Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves Lizbeth Balderas, a former employee of Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc., who filed a complaint for civil penalties under the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) on behalf of herself and 500 other current and former employees. Balderas alleged that Fresh Start violated labor laws by not providing required meal and rest breaks, providing inaccurate wage statements, making untimely wage payments, and failing to pay wages at termination. Balderas did not file an individual claim but proceeded solely under PAGA, representing all aggrieved employees.The trial court struck Balderas's complaint, ruling that she lacked standing to bring a representative PAGA action on behalf of other employees because she did not allege an individual claim in the action. The court relied on language from a United States Supreme Court decision that had incorrectly recited California law on PAGA standing.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Six reviewed the case. The court concluded that Balderas, as an alleged aggrieved employee who was subject to alleged Labor Code violations by Fresh Start, may bring a representative PAGA action on behalf of herself and other Fresh Start employees, even though she did not file an individual cause of action seeking individual relief for herself in this action. The court held that the trial court erred by relying on the United States Supreme Court decision, which was incorrect on PAGA standing requirements. The court reversed the order striking the pleading. View "Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2015, Joseph Semprini filed a lawsuit against his employer, Wedbush Securities, Inc., alleging 11 personal causes of action and seven class claims for alleged wage and hour violations. Semprini and Wedbush agreed that Semprini’s personal claims would be arbitrated, while the remaining claims would proceed in court. The class was certified in 2017, and the parties litigated Semprini’s class and Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) claims in court over the next several years. In 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana that an employer may enforce an employee’s agreement to arbitrate individual PAGA claims. Following this decision, Wedbush asked its workforce to sign arbitration agreements, and 24 class members, including the second named plaintiff, Bradley Swain, agreed to do so.The Superior Court of Orange County denied Wedbush’s motion to compel arbitration of the named plaintiffs’ individual PAGA claims and the claims of the 24 class members who signed arbitration agreements. The court found that Wedbush had waived its right to compel arbitration by entering into the 2015 stipulation.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that even if the Viking River decision or the 2022 arbitration agreements gave Wedbush a new right to move to compel certain claims to arbitration, Wedbush waited too long to make its motion, particularly in light of the looming trial date. The court found that Wedbush had waived its right to compel arbitration by waiting nine months after the Viking River decision and five to six months after select class members signed the new arbitration agreements to file its motion to compel arbitration. View "Semprini v. Wedbush Securities Inc." on Justia Law

Saide Lugo, a former employee of Pixior, LLC, filed a lawsuit against the company and some of its employees for malicious prosecution. Lugo alleged that Pixior falsely reported her to the police, leading to a criminal prosecution against her, which she ultimately defeated. The parties disagreed on the circumstances leading to the police report. Pixior claimed that Lugo, a disgruntled employee, deleted valuable computer files upon her resignation. Lugo, on the other hand, argued that Pixior fabricated charges against her to tarnish her reputation as she was about to assist Pixior's adversary in an impending dispute. Both parties agreed that Pixior reported Lugo to the police, leading to her arrest and subsequent charges, which were eventually dismissed after it was discovered that a Pixior employee had lied under oath.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially reviewed the case. Pixior filed a special motion to strike in response to Lugo's lawsuit, which the trial court denied. The court found that Pixior's motion satisfied the first step of anti-SLAPP analysis, determining that Lugo's lawsuit concerned protected activity. However, the court ruled against Pixior on the second step, which required Lugo to demonstrate a probability of success.The case was then reviewed by the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District. The appellate court disagreed with the lower court's decision on the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. The court found that Lugo failed to defeat Pixior's defense that the police conducted an independent investigation before the district attorney filed charges. The court ruled that this independent investigation was a superseding cause that insulated Pixior from liability. Therefore, the court reversed the lower court's decision, ruling in favor of Pixior and awarding costs to the appellants. View "Lugo v. Pixior, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between a married couple, identified as Br. C. and Be. C., who have three-year-old twins. The dispute centers around a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) that Br. C. obtained against Be. C. The DVRO was granted after several incidents of verbal and physical abuse, including Be. C. yelling at Br. C., throwing objects, and using derogatory language. The court also admitted into evidence three audio recordings of Be. C.'s abusive behavior, which Br. C. had made prior to filing for the DVRO.The Superior Court of Placer County granted the DVRO, which protects Br. C., their two children, and their two dogs from Be. C. for a three-year period. Be. C. appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting the three recordings into evidence and that substantial evidence does not support the DVRO.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District reviewed the case. Be. C. challenged the admissibility of the three audio recordings, arguing that he did not know he was being recorded at the time. The court found that the recordings were admissible under section 633.6, subdivision (b) of the Penal Code, which allows a victim of domestic violence to record a confidential communication if they reasonably believe it may contain evidence relevant to a restraining order. The court also found that substantial evidence of domestic violence supported the trial court's ruling. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the Superior Court of Placer County, upholding the DVRO against Be. C. View "Br. C. v. Be. C." on Justia Law

The case involves Clifford Alan Dilbert, who filed petitions for clemency and/or commutation of his prison sentence with the Governor's office in 2016, 2017, 2019, and 2021. Dilbert claimed that he had not received any communication from the Governor's office regarding the processing of his clemency petition. He sought a writ of mandate to compel Governor Gavin Newsom to process his applications and reapplications for clemency/commutation, render a decision on those applications, and notify him of the decision in a timely manner.The Superior Court of Sacramento County sustained the Governor’s demurrer to the petition without leave to amend. The court concluded that Dilbert does not have a due process right to have his applications processed within a particular time frame and the law imposes no duty to process clemency applications within a particular time frame. Dilbert appealed this decision.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court found that neither the California Constitution nor any provision of Penal Code sections 4800 to 4813 contains an express requirement that the Governor process clemency applications within a specified time frame. The court also rejected Dilbert's argument that the application instructions created an obligation for the Governor to grant discretionary clemency within a certain amount of time. The court concluded that Dilbert does not have a due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 7 of the California Constitution to have his application processed within a certain time frame. View "Dilbert v. Newsom" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between the City of Santa Cruz (City) and the County of Santa Cruz (County) over the interpretation of the City's claim presentation ordinance. The County sued the City for damages exceeding $1.2 million, alleging that the City's failure to maintain and manage a certain area led to emergency repairs. The County argued that it was not required to present a claim to the City before filing the lawsuit, as per the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.). The City, however, demurred, arguing that the County failed to present a claim directly to the City as required by the City’s claim presentation ordinance (Santa Cruz Mun. Code, § 1.14.010).The trial court sustained in part and overruled in part the City’s demurrer, rejecting the City's argument that the County was required to present a claim before filing the lawsuit. The court reasoned that the City’s ordinance applies to claims that are “not governed by” section 905 (Santa Cruz Mun. Code, § 1.14.010), and the County’s claim against the City is governed by section 905, which provides an exception to the claims presentation requirement for the County’s claim against the City.The City appealed, arguing that its ordinance, which applies to claims “not governed by” section 905, must be interpreted as applying to claims “excepted” from section 905. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District agreed with the City's interpretation. The court concluded that the trial court erred in determining that the County was not required to comply with the claim presentation ordinance before filing its lawsuit against the City. The court directed the trial court to vacate its demurrer order, to enter a new order sustaining the demurrer, and to decide in the first instance whether the County should be granted leave to amend. View "City of Santa Cruz v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Taylor C., who was declared a ward of the court at the age of 14. After his wardship ended, Taylor successfully moved to dismiss his wardship petitions under the Welfare and Institutions Code section 782. He then sought to seal his juvenile court records. However, the juvenile court denied his request, citing his prior adjudications for committing forcible lewd conduct, which made his records ineligible for sealing under section 781, subdivision (a)(1)(F). Taylor appealed, arguing that the dismissal of his wardship petitions erased the adjudication of his offenses as if they never existed.The lower court had granted Taylor's motion to dismiss his wardship petitions, finding that the interests of justice and Taylor's welfare warranted dismissal and that he was no longer in need of rehabilitation. However, it denied his motion to seal his juvenile court records, citing the prohibition in subdivision (a)(1)(F) of section 781 on sealing records relating to his forcible lewd conduct offenses.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the dismissal of a juvenile petition under section 782 does not obviate the prohibition on sealing records under section 781, subdivision (a)(1)(F) in cases involving certain delineated offenses. The court found that Taylor's records were ineligible for sealing because section 782, subdivision (e) provides that dismissal of a petition does not alone constitute a sealing of records and section 781, subdivision (a)(1)(F), precludes sealing due to the forcible lewd conduct offenses. View "In re Taylor C." on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Joseph Gazal, donated over $1 million to purchase a car and a home for a destitute family. He was inspired to make this donation after hearing a homily delivered by defendant Carlos Echeverry, a deacon at his church. Gazal brought a lawsuit against Echeverry and his wife, Jessica Echeverry, as well as SOFESA, Inc., a nonprofit founded and led by Jessica Echeverry. Gazal claimed he was deceived into believing the car and house would be purchased for and titled to the destitute family, when in fact they were bought and titled to SOFESA.The defendants filed a special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute, asserting that the homily and following conversations were protected speech. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the complaint did not rest on protected speech, but rather on private conduct and speech not directed at a wide public audience. Additionally, the court found that the causes of action arose from further communications that took place weeks after the homily.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that while the homily could be considered protected speech, the plaintiff's claims did not arise from the homily but rather from the alleged misconduct that occurred after its delivery. The court also found that the private discussions following the homily did not qualify for anti-SLAPP protection as they did not contribute to a public conversation on the issue of homelessness. Furthermore, the court denied a motion for sanctions filed by the plaintiff. View "Gazal v. Echeverry" on Justia Law

This case involves Stewart Johnston who was the defendant, cross-complainant, and appellant, against BTHHM Berkeley, LLC, PNG Berkeley, LLC, Michail Family 2004 Living Trust, Bianca Blesching, Scot Hawkins (collectively, BTHHM), and Holda Novelo and Landmark Real Estate Management, Inc. (collectively, Landmark). Johnston owned a property which he was to lease to BTHHM for a cannabis dispensary once permits were granted by the City of Berkeley. However, after the city approved the permit, Johnston refused to deliver possession of the property to BTHHM, leading to a lawsuit by BTHHM against Johnston.Following mediation, a two-page term sheet titled “Settlement Term Sheet Agreement” was signed by all parties. Johnston later wished to withdraw from the agreement. BTHHM and Landmark moved to enforce the term sheet pursuant to section 664.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which the court granted. Johnston failed to make the payments required by the enforcement orders. The court granted BTHHM's motion for entry of judgment, awarded prejudgment interest to BTHHM, entered judgment against Johnston, and dismissed his cross-complaint with prejudice.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four reversed the trial court’s award of prejudgment interest but otherwise affirmed the decision. The court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the term sheet’s language evinces the parties’ mutual agreement to settle the case according to its terms. However, the court concluded that the award of prejudgment interest was unauthorized as it differed materially from the terms of the parties’ agreement. View "BTHHM Berkeley, LLC v. Johnston" on Justia Law

In 2014, plaintiffs Medallion Film LLC and Pelican Point Capital Partners entered into a consulting fee agreement with Clarius Capital Group, managed by William Sadleir. The agreement stipulated that Medallion Film and Pelican Point would assist Clarius in obtaining funding for film projects, and Clarius would pay them a portion of any funding obtained. However, it is alleged that Sadleir dissolved Clarius and its affiliate and subsidiary entities in 2015 and formed a new set of corporate entities under the name Aviron with the assistance of the law firm Loeb & Loeb.The plaintiffs allege that Sadleir controlled both the Clarius and Aviron entities and transferred Clarius’s assets to the Aviron entities. Aviron later obtained a loan for its film projects from BlackRock, which Medallion Film and Pelican Point claim they were entitled to a portion of under their agreement with Clarius. However, Sadleir denied any affiliation between Aviron and Clarius and said he was solely an employee of Aviron.The plaintiffs sued Loeb & Loeb in December 2021, alleging causes of action for fraudulent misrepresentation, deceit by concealment, negligent misrepresentation, aiding and abetting fraud, and violating California Business and Professions Code section 17200. Loeb & Loeb filed a special motion to strike the first amended complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation under section 425.16. The trial court granted the special motion to strike.However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight vacated the judgment, reversed the order granting the special motion to strike, and remanded with directions to enter a new order denying the motion. View "Medallion Film LLC v. Loeb & Loeb LLP" on Justia Law