Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

California's compulsory joinder statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 389, applied when a fiduciary relationship exists between the plaintiff and the persons for whose benefit the action is prosecuted. Plaintiff obtained assignments from over a thousand borrowers that transferred 100 percent interest in causes of action relating to their home loans and a 5 percent ownership interest in the real estate securing the home loans. Plaintiff then filed suit against various entities involved in originating, servicing, or enforcing those loans. Plaintiff subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandate to challenge the trial court's order requiring joinder of the borrowers under section 389. In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal held that plaintiff had no fiduciary relationship with the borrowers. Because the assignments were for the mutual benefit of plaintiff and the borrowers, the court held that section 369, subdivision (a)(3) did not apply and did not authorize plaintiff to proceed without joining the borrowers. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for writ of mandate and lifted the stay. View "Brown v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Petitioner Apple, Inc. (Apple) is the defendant in a putative class action filed by plaintiffs and real parties in interest Anthony Shamrell and Daryl Rysdyk. In their operative complaint, plaintiffs alleged that Apple's iPhone 4, 4S, and 5 smartphones were sold with a defective power button that began to work intermittently or fail entirely during the life of the phones. Plaintiffs alleged Apple knew of the power button defects based on prerelease testing and postrelease field failure analyses, yet Apple began selling the phones and continued to sell the phones notwithstanding the defect. The trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification but expressly refused to apply Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California, 55 Cal.4th 747 (2012) to the declarations submitted by plaintiffs' experts. The trial court believed it was not required to assess the soundness of the experts' materials and methodologies at this stage of the litigation. The Court of Appeals determined that belief was in error, and a prejudicial error. “Sargon applies to expert opinion evidence submitted in connection with a motion for class certification. A trial court may consider only admissible expert opinion evidence on class certification, and there is only one standard for admissibility of expert opinion evidence in California. Sargon describes that standard.” The Court of Appeal directed the trial court to vacate its order granting plaintiffs' motion for class certification and reconsider the motion under the governing legal standards, including Sargon. View "Apple Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Petitioner Apple, Inc. (Apple) is the defendant in a putative class action filed by plaintiffs and real parties in interest Anthony Shamrell and Daryl Rysdyk. In their operative complaint, plaintiffs alleged that Apple's iPhone 4, 4S, and 5 smartphones were sold with a defective power button that began to work intermittently or fail entirely during the life of the phones. Plaintiffs alleged Apple knew of the power button defects based on prerelease testing and postrelease field failure analyses, yet Apple began selling the phones and continued to sell the phones notwithstanding the defect. The trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification but expressly refused to apply Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California, 55 Cal.4th 747 (2012) to the declarations submitted by plaintiffs' experts. The trial court believed it was not required to assess the soundness of the experts' materials and methodologies at this stage of the litigation. The Court of Appeals determined that belief was in error, and a prejudicial error. “Sargon applies to expert opinion evidence submitted in connection with a motion for class certification. A trial court may consider only admissible expert opinion evidence on class certification, and there is only one standard for admissibility of expert opinion evidence in California. Sargon describes that standard.” The Court of Appeal directed the trial court to vacate its order granting plaintiffs' motion for class certification and reconsider the motion under the governing legal standards, including Sargon. View "Apple Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Petitioners California Self-Insurers’ Security Fund (the Fund) and Nixon Peabody LLP (Nixon Peabody or the firm) sought a writ of mandate to direct the trial court to vacate its order disqualifying Nixon Peabody from representing the Fund in the underlying case. Petitioners argued the trial court mistakenly believed it was compelled by law to disqualify the firm; the court instead should have made further factual findings and exercised its discretion. Real parties in interest contended disqualification was mandatory and therefore no discretion needed to be exercised. The Court of Appeal concluded that automatic disqualification was not required under these facts. View "CA Self-Insurers' Sec. Fund v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Petitioner, the Attorney General of the State of California, sought a peremptory writ of mandate directing respondent Superior Court of Sacramento Country to vacate its order requiring that he rescind the circulating title and summary he prepared for a proposed 2018 ballot initiative measure to repeal portions of Senate Bill 1, the Road Repair and Accountability Act of 2017, and replace it with the title and summary approved by the court. The court ruled the circulating materials prepared by the Attorney General were confusing, misleading, and likely to create prejudice against the proposed measure. After the Attorney General filed his writ petition with the Court of Appeal court, and initial opposition was filed by the real party in interest Travis Allen, the Court of Appeal issued an order to preserve its jurisdiction, staying the superior court’s ruling and any proceedings thereon, pending further order of the Court of Appeal. Having reviewed the petition and opposition thereto, the Court of Appeal concluded the language prepared by the Attorney General, contrary to the findings of the respondent court, did not mislead the voters or create prejudice against the measure. Consequently, there was no legal or factual basis for respondent court’s interference with the Attorney General’s exercise of his statutory duties. The Court issued the preemptory writ of mandate and continued the stay order pending finality of this decision. View "Becerra v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Petitioner, the Attorney General of the State of California, sought a peremptory writ of mandate directing respondent Superior Court of Sacramento Country to vacate its order requiring that he rescind the circulating title and summary he prepared for a proposed 2018 ballot initiative measure to repeal portions of Senate Bill 1, the Road Repair and Accountability Act of 2017, and replace it with the title and summary approved by the court. The court ruled the circulating materials prepared by the Attorney General were confusing, misleading, and likely to create prejudice against the proposed measure. After the Attorney General filed his writ petition with the Court of Appeal court, and initial opposition was filed by the real party in interest Travis Allen, the Court of Appeal issued an order to preserve its jurisdiction, staying the superior court’s ruling and any proceedings thereon, pending further order of the Court of Appeal. Having reviewed the petition and opposition thereto, the Court of Appeal concluded the language prepared by the Attorney General, contrary to the findings of the respondent court, did not mislead the voters or create prejudice against the measure. Consequently, there was no legal or factual basis for respondent court’s interference with the Attorney General’s exercise of his statutory duties. The Court issued the preemptory writ of mandate and continued the stay order pending finality of this decision. View "Becerra v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Appellant James Bulen (James) and respondents (the Gaynor beneficiaries) were extended family members who were cobeneficiaries of a trust (Trust) created by their grandfather or great-grandfather (Grandfather). Years after Grandfather's death, these individuals and others engaged in contentious disputes over the management and control of the Trust. After the probate court resolved these disputes, the Gaynor beneficiaries filed a surcharge petition against the cotrustees, and later added James as a respondent based on his alleged de facto trustee status. The Gaynor beneficiaries alleged that James and the cotrustees wrongfully withdrew trust assets and then used these assets to file and defend probate petitions in attempting to persuade the probate court to adopt their management plan. The Gaynor beneficiaries sought reimbursement of all funds improperly withdrawn from the Trust. Focusing on the paragraphs of the surcharge petition related to the prior probate litigation, James moved to strike the claims against him under California's anti-SLAPP statute. The probate court found the claims were not governed by the anti-SLAPP statute and denied the motion. James appeals. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Gaynor v. Bulen" on Justia Law

Land Partners, LLC, and Los Alisos Ranch Company (collectively, Land Partners) appealed a postjudgment order denying their motion for attorney fees brought pursuant to Revenue and Taxation Code section 5152. Although the court had found the County of Orange Assessor (Assessor) used a constitutionally invalid methodology in valuing Land Partners’ property for property tax purposes, the court determined there was no evidence the Assessor’s actions were due to his subjective belief that a certain constitutional provision, statute, rule or regulation was invalid or unconstitutional. Because the court concluded proof of the latter was a statutory prerequisite to recovery of fees under the statute, it held Land Partners was not entitled to attorney fees. Land Partners argued on appeal the court erred in interpreting section 5152. It argued proof of the Assessor’s subjective mindset was not required; instead showing a violation of well-established and unambiguous law was sufficient for recovery of attorney fees. The Court of Appeal disagreed with Land Partners’ premise and affirmed the order. View "Land Partners, LLC v. County of Orange" on Justia Law

The underlying action was initiated by homeowners from two residential developments in Rocklin against appellants Centex Homes and Centex Real Estate Corporation (Centex) for alleged defects to their homes. Centex and cross-defendant and respondent St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company (St. Paul) have a history of insurance coverage disputes. St. Paul was an insurer for subcontractor Ad Land Venture (Ad Land), and agreed to defend Centex as an additional insured subject to a reservation of rights. Centex filed a cross-complaint against its subcontractors and St. Paul that sought, as the seventh cause of action, a declaration that Centex was entitled to independent counsel under Civil Code section 28601 because St. Paul’s reservation of rights created significant conflicts of interest. Centex appealed after the trial court granted St. Paul’s motion for summary adjudication of Centex’s seventh cause of action. Centex argued any possible or potential conflict was legally sufficient to require St. Paul to provide independent counsel. The Court of Appeal disagreed. Alternatively, Centex contended independent counsel was required because counsel appointed by St. Paul could influence the outcome of the coverage dispute and St. Paul controlled both sides of the litigation. The Court of Appeal concluded that because Centex failed to establish a triable issue of material fact regarding these assertions, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "Centex Homes v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The underlying action was initiated by homeowners from two residential developments in Rocklin against appellants Centex Homes and Centex Real Estate Corporation (Centex) for alleged defects to their homes. Centex and cross-defendant and respondent St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company (St. Paul) have a history of insurance coverage disputes. St. Paul was an insurer for subcontractor Ad Land Venture (Ad Land), and agreed to defend Centex as an additional insured subject to a reservation of rights. Centex filed a cross-complaint against its subcontractors and St. Paul that sought, as the seventh cause of action, a declaration that Centex was entitled to independent counsel under Civil Code section 28601 because St. Paul’s reservation of rights created significant conflicts of interest. Centex appealed after the trial court granted St. Paul’s motion for summary adjudication of Centex’s seventh cause of action. Centex argued any possible or potential conflict was legally sufficient to require St. Paul to provide independent counsel. The Court of Appeal disagreed. Alternatively, Centex contended independent counsel was required because counsel appointed by St. Paul could influence the outcome of the coverage dispute and St. Paul controlled both sides of the litigation. The Court of Appeal concluded that because Centex failed to establish a triable issue of material fact regarding these assertions, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "Centex Homes v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co." on Justia Law