and place burdens on the Division’s activities pay nothing. The trial court likewise found that the fees passed through to the water supply contractors in fiscal year 2003-2004 pursuant to regulation 1073 ran afoul of the supremacy clause “because the allocation of fees [was] not limited to the contractors’ beneficial or possessory use of the [USBR’s] water rights.” In addition, the trial court found that the fee regulations were invalid because they operated in an arbitrary manner as to a single payor, Imperial Irrigation District. Accordingly, the trial court invalidated regulations 1066 and 1073, “as adopted by Resolution 2003-0077 in 2003-2004.” The Board appealed, contending the trial court erred in invalidating the fee regulations. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court’s central premise was wholly incorrect because it failed to recognize the role that general fund money played in fiscal year 2003-2004: the fees assessed on permit and license holders were proportionate to the benefits derived by them or the burdens they placed on the Division. The trial court erred in determining that the fee regulations were invalid based on their application to a single payor. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment invalidating the fee regulations. View "No. CA Water Assn. v. St. Water Resources Control Bd." on Justia Law

In 2016, personnel from real party in interest, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS), received a referral alleging emotional abuse and general neglect of Minors by Mother and physical abuse by R.N. (Father 1). The allegations alleged substance abuse by Mother and domestic violence in the presence of Minors. CFS personnel received a second referral alleging Mother was transient, on drugs, and had left Minors with a friend. Minors disclosed witnessing the parents engage in domestic violence. They also described substance use by both the parents and drug paraphernalia in the home. They described being hit by both parents. Minors said they did not feel safe with the parents. Mother had a previous history with CFS, including three previous neglect investigations, three prior abuse investigations; Father 1 had an extensive history with CFS. Reunification services as to six of Father 1’s other children had previously been terminated; Father 1’s parental rights had been terminated as to one of his other children. Father 1 also had an extensive criminal history. The juvenile court terminated petitioner, W.P.’s (Mother), reunification services as to G.N. (born in September 2016), R.Y. (born in January 2009), M.M.M.1 (born in March 2005), and M.M.M.2 (born in May 2003) (collectively Minors), and set the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. In her petition, Mother contended the juvenile court erred as a matter of law in declining to grant her another six months of reunification services as to the elder three Minors. Mother contended the court erred as a matter of law in declining to provide her a minimum of 12 months of reunification services because the court improperly interpreted section 361.5 (a)(1)(c), to apply to any sibling group removed from parents, regardless of whether those siblings were placed together. CFS conceded the juvenile court erred in its interpretation of the statute and in terminating Mother’s reunification services after only six months based upon that erroneous interpretation. the Court of Appeal agreed and granted Mother's petition. View "W.P. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 2016, personnel from real party in interest, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS), received a referral alleging emotional abuse and general neglect of Minors by Mother and physical abuse by R.N. (Father 1). The allegations alleged substance abuse by Mother and domestic violence in the presence of Minors. CFS personnel received a second referral alleging Mother was transient, on drugs, and had left Minors with a friend. Minors disclosed witnessing the parents engage in domestic violence. They also described substance use by both the parents and drug paraphernalia in the home. They described being hit by both parents. Minors said they did not feel safe with the parents. Mother had a previous history with CFS, including three previous neglect investigations, three prior abuse investigations; Father 1 had an extensive history with CFS. Reunification services as to six of Father 1’s other children had previously been terminated; Father 1’s parental rights had been terminated as to one of his other children. Father 1 also had an extensive criminal history. The juvenile court terminated petitioner, W.P.’s (Mother), reunification services as to G.N. (born in September 2016), R.Y. (born in January 2009), M.M.M.1 (born in March 2005), and M.M.M.2 (born in May 2003) (collectively Minors), and set the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. In her petition, Mother contended the juvenile court erred as a matter of law in declining to grant her another six months of reunification services as to the elder three Minors. Mother contended the court erred as a matter of law in declining to provide her a minimum of 12 months of reunification services because the court improperly interpreted section 361.5 (a)(1)(c), to apply to any sibling group removed from parents, regardless of whether those siblings were placed together. CFS conceded the juvenile court erred in its interpretation of the statute and in terminating Mother’s reunification services after only six months based upon that erroneous interpretation. the Court of Appeal agreed and granted Mother's petition. View "W.P. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

On September 28, 2016, the Medical Board filed an accusation against Alfred Adams, M.D., alleging that he prescribed himself controlled substances, failed to cooperate with the board, and failed to provide an accurate address. The accusation was served by certified mail on his Emeryville address of record. The unopened mail was returned, stamped “Return to Sender, Unable to Forward.” On November 1, the board sent notice of default by certified mail, which was also returned. After a Lexis search, the board served the accusation by certified mail to another Emeryville address. On January 20, 2017, the board issued a default decision, revoking Adams’s medical license, which was served by certified mail and first class mail to both addresses. On April 7, 2017, Adams sought mandamus relief, claiming that no evidence established service. The court directed the board to set aside its default decision. The court of appeal ruled in favor of the board. Section 11505(c) authorizes service of a document adversely affecting one’s rights by registered mail and “does not require proof of service in the form of a return receipt signed by the party or other acknowledgement of receipt by the party.” Section 8311 authorizes “any other means of physical delivery that provides a receipt” but does not impose this requirement if service is made by certified mail. View "Medical Board of California v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff unsuccessfully sued Bartsch’s estate, claiming to be Bartsch’s son, unintentionally omitted from his father’s will. The court of appeal upheld a finding that Bartsch was aware of plaintiff’s existence when he executed his will, having reluctantly made court-ordered child support payments to plaintiff’s mother for many years. Plaintiff separately sued the attorney who represented the executor and the executor, alleging intentional fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment, because the defendants stated under penalty of perjury that decedent had no children when they filed the probate petition, did not serve notice of their petition on plaintiff, and “willfully failed to inform the Court [that plaintiff was Bartsch’s son], depriving plaintiff of the opportunity to assert a claim. He also alleged that the way defendants stated the petition’s allegations made him believe that decedent “was not aware that he had a son or had forgotten it,” leading him to incur significant legal fees. The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiff could not establish any damages because it was established that he had no interest in Bartsch’s estate. His claims are based entirely on the defendants' representations in connection with the probate proceeding and are, therefore, barred by the litigation privilege, Civil Code 47(b). View "Herterich v. Peltner" on Justia Law

Brown worked for BCP for 10 years. BCP had permitted Brown to wear shirts with BCP patches, rather than a uniform shirt. After discovering that it could order larger-size uniform shirts, BCP purchased such shirts for Brown in 2011. He was fired in January 2012 for wearing the wrong shirt. The Employment Development Department (EDD) denied his application for unemployment benefits. The trial court granted Brown’s writ petition, concluding that Brown had not engaged in misconduct sufficient to disqualify him from benefits because he had offered to go home and change shirts and was terminated on his first violation. In August 2013, EDD responded that EDD had paid Brown “all the benefits for which he has been found eligible,” noting that it was requiring Brown to submit certification forms and that an eligibility issue would need to be resolved before further benefits could be paid. in October 2014, Brown sought enforcement, claiming that EDD had imposed improper conditions, caused extended delays, and continued to withhold benefits. The court found EDD’s failure to comply “without good cause,” levied a $1,000 fine, awarded attorney fees, and determined that the rate of interest for wrongfully withheld unemployment benefits was seven percent, the judgment interest rate (Government Code 965.5(a), (d)). The court of appeal reversed, remanding for calculation of interest at 10 percent under Civil Code 3289(b). EDD’s statutory obligations are like contractual promises, subject to the statutory contractual rate of prejudgment interest. Brown’s right to prejudgment interest gave way to his entitlement to post-judgment interest with the trial court’s order. View "Brown v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board" on Justia Law

Surviving heirs of a helicopter crash filed a wrongful death action against cross-complainants. The Court of Appeal held that Robinson Helicopter's cross-complaint should have been dismissed because service was attempted beyond the three year statutory period, and Robinson Helicopter offered no valid exception to this rule; Honeywell and Rolls-Royce failed to properly serve petitioners pursuant to the Hague Service Convention; and thus petitioners' motion should have been granted and the cross-complaints dismissed. Accordingly, the court issued a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the respondent court to vacate its August 28, 2017 order denying the motion to quash service of summons and dismissing the cross-complaints, and issue a new order granting the motion to quash and dismissing the cross-complaints without prejudice. View "Inversiones Papaluchi S.A.S. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion to vacate an order declaring him a vexatious litigant. The court held that the order declaring plaintiff to be a vexatious litigant was not void for lack of jurisdiction; plaintiff's motion to vacate based on extrinsic fraud was untimely; and plaintiff's argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to vacate its April 2010 minute order was forfeited. View "Pittman v. Beck Park Apartments" on Justia Law

When the complaint itself alleges protected activity, a moving party may rely on the plaintiff's allegations alone in arguing that the plaintiff's claims arise from an act "in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech" under the anti-SLAPP statute. The Court of Appeal explained that, while Code Civ. Proc., 425.16 requires a court to consider both the "pleadings" and the "supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based," it does not require a moving party to submit declarations confirming the factual basis for the plaintiff's claims. In this case, the prelitigation conduct encouraging third parties to sue was protected petitioning activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e). The court held that appellants could rely on Bel Air's allegations that they urged other employees to quit and sue, even though appellants denied engaging in this conduct. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's order denying appellants' motion to strike. View "Bel Air Internet, LLC v. Morales" on Justia Law

Victaulic, a manufacturer, sued its insurers in connection with product liability claims that resulted in litigation. Following summary adjudication for Victaulic (duty to defend) and a declaratory ruling (duty to indemnify), the case proceeded to a jury trial on Victaulic’s bad faith claim. Numerous witnesses testified and over 100 exhibits were introduced. Reversing an in limine ruling, the court allowed Victaulic to interrogate Finberg, the examiner on most of the claims, who had verified the insurers’ responses to Victaulic’s requests for admissions (RFAs). The court concluded Finberg “made an admission that she perjured herself” and stopped Finberg’s testimony. When she resumed the stand the next day, represented by personal counsel, the court ruled that she could, on a blanket basis, claim the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination— in front of jury. Victaulic’s closing arguments focused on “Finberg,” “RFAs,” “lies,” and “penalty of perjury.” The jury awarded damages for breach of contract totaling $1,073,868.80, with attorney fee damages for bad faith of $8,259,712.31. The punitive damages trial resulted in an award of $46 million. The court of appeal reversed, finding prejudicial errors, beginning with the court’s allowance of the use of the RFA responses, compounded by the court’s intensive questioning of Finberg, and by several errors in handling Finberg’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment. View "Victaulic Co. v. American Home Assurance Co." on Justia Law