Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Delane Hurley appealed a judgment in her action against defendants California Department of Parks and Recreation (DPR) and Leda Seals (together Defendants) that alleged, inter alia, causes of action for sexual orientation discrimination, sex discrimination, sexual harassment, retaliation, and failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, all in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), and a cause of action for violation of the Information Practices Act (“IPA”) and additionally alleged causes of action against Seals only for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED). Following trial, the jury returned verdicts in favor of Defendants on the FEHA causes of action, against Defendants on the IPA cause of action, and against Seals on the IIED and NIED causes of action. The jury awarded Hurley $19,200 for past economic damages and $19,200 for past noneconomic losses against both Defendants, and $28,800 in punitive damages against Seals only. The court denied Defendants' motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). On appeal, Hurley contended trial court erred by excluding evidence that was relevant to her FEHA causes of action. DPR and Seals challenged the judgment against them on the IPA cause of action and the trial court's denial of their JNOV motions. DPR contended: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the finding it violated the IPA; and (2) the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47(b), barred the IPA cause of action against it. Seals contended: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the finding she violated the IPA; (2) the litigation privilege barred the IPA cause of action against her; (3) the IPA cause of action was alleged under, and the jury was instructed on, a statute that was inapplicable to her; (4) there was insufficient evidence to support the findings against her on the IIED and NIED causes of action; (5) the workers' compensation exclusivity doctrine barred the IIED and NIED causes of action against her; and (6) the punitive damages award against her must be reversed for, inter alia, instructional error and insufficiency of the evidence to support it. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, except for the award of economic damages against DPR, and modified the judgment accordingly. View "Hurley v. California Dept. of Parks and Recreation" on Justia Law

Area 51 used Alameda city property for events it planned for third-party companies. PM assisted the city with managing the license arrangements. Due to problems connected with Area 51 events, the city ceased doing business with it. Area 51 had committed to third-party entities based on PM’s previous confirmation of the city’s willingness to license space. Area 51 sued. Defendants (city, PM, and individuals) filed a demurrer and a motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. The court denied that motion and granted the demurrer. The court of appeal reversed in part. While the thrust of the claims against the city is breach of contract, the individual defendants were not contracting parties; the sole basis for asserting liability against them is what they did on behalf of the city. That conduct is expressive in nature (emails confirming dates, and announcing termination of the leasing relationship), which qualify as “written or oral statement[s] . . . made in connection with an issue under consideration . . . by a[n] . . . executive . . . body,” under the anti-SLAPP law. Area 51 could not show a probability of prevailing on the merits. The case was remanded for consideration of an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. View "Area 51 Productions, Inc. v. City of Alameda" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of lewd or lascivious acts against a child under the age of 14 and was remanded to custody. The matter was continued to 10:00 a.m. on January 24, 2014, for sentencing. Defendant was ordered to appear “on that date.” On November 22, International posted a $300,000 bail bond. On January 21, the court re-set the sentencing hearing for 9:00 a.m. on January 24, 2014. The hearing began at 9:18. Defendant was not present. An attorney who had represented Defendant did not know where he was. Defendant’s wife had reported him as missing. The court ordered bail forfeited and no bail set. On February 10, notice of the order was mailed to International, stating that it had 185 days to seek relief from forfeiture under Penal Code sections 1305-1306. In August, the court granted an extension until February 10, 2015. On February 9, International unsuccessfully moved to toll time, stating that it had tracked Defendant to Mexico and that extradition was being pursued. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to declare the forfeiture before the time Defendant had been ordered to appear. The court rejected arguments that county counsel lacked standing to object to the surety’s tolling request and that the court should be authorized to toll that period under these circumstances. View "People v. International Fidelity Insurance Co." on Justia Law

This case involved a challenge to the California Department of Justice’s (DOJ) policy that individuals who possess a federal license to collect “curio and relic” firearms could not, by virtue of possessing that license, purchase more than one non-curio or relic handgun in a 30-day period. DOJ’s position was challenged by two licensed firearms collectors, who alleged DOJ failed to comply with the California Administrative Procedures Act (APA) in adopting this policy, and also sought a declaration of rights. The trial court granted defendants-respondents Attorney General Xavier Becerra and Chief of the Bureau of Firearms Stephen J. Lindley’s motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiffs-appellants Alvin Doe and Paul A. Gladden’s cross-motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ complaint for declaratory relief. The trial court ruled that DOJ’s position embodied the only legally tenable interpretation of Penal Code section 27535. On appeal, plaintiffs argued the interpretation DOJ announced in 2014 was void because: (1) it was inconsistent with section 27535; and (2) it was not adopted in compliance with the APA. We agree with plaintiffs and address their arguments in reverse order. Regarding their second argument, the Court of Appeal concluded DOJ’s policy was not exempt from being promulgated under the APA because it did not embody “the only legally tenable interpretation” of the statute. (Gov. Code, sec. 11340.9, subd. (f).) Having decided that DOJ’s 2014 interpretation of section 27535 was void for failure to comply with the APA, the Court resolved any ambiguity regarding the proper construction of the statute and construed it as allowing individuals with the designated federal license, and certificate of eligibility, to purchase more than one handgun within 30 days regardless of the type of handgun being purchased. View "Doe v. Becerra" on Justia Law

This case involved a challenge to the California Department of Justice’s (DOJ) policy that individuals who possess a federal license to collect “curio and relic” firearms could not, by virtue of possessing that license, purchase more than one non-curio or relic handgun in a 30-day period. DOJ’s position was challenged by two licensed firearms collectors, who alleged DOJ failed to comply with the California Administrative Procedures Act (APA) in adopting this policy, and also sought a declaration of rights. The trial court granted defendants-respondents Attorney General Xavier Becerra and Chief of the Bureau of Firearms Stephen J. Lindley’s motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiffs-appellants Alvin Doe and Paul A. Gladden’s cross-motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ complaint for declaratory relief. The trial court ruled that DOJ’s position embodied the only legally tenable interpretation of Penal Code section 27535. On appeal, plaintiffs argued the interpretation DOJ announced in 2014 was void because: (1) it was inconsistent with section 27535; and (2) it was not adopted in compliance with the APA. We agree with plaintiffs and address their arguments in reverse order. Regarding their second argument, the Court of Appeal concluded DOJ’s policy was not exempt from being promulgated under the APA because it did not embody “the only legally tenable interpretation” of the statute. (Gov. Code, sec. 11340.9, subd. (f).) Having decided that DOJ’s 2014 interpretation of section 27535 was void for failure to comply with the APA, the Court resolved any ambiguity regarding the proper construction of the statute and construed it as allowing individuals with the designated federal license, and certificate of eligibility, to purchase more than one handgun within 30 days regardless of the type of handgun being purchased. View "Doe v. Becerra" on Justia Law

Minors N.C., P.G., J.G., and D.G. appealed orders denying the Imperial County Department of Social Services' petition to remove them from the care of their paternal aunt under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 387 and 361.3. Minors contended that in view of the court's finding that the three youngest children were diagnosed with nonorganic failure to thrive while in their aunt's care, the court erred in determining that continued placement with their aunt was appropriate and in their best interests. The Court of Appeal agreed, concluding the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the children to remain with a caregiver who failed to provide adequate food to them, causing serious injury to the health and well-being of the three youngest children. View "In re J.G." on Justia Law

Minors N.C., P.G., J.G., and D.G. appealed orders denying the Imperial County Department of Social Services' petition to remove them from the care of their paternal aunt under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 387 and 361.3. Minors contended that in view of the court's finding that the three youngest children were diagnosed with nonorganic failure to thrive while in their aunt's care, the court erred in determining that continued placement with their aunt was appropriate and in their best interests. The Court of Appeal agreed, concluding the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the children to remain with a caregiver who failed to provide adequate food to them, causing serious injury to the health and well-being of the three youngest children. View "In re J.G." on Justia Law

Defendants appealed the trial court's order awarding costs to plaintiffs in a wrongful death case under Code of Civil Procedure section 998. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the joint offer to settle both wrongful death claims was valid. The court held that the trial court properly awarded plaintiffs costs under section 998. In this case, defendants did not anticipate that either wrongful death claim, standing alone, would exceed the settlement offer. The court explained that this was precisely the situation in which an additional cost award under section 998 was appropriate and in furtherance of the goal of encouraging parties to accept reasonable settlement offers. View "Gonzalez v. Lew" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of Southern SARMs' postjudgment motion for sanctions against Nutrition Distribution because Southern SARMs had failed to give Nutrition Distribution the required notice. The court held that, based on the plain language and legislative history of former subdivision (f) of Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5, and confirmed by the August 2017 amendments to that provision, a 21-day waiting period applies to a motion for sanctions under section 128.5 that, as here, is directed to allegedly improper actions or tactics that can be withdrawn or appropriately corrected. In this case, because Southern SARMs failed to provide Nutrition Distribution with the safe harbor opportunity to withdraw its first amended complaint before filing its motion for sanctions, the trial court properly denied the motion. View "Nutrition Distribution, LLC v. Southern SARMs, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of Southern SARMs' postjudgment motion for sanctions against Nutrition Distribution because Southern SARMs had failed to give Nutrition Distribution the required notice. The court held that, based on the plain language and legislative history of former subdivision (f) of Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5, and confirmed by the August 2017 amendments to that provision, a 21-day waiting period applies to a motion for sanctions under section 128.5 that, as here, is directed to allegedly improper actions or tactics that can be withdrawn or appropriately corrected. In this case, because Southern SARMs failed to provide Nutrition Distribution with the safe harbor opportunity to withdraw its first amended complaint before filing its motion for sanctions, the trial court properly denied the motion. View "Nutrition Distribution, LLC v. Southern SARMs, Inc." on Justia Law