Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In November 2013, Vincent Selvidge died of a heart attack. His surviving wife and children (plaintiffs) sought to sue defendant, a physician who treated Selvidge, for medical malpractice. Plaintiffs filed their suit on January 28, 2015; 85 days after the one-year statute of limitations to bring a medical malpractice claim had expired. Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that the suit was untimely. Plaintiffs claimed they were entitled to tolling of the limitation period for 90 days pursuant to section 364 because they provided notice to defendant on October 24, 2014, of their intention to sue him. By their reasoning, the statute of limitations did not expire until February 2, 2015, and their suit was timely. To prove they provided notice to defendant, plaintiffs submitted a declaration from the legal assistant to plaintiffs’ attorney, who mailed the notice of intent to a Southern California address listed for defendant on the medical board’s Web site. She also called the facility in Rancho Cordova where defendant had treated Selvidge and learned defendant was no longer an employee. Although the legal assistant declared that the notice was not returned as undelivered, she did not send the letter by certified mail or prepare a proof of service. Defendant claimed to have never received the notice of intent. The address he provided to the medical board, and to which the letter was mailed, was not defendant’s residence but an address he used for billing purposes. The address was owned by a business service company that received mail on behalf of defendant and his medical corporation, to which he was the sole employee. In October of 2014, defendant estimated he checked his mailbox at the address he provided to the medical board once or twice a month. The trial court granted defendant’s summary judgment motion, finding that because defendant did not have actual notice of plaintiffs’ intention to file an action against him, plaintiffs were required to comply with the mailing provisions found in Code Civ. Proc. section 1013(a). The issue this appeal presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether mailing a notice of intent to file an action to a physician’s address of record with the Medical Board of California provided adequate notification of a potential medical malpractice suit under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act. The Court held that it did, and accordingly reversed the trial court’s determination to the contrary. View "Selvidge v. Tang" on Justia Law

Robert and Janice married in 1964; in 1986, they divorced. In the meantime, after 20 years of service, Robert had retired from the United States Air Force. In a stipulated judgment, the trial court awarded Janice her community property interest in Robert’s military retired pay. In 2012, it was determined that Robert had a combat-related disability. As a result, he became eligible to receive both veteran’s disability benefits and combat-related special compensation (CRSC); to do so, however, he had to waive his retired pay. Before the waiver, Robert received $791 a month and Janice received $541 in retired pay (taxable). After the waiver, Robert received $1,743 a month in veteran’s disability benefits and $1,389 a month in CRSC, for a total of $3,132 (tax-free); Janice received nothing. The trial court ordered Robert to start paying Janice $541 a month in permanent and nonmodifiable spousal support. Robert appealed, contending: (1) under federal law, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to make any award to Janice based on Robert’s receipt of either veteran’s disability benefits or CRSC; (2) the trial court erred by using spousal support as a remedy for the loss of a community property interest; (3) the trial court erred by making its award of spousal support nonmodifiable; (4) because the judgment dividing the community property was long-since final, the trial court could not give Janice any remedy for the loss of her community property interest in the retired pay; (5) all of Robert's income was exempt, therefore could not be required to satisfy Janice's claim; and (6) Janice was not entitled to spousal support, and the trial court abused its discretion by finding otherwise. The Court of Appeal agreed federal law prohibited the trial court from compensating Janice, in the form of spousal support or otherwise, for the loss of her share of Robert’s retired pay. However, it could properly modify spousal support, provided it did so based on the relevant factors and not as compensation. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded with directions to hold a new trial on Janice’s request for a modification of spousal support. View "In re Marriage of Cassinelli" on Justia Law

Robert and Janice married in 1964; in 1986, they divorced. In the meantime, after 20 years of service, Robert had retired from the United States Air Force. In a stipulated judgment, the trial court awarded Janice her community property interest in Robert’s military retired pay. In 2012, it was determined that Robert had a combat-related disability. As a result, he became eligible to receive both veteran’s disability benefits and combat-related special compensation (CRSC); to do so, however, he had to waive his retired pay. Before the waiver, Robert received $791 a month and Janice received $541 in retired pay (taxable). After the waiver, Robert received $1,743 a month in veteran’s disability benefits and $1,389 a month in CRSC, for a total of $3,132 (tax-free); Janice received nothing. The trial court ordered Robert to start paying Janice $541 a month in permanent and nonmodifiable spousal support. Robert appealed, contending: (1) under federal law, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to make any award to Janice based on Robert’s receipt of either veteran’s disability benefits or CRSC; (2) the trial court erred by using spousal support as a remedy for the loss of a community property interest; (3) the trial court erred by making its award of spousal support nonmodifiable; (4) because the judgment dividing the community property was long-since final, the trial court could not give Janice any remedy for the loss of her community property interest in the retired pay; (5) all of Robert's income was exempt, therefore could not be required to satisfy Janice's claim; and (6) Janice was not entitled to spousal support, and the trial court abused its discretion by finding otherwise. The Court of Appeal agreed federal law prohibited the trial court from compensating Janice, in the form of spousal support or otherwise, for the loss of her share of Robert’s retired pay. However, it could properly modify spousal support, provided it did so based on the relevant factors and not as compensation. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded with directions to hold a new trial on Janice’s request for a modification of spousal support. View "In re Marriage of Cassinelli" on Justia Law

In 2003, the Legislature enacted Water Code section 1525, which required the holders of permits and licenses to appropriate water to pay an annual fee according to a fee schedule established by the Board. At the same time, the Legislature enacted sections 1540 and 1560, which allowed the Board to allocate the annual fee imposed on a permit or license holder who refuses to pay the fee on sovereign immunity grounds to persons or entities who contracted for the delivery of water from that permit or license holder. Plaintiffs Northern California Water Association, California Farm Bureau Federation, and individual fee payors claimed that the annual fee imposed in fiscal year 2003-2004 constituted an unlawful tax, as opposed to a valid regulatory fee because it required fee payors to pay more than a de minimis amount for regulatory activities that benefited nonfee-paying right holders. Plaintiffs also claimed that the fees allocated to the water supply contractors violated the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution because they exceeded the contractors’ beneficial interests in the USBR’s water rights. The California Supreme Court previously ruled sections 1525, 1540, and 1560 were constitutional on their face. The Supreme Court found that the record was unclear as to: (1) “whether the fees were reasonably apportioned in terms of the regulatory activity’s costs and the fees assessed;” and (2) “the extent and value of the [contractors’ beneficial] interests.” Accordingly, the Supreme Court directed the Court of Appeal to remand the matter to the trial court to make findings on those issues. Following a 10-day bench trial, the trial court issued a statement of decision that determined inter alia that the statutory scheme as applied through its implementing regulations imposed a tax, as opposed to a valid regulatory fee, by allocating the entire cost of the Division’s regulatory activities to permit and license holders, while nonpaying-water-right holders who benefit from and place burdens on the Division’s activities pay nothing. The trial court likewise found that the fees passed through to the water supply contractors in fiscal year 2003-2004 pursuant to regulation 1073 ran afoul of the supremacy clause “because the allocation of fees [was] not limited to the contractors’ beneficial or possessory use of the [USBR’s] water rights.” In addition, the trial court found that the fee regulations were invalid because they operated in an arbitrary manner as to a single payor, Imperial Irrigation District. Accordingly, the trial court invalidated regulations 1066 and 1073, “as adopted by Resolution 2003-0077 in 2003-2004.” The Board appealed, contending the trial court erred in invalidating the fee regulations. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court’s central premise was wholly incorrect because it failed to recognize the role that general fund money played in fiscal year 2003-2004: the fees assessed on permit and license holders were proportionate to the benefits derived by them or the burdens they placed on the Division. The trial court erred in determining that the fee regulations were invalid based on their application to a single payor. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment invalidating the fee regulations. View "No. CA Water Assn. v. St. Water Resources Control Bd." on Justia Law

In 2003, the Legislature enacted Water Code section 1525, which required the holders of permits and licenses to appropriate water to pay an annual fee according to a fee schedule established by the Board. At the same time, the Legislature enacted sections 1540 and 1560, which allowed the Board to allocate the annual fee imposed on a permit or license holder who refuses to pay the fee on sovereign immunity grounds to persons or entities who contracted for the delivery of water from that permit or license holder. Plaintiffs Northern California Water Association, California Farm Bureau Federation, and individual fee payors claimed that the annual fee imposed in fiscal year 2003-2004 constituted an unlawful tax, as opposed to a valid regulatory fee because it required fee payors to pay more than a de minimis amount for regulatory activities that benefited nonfee-paying right holders. Plaintiffs also claimed that the fees allocated to the water supply contractors violated the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution because they exceeded the contractors’ beneficial interests in the USBR’s water rights. The California Supreme Court previously ruled sections 1525, 1540, and 1560 were constitutional on their face. The Supreme Court found that the record was unclear as to: (1) “whether the fees were reasonably apportioned in terms of the regulatory activity’s costs and the fees assessed;” and (2) “the extent and value of the [contractors’ beneficial] interests.” Accordingly, the Supreme Court directed the Court of Appeal to remand the matter to the trial court to make findings on those issues. Following a 10-day bench trial, the trial court issued a statement of decision that determined inter alia that the statutory scheme as applied through its implementing regulations imposed a tax, as opposed to a valid regulatory fee, by allocating the entire cost of the Division’s regulatory activities to permit and license holders, while nonpaying-water-right holders who benefit from and place burdens on the Division’s activities pay nothing. The trial court likewise found that the fees passed through to the water supply contractors in fiscal year 2003-2004 pursuant to regulation 1073 ran afoul of the supremacy clause “because the allocation of fees [was] not limited to the contractors’ beneficial or possessory use of the [USBR’s] water rights.” In addition, the trial court found that the fee regulations were invalid because they operated in an arbitrary manner as to a single payor, Imperial Irrigation District. Accordingly, the trial court invalidated regulations 1066 and 1073, “as adopted by Resolution 2003-0077 in 2003-2004.” The Board appealed, contending the trial court erred in invalidating the fee regulations. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court’s central premise was wholly incorrect because it failed to recognize the role that general fund money played in fiscal year 2003-2004: the fees assessed on permit and license holders were proportionate to the benefits derived by them or the burdens they placed on the Division. The trial court erred in determining that the fee regulations were invalid based on their application to a single payor. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment invalidating the fee regulations. View "No. CA Water Assn. v. St. Water Resources Control Bd." on Justia Law

In 2016, personnel from real party in interest, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS), received a referral alleging emotional abuse and general neglect of Minors by Mother and physical abuse by R.N. (Father 1). The allegations alleged substance abuse by Mother and domestic violence in the presence of Minors. CFS personnel received a second referral alleging Mother was transient, on drugs, and had left Minors with a friend. Minors disclosed witnessing the parents engage in domestic violence. They also described substance use by both the parents and drug paraphernalia in the home. They described being hit by both parents. Minors said they did not feel safe with the parents. Mother had a previous history with CFS, including three previous neglect investigations, three prior abuse investigations; Father 1 had an extensive history with CFS. Reunification services as to six of Father 1’s other children had previously been terminated; Father 1’s parental rights had been terminated as to one of his other children. Father 1 also had an extensive criminal history. The juvenile court terminated petitioner, W.P.’s (Mother), reunification services as to G.N. (born in September 2016), R.Y. (born in January 2009), M.M.M.1 (born in March 2005), and M.M.M.2 (born in May 2003) (collectively Minors), and set the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. In her petition, Mother contended the juvenile court erred as a matter of law in declining to grant her another six months of reunification services as to the elder three Minors. Mother contended the court erred as a matter of law in declining to provide her a minimum of 12 months of reunification services because the court improperly interpreted section 361.5 (a)(1)(c), to apply to any sibling group removed from parents, regardless of whether those siblings were placed together. CFS conceded the juvenile court erred in its interpretation of the statute and in terminating Mother’s reunification services after only six months based upon that erroneous interpretation. the Court of Appeal agreed and granted Mother's petition. View "W.P. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 2016, personnel from real party in interest, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS), received a referral alleging emotional abuse and general neglect of Minors by Mother and physical abuse by R.N. (Father 1). The allegations alleged substance abuse by Mother and domestic violence in the presence of Minors. CFS personnel received a second referral alleging Mother was transient, on drugs, and had left Minors with a friend. Minors disclosed witnessing the parents engage in domestic violence. They also described substance use by both the parents and drug paraphernalia in the home. They described being hit by both parents. Minors said they did not feel safe with the parents. Mother had a previous history with CFS, including three previous neglect investigations, three prior abuse investigations; Father 1 had an extensive history with CFS. Reunification services as to six of Father 1’s other children had previously been terminated; Father 1’s parental rights had been terminated as to one of his other children. Father 1 also had an extensive criminal history. The juvenile court terminated petitioner, W.P.’s (Mother), reunification services as to G.N. (born in September 2016), R.Y. (born in January 2009), M.M.M.1 (born in March 2005), and M.M.M.2 (born in May 2003) (collectively Minors), and set the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. In her petition, Mother contended the juvenile court erred as a matter of law in declining to grant her another six months of reunification services as to the elder three Minors. Mother contended the court erred as a matter of law in declining to provide her a minimum of 12 months of reunification services because the court improperly interpreted section 361.5 (a)(1)(c), to apply to any sibling group removed from parents, regardless of whether those siblings were placed together. CFS conceded the juvenile court erred in its interpretation of the statute and in terminating Mother’s reunification services after only six months based upon that erroneous interpretation. the Court of Appeal agreed and granted Mother's petition. View "W.P. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

On September 28, 2016, the Medical Board filed an accusation against Alfred Adams, M.D., alleging that he prescribed himself controlled substances, failed to cooperate with the board, and failed to provide an accurate address. The accusation was served by certified mail on his Emeryville address of record. The unopened mail was returned, stamped “Return to Sender, Unable to Forward.” On November 1, the board sent notice of default by certified mail, which was also returned. After a Lexis search, the board served the accusation by certified mail to another Emeryville address. On January 20, 2017, the board issued a default decision, revoking Adams’s medical license, which was served by certified mail and first class mail to both addresses. On April 7, 2017, Adams sought mandamus relief, claiming that no evidence established service. The court directed the board to set aside its default decision. The court of appeal ruled in favor of the board. Section 11505(c) authorizes service of a document adversely affecting one’s rights by registered mail and “does not require proof of service in the form of a return receipt signed by the party or other acknowledgement of receipt by the party.” Section 8311 authorizes “any other means of physical delivery that provides a receipt” but does not impose this requirement if service is made by certified mail. View "Medical Board of California v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff unsuccessfully sued Bartsch’s estate, claiming to be Bartsch’s son, unintentionally omitted from his father’s will. The court of appeal upheld a finding that Bartsch was aware of plaintiff’s existence when he executed his will, having reluctantly made court-ordered child support payments to plaintiff’s mother for many years. Plaintiff separately sued the attorney who represented the executor and the executor, alleging intentional fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment, because the defendants stated under penalty of perjury that decedent had no children when they filed the probate petition, did not serve notice of their petition on plaintiff, and “willfully failed to inform the Court [that plaintiff was Bartsch’s son], depriving plaintiff of the opportunity to assert a claim. He also alleged that the way defendants stated the petition’s allegations made him believe that decedent “was not aware that he had a son or had forgotten it,” leading him to incur significant legal fees. The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiff could not establish any damages because it was established that he had no interest in Bartsch’s estate. His claims are based entirely on the defendants' representations in connection with the probate proceeding and are, therefore, barred by the litigation privilege, Civil Code 47(b). View "Herterich v. Peltner" on Justia Law

Brown worked for BCP for 10 years. BCP had permitted Brown to wear shirts with BCP patches, rather than a uniform shirt. After discovering that it could order larger-size uniform shirts, BCP purchased such shirts for Brown in 2011. He was fired in January 2012 for wearing the wrong shirt. The Employment Development Department (EDD) denied his application for unemployment benefits. The trial court granted Brown’s writ petition, concluding that Brown had not engaged in misconduct sufficient to disqualify him from benefits because he had offered to go home and change shirts and was terminated on his first violation. In August 2013, EDD responded that EDD had paid Brown “all the benefits for which he has been found eligible,” noting that it was requiring Brown to submit certification forms and that an eligibility issue would need to be resolved before further benefits could be paid. in October 2014, Brown sought enforcement, claiming that EDD had imposed improper conditions, caused extended delays, and continued to withhold benefits. The court found EDD’s failure to comply “without good cause,” levied a $1,000 fine, awarded attorney fees, and determined that the rate of interest for wrongfully withheld unemployment benefits was seven percent, the judgment interest rate (Government Code 965.5(a), (d)). The court of appeal reversed, remanding for calculation of interest at 10 percent under Civil Code 3289(b). EDD’s statutory obligations are like contractual promises, subject to the statutory contractual rate of prejudgment interest. Brown’s right to prejudgment interest gave way to his entitlement to post-judgment interest with the trial court’s order. View "Brown v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board" on Justia Law